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Abstract 
 
 
 
During more than three decades, corporate non-financial and sustainability reporting has 
been widely conceived as a voluntary practice, a matter of going beyond the requirements of the 
law. Therefore, it has been traditionally overlooked by legal and socio-legal scholars. However, 
during the last decade things have rapidly changed. We are currently witnessing the emergence of a 
mix of mandatory and voluntary regulatory approaches to Corporate Sustainability Accounting 
(CSA) and the integration of some elements of non-financial reporting into accounting standards. 
What explains these changes in CSA regulation within the EU arena, at different levels of 
regulation and through varying modes of governance? More specifically, which political and socio-
economic actors are driving the current emergence of CSA regulation? What are their interests? 
How are these different actors organizing and mobilizing themselves? How and why do they 
succeed in creating regulatory changes? 
This research has been based on three main sources of data: documents analysis; literature 
review; in-depth élite interviews (26). It has also been strengthened by a participant observation of 
five months at the EU Commission, collaborating to the legal drafting and Impact Assessment of 
the new EU directive on non-financial reporting. The criteria for designing the fieldwork have been 
based on the idea of mapping the position of six groups of actors interested in shaping the 
emergence of CSA regulation. The groups of actors considered are: managers of large corporations; 
organized labour; civil society and NGOs; institutional investors; public authorities; and 
professional experts (accountants; financial analysts; lawyers). The analytical framework deployed 
by this study is a Bourdieusian reflexive socio-legal approach (see Madsen and Dezalay 2002; 
Madsen 2011), used as an over-arching research strategy in conjunction with the existing literature 
(see Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Graz 2006; Crouch 2011; Streeck 2011). 
The study claims that the struggles for regulating CSA should be seen as a lens for analyzing 
broader changes in the field of European corporate governance regulation and in the relation 
between business and society. A main finding of the Doctoral Thesis, something that has been 
argued for throughout the study, is that the accounting field has developed a historically specific 
relation of structural homology with the economic field. Therefore, Chapter 3 argues that the 
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emergence of ‘social accounting’ regulation, in the 1970s, mirrored contemporaneous debates about 
‘industrial democracy’. Similarly, the ‘financialisation’ of the 1990s and 2000s has mirrored the 
structuration of accounting standards narrowly focused only on financial information. Today, the 
emergence of ‘sustainability accounting’ regulation in Europe reflects and constructs the political 
attempt to build a regime of capital accumulation aimed at creating longer-term and ‘sustainable’ 
growth. 
More specifically, drawing on interviews with key informants and documents analysis, the 
study argues that financial turbulences and corporate scandals at the beginning of the 2000s fostered 
the inception of a European ‘transparency coalition’ (see Gourevitch and Shinn 2005) led by 
investors and including NGOs and part of the trade unions, which drove a series of reforms in the 
areas of corporate governance and corporate responsibility. The 2008 financial crisis worked as a 
catalyst for strengthening this regulatory trend and for fostering a stronger role of the state in its 
regulatory role. Therefore, we are also witnessing the integration of corporate sustainability in 
company law and corporate governance regulation and the convergence of financial and non-
financial aspects in the regulation of corporate reporting. However, it is too early to say whether this 
coalition will overcome the opposition of managers, who favour a voluntary approach and are 
lobbying against mandatory non-financial reporting. The study also questions the potential of the 
‘transparency coalition’ to build a new regime of governance of the economy, not just corporate 
governance.  
 The dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces objectives, questions and key 
concepts. It contains a preliminary conceptualization of the field of research and the research 
questions. Chapter 2 has been focused on the critical review of the literature and of existing 
explanations of the emergence of CSA regulation. Furthermore, it presents the socio-legal reflexive 
methodological and epistemological approach that has been adopted to explain the emergence of 
this new multi-level regulatory framework. In Chapter 3, the reader can find a summary of the long-
term development of non-financial reporting during over four decades, starting from the 1970s’ (see 
also Annex I). Chapters 4 and 5 narrow down the empirical research, focusing on a more limited 
periodisation (mid-1990s to 2011) and on the case study of the struggles for shaping an EU-level 
regulatory framework for non-financial reporting. The aim of Chapter 4 and 5 has been to 
empirically strengthen the broader analysis outlined in Chapter 3, on the basis of the data collected 
during the fieldwork. Chapter 6 concludes summarising the key arguments and offering some 
reflections on future researches. 
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1. An idea whose time has come.  
Introducing objectives, questions and key concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is one thing stronger than all the armies in the world, and that is an idea whose time 
has come. 
Victor Hugo (1877) “The History of a Crime”, Conclusion Chapter X 
 
Make no mistake: a new world order is emerging. The race for leadership has already 
begun. For the winners, the rewards are clear: Innovation and investment in clean energy 
technology will stimulate green growth; it will create jobs; it will bring greater energy 
independence and national security. 
           Josef Ackermann (2010) CEO of Deutsche Bank  
 
I used to dismiss Integrated Reporting as just another little fad. But after researching the 
subject more thoroughly I believe it is an idea whose time has come. The aim of the 
Integrated Reporting movement is one that is close to my heart: the holy grail of producing 
leaner, more meaningful reports that give a comprehensive view of the organization and 
concentrate on the main reporting areas investors and other stakeholders really want to 
know about – the company’s strategy and how it’s working. 
Mark Spofforth (2012) President IECAEW  
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1.1 Introduction. The emerging regulation of corporate non-financial reporting 
 
The object of this study is the struggles for regulating the corporate practice of accounting 
for non-financial information. This is a business practice which has been variously defined over 
time as ‘Corporate Sustainability Accounting’ (CSA); Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) disclosure; Non-Financial Reporting (NFR); social and environmental reporting
1
 and whose 
regulation has progressively emerged at different levels and through varying modes of governance. 
The research empirically focuses on the EU-level of regulation as an intersection where both 
national lawmaking and global norm-making processes are confronted and negotiated (see 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Madsen 2006; Halliday 2009; Zumbansen 2011). Although the study 
(Chapter 3) presents a summary review of over four decades of struggles for the regulation of this 
social practice, it empirically focuses on the decade 2001-2011 (Chapters 4 and 5).  
The global financial crisis and recent corporate scandals have worked as a catalyst for reviving the 
debate on the regulation of transnational corporations (TNCs). Among other aspects, it has put into 
question whether accounting standards should be revised to include non-financial disclosure, such 
as Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) information. Indeed, during the last decade, a 
growing number of large companies voluntarily decided to engage in non-financial or sustainability 
                                                          
1
 As we shall see in the following chapters, the definition of this social practice is still ambiguous and 
contentious. According to a recent report by KPMG and others (2013: 84), “A sustainability report is an 
organizational report that gives information about economic, environmental, social and governance 
performance and impacts.” EU regulators often preferred the term ‘non-financial reporting’ (NFR) to others 
such as ‘ESG reporting’, ‘sustainability reporting’ or ‘social and environmental reporting’. See for instance 
the Single Market Act (Commission 2011a); the 2011 CSR Communication (Commission 2011b); the 2012 
Corporate Governance Action Plan (Commission 2012a) and the current EC proposal on disclosure of non-
financial information by companies (Commission 2013). However, this study prefers to adopt the concept of 
Corporate Sustainability Accounting (CSA) (Zadek et al. 1997; Lamberton 2005; Unerman et al. 2007; Tilt 
2007; Cooper 2010). First of all, because it clearly anchors this business practice within the accounting field, 
therefore implicitly overcoming the idea that it is something distinct from traditional financial accounting. 
Furthermore, it stresses the link with the key problem of governing externalities (sustainability) and calls 
companies accountable for their complicity in an untenable model based on consumerism and unlimited 
growth. More specifically, this study purposely avoided the broad definition of NFR, arguing that the latter is 
only apparently neutral. In effect, it runs the risk of re-producing an harmful and arbitrary distinction 
between ‘financial’ and ‘non-financial’ which has increasingly characterised not only the sphere of 
accounting but, more generally, the economic field. Practically, such distinction would exclude or 
marginalise social and environmental aspects from financially-relevant aspects of economic life. More 
details on this choice have been provided in section 2.3. Overall, the concept of CSA is based on the idea of 
‘triple bottom line’ reporting (see Elkington 1997). It typically concerns the practice of formally disclosing 
information about social, environmental and governance (ESG) aspects of corporate performances. For the 
scope of this study, however, CSA and other concepts such as NFR; ESG reporting; social and 
environmental accounting; sustainability reporting; integrating reporting; etc. are largely interchangeable, 
although it takes into consideration the fact that different definitions are historically rooted and part of the 
game that the different actors play to shape changes in the accounting field. 
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reporting. However, in absolute terms, the number of companies reporting is still rather modest
2
 and 
various studies revealed that their quality and accuracy is mixed (see Henriques 2010; UNCTAD 
2010; Van Wensen et al. 2011; SOMO 2013). Therefore, practitioners, academics and policy-
makers are debating the merits and challenges of adopting a new regulatory framework. This should 
take into consideration vital interdependencies between economic, social and environmental 
aspects, reflecting the appearance of increasingly complex corporations, and address critical 
disclosure gaps in existing standards.   
The rationale for this research is relatively straightforward: the study questions what 
explains changes in the European regulation of social and environmental disclosure over time. In 
fact, during the 1970s, there used to be a lively debate concerning the regulation of corporate social 
accounting and auditing. At the beginning of the 1980s, this debate suddenly came to an end. As a 
consequence, for over two decades non-financial disclosure was widely conceived as a voluntary 
practice, a matter of going beyond the requirements of the law (Unerman et al. 2007; Gray et al. 
2009; Gray 2010a) and legal and socio-legal scholars largely overlooked the issue. However, since 
the end of the 1990s things have changed again. There has been an ongoing process of definition of 
what sustainability reporting means and of the contents and modes of its regulation. A ‘smart mix’ 
of mandatory and voluntary regulatory approaches has emerged, requiring large corporations to 
disclose more and better environmental, social and governance (ESG) information. There are ever-
growing political, market and social pressures on large corporations to become more transparent 
with respect to their sustainability policies, use of resources and impact on society. As it has been 
pointed, for large companies, reporting has become “the norm, rather than the exception.” (KPMG 
2008: 4) More recently, it has been often claimed that sustainability reporting is an idea or a 
concept whose time has come
3
. Even the SG of the UN, Ban Ki Moon, said on 16 February 2012 
that the time has arrived for sustainability reporting (Ban 2012). 
                                                          
2
 According to the data provided by corporate.register.org, it is possible to estimate that the total number of 
EU large companies disclosing non-financial information through the Annual Report or a stand-alone report 
on a yearly basis amounts to circa 2500. While this number represents a consistent and remarkable increase 
as compared to the recent past, it also tells that over 90% of European large companies do not disclose such 
information on a regular basis, considering the number of large companies at circa 42 000 (see Commission 
2013: 10) 
3
A part from Spofforth’s interview (2012), which has been quoted at the very beginning of this chapter, this 
attitude of new confidence in the success of sustainability reporting, after decades of marginalisation, is 
mirrored in work of Eccles and Krzus (2010). However, perhaps the best example of this confidence can be 
found in the latest public speeches of Mervyn King. King is a South African judge, well known as the long-
term Chairman of the GRI and the main architect of South Africa’s corporate governance codes (King I, II 
and III). During the last two decades, he has been one of the most influential institutional entrepreneurs of 
CSA’s global expansion. In his keynote address at the 2012 Australian GRI Conference he stated: 
“Integrated thinking involves identifying and prioritising short, medium and long term sustainability risks 
and opportunities and their impact on the business of the company. [...] The era of short term capitalism has 
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This growing support for CSA has resulted in a number of global regulatory initiatives for 
the disclosure of ESG information, including the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); the UN Global 
Compact (UN GC); the ISO 26000 and, more recently, the attempt to develop a global framework 
for integrated reporting by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC)
 4
. In 2010, a 
survey of the practice of sustainability disclosure, limited only to 32 countries around the world, 
already detected 142 country standards and/or laws with some form of ESG-related disclosure 
requirements or guidance (KPMG et al. 2010). In 2013, a new survey, extended to 45 countries, 
revealed that this number increased to 180 standards and/or laws (KPMG et al. 2013). In general, 
there is a renewed activism of the state in its regulatory role. In 2010, 62% of the regulatory 
initiatives could be classified as mandatory and 32% as voluntary (KPMG et al. 2010). The 2013 
survey shows that this proportion has further shifted in favour of mandatory reporting. Currently, 
over two thirds (72%) of the initiatives can be classified as mandatory and less than one third (28%) 
as voluntary (KPMG et al. 2013)
5
.  
At the EU-level, the 2003 Modernisation Directive first introduced in the EU Law a 
requirement on all companies to include "to the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
company's development performance or position” in their annual report “both financial and, where 
appropriate, non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including 
information relating to environmental and employee matters"
6
. Since then, several Member States 
have already introduced requirements that go beyond the existing EU legislation (see Annex I). The 
2011 Single Market Act (SMA) first announced that this obligation would be further expanded. 
Eventually, in April 2013, the EU Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a new directive 
enhancing the transparency of certain large companies on social and environmental matters. The 
legislative proposal is currently under discussion at the European Parliament. Outside the EU, 
similar regulatory initiatives have been recently undertaken by many states, including China, Brazil 
the US, India and South Africa
7
. Together with this new regulatory momentum, a whole corporate 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
come to an end and the world is moving to sustainable capitalism. [...] The revolution of integrated thinking 
has been completed. The corporate bastille has been stormed. The evolution is only in the form of an 
integrated report. [...] Integrated reporting is a concept whose time has come.” (King 2012) 
4
 More details have been provided in Chapter 3 and Annex I. 
5
 This data are even more significant if we consider that a very first survey, in 2006, which considered only 
19 countries/regions had found only 60 regulatory initiatives, of which 35 (58%) could be considered as 
mandatory and 25 (42%) as voluntary (see KPMG et al. 2013: 9). 
6
 See Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,18 June 2003, amending 
Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts 
of certain types of companies, banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, It can be 
retrieved at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:178:0016:0022:EN:PDF  
7
 In the US, SEC issued the "Guidance Regarding Disclosure related to Climate Change" in 2010, requiring 
listed companies to disclose material climate change-related risks. In China, since 2008 all Chinese State–
owned enterprises should establish a CSR information reporting system, on the basis of the Guidelines on 
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sustainability industry is rapidly expanding, which includes rating agencies, financial analysts, 
accountants and management consultants dedicated to corporate sustainability. Furthermore, the UN 
Guidelines on business and human rights, elaborated by the Special Representative Prof. John 
Ruggie and strongly supported by the EU, have attracted much attention on large undertakings’ 
responsibility for respecting human rights (see FIDH 2010; Mares 2011). As transparency and due 
diligence mechanisms play a crucial role in the Guidelines, they have boosted the momentum for 
including human rights in the emerging global and EU regulation of CSA
8
. NGOs, such as the 
European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), and organised civil society have increased their 
campaign activities to demand the Commission and the European Parliament as well as national 
regulators to include mandatory disclosure of information about business respect of fundamental 
rights and labour standards in the annual report. 
Despite mounting interest in CSA, what is often absent from the current debate is sustained 
attention to changes in its regulation. As we shall see in Chapter 2, most of the existing explanations 
of CSA explosion tend to take changes in the regulation of CSA for granted, either as an 
independent variable or as the mere result of power asymmetries. Furthermore, they are 
overwhelmingly based on under-developed legitimacy theory perspectives. While the latter provide 
plausible explanations for managers’ willingness to engage in sustainability reporting practices, 
they appear inadequate to explain the broader shift towards mandatory disclosure. In particular, 
legitimacy theory needs to be integrated and re-considered within broader social and political 
theoretical frameworks. Finally, most of the literature does not pay enough attention to the 
distinctive transnational character of the current emergence of CSA regulation. The next section 
will elaborate on the innovative contributions to knowledge of this socio-legal analysis.   
 
1.2 Situating the study 
 
The study looks at corporate sustainability accounting (CSA) regulation both as an object of 
analysis in its own right and as a lens for examining broader changes in transnational corporate 
regulation and governance, in the context of an increasingly globalised economy. It implies a broad 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities issued by SASAC. In India, since 2011 the Security Exchange 
Board (SEBI) requires listed entities to submit a Business Responsibility Report as part of their Annual 
Report, http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/home/list/4/23/0/0/Press-Releases. In South Africa, since 2010, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) requires that all listed companies produce an integrated report, on a 
"report or explain" basis https://www.saica.co.za/tabid/695/itemid/2344/language/en-ZA/An 
integratedreport-is-a-new-requirement-for-list.aspx. 
8
 See, in particular, Principles 3 and 21 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN 
HRC 2011). 
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definition of ‘regulation’ as “all forms of formal and informal rule making pertaining to some 
collective (nations, groups, sectors) where those rules are either binding to the members of that 
collective or at least significantly constrain their behaviour. This involves both public and private 
(self-)regulation [...].” (van Appeldorn et al. 2007: 5)  
This research presents three innovative aspects compared to the existing literature.  
First of all, the study explicitly takes regulation as its main explanandum. Analysing the literature 
on corporate sustainability accounting (see section 2.2), regulation tends to be taken for granted, 
either as an independent variable – an “apolitical realm, an autonomous force that, as such, needs no 
further explanation” (van Apeldoorn and al. 2007: 8) – or as the mere result of conflicts and power 
asymmetries among different interest groups and constituencies. On the contrary, the study takes a 
position that equally differs from the legal instrumentalism of most activists-scholars as well as 
from the legal formalism of those who tend to present legal norms and prescriptions as ‘neutral 
public goods’ (see Bourdieu 1986). Objectivising CSA regulation, it “calls for somehow 
establishing the object of enquiry beyond these stakes and interests, yet in a way that allows them to 
be taken seriously as part of the object of enquiry [...].” (Dezelay and Madsen 2012: 437). 
Therefore, adopting a reflexive sociological approach, the researcher will attempt to avoid to be 
trapped in the symbolic discourses that characterise this subject-area – business ‘responsibility’; 
‘sustainability’; ‘accountability’ – particularly because the actors involved in CSA tend to rely on 
academic or quasi-academic resources for legitimising their positions. 
Secondly, the study takes a long-term historical view at the emergence of non-financial 
disclosure regulation. It draws on Bourdieu’s suggestion of “restoring economics to its true function 
as a historical science” (Bourdieu 1997), as an antidote to the excessive use of the notion of 
economic rationality (Boyer 2003: 67). Notably, the research anchors this practice within the long-
standing debate about corporate governance regulation (CGR) in the broader sense
9
, seen as the 
problem of the 'architecture of accountability' (Parkinson 2006) of large corporations (Berle and 
Means 1932).  This historical approach has been practically realised through an empirical research 
that has followed the establishment of CSA regulation over time as a social and historical 
                                                          
9
 Many definitions of corporate governance exist, reflecting the different development of business over time 
in various social and politico-economic realities. As a consequence any narrow and normative definition of 
corporate governance result rather problematic (see for instance the law and economics approach adopted by 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and should be adjusted to the context. For the scope of this research, I can refer to 
Aoki, who defines corporate governance as “the structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties 
with a stake in the firm” (Aoki, 2000: 11). Van Apeldoorn et al (2007: 4) broadly defined it as “the way the 
modern capitalist corporation is ‘governed’, that is, by whom (the issue of corporate control) and for whom, 
to which purpose. As such, it refers to the institutionalised practices that are both the medium and the 
outcome of the power relations between the various actors that have a stake in the modern corporation [...].” 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005: 3) synthetically defined it “the authority structure of a firm” that “decides who 
has claim to the cash flow of the firm, who has a say in its strategy and its allocation of resources.” 
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construction and constantly questions how it came about, identifying  the key points of conflict and 
transformation and how this subject-area has emerged as a new field of regulation.  
Lastly, most of the literature on sustainability reporting regulation focuses either on single 
regulatory initiatives
10
 or national legal frameworks
11
. Comparative studies
12
 are scarce and, even 
rarer are studies that provide a comprehensive picture of this rising regulatory regime
13
. Instead, this 
research explicitly recognises that current changes in the regulation of CSA require an integrated 
multilevel analysis
14
. Although empirically limited to EU-level initiatives, it underlines that, as 
business increasingly operates on a transnational scale, also business regulation and particularly 
accounting standards
15
 are required to operate across interacting arenas and levels of governance 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Zumbansen 2011; Picciotto 2011). Adopting this perspective, the 
EU regulatory level becomes a privileged point of observation from which it is possible to explore 
not only the relation between national law-making and global norm-making but, crucially, also 
between law and non-law. This is not to claim that national and local legal-regulatory structures 
have become anyhow less relevant. It is rather to affirm that there is much to learn on the 
transformations of the corporate regulatory landscape adopting a distinctly transnational 
perspective.  
The framework deployed by this study to explain the re-emergence of CSA regulation in 
Europe is drawing on a Bourdieusian reflexive socio-legal approach (see section 2.3). More 
specifically, it has benefited from Prof. Mikael Rask Madsen’s outline of a reflexive sociology of 
the internationalization of law and attempted to further develop it (Bourdieu 1986; Madsen and 
Dezalay 2002; Madsen 2006; Madsen 2011). However, rather than a Bourdieusian study of CSA 
regulation, ‘reflexivity’ has been used as an over-arching research strategy in conjunction with 
existing studies of Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR); Corporate Sustainability and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (in particular Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Crouch 2006, 
2009 and 2011; Graz 2006; Streeck 2011; Paterson 2009; Koch 2011)
16
.  
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 See, for instance, Levy et al (2010); Brown et al. (2007) on the case of the Global Reporting Initiative 
framework for sustainability reporting. 
11
 For instance see the work of Karin Buhmann (2010) who uses a socio-legal approach to explain the case 
for the 2008 Danish Law; see Prof. Charlotte Villiers’ (2006 and 2012) work on the emergence of narrative 
reporting in the UK under the Company Act 2006.   
12
See Unerman et al. (2007). 
13
See KPMG et al. (2010) and KPMG et al. (2013) for a broad review. 
14
For instance, the 2008 Danish law on social and environmental disclosure is a piece of national legislation 
which encourage but not oblige large business entities to disclose non-financial information on the basis of a 
number of generally accepted international frameworks, including private ones such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). 
15
For a critical introduction see Dewing and Russell (2007). 
16
 This is consistent with Bourdieu’s own idea that his contribution should not been perceived as a ‘grand 
sociological theory’ but adapted, modified and practically employed for empirical sociological enquires. 
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Overall, in order to tackle questions of  transnational corporate accountability and law, 
seemingly disparate research and policy agendas need to be better connected, especially with regard 
to the relation between law and new institutional economics (NIE)
17
; law and political economy and 
law and governance studies (see section 2.2). Working on this perspective, the study explores the 
giant corporation 'architecture of accountability' neither as a sub-set of state determinations; nor as a 
one-dimensional, 'under-socialised' and 'de-politicised' nexus of contracts but as a socially 
embedded yet relatively autonomous 'field of practice'
18
.  
Although questions of ‘transnational corporate law’ lie at the bottom of much of the present 
literature on ‘post-regulatory law’ and global governance, it should be underlined that mainstream 
legal studies are still uncomfortable with the paradigm shift ‘from government to governance’. In 
fact, some of the key contributions to this area of research come from fields other than 
Jurisprudence – such as Political Science; Geography; Regulatory Studies. Sociology of Law, 
instead, appears at the forefront of the current debate about corporate governance regulation and 
CSR and it is well equipped to address this inter-disciplinary subject-area. In fact, some prominent 
socio-legal scholars have already offered a variety of ground-breaking analyses
19
. As Zumbansen 
(2009: 13) wrote, this enquire about transnational law and corporate governance would revisit “the 
core question of any Sociology of Law, namely to investigate the correlation between law and other 
spheres of culture.
” 20
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 While scholars in the different variations of new institutional economics (NIE) and behavioural economics 
provide for fundamental insights into “the sticky nature of institutions and mindsets that shape economic 
development, there has been relatively little attention given to the evolving forms and instruments of legal 
regulation.” (Zumbansen 2009: 9) Where a more engaged dialogue has been initiated, important insights 
have been gained with regard to the relevance of social norms, routines, practices and networks that shape 
economic relations and developments. See Posner (2000), Law and Social Norm; Scott (2007), Hoffmann v. 
Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance. 
18
See Bourdieu (2000), Les structures sociales de l'economie. In particular, the included post-scriptum Du 
champ national au champ international. 
19
 See on this issue, in particular, the recent excellent works of three socio-legal authors as different as 
Doreen McBarnet (2007); Sol Picciotto (2011); Ronen Shamir (2013). 
20
 See early socio-legal works by Ehrlich (‘living law’) and Gurvitch (‘social law’) as well as more recent 
works from different perspectives, including Teubner (1992): The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal 
Pluralism; Sousa Santos (1987): Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Postmodern Conception of Law; 
Galanter (1981): Justice in many rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law; and Moore (1973): 
Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study. 
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1.3 Research questions and conceptualisations 
 
On the basis of the preliminary issues discussed in the previous sections, it is possible to 
formulate the following central research question
21
:  
 
What explains the emergence of Corporate Sustainability Accounting (CSA) within the EU 
regulatory arena, at different levels of regulation and through varying modes of governance?  
 
This central question gives rise to three sets of sub-questions: 
 
a) What is the content of the changes in CSA regulation taking place in the EU regulatory 
arena?  
b) How and through which modes of regulation do these changes take place?  
c) What explains these changes in both the form and content of CSA regulation? 
 
In order to start developing answers for each of the above mentioned questions, I started 
with elaborating a preliminary ‘map’ of the field of accounting regulation, drawing on the 
comprehensive topology developed by Graz (2006) in its analysis of international standardisation 
and corporate democracy. The aim has been to locate CSA regulation in the established regulatory 
debate about accounting standards and corporate governance and to organise a number of 
conceptual options in order to build a set of preliminary hypotheses. Rather than the classic 
public/private, or state/market divide, I would suggest that we should look at a rift confronting the 
advocates of legally binding standards for corporate social accountability (that is, bringing 
standard-setting bodies into the universal legal domain), and advocates of a set of technical extra-
financial accounting standards (minimal sectoral and market-based standards, universally 
recognised). In the context of this study, I will argue that this tension can be potentially creative of a 
new regime of “economic governance—not just corporate governance, though it has implications 
for that, but also governance of the economy and even of society at large.” (Maclean and Crouch 
2012: 1) To consider CSA regulation in this way renders it explicitly political, and one of the most 
advanced examples of the mix of voluntary and mandatory strategies that attempts to gradually 
integrate the two poles of economic accounting and corporate social accountability. 
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 The research questions have been elaborated drawing on the research questions outlined by Overbeek et al. 
(2007) in their study of recent changes in European corporate governance regulation. 
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Graz identifies four dimensions which have been represented in two Cartesian spaces in the 
following sections. For the scope of this study, the first grid (Fig. 1.1) has been used to map 
changes in the content of corporate accounting standards. The first two dimensions shed light on 
who defines standards, along an institutional continuum extending from markets-driven 
standardisation to the public law realm of regulatory policies. The other two dimensions involve 
what can be expected to be standardised, along a material continuum stretching from physical and 
invariable measures (tangible) to historically-bound societal values (intangibles). The second grid 
elaborated by Graz, instead, has been adapted to map out changes in their mode of corporate 
accounting standards (Fig. 1.2). It concerns differentiated processes of standardisation that emerge 
once an agreement has been reached on the definition and content of standards. Namely, it provides 
further explanation on how and (from) where accounting standards can eventually be recognised 
and implemented. 
 
A. Conceptualising changes in the content of ESG regulation. What is the content of 
current changes in CSA regulation? 
The starting point of this research is that groups of actors are engaged in coalitions and 
conflicts to shape a certain regulatory outcome (see Braithwaite and Drahos 2000)
22
. The strategy to 
address this question has been rather classic, focusing on the definition of three key aspects: the 
players, the space and the relations within the space or field (see also Graz 2010). Therefore, I have 
first identified the main groups of actors interested in shaping CSA regulation. Secondly, I have 
used Graz topology to explore the accounting field. Lastly, I have attempted to further analyse their 
dynamic relations amongst the key groups, drawing on Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) ‘coalitional’ 
approach to corporate governance regulation. Through this approach I have highlighted how the 
different actors organise and mobilise themselves in relation with changes in accounting regulation.   
As regards the main groups of actors interested in shaping CSA regulation, I have chosen to 
rely on the very categories that the European Commission has elaborated throughout a decade-long 
process of consultations and dialogue with stakeholders on this issue
23
. Therefore, I identified six 
broad groups of actors that, during the last decade, have been present and active in the European 
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 While this dynamic is common even to private and hybrid regulatory initiatives, it is more explicit at the 
EU-level than elsewhere. In fact, the latter is organised in a way that has to formally take into consideration 
the instances of all the main stakeholder groups involved. 
23
 See, in particular, the EC Workshops on non-financial disclosure (2009-2010) but also the public 
consultation on the EU Green Paper on CSR (2001) and the EU Multi-Stakeholders Forum (EMF) on CSR.  
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process of CSA regulation
24
. First of all, there are the preparers of corporate sustainability reports, 
typically financial and non-financial large corporations, generally represented by and organised into 
business associations, such as BusinessEurope at the EU-level. Afterwards, there are the users of 
such information, the main groups of actors that are interested in the content of such reports. Here 
the focus has been on four main groups: investors; organised labour and trade unions (TUs); civil 
society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); public authorities, particularly Member 
States; the EU institutions
25
 (the European Parliament; the European Council and the Commission) 
and intergovernmental organisations (e.g. UN; OECD). Lastly, I have identified a sixth group of 
actors made of professional experts (in particular, accountants; financial analysts; lawyers).  
Overall, this conceptualisation appears consistent with the existing literature on CSR and 
corporate governance (CG). It refers to the ‘trinity’ – capital, management, labour – that is central 
in most CG analyses (see Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Furthermore, it 
recognises the key role of professions in shaping global business regulation. Moreover, it 
acknowledges the rise of an active, transnational civil society (including NGOs; consumers and 
media). Lastly, the category of ‘public authorities’ represents the views of state actors (in the broad 
sense) themselves organised at different levels of regulation (international, European, national, 
regional) and holding relevant stakes of the market, through fully or partly publicly controlled 
enterprises. While the list of actors could have been improved and integrated, in order to give more 
space to e.g. consumers, SMEs or different types of investors, the rationale for choosing these 
groups of actors is related to the attempt of building a reflexive sociological approach (see section 
2.3). Therefore, rather than creating new categories, the challenge of this study has been to try to 
analyse the categorisation that are already widely used. 
The second challenging aspect that I had to address concerns the definition of the field, the 
social space where the regulation of CSA practices applies and where it can be studied. Drawing on 
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 It is worth to stress that, within each group, we can identify a ‘plurality’ of voices, interests and positions. 
Groups are more or less organised and structured through various modes of political (government and law), 
social (association, network, communities) and economic (market, organisations) governance (see Crouch 
2006) that allow them to operate not just at the European but at multiple levels. For instance, while TUs and 
large European companies are typically joined through associational national and international mechanisms 
of governance; investors and NGOs tend to be more freely organised through loose social and regulatory 
networks that allow them to operate across borders, on a transnational scale. While a detailed account of the 
specificities and heterogeneity of those different ‘constellations’ has been already developed elsewhere and 
cannot be discussed here (see Cafaggi 2005), it has been constantly taken into consideration through the 
research. 
25
 The role of the EU deserves some further comments. In the context of this study, its role is both crucial 
and ambivalent: it ultimately acts both as actor (public authority) and structure (regulatory arena). However, 
the object of this Doctoral Thesis is not primarily related with European studies. The EU is rather used as a 
political laboratory, from which it is possible to effectively assess broader changes in the regulation of non-
financial disclosure at different levels of regulation and through varying modes of governance. 
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Graz (2006) topology, I have conceptualised this space looking at the relation between who sets the 
standards and what is the content of such standards.  
As regards who defines standards, the continuum is between a ‘market-shaping’ approach, 
leaning towards a regulatory intervention of public authorities in the field of corporate 
accountability, and a ‘light touch’, ‘market-making’ approach, in which professional bodies and 
experts are setting the standards (on the difference between ‘market-shaping’ and ‘market-making’ 
approaches and its application to EU policies see Lucia Quaglia 2010). For the scope of this study, 
the two poles provide an indication of the degree of relative autonomy of the accounting field from 
external social and political control.  
As Graz (2006: 123) points out: “Market mechanisms and policy choices both affect the 
agents involved in the field, but they do so in various ways, which may be seen as located in an 
institutional continuum.” On the one hand, there are standards that belong more to the sphere of 
economic activity, governed by its own economic rationality and requiring companies to disclose 
only financially-relevant information. It has been from this ‘market angle’ that financial analysts, 
large mainstream investors or rating agencies are increasingly looking at some forms of ESG 
(Environmental, Social and Governance) disclosure. For instance, the German association of 
financial analysts (DVFA) has created in March 2008 a list of KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) 
for the integration of ESG into financial analyses. On the other hand, accounting standards can also 
be seen as belonging to the broader public sphere of political action, characterised by a different 
distributive rationality (Streeck 2011). For instance, public authorities might require firms to 
disclose environmental information on the basis of a precautionary principle or to disclose 
information about anti-bribery and corruption policies. It is from this other angle that some NGOs 
are demanding policy-makers to introduce mandatory, verifiable, legally binding rules for the 
disclosure of information about the respect of human rights in TNCs’ supply chains. Along this 
institutional continuum we can encounter a mix of business-driven and politically-driven initiatives 
involved in various processes of standardisation of sustainability reporting, with considerable 
variations across Europe. We can find private regulatory networks, such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative, which have created internationally accepted guidelines for sustainability reporting that 
have been subsequently amended on the basis of a consensus among its various public and private 
stakeholders. The adoptions of consortium standards enable a mix of procedural transparency and 
flexibility and might shorten the time necessary to reach an agreement over the content of the 
information to be disclosed. Consortia have become more inclusive, typically involving both users 
(NGOs, TUs, investors and public authorities) and issuers (companies) in the standard-setting 
process.  
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Figure 1.1 The field of research: changes in the content of accounting regulation. 
 
 
The other key dimension that defines the field of research (as represented in the Cartesian 
space above) concerns a material continuum delineating what can be standardised. According to 
Graz, this goes back to the relation between human beings and nature and ranges from natural and 
invariable physical measures (with ‘indisputable’ properties), to constructed and historically 
bounded societal values, which are always contestable. Graz notes that within the second category 
“we encounter a range of issues which have been relegated to the margins of the political agenda for 
perhaps too long.”  (2006: 125)  
The image of a continuum on the dimension of history/nature is a bit stretched and it is 
subject to occasional overlaps. In fact, the stages by which standardisation processes moved from 
one pole to the other are themselves historically determined and have much to do, in particular, with 
the emergence and triumph of modernity and scientific rationality
26
. However, without falling into a 
very common instrumentalist view of technology, this conceptualisation might be useful to the 
extent that we consider that the object of any business accounting standard inevitably blend physical 
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 One case in point is the ‘invention’ of the decimal metric system by French revolutionaries inspired by the 
pursuit of a truly universal, invariable and natural standard. 
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and social aspects. Applying this scheme to corporate accounting standards, a widely adopted 
distinction is between ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ assets. There is a plethora of definition of the 
latter, for instance the IAS 38, the International Accounting Standards treats them as non-monetary 
and without physical substance. Examples are computer software, patents and copyrights. However, 
as we shall see in section 2.3, there is no yet a universally accepted definition of what concepts like 
‘intangible’; ‘non-financials’ and ‘ESG’ information actually mean. They are defined in relation 
with the established area of financial disclosure. Financial-non-financial and tangible-intangible are 
too often considered as given and therefore taken for granted realities, while they have emerged as 
the result of an ongoing process of social and historical construction. Broadly speaking, one key 
difference between the two poles is that tangible assets can be more easily compared, responding to 
one of the key necessities of financial analysts.  
In defining the field of research, the originality of the study has been to try not to isolate 
CSA regulation from more traditional financial accounting standards, seen both as responding to 
crucial questions of corporate governance regulation. What is the purpose of the modern joint-stock 
corporation? How is it ‘governed’ and who controls it? To whom are TNCs accountable? On the 
basis of which aspects of their performance, large corporations should be accountable? Different 
answers to such questions would lead to changes in the content of Accounting Law and accounting 
standards and guidelines to include new aspects concerning non-financial performances and 
intangible assets. In particular, conceptualising changes in the content of CSA regulation, the 
research has been focused on the crucial divide financial/non-financial as defining the accounting 
field and its historically specific relation of structural homology with the economic field (see 
section 2.3). In Bourdieu’s terms, this division constitutes the nomos of this field of practice.  
The third challenge has been to highlight the power relations and conflicts among the 
various groups of actors that operate on the field, avoiding the kind of ‘flat’ and de-politicised 
analysis that often characterises CSR studies and stakeholder theories. Working on this perspective, 
the data collected in the fieldwork have been analysed on the basis some well-established 
conceptualisations elaborated by the literature on changes in corporate governance regulation 
(CGR)
27
. Drawing on a relatively recent strand of actor-centred institutionalist studies (see Aguilera 
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 There are a number of dichotomies in the CG literature that can be useful for our analysis, starting from 
the ‘classic’ distinction between owners control versus managerial control (see Berle and Means 1932; 
Burnham 1941). How the emergence of non-financial forms of accountability is reflected within the 
fiduciary relation between owners (principals) and directors (agents)? A further useful conceptualisation 
concerns the distinction between insiders’ (block-holders) versus outsiders’ (share-holders) control: how is 
the governance of corporate externalities related with their different approach towards company’s 
employees, suppliers, customers or finance providers? A third conceptualisation concerns the classic struggle 
that takes place between capital and labour. How mandatory social and environmental disclosure would 
affect this relation?   
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and Jackson 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005) might provide further insights to address power-
relations and conflicts among the six groups of actors mentioned above. In particular, Gourevitch 
and Shinn (2005) highlight the full range of coalitions that can feasibly emerge among capital, 
labour and managers. They propose a dynamic analysis of changes in the regulation corporate 
governance based on a coalitional approach, outlining in particular three possible cleavages and 
coalitions between the three groups of actors. As the result they identify several coalitions that have 
historically emerged, shaping the current variety of models of corporate governance. The ‘class 
coalition’ arises when interests of capital and management oppose the interests of labour. The 
‘corporatist coalition’ pits labour and management against owners. Finally, the ‘accountability’ or 
‘transparency coalition’ concerns the common interests of shareholders and labour vis-à-vis 
management.  
As we shall see, this coalitional approach has proved rather effective to anchor the 
emergence of CSA regulation within the long-standing debate about CGR and to analyse the 
accounting field as a field of struggles (see section 2.5). Specifically, the study hypothesises that the 
first emergence of ‘social accounting’ regulation, during the 1960s and 1970s, has been driven by a 
‘corporatist coalition’, while the current cycle of regulation is driven by a ‘transparency coalition’ 
which is challenging mangers’ unrestrained power. However, the study further built on and 
expanded Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) theorisation, adapting it to the social and historical 
evolution of CSA and adjusting the model to a broader definition of corporate governance, which 
includes also civil society (NGOs), public authorities and professionals (particularly accountants; 
lawyers and financial analysts).  
 
B. Conceptualising changes in the mode of CSA regulation. How and through which 
modes of regulation do these changes take place?  
The second grid (below), adapted from Graz (2006), describes the two dimensions on which 
global processes of standards recognition can be understood. In order to answer to the above 
research question, the study could make use of a number of conceptual options that have been 
developed in regulatory and governance studies, starting from the dichotomies private/public or 
national/supra-national regulation. However, as for most other dichotomies, in the cases of national 
versus supra-national or public versus private regulation, empirical developments tend to fall 
between these poles (see Overbeek et al. 2007).  
Changes in the mode of accounting regulation arise once a certain level of agreement has 
been reached as regards the definition and content of standards, a crucial step which sees financial 
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accounting in a much more advanced stage as compared to non-financial reporting. This second 
question concerns, in particular, the role of the law and the legal field in relation with the field of 
accounting. In fact, standardisation processes might differ according to the way standards’ 
conformity is (legally) recognised and executed. Therefore, considering changes in the mode of 
accounting standardisation we need to distinguish between standardisation per se (the definition of 
the content) and recognition of existing standards. The former is driven by the attempt to 
homogenise specifications across different jurisdictions while the latter allows for the acceptance of 
a plurality of standards or means of assessing conformity with them. As regards worldwide 
processes of standards recognition, Graz (2006:126) affirms that they can be understood on two 
dimensions: the organisational procedures involved in standards recognition and the territorial 
competence on which the assessment of conformity is predicated. 
As regards territorial competence, Nicolaidis and Egan note that “domestic regulators 
accept unprecedented transfers of regulatory sovereignty by recognising non-domestic standards as 
valid under their jurisdiction, whether they have taken part in their development (standardization) or 
not (recognition).” (2001: 455) This first continuum regards the distinction between exogenous and 
endogenous principles of standards recognition (see Fig 1.2). The ‘global recognition’ extreme 
corresponds to a scenario of ‘one market, one standard, one verification, globally accepted’. 
Theoretically this situation could be realised if an exogenous standard for disclosing such 
information would be accepted worldwide on a purely exogenous basis. Since the 1970s a similar 
aim has been pursued, as regards financial accounting, by a powerful private standard-setting body, 
the IASC (international Accounting Standards Council) (see Chapter 3). On the other extreme, 
‘national recognition’ corresponds to a scenario in which none of the various ways of assessing 
conformity to a certain standard were recognised on an international basis. In this case, firms would 
have to prepare different annual reports for each of the national jurisdictions in which they trade, in 
order to operate in that market.  
Dominant managerial and law-and-economics approaches to accounting regulation and 
corporate governance (CG) tend to take this ‘transfer of regulatory sovereignty’ for granted, as a 
merely technical and neutral aspect. However, critical accounting and CG studies have pointed out 
that the political and democratic implications of this regulatory shift have been widely neglected 
(see Dewing and Russell 2007). In general, this relevant transfer of sovereignty challenges the 
omnipresence of the state that characterised especially – but not only – European idea(s) of law as 
well as the conventional understanding of academic social sciences: political sciences; sociology; 
(macro-)economics and general history. Furthermore, this shift underpinned the normative 
implications of contemporary CSR perceived as non-law, meaning the existence of extra-legal 
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social constrains to corporate behaviour that had been often overshadowed by the prominence of 
national states. In fact, the latter “appeared to combine both a responsibility for externalities and 
other collective and public goals, and possession of the means to impose certain interpretations of 
these goals.” (Mclean and Crouch 2011: 5) 
 
Figure 1.2 The field of research: conceptualising changes in the mode of accounting regulation 
 
 
The other dimension of changes in the mode of accounting regulation concerns 
organisational procedures for recognition of conformity to an agreed standard, which can be 
located on a continuum with the public and private spheres at each extreme.  
In practice, on the contrary of financial accounting, this dimension of CSA frameworks has 
not seen much concrete developments yet. However, this is a crucial area of struggles in any 
standardisation process and periodically the hoary issue of verification arises in the CSA regulatory 
debate. In theory, this continuum might run across a wide range of organisational options. At the 
‘private sphere’ extreme, one might find declarations of conformity accepted as such (like the CE 
mark which can be found on packaging). At the opposite extreme there are auditing and inspection 
services that perform ‘third-party’ certifications, which might be themselves assessed by a public 
accreditation body. The latter are public agencies or bodies that extend formal recognition that a 
body or person is competent to carry out specific tasks of verification. In between the two poles, all 
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sorts of quality insurance arrangements; declarations of conformity; assessment schemes and 
mechanisms of private certification exist. 
 
C. What explains changes in both the form and content of CSA regulation? 
Overall, the crucial aspect when we address changes in the content and mode of CSA 
regulation is ‘trust’ in what Bourdieu (1997) called the well founded illusio of the economic field to 
autonomously operate for the public good.  
As Max Weber as well as other major authors, like Shumpeter and Sombart, already noted, 
accounting practices have been a crucial tool for the universalisation of (economic) rationality and 
calculability, which eventually led to the expansion of modern capitalist regimes and, during the last 
three decades of what has been defined as ‘world-capitalism’28. Building on this initial hint, the 
study develops the argument that the accounting field has progressively developed a historically 
specific relation with the economic field: there is structural homology between the two. That means, 
in Bourdieu’s terms, that there has been an identical structuration of two social spaces over time 
producing specific effects that he notably called ‘imposture légitime’, legitimate imposture. This 
idea is supported by some critical accounting studies, which have showed that accounting is not 
simply a decision-making aid that ‘reflects’ changes in the economic field. It plays a much more 
dialectic and ‘constructive’ role. It actively contributed to create economic realities, exerting what 
Bourdieu defines a symbolic power over the definition of what economic capital and value means 
(see section 2.3). That makes accounting a valuable resource to certain social actors wishing to 
promote a particular version of reality. On the basis of this literature, I will test whether the cyclical 
development of social and environmental reporting regulation can be explained in parallel with the 
broader ‘history’ of the relational struggles in the economic field for the control of corporate 
resources. In order to corroborate this hypothesis I will operate a preliminary scientific process of 
‘double historicisation’ (cf. Bourdieu  1996; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) of both the research 
object – the regulation of CSA in Europe – and the academic construction of this object – 
integrating the parallel academic fields of corporate governance regulation (financial disclosure) 
and corporate social accountability (non-financial disclosure).  
Hence, what is the specific relation between the fields of accounting and the economic field? 
What explains changes in CSA regulation, both in the mode and the content, over time?  
                                                          
28
 On the relation between ‘world capitalism’ regulation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) see, in 
particular, Shamir (2011). The author stresses that the ‘world-capitalism paradigm’ offers strong tools for 
theorizing the mechanisms of change that characterise the current CSR regulation and mediate between 
political agency and institutionalized regulatory outcomes. 
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The study hypothesises that changes in the European debate on CSA regulation should be 
contextualised as part of the underlying tension in the political-economic configuration of 
advanced-capitalist societies during the post-war period. More precisely, I will refer to the tension 
between what Wolfgang Streeck calls “popular ideas of social justice and economic insistence on 
market justice” (2011: 24). The author identifies four phases in this endemic conflict between 
capitalist markets and democratic politics, which characterised the post-war social formation that 
we call ‘democratic capitalism’29. This tension, he argues, arises from the fact that “under 
democratic capitalism, governments are theoretically required to honour both principles 
simultaneously, although substantively the two almost never align.” (2011: 7) However, I have re-
interpreted this tension using the ‘analytical lens’ developed by Pierre Bourdieu, starting from the 
ideas of capital(s); habitus; symbolic power; symbolic violence and the tension between different 
social fields (the economic field; the field of the state; the accounting field and the legal field). 
Adopting this perspective it appears clear that the rise of financial-only accounting standards have 
been instrumental in the autonomisation and financialisation of the economic field. 
During the 1960s and 1970s period of economic Keynesianism and corporatist employment 
relations, the economic field was largely under political control. In Europe, the very concept of 
‘corporate governance’ was seen as a sub-system of the state’s ‘governance of the economy’, a 
triangular partnership of co-ordinated industrial relations between employers-employees with 
governments playing a key role as the ‘social bargain’ facilitators. This model proved extremely 
successful in rising standards of living and warranted three decades of economic expansion: it was 
based on the Fordist principle that higher employees’ wages would benefit also the employers, 
because workers would be able to buy and consume more, making owners richer. However, this 
model of economic accumulation also had two major limitations. First of all, it is very resource-
intense: social peace is guaranteed by the attractive illusion of indefinite economic growth but 
actual resources are limited and unevenly distributed. Secondly, as Streeck (2011) points out, the 
collective rationale of democratic resources’ entitlement ultimately conflicts with the laws of 
economic rationality and efficiency based on marginal productivity.  
‘Democratic capitalism’ first entered a major crisis in the second half of the 1970s, when it 
appeared clear that wages’ automatic increase was creating very high levels of inflation. The 
reaction of Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies (LMEs) and more co-ordinated Continental 
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 He defines the latter as a political economy ruled by two conflicting principles, or regimes, of resources 
allocation: one operates according to marginal productivity (‘the free play of market forces’) and the other 
based on social need or entitlement (‘as certified by the collective choices of democratic politics’). 
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European economies (CMEs) to this first major crisis has been very different
30
. At the beginning 
and until the early 1980s, the collective bargain mechanism of Continental Europe seemed better 
equipped to face the crisis and keep inflation down. It is in this context that ideas of social 
accounting emerged, as one of the features of a new model of corporate governance based on ideas 
of ‘industrial democracy’. This possibility was considered also in the UK and the US, often 
presented as a way to ‘modernise’ Anglo-Saxon Company Law.  Social accounting was widely 
discussed in Parliaments and the French Parliament even passed a law, in 1977, making social 
reporting mandatory for all companies with more than 500 employees. The introduction of social 
and particularly employees-related aspects was seen as a ‘transformative’ device which would have 
valued other forms of capital and given much more power to trade unions. It was also a form of 
accounting that explicitly recognised the diminished role of shareholders, reduced to passive, 
bondholders and rentiers.  
However, except from France, in most of Western European jurisdictions the ‘momentum’ 
was lost. Trade unions were more interested in collective bargain than participating to corporate 
accountability and governance bodies. Therefore ideas of social accounting were abandoned and a 
system of financial-only accounting, based on global standards elaborated by professional 
accountants, became the ‘common language’ of a globalising financial capitalism. In the UK and 
US, ‘law-and-economics’ approaches to company law prevailed, which identified the problem in 
‘strong managers and weak owners’, excluding employees from the control of companies’ 
resources.  Companies’ autonomy was promoted together with the deregulation of the financial 
sector; the principle of shareholder primacy; and an aggressive anti-unions campaign. Dispersed 
investors re-organised themselves as investment funds and large institutional investors, 
strengthening the principle of shareholder primacy fostered by growing reliance on private 
pensions. The ‘neo-liberal’ cure seemed to work and in the 1990s the US and UK started to grow 
much faster than Continental European economies, which had also accumulated a relevant public 
debt (see Jessop 1992 and 2007; Ireland and Pillay 2010). 
By the mid-1990s, the EU model of ‘industrial relations’ based on the ‘social bargain’ 
entered into a second deep crisis and also in Continental Europe was gradually imported what Colin 
Crouch calls ‘Privatised Keynesianism’ (2011). The latter can be defined as a phase of post-war 
democratic capitalism, in which the state decided to give up its political responsibility to guarantee 
full employment and made the labour market more flexible and employers free to abandon the 
‘collective bargain’, in exchange for ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR). The dismantlement of 
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 On the difference between CMEs and LMEs, widely used in the so-called VoC (Variety of Capitalism) 
literature, see Hall and Soskice (2001). 
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the public welfare was compensated by unprecedented access to credit by individuals and 
consumers, so to sustain full employment and more consumption. During this period, voluntary 
global frameworks for corporate social and environmental (sustainability) reporting first emerged in 
Europe, in parallel with the process of autonomisation and internationalisation of the economy and 
a symmetric process of international harmonisation and privatization financial accounting 
standards. Initially, voluntary sustainability accounting served to strengthen trust in the autonomous 
capacity of financial capitalism to operate for the public good. In fact, around 2000, some unsetting 
cracklings had first revealed that Privatised Keynesianism was not meant to last: the Asian financial 
crisis, anti-capitalist protests and the intense consumption of Planet resources showed that this was 
a potentially destructive and unsustainable path. Finally, the 2008 financial crisis reduced the 
empirical and theoretical foundations of Privatised Keynesianism to ruins and made ever more 
apparent the need for a new system of accounting that goes beyond traditional financial disclosure.  
The 2008 financial crisis made suddenly apparent to everyone the elements of ‘illusio’ and 
‘symbolic violence’ that were buried in the relations of domination that characterise Privatised 
Keynesianism. The crisis arrived to undermine and question even the very autonomy of the 
economic field towards other social fields, particularly the political and legal fields, which 
(re)gained the symbolic power to intervene in the governance of the economy. Crucially for our 
study, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial disaster, public support for more legal control 
(accountability) over business and financial practices became widespread. This drove the explosion 
of CSA regulation. However, the latter has not been driven only by ‘legitimising’ aims: there is a 
real challenge emerging in the European economic field between states and financial markets and 
CSA is entering into this territory of extreme symbolic violence. On the one hand, part of the 
investor community, TUs and ‘civil society’ social actor are strongly demanding for more non-
financial information. Drawing on Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), I will argue that it has been this 
‘transparency coalition’ the main driver of the current explosion of CSA regulation in Europe. This 
coalition is challenging the power of European managers and block-holders, who have consistently 
and successfully demanded CSA to be voluntary.   
Once again, the economy and the accounting field seem to evolve symmetrically creating 
specific and significant effect on society and the environmental where people live: the current 
debate about ‘sustainability accounting’ and ‘shared value creation’ are likely to structure the 
emerging discussion about ‘long-term’ and ‘sustainable’ models of capitalism. However, this 
structuring effect is neither acknowledged nor publicly discussed. It tends to be taken for granted as 
a ‘matter of fact’ (legitimate imposture). In the current situation, many of the questions that 
characterised the social accounting debate in the 1970s have re-emerged more urgent and complex 
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than ever. What is the purpose of large corporations? What sort of ‘value’ companies generate? Is it 
only ‘economic’ value? Is it only shareholder value? How large companies impact the social 
environment in which they operate? Should companies become more accountable and transparent 
also as regards their impact in terms of e.g. human rights policies; carbon emissions or anti-
corruption policies? Where should they disclose such information? Should accounting be radically 
transformed to include ESG data? How financial and non-financial disclosure could be better 
integrated? To whom companies and their managers should be held accountable? What is the role 
of private standard-setting bodies? What is the purpose of accounting standards? What is the role of 
public authorities and law-makers? While some of these questions go back to the corporate 
governance debates of the 1930s and the 1970s, there is a key difference. Back then, regulatory 
initiatives were politically and legislative-driven. Nowadays, CSR policies and CSA regulatory 
initiatives are, usually, corporate and market-driven. As Mclean and Crouch (2011: 1-2) pointed 
out, there is little debate about this. The ubiquity of CSR practices and corporate acknowledgments 
of their responsibilities towards local communities and the environment may seem to render further 
discussions superfluous. Quite on the contrary, they only represent the beginning of the debate on 
the political implications of major firms shaping regulatory frameworks and taking responsibilities 
beyond their role as market actors. It is the triumph of a pervasive economic vision of reality that 
poses fundamental questions about its limits/limitations; the autonomy and excessive power of 
economic actors; the force of legal and extra-legal regulatory means. In a world in which virtually 
anything is financially relevant, what is left to ‘non-financial’ issues? The difficulties that regulators 
face in defining what is ‘non-financial’ seem to certify this absolute dominion of the economy. At 
the same time, it might also represent a unique opportunity for putting it into question; to discuss 
about what is non-financial; what still talks a different language and cannot be translated into 
economic value(s).  
The economy is stretching way beyond traditional market conceptualisations. This situation 
calls for an extremely problematic re-politicisation of corporate governance, seen as the 
‘architecture of accountability’ (Parkinson 2006). On the one hand, there is the force of democratic 
corporate accountability, which is based on the legal and political control of the state over 
economic activities and the ‘right to know’ about the impact of large corporations on people’s 
everyday lives. On the other hand, there is the economic logic of corporate accounting, which 
interprets confidence crises as “deficits of knowledge of the laws governing the economy as a 
wealth-creation machine, or from disregard of such laws in selfish pursuit of political power.” 
(Streeck 2011: 8) Accounting laws and the accounting field is currently torn by this, potentially 
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creative, tension and could become a crucial, though misrecognised, terrain on which a more 
‘sustainable’ regime of capital accumulation can be constructed. 
 
1.4 The structure of the study 
After a review of the literature, the next chapter presents the methodology and the method 
adopted by the study. I have used a Bourdieusian reflexive socio-legal approach as over-arching 
research strategy to explain the cyclical emergence of CSA regulation (Bourdieu 1986; Madsen and 
Dezalay 2002; Madsen 2006; Madsen 2011) in conjunction with a number existing critical studies 
(in particular Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Crouch 2006, 2009 and 2011; Streeck 2011). The study 
starting point has been the lack of a universally accepted definition of CSA. Chapter 2 argues that 
this practice has been socially and historically constructed using two negative definitions: as non-
financial and non-law. As regards the research method, this is closely related with the methodology. 
The empirical research is based on data collected using three sources: the review of the literature; in 
depth elite interviews and document analysis, strengthened by a five months participant observation 
at the EU Commission.    
Chapter 3 reviews over forty years of struggles for regulating non-financial reporting in 
Europe. It argues that this development has been cyclical rather than linear and that the turning 
points in the history of CSA regulation can be explained looking at the parallel development of the 
European regimes of corporate governance regulation (CGR) and economic capital accumulation. 
As regards the content of accounting regulation, 1970s’ proposals for mandatory social reporting 
had been abandoned starting from the early 1980s until the late 1990s, in favour of detailed 
disclosure of financial-only and tangible information. During the early 2000s, a preliminary nucleus 
of an ill-defined and broad form of non-financial accounting has emerged, usually integrating 
social, environmental and economic issues, as ‘sustainability reporting’. However, the latter was 
developed in isolated from financial accounting and often ignored by the accounting profession. 
Finally, after 2008 we are witnessing some serious attempts to integrate financial and non-financial 
accounting. As regards changes in the mode of accounting regulation, the period between the 1980s 
and the 2000s marked a dramatic structuration of the financial accounting regulatory regime that 
used to be rather under-developed until then. From being largely national and public, it has become 
global and privatised, in particular driven by the role of the accounting profession and the 
International Acccounting Standard Committee Foundation (IASC Foundation). However, little 
changes have concerned the area of sustainability reporting that came to be identified as ‘non-law’. 
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Only starting from the 2000s, European regulators gradually paid closer attention to ESG 
information and many countries included non-financial aspects in accounting laws. The chapter 
introduces the argument that there is a historically specific relation of structural homology between 
the accounting field and the economic field. It looks beyond explanations based only on 
‘legitimacy’ and it focuses on the tension between legitimacy and accumulation of capital in the 
economic field. Considering this symmetric development, it is possible to identify identical changes 
in the regulation of accounting and in the capitalist regime of accumulation. During the 1970s the 
corporatist regime mirrored debates about regulating social accounting. During the 1990s processes 
of economic financialisation saw the emergence of financial-only accounting standards. Nowadays, 
the search for a more sustainable model of capital accumulation is mirrored by a new attention to 
intangible forms of capital framed as ESG/sustainability accounting. This argument confirms the 
intuitions of some critical accountants that started to argue about the symbolic power of accounting.  
However it sets the puzzle of the relation between the nomos of the accounting field and the law, 
which is developed in the following two chapters considering the case study of the EU-level debate 
for regulating non-financial reporting. 
Chapter 4 narrows down the analysis and empirically assesses the recursive process of 
creating a EU framework for the disclosure of non-financial. It puts forward the argument that 
within the European accounting field a ‘transparency coalition’ has driven between the two crises 
2001-2011 the emergence of non-financial reporting regulation and at each financial crisis has 
become more structured and broader. In particular through a series of in-depth interviews with EU 
regulators and other key stakeholders investigates the development of CSA regulation from the 
Green Paper 2001 until the 2011 CSR Communication. In particular, it juxtaposes the development 
of CSR policies and CG regulation, arguing that there has been a gradual shift from a position that 
used to see CSA as non-law to one that embraces a smart mix of mandatory and voluntary tools. I 
will argue that there is an objective convergence of interests amongst part of institutional investors, 
NGOs and part of trade unions for enhancing corporate accountability which has the potential for 
developing into a new regime of economic governance – not just corporate governance – based on 
rapidly developing normative ideas of economic sustainability. This entails a complex shift in the 
nomos of the accounting field of practice. The distinction financial/non-financial in fact has 
become, at each economic crisis, more blurred. It is too narrow and excludes the large majority of 
the information that are ‘material’ to investors. On this basis, concrete possibilities to innovate the 
current regime would combine respect of human rights and the environment and profitability. 
However, it is necessary the active engagement of regulators that occupy a central role in the 
narrative. 
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Chapter 5 assesses changes during the same period (mid-1990s to 2011) of the previous 
chapter and also on the basis of the same data sources. However, it deepens the broad historical 
framework outlined in the previous chapter focusing on the various groups of actors’ ability to 
shape the accounting regulatory field. It considers four key topics: the emergence of a ‘transparency 
coalition’ for mandatory non-financial reporting; the role and ‘law-and-economics’ habitus of 
regulators and policy-makers; the sharp opposition of managers against any introduction of non-
financial disclosure in Accounting Law; finally, the crucial role of accountants, lawyers and 
financial analysts as the architects of the emerging regime of CSA regulation.  
Chapter 6 summarises the main arguments outlined through the previous chapters as 
regards the explanation of changes both in the content and in the mode of CSA regulation. In 
particular, it focuses on better explaining the analysis of the historical and empirical findings 
(Chapters 3; 4 and 5) on the light of the Bourdieusian theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2. 
Eventually, it briefly discusses some of the limitations of the present study and suggests new 
researches avenues.   
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2. What explains the emergence of sustainability 
accounting regulation? 
 
In dreams begin responsibilities. 
W.B.Yeats (1914) Responsibility in “Responsibilities and Other Poems”. 31 
 
2.1 Introduction. Why researching CSA regulation matters? 
The first interesting aspect that emerged from the initial review of the literature has been the 
almost complete isolation and marginalisation that traditionally characterises ‘non-financial’ 
accounting in relation to financial reporting. They can be seen as ‘parallel universes’ and, indeed, 
they have been conventionally treated as such.  
Journals have been created to discuss about the heterogeneous world of non-financial 
reporting (NFR) (e.g. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal; Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting and Accounting; Organizations and Society), hosting debates that had very little echo in 
the mainstream accounting literature. Many studies revealed that CFOs are rarely aware of non-
financial issues (see Deloitte 2011; Sullivan 2011), while the latter are often handled by a separated 
(CSR) unit or, at times, by the public relations office (Owen 2003). Similarly, the mainstream 
corporate governance (CG) literature has dedicated much attention to debates on accounting 
regulation (see, for instance, the list of ICGN publications). However, it has largely excluded issues 
related to sustainability accounting (e.g. accounting and human rights; carbon disclosure). Policy-
makers and regulators actively contributed to this situation treating the two forms of accounting as 
belonging to separated boxes: NFR as a ‘voluntary’ issue concerning CSR policies; while financial 
accounting has been addressed as a matter of company law and CG regulation. Therefore, financial 
disclosure is heavily regulated. Companies have to report on the basis of detailed and binding 
international standards (the IFRS’ rulebook is 2 500 pages; the US GAAP’s covers 25 000 printed 
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 In the run-up to the publication of ISO 26000, the international standard giving guidance on social 
responsibility, a video was used to launch the new framework as the “norm for social responsibility”. The 
issue of social responsibility was presented through the eyes of children all over the Planet. The video is 
extremely telling as regards the ‘symbolic power’ of sustainability reporting; the new political and regulatory 
role of large business undertakings that underlie the global emergence of corporate accountability and, also, 
the relation between dreams and responsibilities. The video is publicly available at:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJUm3JqF-Ro 
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pages). On the other hand, standards for non-financial reporting are still fragmented and under-
developed. The closest thing to an internationally accepted standard is the voluntary framework 
developed by a private non-profit organization, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), founded in 
1997. Furthermore, while companies are required to audit their annual report, such obligation does 
not exist for NFR. Several studies and experts concluded that, in terms of accuracy, quality and 
reliability, at present, only few sustainability reports would meet the existing standards for financial 
reports (see Owen 2008; Henriques 2010). There is still a major gap between financial and non-
financial reporting in terms of quantity and quality (see Commission 2013).  
Nonetheless, during the last decade, things are progressively changing, both in sustainability 
reporting practice and in its regulation. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the number of 
companies publishing sustainability reports is constantly increasing (KPMG et al. 2013). Issues of 
social and environmental reporting started to regularly appear in most of the debates on the future of 
accounting practices (see Drever et al. 2007: 191). The narrow ‘law-and-economics’ shareholder-
centred approach to CG has been weakened by corporate scandals (Enron, Parmalat) and financial 
crises. It is now widely recognised that CG best practices include respect for human rights and the 
environment (see King 2007). Finally, driven by the prominence of CSR and sustainability issues in 
the public debate, also public authorities and regulators started to include sustainability in CG and 
company law provisions
32
. Central in this debate has been the prospective of expanding accounting 
regulation to include non-financial aspects of corporate performances.  
This study aims to shed light on this relevant shift and on the ‘collision’ between the two 
worlds of sustainability and financial accounting, with all the anticipation, ambiguities and 
experimentations that characterise this phase. In particular, this research focuses on the inclusion of 
non-financial aspects in the EU accounting regulation. This has been a long and patient process that 
started in the late 1990s and it is still ongoing and it is also part of a broader shift towards a more 
sustainable and inclusive model of economic growth. However, in order to understand why the two 
harms of accounting are laboriously coming closer, it is worth to start questioning why non-
financial reporting regulation has been marginalised in the first place? Why it has developed so 
little and so late as compared to financial accounting? What does it say about current regulatory 
changes in CSA? 
Two arguments have been often proposed. One is common in academic and quasi-academic 
managerial studies. They argue that we are now entering the ‘era of corporate accountability’ and 
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 As the EC affirmed in the 2011 CSR Communication, “A strategic approach to CSR is increasingly 
important to the competitiveness of enterprises. It can bring benefits in terms of risk management, cost 
savings, access to capital, customer relationships, human resource management, and innovation capacity.” 
(Commission 2011) 
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there has been a linear and progressive development from corporate ‘irresponsibility’ towards an 
epoch of ‘sustainable capitalism’33. Corporate sustainability accounting is therefore seen as ‘an idea 
whose time has come’, the coming of age of sustainability reporting. However, there are various 
issues with this deterministic explanation of CSA emergence. First of all, it neglects the role of 
interests and conflicts in shaping the corporate field. Furthermore, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, from a more careful analysis, it emerged that during the 1970s and 2000s there has been a 
much more lively regulatory debate concerning corporate social accounting, as compared to the 
1980s and 1990s. This conclusion suggests a cyclical rather than linear and progressive 
development of non-financial reporting.  
The second argument that has been often adopted to explain this late regulatory development 
has been that, after all, NFR provides managers, investors and stakeholders with comparatively less 
relevant information than financial reports. This is something that variously came out during my 
interviews. Then, perhaps, there is a good reason if policy-makers and regulators prioritised 
financial aspects of corporate performance. However, this hypothesis has also been soon dismissed. 
In fact, there are, at least, three very strong rationales why regulating corporate sustainability 
reporting matters.  
First of all, there is a rationale for mandatory extra-financial reporting related with questions 
of 'corporate social accountability' that have been discussed ever since the first emergence of the 
modern join-stock corporation
34
 and that is becoming ever more relevant today (see Mitchell and 
Sikka 2005; Utting and Marques 2009; Ireland and Pillay 2010; Soederberg 2011). The traditional 
raison d’être for social and environmental accounting has always been the concern over the power 
and influence of corporations on many aspects of our lives
35
 An influence that has grown during the 
last three decades to affect every aspect of our lives: water, gas, news, environment, schools and 
even unborn babies (see Mitchell and Sikka 2005). As Prof Rob Gray pointed out, “accountability is 
based on the principal of rights to information – rights which derive from a number of sources: 
legal, quasi-legal, moral and so on.” The need for introducing this obligation is therefore not strictly 
due to economic or technical reasons but to the fact that “power and responsibility need to be 
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 A prominent example of this rhetoric about the ineluctable arrival of sustainable capitalism can be found in 
the Manifesto of former US President Al Gore (see Gore and Blood 2011). As pointed out with the usual 
sarcasm by Prof. Rob Gray (2008), during the 2000s, corporate social and environmental accounting has 
moved “from ridicule to revolution; from hope to hubris”. 
34
 The need for controlling corporate misbehaviour and excessive power has been underlined even by the 
father of modern political economy, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776). 
35
 Gray notes, “Enquiry into social accounting offers, inter alia, the promise (however idealized) of an 
international corporate, institutional and financial complex held substantially accountable to civil society for 
its activities. Such an accountability – if applied successfully – would expose much duplicity; it would make 
transparent the essential and unavoidable conflicts that a global, astonishingly successful (and probably 
essentially rapacious) capitalism generates.” (2010: 550) 
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matched in a fair society. This matching is ensured by the demos who, in turn, require information 
on which to make the appropriate judgements. The accounts of organisations are one of these 
sources of information and without these accounts, democracy is hollow, the demos is powerless 
and, depending on the circumstances, the power of the (non) accountable organisations significantly 
outstrips their responsibility.” (Gray 2005: 7)36 Seen from this perspective, sustainability disclosure 
might constitute a fundamental tool for empowering stakeholders (particularly NGOs and TUs) just 
as financial accounting empowered dispersed shareholders (Unerman et al. 2007). According to this 
argument the law should demand MNEs to provide detailed and independently verified information 
about their impact on the environment and society. In particular, human rights reporting and 
periodic review of working conditions in MNEs supply chains deserve special attention
37
.   
A second reason for the disclosure of extra-financial information emerged more clearly only 
during the late 1980s and the 1990s and it is related to the urgency of subverting the current 
unsustainable path towards ecological collapse. There is a vast literature that has demonstrated the 
risks connected with ‘business as usual’ and to which this study refers to for a thoughtful analysis of 
this issue (Jackson 2009; NEF 2009). There is sound scientific evidence that in a few decades the 
humanity has arrived to use the equivalent of 1.5 Planets Earth. Meaning, it takes one year and six 
months to our ecosystem to generate the resources and services we consume in one year
38
. We 
could define this as a 'global governance' driver for having mandatory CSA regulation. Considering 
this situation, there is a clear case for mandatory reporting about TNCs actual and prospective 
impacts (in economics often called ‘extenalities’ both positive and negative) on society and the 
environment
39
. As Bulkeley and Newell pointed out, given their size, capacity and power, 
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 Emphasis added. 
37
 The obvious reference in the debate about human rights is the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, adopted in 2011 by UN Human Rights Council. It is worth to highlight Jennifer Zerk collaboration 
with CORE (Corporate Responsibility Coalition) to publish in 2011 Simply Put. Towards an effective UK 
regime for environmental and social reporting by companies. Also the ECCJ (European Coalition for 
Corporate Justice) has been working on this direction. Finally, the University of Edinburgh submitted an 
insightful Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment Applicable to European 
Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union (Augenstein 2010). 
38
 In a nutshell, the key argument is that the current economic regime, based on unlimited growth and 
consumption, consuming Planet’s resources too rapidly. This concern is well documented by solid scientific 
evidence. For instance, the Ecological Footprint Network has elaborated the Ecological Footprint Indicator, 
comparing the humanity’s ecological impact and the amount of productive land and sea available supplying 
key ecosystem services during the period 1961-2005. See Global Footprint Network (2008). 
39
 The economic consequences of this reckless race to consumerism and growth are so dangerous that 
economist Joseph Stiglitz recently claimed that climate change is the most important economic issue that the 
US economy is currently facing. In 2005 the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, gathering 1360 experts 
from 95 countries reached the conclusion that “human activity is putting such strain on the natural functions 
of Earth that the ability of the Planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer taken for 
granted.” One ecosystem service, in particular, climate regulation, is going through a dramatic 
transformation. In fact, after remaining stable for over 1000 years at 280 parts per million, the level of 
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multinational corporations have often a more significant role to play in the global governance of 
sustainability than many States, suggesting a “very different geography of responsibility” (Bulkeley 
and Newell 2010: 2).  
However, adopting an ‘accounting rationale’, one could say that companies have to make 
profits first and that non-financials are not, ‘economically speaking’, material information. 
Therefore, many scholars framed it as a problem of large business entities resisting to the external 
pressure from civil society, local communities, and workers. However, this is also a broadly 
incorrect way of framing the problem. One might be surprised discovering that, according to several 
studies, the value of ‘non-financial’ reporting, considered as the information that are not currently 
captured by current financial reporting, is up to five times higher than the one of financial 
information (see IIRC 2011; CSR Europe 2010). In fact, during the last 25 years the explanatory 
capacity of traditional tangible and financial accounting has constantly decreased
40
. Until the 1980s, 
the annual reports used to account for 80% of the market value of a company; in 1990, this 
percentage had already decreased to 55% and it has been calculated that currently it is below 20%. 
In other words, non-financial information accounts for 80% of the value of the S&P 500 Index 
(Ocean Tomo 2010; Accenture 2004). While only part of this value can be captured looking at ESG 
data, there is a growing consensus and some convincing empirical evidence that more sustainable 
companies tend to be better managed (see Bauer and Hann 2010; Kruse and Lundbergh 2010; 
Deutsche Bank 2012). As a consequence they also attract a better class of employees, are better able 
to manage risks, can count on stronger visibility and better reputation and better longer-term 
performances. Therefore, financial analysts are increasingly interested in mandatory disclosure of 
ESG information that could help to address critical gaps in existing accounting standards. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2), are currently over 400, driven by a growing world population 
consuming more fossil fuel, eating more meat, using more land for agriculture or for urban expansion. Lord 
Nicolas Stern, the author of the famous 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
39
, recently 
admitted that the situation is “far, far worse” than he predicted in 2006 and that he believes “we are on track 
for something like 4°C above the long term average
39
. The World Bank, in its report 2012, Turn Down the 
Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided, has confirmed that we are heading towards a 4°C warmer 
world “marked by extreme heat-waves, declining global food stocks, loss of ecosystems and biodiversity, 
and life-threatening sea level rise.” 
40
 In order to give an idea of the significance of this accounting gap, considering the value of the global stock 
markets at US$ 50 trillion (March 2010), it has been estimated that 80% represents a gap of US$ 40 trillion 
between the ‘book value’ of publicly listed companies and their so-called ‘market value’ (CSR Europe 2010). 
Therefore, this represents a long-term trend that characterises contemporary capitalism and which signals 
that the process of accumulation of capital is radically changing. There is a growing strand of literature 
arguing that, looking at the long-term performance of companies, a strong relation  exists between 
competitive advantages and so-called ESG (environmental, social and governance) performance (see in 
particular Ioannou and Serafeim 2011).  
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In sum, there is a glaring paradox in the accounting field that requires further researches. It 
is binding for companies to prepare and audit expensive annual reports that are of very limited 
value, from a social and environmental point of view, and of a modest but steadily decreasing 
economic value. On the other hand, despite over four decades of heated debates, regulators have 
started only very recently to realise that the issue of accounting for non-financial information is 
potentially socially, environmentally and also economically relevant. Even more strikingly, there is 
very little literature that attempts to shed light on this situation, most of the studies tends to take the 
arbitrary distinction between mandatory financial and voluntary non-financial accounting for 
granted, as a matter of fact. There is a need for empirical studies that go beyond normative and 
functionalist approaches and question: what has been the role of law-makers – in particular of EU 
law and policy-makers – in this process? Which political and socio-economic actors are driving the 
current emergence of CSA regulation? What are their interests? How are these different actors 
organising and mobilising themselves? How and why do they succeed in creating regulatory 
changes? 
This chapter outlines my explanation of the current emergence of CSA regulation. In 
particular, it outlines some of the cornerstones on which the study has been built: the underlying 
methodological approach; its application to the field of research; the research methods employed. 
The following section (2.2) will offer a critical review of the literature, focusing on the existing 
explanations of the transnational emergence of CSA regulation. I will argue that while different 
approaches shed light on different aspects of CSA regulation’s emergence, none of them provides a 
convincing explanation. Section 2.3 introduces the Bourdieusian reflexive socio-legal approach that 
has been adopted by this study. The section outlines the epistemological assumptions of reflexive 
sociology together with some key theoretical concepts (e.g. habitus; capital; field; nomos). Section 
2.4 will explain how I have deployed this reflexive approach – in conjunction with the literature – to 
explain the cyclical emergence of CSA regulation in Europe.  Lastly, section 2.5 will present the 
argument in brief while section 2.6 discusses questions of research method. 
 
2.2 A critique of the literature 
As the consequences of the growing complexity and expansion of ‘non-financial’ reporting, 
also the literature has also become more widespread and fragmented. Therefore, providing a 
comprehensive review would go beyond the scope of this study. Significant contributions to the 
study of CSA regulation can be found in a variety of disciplines, particularly critical accounting; 
managerial studies; regulation studies; but also political science and sociology. Detailed reviews of 
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the literature already exist (Mathews 1997; Bebbington and Gray 2001; Spence et al. 2010; Gray 
2010; Guthrie and Parker 2012). The aim of this section has been rather to critically review the 
existing approaches to my research question. 
As I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, the overwhelming majority of the 
literature explains the emergence of private disclosure of social and environmental information 
drawing on a ‘legitimacy theory’ perspective (see Patten 1992; Gray et al 1995; Deegan 2002; 
O’Donovan 2002; Cormier and Gordon 2001; Cho and Patten 2007; Tilling and Tilt 2010). In a 
nutshell, their argument is that the current sustainability reporting explosion is a company response 
to pressures coming from a range of ‘stakeholders’ (media, governments, customers, NGOs, 
responsible investors). Therefore the rise of regulatory frameworks such as the UN GC or the GRI 
has been explained as a way that business adopted to legitimise its existence to society. Although 
criticised, this perspective has been extremely influential, drawing much attention to the 
motivations of individual companies (reputation, marketing, responsibility) and lacking of a 
sustained attention to CSA regulation per se. However, as it has been already claimed elsewhere, 
this reliance on legitimacy can be “positively misleading” since this theory is “underdeveloped” and 
“using it to make specific predictions is difficult” (see Owen 2008; Mobus 2005). Owen maintains 
that legitimacy provides desk-based researchers with a “plausible explanation” without any real 
effort to determine whether a reporting practice “may or may not promote transparency and 
accountability towards non-capital provider stakeholder groups.” (2008: 248) In effect, a major 
problem with this approach is that already ‘knowing’ that companies issue social and environmental 
reports in order to generate legitimacy, there is no reason for further look at what explains the 
emergence of this practice.  
The progressive development of a multi-level regulatory regime for CSA (see Chapter 3) 
requires further theoretical and empirical analyses aimed at strengthening this perspective in 
conjunction with broader theoretical approaches. Therefore, in order to explain the current shift 
from voluntary disclosure towards a ‘smart mix’ of voluntary and mandatory requirements, this 
study should move beyond legitimacy theory as such or, better, integrate it within a more 
comprehensive explanatory framework. As a preliminary step towards a better understanding of 
what is actually driving current changes in CSA regulation, I shall first consider this regulation in 
relation with broader explanations of changes in corporate governance regulation (CGR). In fact, as 
I have argued in section 1.2, a difference between this study and most of the existing literature is 
that it firmly anchors non-financial disclosure within the long-lasting debate on mechanisms of 
corporate governance and control. This approach is in line with a recent strand of critical studies of 
corporate governance, sustainability and corporate social responsibility regulation (see Sjåfjell 
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2009; Kruse and Lundbergh 2010; Vitols and Kluge 2011; Williams and Zumbansen 2011; Mares 
2012; Kinderman 2012). This way of situating the study sets the key question of why the treatment 
of the two branches of accounting laws has been so different as the central puzzle of this research 
area. In particular, there is a bourgeoning but still rather fragmented literature on business 
regulation that frequently contains references to the transnational emergence of CSA regulation
41
. 
Exploring these broader strands of literature about changes in global business regulation, we can 
broadly identify four ‘explanatory approaches’, based on law-and-economics; political; neo-
institutionalist; and regulatory studies. While I will argue that none of them provide an exhaustive 
explanation, they do illuminate different aspects of the current emergence of CSA regulation and, in 
different ways, provide arguments that already overcome rather intuitive explanations based on 
‘legitimacy theory’.  
The majority of the contributions still comes from market-oriented managerial and law-
and-economics studies. They are often rather under-theorised (Unerman et al. 2007) and have been 
criticized for being subsumed under the dominant business discourse (see Gray et al. 2009). 
Overall, they offer a rather ‘modest’ account of corporate responsibilities as aimed to voluntarily 
internalise negative environmental and social corporate externalities using market-oriented 
mechanisms (see Parkinson 2006). Furthermore, they stress the autonomous role of law and 
regulation, isolated from social and political aspects
 42
. This approach narrowly defines the firm as a 
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 For instance, looking at recent contributions, the work of authors such as Ruth Aguilera and Cynthia 
Williams has been seminal in attempting to create an actor-centred neo-institutionalist approach, which 
integrate social and environmental aspects into varieties of corporate governance regulation (see Aguilera 
and Jackson 2003; Aguilera et al. 2006; Williams and Aguilera 2008; Rupp, Williams and Aguilera 2011). 
From a legal and socio-legal point of view, many scholars have contributed to approach again Law and 
‘voluntary’ CSR. In particular, Doreen McBarnet (2007) and Elisa Morgera (2009) have attracted the 
attention to new forms of legal and extra-legal corporate accountability, including CSA. Charlotte Villier 
(2006 and 2008) and Beate Sjåfjell (2009) have contributed to create a link between company law and 
sustainability; while Peer Zumbansen, Simon Deakin and Larry Catà Backer have developed the idea of 
analysing corporate governance and CSR within a transnational regulatory space. Legal scholars such as 
Paddy Ireland (2001; Ireland and Pillay 2010) and Sol Picciotto (2012) have consistently attempted to 
countervail the ‘standard’ approach to company law and corporate governance regulation. A growing strand 
of environmental studies have been mapping the multi-level governance of corporate sustainability (Newell 
and Paterson 2010; Biermann and Pattberg 2008) There have been also fundamental contributions to re-
radicalise and re-politicise corporate governance and business regulation from several critical political 
scholars (Overbeek et al. 2007; Horn 2011; Graz and Nolke 2008). Following in their footsteps, this study 
attempts to explain the emergence of CSA regulation as part of broader changes in business and global 
regulation. In order to better relation between legitimacy theory and these strands of literature, we can 
broadly identify three main explanatory approaches. 
42
 Drawing on a series of comparative studies in law and finance realised by Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrej Shleifer and Robert Vishny (often referred to as ‘LLSV’), law-and-economics 
maintains that efficient governance systems are the product of properly developed financial and legal 
systems aimed to minimize agency costs (see La Porta et al. 1999 and Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Their 
theory of CGR is based on the idea that law matters: Common Law countries, such as the US, developed 
stronger mechanisms of shareholders’ protection than Civil Law ones, such as Germany. Their main 
47 
 
‘nexus of contracts’ between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) and corporate 
governance (CG) as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment.” (Schleifer and Vishny, 1996:2)  
It is accurate to stress that, drawing on Milton Friedman’s firm position against CSR (1970), 
this ‘standard’ approach to corporate governance has overwhelmingly ignored issues of corporate 
social accountability and disclosure of non-financial information and, in any cases, isolated them 
from key questions of corporate governance and shareholder control. However, during the last 
decade they have started paying growing attention to non-finacial reporting, explaining/justifying 
the impressive rise of non-financial disclosure by claiming that there is an economic rationale for 
this kind of disclosure. Therefore, most of these managerial studies have attempted to demonstrate 
that sustainability reporting actually enhances economic efficiency and positively affect the 
company’s bottom line (the so-called business case for CSR). Namely, they focus on the possible 
financial benefits that a company can have engaging in CSR practices, including reporting, in terms 
of better reputation; stronger brand value; higher customers’ loyalty and employees’ motivation. 
Management guru Michel Porter, from Harvard Business School, arrived to argue that incorporating 
societal issues into managerial strategies and operations is the next major transformation of 
capitalism in the post financial crisis era and identified measurement as a key driver for creating 
what he called ‘shared value’, rather than just traditional financial value (Porter and Kramer 2011). 
In this sense, the managerial approach shows a clear link with the ‘legitimacy theory’ explanation of 
CSA emergence.  
A recent and more sophisticated argument within managerial studies is considering whether 
companies that take into account ESG aspects are better off in the long-term because they tend to be 
better managed
43
 (e.g. Ioannou and Serafeim 2011; Bouer and Hann 2010; DB Research 2012). In 
effect, many ‘law-and-finance’ studies have provided some evidence that company’s revenues are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
conclusion has been that, in a globalised financial economy, Common Law countries are better equipped to 
attract investments and efficiently minimise agency costs (see in part. Jensen 2001). During the 1990s their 
approach became so influential in areas such as company law, contract law and property law that American 
legal scholars Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman (Yale University and Harvard University) famously 
announced ‘the end of history for company law’, foreseeing the inevitable and desirable global convergence 
towards Anglo-Saxon capitalism (2001).  
43
 In particular Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) examine the effect of mandatory sustainability reporting on 
several measures of socially responsible management practices. Using data for 58 countries, we show that 
after the adoption of mandatory sustainability reporting laws and regulations, the social responsibility of 
business leaders increases. We also document that both sustainable development and employee training 
become a higher priority for companies, and that corporate governance improves. Furthermore, we find that 
companies implement more ethical practices, reduce bribery and corruption, and that managerial credibility 
increases. These effects are larger for countries with stronger law enforcement and more widespread 
assurance of sustainability reports. 
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closely related to non-financial aspects related with ESG data
44
. Here the case for including non-
financials in accounting standards is supported by the notion that we are witnessing an historical 
shift from an industrial age towards a post-industrial, knowledge-based economy. Therefore, they 
argue that also accounting standards need to keep pace with this transformation and include all 
(financial and non-financial) information that investors need to assess risks and opportunities of the 
company. As already mentioned in the introduction, several studies pointed out that the percentage 
of market value represented by physical and financial assets versus intangible factors is steadily 
decreasing (see Accenture 2004; Ocean Tomo 2010). This suggests that as business has become 
more complex accounting standards merely focusing on financial performance and ignoring factors 
related to employment relations; reputation; customers’ loyalty; risk management; supply chains 
management cannot really explain value-creation processes. Since managers do not disclose such 
information on a voluntary basis, regulators’ interventions is invoked to make this practice 
mandatory
45
. Nonetheless, it is crucial to stress that these findings would support only the case for 
introducing mandatory disclosure of material – financially relevant – ESG information. In fact, this 
approach do not question the assumption that managers should act only – on primarily – on the best 
interest of their shareholders. They rather stress that companies that effectively manage their non-
financial risks and opportunities – including some social and environmental aspects – in the long 
term outperform their competitors. 
Overall, managerial and law-and-economics approaches to CSR have been rather useful to 
highlight the existence of some strong economic arguments for the introduction of CSA standards, 
implicitly proving Milton Friedman (1970) and his followers (Jensen 2001) wrong in their claim 
that CSR would create markets’ inefficiencies. Even after the global financial crisis, this market-
oriented approach is still very popular among regulators and policy-makers, possibly because it 
proposes only marginal ‘adjustments’ to the existing economic paradigm (focusing on ‘green’ 
growth and ‘shared’ prosperity).46 However, there are several problems related with this 
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 There is a strand of academic researches that seems to indicate a positive correlation between better extra-
financial and financial performance. Bouer and Hann (2010), for instance, looked at 582 US companies over 
a period of 10 years. Over that time the companies with good environmental records were deemed more 
‘creditworthy’, a contrast to companies with questionable environmental practices, who paid higher costs for 
financing. Deutsche Bank Research (2012) reviewed over 100 papers on this issued reaching the conclusion 
that "Environmental, Social and Governance" (ESG) factors are correlated with superior risk-adjusted returns 
at a securities level. They found that most studies are showing correlation between financial performance of 
companies and  what it perceives as advantageous ESG strategies, at least over the medium (3-5 years) to 
long term (5-10 years).  
45
 See for example, Financial Services Council and The Australian Council of Superannuation Investors 
(2011); Haigh and Shapiro (2011)  
46
 This rationale has been adopted in many recent publications from a number of public national and 
international agencies, such as the UN PRI and the UNEP Finance Initiative or private bodies, such as 
EFFAS, the ICGN and IIRC to justify the introduction of mandatory CSA. See UNEP FI and UN PRI 
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explanatory framework. In particular, studies in economic sociology, pointed out that this approach 
is ‘under-socialised’ and it naturalises markets regimes that are actually socially and historically 
contingent (see Granovetter 1985; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; 
Fligstein 2001; Rajan and Zingales 2003). Furthermore, political scientists have convincingly 
argued that their approach tend to take regulation ‘for granted’ as an independent variable, an 
‘apolitical realm’ that, as such, does not need any further explanation (Blair and Roe 1999; 
Overbeek et al. 2007). More specifically, it has been rightly pointed out that, in managerial studies, 
issues of corporate social accountability appear conceptually isolated from fundamental questions 
of corporate governance and control (Ireland 2000; Ireland and Pillay 2010; Soederberg 2010).  
Many alternative corporate governance accounts, touching upon CSA regulation, have been 
developed to challenge this mainstream approach. In heavily stylised terms, there are three strands 
of explanatory arguments that stress respectively the role of politics; institutions and regulation.  
The second approach stresses the primacy of politics and tends to explain changes in 
sustainability reporting as the result of the struggles amongst opposing social and political 
constituencies organised in interest groups and power-relations.  
This heterogeneous body of literature tremendously contributed to my own understanding of 
power relations and of CSA as a ‘field of struggles’. Within this perspective, the sharp rise in the 
number of sustainability reports has been generally explained as a strategy employed by and for 
proponents of ‘neo-liberalism’ in response to repeated crises of legitimation and market pressures 
(see Alice Mah 2004; Bebbington 2008). The contemporary spread of CSR policies, including 
CSA, is seen as an attempt to incorporate and depoliticise more radical demands for changes in the 
governance and regulation of large corporations, legitimising and hence, at the same time, 
reinforcing the status quo (Levy and Egan 2003; Shamir 2005; Levy and Kaplan 2008; Hanlon 
2011) In neo-Gramscian terms, the CSR policy debate constitutes a moment of trasformismo 
(Gramsci 1971), in which contestation and opposition have been incorporated, and effectively 
depoliticised, through broad processes of stakeholder dialogue and the adoption of  self-regulatory 
measures.  
This strand of studies has the merit of re-radicalising and politicising CSR. It has questioned 
the current emergence of largely ‘voluntary’ and fragmented frameworks for corporate 
sustainability disclosure as juxtaposed to binding minority shareholders protection and international 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(2011): Universal Ownership. Why environmental externalities matter to institutional investors. “Large 
institutional investors are, in effect “Universal Owners”, as they often have highly-diversified and long-term 
portfolios that are representative of global capital markets. […] Long-term economic wellbeing and the 
interests of beneficiaries are at stake. Institutional investors can, and should, act collectively to reduce 
financial risk from environmental impacts.” (UNEP FI and UN PRI 2011: 4) 
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investment agreements. It tends to raise the attention to the fact that the emerging idea of 
‘sustainability’ reporting is not only contested and ambiguous but also a ‘captured’ one. They argue 
that, despite the name, CSR reporting has little or even nothing to do with sustainability (see also 
Gray 2010a). Therefore, the alternative that is often proposed consists in imposing harder rules on 
TNCs, including detailed, mandatory and verified disclosure of their policies and information 
regarding their employees, human rights and climate policies and performances. Although ground-
breaking and thought-provocative, this explanation still presents several limitations. First of all, 
likewise managerial and law-and-economics studies, it tends to take regulation for granted: law and 
regulation is seen as a dependent variable, as the mere result of politics and dominant interests. 
Secondly, while they rightly points to the flaws of the ‘neoliberal’ regime of financial de-regulation, 
it has been convincingly pointed out that they might to ask from law more than the law can actually 
deliver (McBarnet 2007)
47
. Lastly, one of the crucial limitations of this approach consists in the fact 
that many critical political studies rely on a ‘materialist’ or ‘economicist’ perspective that make 
them inappropriate for this study. As Peter Gourevitch (2007) admitted, ‘politics matter’ 
explanations of changes in CGR share with managerial and law-and-economics accounts the idea 
that groups of actors are organised in constituencies based on common interests. They deem that 
financial incentives and enforceable legal constrains are what holds most cooperative relations 
together. However, as Margaret Blair (2003: 14) contended: “Most business relationships involve, 
and indeed require, a substantial amount of voluntary cooperation and trust among participants in 
the enterprise.”  
A third approach, alternative to both the dominant managerial/law-and-economics and the 
interest groups explanations, stresses the role of institutions, industrial relations and social 
norms
48
.  
This broad strand of literature tends to see politics as a sub-system of social action within a 
broader social and institutional setting, stressing the relevance of social norms, values and 
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 As noted by Parkinson, while policy makers normally look at ‘external’ regulation as the means of 
controlling the social and environmental impacts of business, ‘internal’ corporate governance is important as 
well for two main reasons (see Parkinson 2006: 2). First, governance arrangements are likely to affect a 
company propensity to comply with regulation. In order to secure not only companies’ commitment but even 
their conformity with legal provisions down the lines of command, the internal structures of control, 
hierarchies and corporate culture need to be taken in account
47
. The second reason concerns the well-known 
limitations of regulation as a means of prescribing socially desired outcomes, resulting from problems 
inherent in the use of general rules. In fact, legislators simply cannot keep up with everything corporations 
do or with the potential consequences of their actions. Simultaneously, corporations are very good in 
appearing to comply, finding loopholes and other measures to avoid compliance. Furthermore, as we already 
mentioned, TNCs increasingly operate beyond borders. Therefore, they can decide (or simply threaten) to 
relocate where the external regulation of their activities appears softer or even nonexistent. 
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regulatory networks. The key point is that, as compared to the other two accounts, this strand of 
literature tends to stress the notion that cultural and social processes significantly shape regulatory 
changes. Whereas political explanations are based on ‘social conflicts’, here the attention shifts to 
‘social structures’, such as: the growing number of interactions between companies, governmental 
agencies, international bodies and NGOs or the collaboration and discussion amongst them which 
led to the creation of voluntary global regulatory initiatives such as the GRI or the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (see Kolk 2005; Larriaga-Gonzalez 2007: 152)
49
. Once again, legitimacy plays a 
fundamental role, yet, according to Larriaga-Gonzales, in a “richer” way than in other explanations. 
The author noted, “Legitimacy in the social and environmental accounting literature assumes a 
manipulative logic, based on self-interest, which could correspond to coercive structures. [...] 
Institutional theory, however, also permits different motives to be explored: primarily based on the 
logics of appropriateness and on the social construction of reality.” (2007: 163)  
The major contribution of this approach has been to broaden a corporate governance debate 
that otherwise appears extremely under-socialised and narrowly focused on economic rationality 
and interests. Furthermore, it has been extremely successful in contesting the inevitable global 
convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon, Common Law model of corporate regulation
50
. In particular, 
an influential book, The Varieties of Capitalism, edited by Hall and Soskice (2001), represented a 
turning point in this debate: the most ambitious and significant attempt to date to build in a rigorous 
way on the loose variety of neo-institutionalist analyses
51. Drawing on the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ 
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 At the origin of this explanation of regulatory changes are the notions of ‘organisational fields’ and 
‘mechanisms of institutionalisation’ elaborated by authors such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983; 1991) and 
Scott (1995). An organisational field is formed by those organisations that collectively constitute a 
recognised area of institutional life (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) “that partake a common meaning system 
and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another that with actors outside the 
field” (Scott 1995: 56). From a regulatory perspective, this approach identifies different mechanisms of 
institutionalisation (or isomorphism) that Scott defined as regulative; normative and cognitive (1995). In 
general, this perspective tends to analyse the multi-level emergence of CSA regulation, as a process of 
institutional change rather than political conflicts. CSA is perceived as a social practice that business 
organisations undertaken over time within a certain institutional field. According to this perspective, the rise 
of CSA could be due to normative isophormism (the acquisition of shared social values) or mechanisms of 
imitation (cognitive structures), regardless of its legal implementation or financial impact. 
50
 Authors such as Neil Fligstein (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) convincingly demonstrated that both 
Common Law and Civil Law countries had been far from monolithic in their approach to corporate and 
financial regulation throughout the XIX and XX centuries. 
51
 The Varieties of Capitalism soon became “the emblematic citation for all studies of diversity in capitalist 
economies” (Crouch, 2005: 29). Regarding governance systems, it organizes advanced industrial countries 
into two clusters of coherent types: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies 
(CMEs). The two ideal-types are conceived as the extremes of a continuous based on the relative extent of 
market coordination through investment in transferable assets (LMEs) versus strategic coordination through 
investments in specific assets (CMEs). LMEs, i.e. UK and US, is stylised as dispersed ownership focused on 
short term returns, strong shareholder legal rights, financial institutions based on equity markets, active 
market for corporate control, general education and flexible labour markets, strong inter-firms competition. 
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(VoC) approach, many authors started to see specific cultural and social aspects as related with the 
existence of national models of corporate governance, opening the door to a series of studies of 
varieties of CSR regimes
52
. Possibly, the most influential explanatory framework of this kind has 
been elaborated by Crane, Matten and Moon (2008). They compared and categorised the 
differences in companies’ approach to CSR across the Atlantic, concluding that the US approach to 
CSR can be characterised as ‘explicit’ and the European one as ‘implicit’53 However, despite a 
growing consensus about the relevance of institutions and contextual aspects in business, there is no 
agreement on the number of distinct models of capitalism, neither on the dimensions and 
determinants used to characterize them. In fact, the key problem with both VoC and other 
institutionalist explanations, in general, is their incapacity of explaining change. It is possible to 
affirm that their greater merit has been also their crucial limitation: explanations are over-socialised 
and over-stylised (see Aguilera and Jackson 2003). Colin Crouch (himself considered part of this 
‘broad church’ of neo-institutionalist scholars) noted about the VoC approach: “If our theories of 
action and structure are heavily deterministic, social science will always be taken by surprise by 
change and will have to regard it as something exogenous and mysterious.” (2005: 16) 
Lastly, a fourth major strand of literature, which differs from the ones I have mentioned 
above, has been developed in the burgeoning area of ‘regulatory’ studies and it tends to focus on 
regulation at different levels of governance.  
This broad body of knowledge is relevant in the context of this study because it assigns a 
primary importance to transparency and ‘governance-by-disclosure’ as central feature of a new 
architecture of global governance (see e.g. Black 2008; Baldwin and Cave 2011). The main claim of 
this rapidly unfolding research-area is that private mechanisms of governance are increasingly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
They are identified with neo-liberal policies, radical innovation and new sectors of the economy. CMEs, i.e. 
Germany and Continental Europe, rely on long-term industrial finance, cooperative industrial relations, rigid 
labour market and high levels of vocational training, cooperation in technology and standard setting across 
companies. They are linked to social democracy, incremental innovation and declining economic sectors. A 
key element is that there are strong complementarities within the two types, which determine their effective 
functioning. For example, LMEs short-term finance is associated with a strong external labour market and 
requires quick entry and exit from business activities. 
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 See, for instance, Aguilera et al. (2007); Gjolberg (2010) and Brammer (2012). 
53
 “By explicit CSR we refer to corporate policies which assume and articulate responsibility for some 
societal interests. They normally consist of voluntary programs and strategies by corporations which 
combine social and business value and address issues perceived as being part of their social responsibility by 
the company. […] By implicit CSR we refer to the corporations’ role within the wider formal and informal 
institutions for society’s interests and concerns. Implicit CSR normally consists of values, norms and rules 
which result in (mandatory and customary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues and 
which define proper obligations of corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms. Whilst 
representative business associations would often be directly involved in the definition and legitimization of 
these requirements, individual corporations would not normally articulate their own versions of such 
responsibilities.” Matter and Moon (2008: 7-8). 
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required to take responsibilities for issues that were traditionally left to the public sphere, something 
that classic law-and-economics would deeply disagree upon. However, they also differ from the 
‘politics matter’ approach as they tend to claim that the ‘neo-liberal’ turn of the last thirty years 
does not imply market deregulation and a dismantle of the state. On the contrary, they maintain that 
the state has largely kept its regulatory role and key functions of control but within a process of 
hybridisation and re-regulation of the global sphere. This conclusion has been the outcome of a 
long-standing debate on post-national law.  
Possibly the most ambitious attempt to integrate this fragmented body of studies has recently 
emerged under the label of ‘Regulatory Capitalism’ (Levy-Faur 2005; Levy-Faur and Jordana 2005; 
Braithwaite 2008). Their central claim is that: “While at the ideological level neo-liberalism 
promotes deregulation, at the practical level it promotes, or at least is accompanied by, regulation. 
The results are often contradictory and unintended, and the new global order may well be most 
aptly characterized as ‘Regulatory Capitalism’.” (Levi-Faur 2005: 14) 54 According to the authors, 
the global diffusion of ‘regulatory capitalism’ is characterised above all by the emergence of a new 
division of labour between states and business actors. As a consequence, areas such as corporate 
governance, NGOs governance and CSR, which have been traditionally overlooked by political 
sciences, become essential in the study of public governance. Drawing on the 1990s debates on 
making ‘better’, ‘reflexive’, and ‘smarter’ regulation, the Regulatory Capitalism scholarship 
stresses the role of transparency as the central legal principles for steering, rather than obliging, 
corporations to behave in a more environmentally and socially responsible manner. It tends to 
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 According to Lazer (2005) Regulatory Capitalism can be theorised as a networked order where diffusion 
mechanisms account for spread in the scope and depth of regulation. For instance, legal inventions, such as 
the one of securities in the XVII Century; limited liabilities in Germany and antitrust regulation in the US 
had a fundamental role in shaping the emergence of contemporary mega-corporations (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000; Braithwaite 2008). According to Braithwaite’s account, throughout the 20th Century, the risk 
connected with ever larger chemical and pharmaceutical industries; financial scandals and bubbles that 
shaken investors’ trust; incidents that killed hundreds of people; etc., created more public demand for better 
business regulation. State regulation and private regulation on the other hand, created even larger 
pharmaceutical, chemical, financial corporations. John Braithwaite showed that at the basis of the shift from 
welfare capitalism to regulatory capitalism there is a long and stratified historical process, at every stage of 
this which both markets and the state became stronger, enlarged in scope and transition density (Braithwaite 
and Drahos 2000; Braithwaite 2008). The author argues that this process of ‘corporatisation’ of capitalism 
made easier for the national states to collect taxes and, through those revenues, made possible to fund the 
welfare state and the provision of a number of public services. In a reciprocal causation, state regulation has 
created large corporations, but large corporations also enabled the rise of regulatory states. For instance, 
legal inventions, such as the security in the XVII Century, limited liabilities in Germany and antitrust 
regulation in the US had a fundamental role in shaping the emergence of contemporary mega-corporations 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Braithwaite 2008). According to Braithwaite’s account, throughout the 20th 
Century, the risk connected with ever larger chemical and pharmaceutical industries; financial scandals and 
bubbles that shaken investors’ trust; incidents that killed hundreds of people; etc., created more public 
demand for better business regulation. State regulation and private regulation on the other hand, created even 
larger pharmaceutical, chemical, financial corporations.  
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explain the emergence of mandatory CSA not as an example of business ‘self-regulation’ but rather 
as one of the key features of this new regime of global and international regulation, based on a 
meta-regulatory approach. According to this perspective, the latter can be considered as a 
fundamental regulatory tool of a broader responsive strategy to turn ‘markets in vice into markets in 
virtue’55 (Braithwaite 2008; Parker 2002).  
This growing body of literature has represented a useful development in attracting more 
attention to various elements of post-national corporate regulatory law. However, despite some 
encouraging developments (see for instance Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006), it is still under-
theorised and fragmented. In particular it struggles to convincingly overcome a number of pre-
defined dichotomies between ‘private’ and ‘public’; ‘agency’ and ‘structure’; ‘national’ and 
‘international’, etc. Furthermore, with the weakening of dominant law-and-economics ideas, this 
approach based on a ‘smart mix’ of private and public, voluntary and mandatory rules  has become 
increasingly mainstream in many regulatory areas. It is likely to become conventional wisdom, the 
‘new standard’ in business regulation. In fact, many of the authors tend to perceive their position as 
government consultants, providing policy-makers with the best solutions and the latest ‘regulatory 
tool’56. However, this proximity to political and economic power risks to create reluctance in 
challenging powerful positions and result in a lack of critical analyses and the broad acceptance the 
‘status quo’. As Zumbansen (2009) pointed out, there has been “a strange turn and usurpation” of 
originally progressive ideas of ‘post-interventionist’, ‘post-regulatory’ law, as expressed by 
concepts such as legal pluralism (de Sousa Santos 2002), ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992) and ‘reflexive’ law (Teubner 1983), which first emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, 
“into a market-oriented functionalist agenda.”  
 
2.3 Linking ‘conflicts’ and ‘structure’. Towards a reflexive socio-legal approach 
The framework deployed by this research to explain the cyclical emergence of CSA 
regulation is drawing on a Bourdieusian reflexive socio-legal approach. More specifically, it has 
benefited from Prof. Mikael Rask Madsen’s outline of a reflexive sociology of the 
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 Braithwaite noted that “if vice is perceived by large sections of the community, advocacy of virtue will be 
a reaction that in a market society will run to a market in virtue. […] Self-regulation can work well during 
the period of upswing into virtue; its failure during the descend into vice becomes an opportunity for 
responsive escalation to tough enforcement that sets new benchmarks for the next upswing. When this work, 
we get a higher and smarter ceiling through which the lead producers ascend, setting new expectations for 
the ethical laggards.” (Braithwaite 2008: 61) 
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 See for example the elaboration of concepts such as ‘risk-based regulation’; ‘better regulation’; ‘cost-
benefit analysis’ and ‘impact assessment analysis’ (see Baldwin and Cave 2011) 
55 
 
internationalization of law and attempted to further develop it (Bourdieu 1986; Madsen and 
Dezalay 2002; Madsen 2006; Madsen 2011). Rather than a Bourdieusian study of CSA regulation, 
reflexivity has been used in this research as an over-arching strategy in conjunction with  studies of 
Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR); Corporate Sustainability and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Crouch 2006, 2009 and 2011; Graz 2006; Graz 
and Nolke 2008; Streeck 2011; Paterson 2009; Koch 2011)
57
.  
The aim of this approach is to trespass the lines that characterise the current literature on 
CSA regulation. In fact, as I showed in the literature review, one of the consequences of the 
growing complexity and expansion of non-financials is that the literature struggles to deal with such 
an interdisciplinary and multi-layered subject. First of all, there is the basic difficulty of dealing 
with a newly emerging area of regulation, which can be situated at the crossroads of several 
disciplines, including: management; accounting; environmental studies; human rights; labour law; 
climate change; etc. Furthermore, there is the   complexity of studying a ‘fluid’ transnational 
regulation, which is transforming ad infinitum making the boundaries of such subject institutionally, 
territorially and content-wise dynamic. Any comprehensive exploration of CSA has to be adjusted 
to the indeterminacy of the research object, producing cross-pollination between the many 
components of CSA  without being hampered by pre-defined distinctions between ‘social’ and 
‘economic’; ‘private’ and ‘public’; ‘law’ and ‘politics’; ‘national’ and ‘international’. A 
Bourdieusian reflexive ‘polycentric approach’ contains untapped intellectual resources to explore 
undergoing regulatory transformations not excluding any of the co-producers of these changes. It 
contributes, above all, to overcome the main challenge that characterises the current literature on the 
regulation of sustainability reporting, namely, the definition of the object of study.  
Although Bourdieu never wrote about accounting, his sociological conceptualisations have 
been increasingly used in some of the research areas making up the current debate about CSA, 
without ever being applied directly to the issue of non-financial or sustainability reporting. Critical 
accountants appear increasingly interested in Bourdieu’s conceptualisations (see Neu and Ocampo 
2007; Everett 2004; Free and Macintosh 2009). Though, “the majority of the Bourdieusian studies 
do not mobilise his core concepts of field, capital and habitus holistically” (Malsh et al. 2011: 220). 
Interestingly, a recent review of Bourdieu’s ‘translation’ into the accounting literature reveals that 
none of the articles reviewed concern social and environmental accounting and CSR matters (Malsh 
et al. 2011: 221). The methodology developed by Bourdieu is exercising a similarly growing allure 
on the study of international relations (as recently demonstrated Rebecca Adler-Nissen’s Bourdieu 
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 This is consistent with Bourdieu’s own idea that his contribution should not been perceived as a ‘grand 
sociological theory’ but adapted, modified and practically employed for empirical sociological enquires. 
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in International Relations (2012) but see also Katzenstein 1996; Buger and Villumsen 2007; 
Williams 2007; Merand and Pouliot 2008; Leander 2011) and European studies (Saurugger 2009; 
Georgakakis 2010; Kauppi 2012). Bourdieu’s research framework has also attracted a remarkable 
attention in the area of organisational and managerial studies ever since the 1980s. Though, the 
latter has been ‘mediated’ by the immediate success and ubiquity of the idea of ‘field’, 
conceptualised as ‘organisational field’ by US neo-institutionalist scholars (see DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991: 64). Other central concepts, like ‘habitus’, have been less frequently employed. 
Therefore, it has been noted that “despite some promising steps in the right direction, organizational 
analysis has yet to exploit fully the theoretical and empirical possibilities” of a Bourdieu-based 
approach (see Emirbayer and Johnson 2007).  
The opus of Bourdieu also inspired a further strand of studies that recently emerged in the 
context of international law, economics and politics (Salento 2003 and 2004; Bigo 2006; Dezalay 
and Madsen 2006; Madsen 2011; Dezalay and Madsen 2012). Drawing on this promising ‘Law in 
Society’ approach, I contend that the most significant contribution that a Bourdieusian approach can 
offer to this socio-legal study of CSA regulation does not consist in the selective translation of 
concepts such as field, habitus and capital but in their use as a holistic set of ‘thinking tools’ (tools 
which are already widely used in Sociology). However, their explanatory potential can only reveal 
itself understanding such tools in conjunction with Bourdieu’s underlying epistemological 
assumption: the notion – and the practice – of a reflexive sociology. This ‘predisposition’ is missing 
in most recent applications of Bourdieu’s concepts to the areas closely related to CSA, running the 
risk of producing inflexible and structuralist interpretations of institutional change and reproduction.  
Therefore, the rest of this section will begin by introducing these epistemological 
assumptions together with some key analytical concepts (e.g. field, illusio, habitus, nomos, etc.) that 
will be used – in conjunction with the work of other scholars – to explain the cyclical multi-levels 
emergence of CSA regulation in Europe. 
 
Epistemological assumptions: reflexivity and practice 
First of all, Bourdieu’s reflexivity differs from the ones developed by other contemporary 
scholars like Ulrich Beck and Antony Giddens (Beck, Guiddens and Lash 1994). The latter is an 
attempt to describe the condition of individuals in contemporary society, while the former is a 
preliminary condition for the production of scientific sociological knowledge. It also takes a critical 
stance against Luhmann’s thinking in terms of system theory, which has originated ideas of 
‘reflexive law’ that are increasingly influential in the current debate about transnational corporate 
57 
 
law and CSR
58. For Bourdieu, a reflexive approach “signifies a scientific process of uncovering the 
agents’ orientations, and the predispositions shaping their habits and practices.” (Madsen and 
Dezalay 2002: 190) The key aim of this ‘reflexive’ strategy is to construct a scientifically more 
autonomous object of research which is not based on intuitive readings or readily available 
classifications. The origins of this approach, which Bourdieu has progressively elaborated through 
his life, lays in his dissatisfaction with his initial scientific position, based on the epistemological 
notion that all scientific knowledge is constructed. Already at the end of the 1960s, he started to 
look for a way to ‘objectivise the research object’, meaning to study a certain social practice in a 
way that incorporates objective structures and subjective phenomena in a dialectical relationship. 
This ‘reflexive’ understanding of sociological knowledge has great epistemological implications. 
According to Bourdieu, the social universe exists both as ‘social structures’ and ‘mental structures’ 
(Bourdieu 1984; 1996). The former are systems of distribution of resources (various forms of 
capitals e.g. material; symbolic; cultural; economic); while the latter are systems through which the 
actors classify practical activities into subjective categories e.g. feelings, thoughts, taste, judgements 
and decisions. According to the author, the social universe exists in this dual space. It is in between 
these two dimensions – objective systems of positions and subjective systems of dispositions – that 
social practices are to be found and scientifically studied.  
Accordingly, a reflexive approach calls for a double reading that allows the researcher to 
complete a systematic empirical analysis of the social and historical conditions governing the 
possibility for specific practices (such as the social practice of company sustainability reporting) to 
come about. In more practical terms, Bourdieu suggests researchers to operate what he calls a 
‘double rupture’. A search for objectivisation, rather than objectivity, which entails: on the one 
hand, a critical examination of the dominant academic pre-constructions of the specific subject of 
study (a critical analysis of the way a certain subject area has been constructed); on the other hand, 
a break also with the researcher’s own assumptions (a critical examination of his application of 
certain distinctions and ideas often due to his own background and academic affinity). This process 
of double examination continues through the whole research and should lead to become self-
critically aware of often well hidden interests and pre-understanding, including one’s own.  
The need for a double rupture led to a more specific methodological tool that characterises 
reflexive sociology, namely the call for a ‘double historicisation’. This is linked with the constant 
trans-historical concern of Bourdieu. He questions the parallel historical emergence of all thoughts 
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Peer Zumbansen on transnational corporate law; Larry Catà Backer on business and human rights; Andrew 
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and practices building the ‘tradition’ in a certain subject area of research. The aim is not limited to 
relativise such tradition, putting it into a historical context; it also implies “giving back their 
necessity by tearing them out of the indeterminacy which stems from a false externalisation and 
relating them back to the social conditions of their genesis.” (Bourdieu 1996: 298) This very tiring 
yet rewarding process of carefully questioning both the research object and the academic 
construction of the object has never been more urgent. As Colin Crouch maintains, “In our 
normatively fragmented societies values can only emerge from dispute and struggle.” (2011: 180) 
Although we live in times of significant power struggles and radical transformations, it is patent that 
we cannot count on conceptual frameworks that are able to adequately capture and frame them. 
However, there is little public debate about current disputes and struggles. In the fields of 
economics, accounting and law, closely related to questions of CSA regulation, the conventional 
wisdom is still deeply rooted in the post-war conventional wisdom: this quarter of century of 
uninterrupted growth from the 1950s to the mid-1970s “still dominates our ideas and expectations 
of what modern capitalism is, or could and should be. This in spite of the fact that, in the light of the 
turbulence that followed, [it] should be recognised as truly exceptional.” (Streeck 2011: 5) 
Outlining a theory of social practices based on his empirical observations, Bourdieu had the 
merit of providing researchers with an analytical apparatus constructed around a series of inter-
related and fairly open-ended concepts, enabling a complex assessment of the different dimensions 
of modern societies (Madsen and Dezalay 2002: 190). This construction can be roughly categorised 
as belonging to the ‘differentiation theory’, developed in particular by central figures of the 
sociological tradition like Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons. The underlying idea is that social 
changes from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ society constitute a process of progressive differentiation 
from ‘less’ to ‘more’ structured societies, which Bourdieu identifies with the emergence of various 
semi-autonomous fields of social practice
59
 (e.g. the legal field; the economic field; the journalistic 
field; etc.). However, the author goes beyond this classic functionalist tradition. He characterises 
‘fields’ not as contained or closed entities, rather as fairly open relational spaces of more specific 
and specialised areas of practices. Thus, fields are essentially networks of objective relations 
between ‘players’, which exist apart from the consciousness of the individuals but, at the same time, 
they only exist because of the players’ genuine belief in the necessity of the field and in their 
interest in participating in this ‘playing field’. This belief of the actors implies what Bourdieu calls 
                                                          
59
 Bourdieu defines a field as: “A network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These 
positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their 
occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the 
distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that 
are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, 
homology, etc).” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97) 
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illusio, an immediate adherence to the structures of the field which leads individuals to stop 
questioning them and their habitual position in the game (habitus).  
This peculiar mix of dynamism and structuralism, what Bourdieu calls structural 
constructivism, is what makes his conceptualisations so attractive and analytically useful in a world 
marked by dramatic social changes and transformations. His approach is extremely flexible and can 
be adapted to explain “the most profoundly buried structures constituting the legal universe and the 
‘mechanisms’ which tend to ensure its reproduction and transformation (Madsen 2006: 114; 
Bourdieu 1996: 7). This is a crucial difference not only with classical functionalist theories, but also 
with contemporary ‘system theory’ à la Luhmann, which are based on much less dynamic and 
inclusive structures of systems and sub-systems. Fields are instead transitory configurations that 
Bourdieu uses as analytical tools and that could be compared to magnets. Terdiman (1987: 806) 
notes, “Like a magnet, a social field exerts a force upon all those who come within its range. But 
those who experience these ‘pulls’ are generally not aware of their source. As is true with 
magnetism, the power of a social field is inherently mysterious. Bourdieu's analysis seeks to explain 
this invisible but forceful influence of the field upon patterns of behaviour [...].”   
Along with the notion of ‘field’ and ‘illusio’, reflexive sociology is equipped with a number 
of other ‘thinking tools’, including in particular the concepts of ‘habitus’;’ capital’; ‘symbolic 
power’; ‘nomos’ and ‘symbolic violence’ that I will briefly introduce below.  
 
Key elements of a reflexive sociology 
If the rise of a field implies a degree of structural consistency and autonomy – meaning a set 
of objective and symbolic relations between agents and institutions around increasingly specific 
issues – how and why social structures change or reproduce themselves? This question has been the 
fil rouge of the whole scientific career of Pierre Bourdieu. Building on the scholarship of other 
major authors, such as Veblen, Shumpeter and above all Weber, he constantly questioned why 
mechanisms of social reproduction are so powerful? Why an individual accepts, seemingly freely, 
to obey to another individual, without the necessarily use of physic violence? What are the social 
functions that cultural practices are performing?  
In order to answer these questions, Bourdieu undertook a series of empirical studies through 
which he elaborated a number of analytical tools that characterise his reflexive sociological 
approach. It is possible to start from the notion of habitus, which he greatly developed from Marcel 
Mauss. This can be broadly defined as the internalised scheme guiding the agents’ behaviour, a 
‘practical sense’ which is constructed by the actor’s particular and individual trajectory (Bourdieu 
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1977). In very simple terms, each semi-autonomous field of modern life – from science to 
education; from arts to the economy – engenders a specific historically stratified complex of social 
relations in which the actors conduct their everyday practice. Because of this practice they will 
develop a certain disposition for social action shaped by their position in this field (e.g. 
dominant/dominated or orthodox/heterodox). If this disposition is considered together with other 
dispositions the individual has developed through his life-long experience of various social fields it 
becomes a more settled understanding of the social order in general; a ‘practical reason’; a way of 
classify the world, which becomes natural up to the point that it is taken completely for granted. It 
becomes a body movement and a tone of voice. It is what Bourdieu calls a ‘sense of the game’ that 
the individual is playing in the social space. Therefore, he soon stops questioning this set of 
dispositions and positions that characterise his experience of the different fields of practice. By 
doing so he will tend to acknowledge and reproduce the social forms and the common opinions that 
characterise the various fields as ‘self-evident’, even excluding the very possibility of existence of 
other means of material and symbolic production and alternative power relations. Bourdieu has 
revealed – through statistical analyses and extensive researches on several fields – the ways in 
which the internalisation of subjective structures take place. Crucially he has demonstrated their 
affinity with the reproduction of the objective structures of the social world, for instance in his 
famous study of the cultural heritage in France, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of 
Taste (1984). 
However, it is critical to wipe out a paradoxical and superficial interpretation of Bourdieu’s 
oeuvre as dominated by the fatality of social reproduction. Instead, I would claim that his greatest 
contribution is in a constant tension towards a better understanding of the factors of change and 
transformation (Boyer 2003).  
First of all, the habitus is not merely the product of the social world. It also produces 
incessantly the social world in a dialectical process. In sum, it is both a structured structure and a 
structuring structure. As Madsen and Dezalay note, “The notion of habitus is a significant step 
away from individualism towards a greater understanding of how the human mind is socially 
structured.” (2002: 193) Furthermore, fields are not working as coherent systems systematically 
pursuing a precise social objective. Despite the level of relative autonomy and structural 
consistency of each field, they change both because of external and internal opening that question 
and re-define social hierarchies and power. Competition within the field will always result in 
transformations of the field itself and changes in bordering fields tend to have a continuous 
potential influence on the field. From an empirical point of view, it is critical to discover “which 
forces define the various fields, those trying to redefine them, and thereby also the boundaries of the 
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field.” (Madsen and Dezalay 2002: 193) Fields are open fluid spaces of regulated struggles, of 
competition, of only partial yet permanent revolution, centred on the valuation of the capitals 
possessed by the actors.  
Notably, this struggle is, above all, about what Bourdieu calls the nomos of the field. This 
Greek word means ‘operate a division’ and in Bourdieu’s oeuvre it signifies the ‘law’ of the field, 
the principle of vision and of division which is fitting a certain field of practice and that is always 
potentially at stake but rarely actually challenged. This is a crucial di-vision that marks both the 
internal logic of the field (the relative internal coherence) and its nature as a semi-autonomous space 
of practice
60
. A di-vision that emerges when “the ‘sense of the game’ is structured over time 
reflecting different social configurations and, thereby, historically different sets of “rules of the 
game” or nomos which form a common illusio of the agents of the field.” (Madsen 2011: 265) The 
nomos is usually taken-for-granted and works as a mechanism that enables the translation of the 
external world into the specific code and issues of the field. On the other hand, the nomos is the 
result of the particular ‘symbolic economy’ that the actors have contributed to shape over time in 
terms of valorisation of a specific capital or a combination of capitals (economic, political, legal, 
social, etc.). As we shall see, the study maintains that the nomos of the accounting field has been 
shaped, through different historical stages, valorising material, economic forms of capital over other 
forms of immaterial capital. 
The notion of capital
61, together with the ones of field and habitus is central in Bourdieu’s 
analytical framework. It allows to empirically studying the dynamic relation between fields and 
habitus. It presents some important differences and similarities with its use in Marx
62
. The main 
difference is that it is not centred on the economic capital like in Marx, but on the idea that capital 
awards power in a certain field and are hence relative and corresponding to a particular 
configuration of the field. He pioneered a more complex and extended idea of capital as ‘social 
relation’ constituting a certain historical and space determined social configuration. In this sense, 
the capital is a ‘social energy’ which does not exists and do not produce effects other than within 
the field where it is produced and re-produced, because its efficacy and value are attached to the 
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laws (nomos) specific of a certain field (see Bourdieu 1984: 127). It means that not all the given 
resources – either embodied (habitus) or objectivised (economic or some cultural forms of capital) – 
attached to an actor are active everywhere at the same time. It is the field that determines which 
assets have “currency” as they are pertinent to the existing configuration of the field: for instance, a 
talented musician does not (necessarily) make a good husband or a capable businessman
63
. 
Practically, the objective position of an actor in a field is defined by the amount of tangible or 
intangible assets (capitals) that command access to the specific profits that are at stake in that field. 
Therefore, the competition within the field is usually on the accumulation of the forms of capital 
that are relevant for that specific field, more rarely it is about the definition of the field itself 
(nomos) and therefore of what has currency in that field (capital). The similarity with Marx exists in 
that Bourdieu intended this new notion of capital as the basis for a new theory of social classes
64
, 
affirming that in our societies classes have not disappeared and that the social position of 
individuals has to be determined looking not just at the volume of economic capital he disposes but 
also at other immaterial and intangible assets he can dispose of.  
In particular, Bourdieu claimed that three forms of capital can be accumulated in our 
societies: economic capital; cultural capital and social/symbolic capital. The first has its origin in 
economic studies, although Bourdieu made a more sociological use of it. The cultural capital was 
not completely new either – greatly elaborated from managerial notions of ‘human capital’ 
elaborated by authors such as Kenneth J. Arrow and, in particular, Garry S. Becker. The latter, 
known also as symbolic power and it is possibly the most Bourdieusian of the three. It constitutes 
another crucial reflexive ‘thinking tool’ elaborated with the aim of better exploring the subjective – 
structuring – level of the field in conjunction with the analysis of its structures. Since the individual 
is socialised and can understand and make sense of the world only through symbolic (mental) 
structures, the ‘symbolic power’ should be seen as a very special form of capital65. Conceptually, 
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 As Champagne and Christin (2004: 128) note, this idea has been particularly perceptive because Bourdieu 
elaborated it in a period in which most sociologists were analysing the end of social classes and of class 
conflicts. This relational conceptualisation of capital has also been extremely original as it breaks with the 
dominant ‘realist’ and ‘substantialist’ approach to social classes defined as concrete totalities  
65
 This concept has been progressively elaborated by Bourdieu in different phases.This is typical of 
Bourdieu’s way of elaborating his sociological concepts. They were rarely defined a priori and more often 
were the result of the need and urgency of having a research tool rather than the need of filling a theoretical 
gap. In this case which the elaboration of the idea of symbolic (capital; violence; struggles; forms) has to do 
with his early ethnographic studies centred around extremely fragile concepts of ‘honorability’; ‘prestige’; 
‘credit’; ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’. 
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this is the power of transforming the world: “[B]y transforming the words for naming it, by 
producing new categories of perceptions and judgement, and by dictating a new vision of social 
divisions and distributions.” (Terdiman in Bourdieu 1987:839) This concept adds to the idea of a 
social space in which dominant positions in the fields are always in a precarious situation, as they 
depend not only on the availability of economic capital but also on the availability of immaterial 
forms of capital that can also be accumulated or dilapidated or even get across to someone else. As 
we shall see in the next chapters, this very ‘old idea’ – based on notions of ‘credit’, ‘reputation’ or 
‘honorability’ – of intangible or intellectual capital has been increasingly re-discovered in terms of 
‘non-financial’ and ‘intangible’ forms of capital. Bourdieu already observed that this ‘immaterial’ 
capital is not purely symbolic, in the sense that it tends to be converted into ‘material’ capital. In his 
idea of a ‘general economy of practices’ he highlighted the existence of a circulation of material and 
immaterial goods in which cultural and symbolic capitals have the power of multiplying economic 
leverage.  
The idea of symbolic power is closely related to a last research tool, the notion of symbolic 
violence. This can be defined as the power to construct and impose mental structures, categories of 
perception and thought, which become institutionalised in social and symbolic structures. As such 
they present themselves as matter of fact, as naturally given. As we shall see, Bourdieu understands 
law and the legal field – in the shadow of the state – as a sphere of extreme symbolic dominance, 
which literally grants the ‘right’ to exercise symbolic violence, in addition to the exercise of more 
legitimate forms of power (see Madsen and Dezalay 2002: 194-5).  
This study will attempt to use some of the tools elaborated by Bourdieu – in conjunction 
with the literature – to explain the emergence of sustainability reporting as a new transnational field 
of law. In methodological terms, this process of trans-nationalisation of law can be defined as “a 
shift from studying the allegedly international legal field to studying the internationalisation of law 
in terms of the rise of increasingly more semi-autonomous legal fields at the crossroads of the 
national and international.” (Madsen 2006: 114) The first step towards a reflexive understanding of 
CSA regulation is its definition as a field of research.  
 
2.4 Exploring the transnational regulation of sustainability reporting as a field 
of research  
As we have seen so far, the puzzle of regulating corporate sustainability accounting in 
Europe is closely related to broader questions about the sustainability of our economic model, the 
force of the law; the power and accountability of large corporations and the strength of European 
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democracies. The aim of this research is to study CSA as a social practice in a relational space, the 
‘accounting field’, which produces symbolic power.  
The starting point of this research has been the very definition of CSA – or, better said, its 
lack of a definition – in relation to the growing relevance that this area is gaining, at different levels 
of regulation and through varying modes of governance. In fact, despite its spread among 
academics, business leaders, NGOs and regulators, one of the most intriguing and revealing feature 
of CSA is its lack of a precise and generally accepted definition (Bassen and Kovacs 2008). 
According to the summary of discussion of the EU ‘Workshops on disclosure of ESG information’, 
this practice “takes different forms and can be directed at diverse audiences. It covers, among other 
things: formal CSR or sustainability reports, chapters integrated in annual accounts, digital 
disclosure, advertising, information on packaging, internal communication to employees, subject 
specific publications, and responses to rating agencies or buyers questionnaires.” (Commission 
2009: 1) However, for the scope of this study, I would restrict the field of research to the regulation 
of formal reporting of extra-financial information prepared by large corporations operating within 
the EU area. That would include both non-financial statements integrated in the annual report and 
external, ‘stand-alone’ reports. The rationale for this choice has been to reduce the extreme variety 
of possible issues that should have been otherwise considered and construct a more coherent field of 
research. Furthermore, large corporations' reporting activity has been, by far, the practice that has 
attracted more regulatory attention and public debates. As Gray noted, there is a 'combative' element 
in this kind of reporting practice, related with fundamental questions of corporate power and 
accountability, which differs from disclosure by public authorities or NGOs (Gray 2010a). It is, 
also, the most common and well established form of sustainability accounting, a fact which made 
possible to assess its development over time (see Chapter 3).  
Despite its recent development, CSA is still a magmatic and fluid practice as compared to 
the well-established area of financial accounting. The content of such reports might concern matters 
as diverse as carbon emission; labour rights; biodiversity; water usage; health and safety; human 
rights; diversity; bribery and corruption. Furthermore, it also cuts across issues related to accounting 
for intangibles assets, such as reputation and brand value; HR and training. Therefore, as Rob Gray 
maintains, “to try and talk about ‘social accounting’ as a singularity is to invite confusion.” (Gray et 
al. 2009: 546) Extra-financial aspects of corporate performance are often specific to each particular 
company’s operations. Therefore, reporting varies from company to company, resulting in 
inconsistencies across them. Even more fundamentally, it is the nature of non-financial information 
that makes their measurement difficult (see Lev 2001, Bassen and Kovacs 2008: 184; Cooper 
2010).  
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Instead of simply choosing one of the many existing definitions of CSA
66
 and justify my 
choice or even trying to offer a new definition, I would try first to analyse CSA as a practice in 
search of a definition. The analysis of the language that is conventionally used by the actors 
operating in this area to define this practice is extremely interesting for the scope of this study and it 
has provided the first hints to develop my hypotheses. The objective of this approach is to break up 
the 'official story' about the rise of CSA into many overlapping and, often, opposing texts, versions 
and sources. Using a 'reflexive' methodology to the study of CSA would show that “these 
conflicting narratives ultimately reflect its many stakes, as well as they highlight the central 
conflicts of its historical progression.” (Madsen 2006: 38) As different groups of actors have 
conflicting normative ideas about which information are relevant to the measurement of corporate 
performance, it is the collective process of shaping the very meaning of this social practice that 
becomes the central element of study. The key contribution of this research becomes to juxtapose 
and critically assess the main responses to the question: “what regulating CSA means?”  
The conclusion that I have reached has been that the ‘construction’ – we could even say the 
‘invention’ – of this form of accounting has historically come about through a twofold ‘negative’ 
definition. Notably, CSA has been often referred to as ‘non-financial' reporting. Crucially for our 
study, this has been the definition officially adopted by many regulators, including EU policy-
makers (e.g. 2011 CSR Communication; 2011 EU Single Market Act; 2012 Corporate Governance 
Action Plan). Secondly, this practice has been constructed as ‘non-law’, as taking place ‘over and 
above the law’ (COM 2002). Both aspects are extremely interesting from a socio-legal point of view 
and they will represent the cornerstones of this study.  
 
On the distinction between ‘financial’ and ‘non-financial’. The nomos of the 
accounting field  
I should first consider the implications of CSA regulation being defined as ‘non-financial’. 
At first, this negative definition appears as the most neutral and flexible one, chosen purposely by 
regulators to avoid any decision about the specific content of such reports. It allows new topics and 
instances to be added in, taking into account the fact that this is a practice 'in definition'. However, it 
is more than that: it sets out an implicit distinction between ‘financial’ and ‘non-financial’ aspects 
in the assessment of companies’ performance. Such divide is conventionally taken for granted by 
accountants, managers and investors (habitus). However, I argue that it plays a key role as a 
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 For instance Gazdar (2007: 2) defines ‘non-financials’ as “resources of significant value, that are rarely 
quantifiable but that both account for the gap between book and market capitalisation as also contribute 
greatly to corporate reputation.” 
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structuring principle for the accounting field as a whole and that its effects go way beyond 
accounting.  
Looking at accounting using the reflexive analytical equipment outlined in the previous 
section, I would maintain that the notion of nomos provides a powerful analytical tool that sheds 
light on the distinction between ‘financial’ and ‘non-financial’ accounting. This distinction 
constitutes the nomos of the accounting field: the internal logic of the field, its ‘law’ and, 
eventually, its fundamental principle of internal coherence, of vision and di-vision for those 
individuals active on the field. The study maintains that the serious difficulty that regulators find 
today in settling questions of meaning and boundaries of CSA is, to a large extent, due to the 
relation between the accounting field and the economy. In fact, this arbitrary division is constructive 
of a 'vision of the world’ as split in two, financial aspects versus ‘the others’, structuring the 
economic field. The main practical implication of this distinction can be easily explained: it is a 
way for the economic field to filter information economically (financially) valuable from ‘the rest’. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, during three decades the rest has been traditionally 'left out' all 
together, made 'invisible' (illusio) in a broad, indistinct area: human rights and human capital; 
environmental and employee-related matters; etc. Often, in economics, this area has been referred to 
with another key word: ‘externalities’67 – which is particularly telling as it resembles the idea of 
extra-, both external and extraneous, that de facto characterises the 'invisible half' of the accounting 
world.   
Drawing on Colin Crouch’s definition of CSR68, a working definition that might better 
clarify what I mean with corporate sustainability accounting (CSA)
69
 is that this is a form of 
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 Colin Crouch defines ‘externalities’ as “results of market transactions that are not themselves embodied in 
such transactions.” (2006: 1534) 
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 Colin Crouch claims that CSR “can best be mainstreamed within the wider social science literature if it is 
defined as firms voluntarily assuming responsibility for their externalities [...].” (2006: 1534) Crouch is one 
of the first non-economists that suggests linking CSR with externalities and his definition differs from that of 
others that see CSR more in terms of large companies becoming accountable not only to shareholders but to 
all the multiple stakeholders impacted by their behaviour (Fraser 2005). However, as Crouch points out, “the 
concept of ‘stakeholder’ is suspect, unless it refers to the possessors of legally or substantively guaranteed 
rights within a corporation, rights that can neither be reduced to market transactions nor removed at will by a 
firm (i.e. rights to codetermination enjoyed by employees and embedded in either legislation or guaranteed 
by collective agreements). In fact, he argues that if a right derives directly from a market contract (as with 
customers), the concept of stakeholder is redundant, if it depends on a firm voluntarily deciding to offer it, it 
does not comprise a stake, as it can be withdrawn. Finally, if the term is used in an exhortatory sense
68
, 
“exhortatory concepts do not have a place in scientific analysis.” (Crouch 2006: 1535) 
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 ‘Sustainability reporting’ is the way the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the most widely used 
framework for non-financial reporting worldwide and in Europe, calls this reporting practice. Although, the 
link between ‘CSR’ reporting and ‘sustainability’ has been also criticised (see Gray 2009). It has been argued 
that company-level CSR/ triple-bottom-line reporting activities have little or nothing to do with sustainability 
issues. The word ‘accounting’ is here used to stress that this practice belong to the broader field of corporate 
accounting (regulation). At time, the study also uses the expression ‘social and environmental’ reporting, 
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reporting by which firms take into account the externalities produced by their market behaviour (cf. 
Crouch 2006). They might do so ‘voluntarily’ or as the result of external formal or informal rules 
significantly constraining their behaviour
70
. However, things are rapidly changing. In today’s global 
capitalism, business’ externalities have become increasingly relevant also from an economic point 
of view and they cannot be ignored any longer. As already revealed by a famous report published 
by Deloitte in collaboration with The Economist Intelligence Unit, In the dark: what boards and 
executives don’t know about the health of their business (2004), in recent years it has become 
increasingly apparent that financial statements do not provide an adequate picture of the soundness 
of a company. At every series of corporate crises, scandals and financial turmoil, the arbitrary 
division financial-non-financial has become increasingly criticised and blurred. Traditional 
accounting standards are now widely seen as inadequate, even by a growing section of the 
profession, constituting the object of continuous negotiations and professional delegitimation.  
It is this ‘dark’ area that today has been re-discovered and re-invented under the broad label 
of ‘sustainability reporting’, as different political and socio-economic forces are struggling for 
shaping and promoting their interests through its emergence. As I have argued above, there are 
three main rationales supporting the case for mandatory non-financial reporting: social 
accountability; global sustainability and economic accounting (section 2.1). No wonder, the practice 
of sustainability accounting is conventionally defined as disclosure of Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) information. They broadly respond to the different rationality and instances of 
the main socio-economic groups of actors that are interested in shaping CSA regulation: NGOs, 
trade unions and investors. The task that standard-setting bodies and law-makers are facing is to 
balance these instances and reconcile the different positions. The challenge is to design a regulatory 
framework for companies’ disclosure that would take into account both social and environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
particularly because the concept of integrating ‘social’; ‘environmental’ and other non-financials (in 
particular ‘intellectual capital’ into ‘sustainability reporting’ has emerged only recently. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, during forty years of non-financial reporting, it has emerged only during the last decade. 
This study uses ‘non-financial’; ‘sustainability’ and ‘social and environmental’ broadly as synonyms..In this 
perspective, the apparently trivial act of giving a name to this accounting practice has rather transformative 
meaning. That is one of the main reasons why I decided to use the notion of CSA. While adopting the 
expression 'non-financial reporting' (NFR) could have been seen as more adherent to the way (EU) regulators 
call this practice, it would also meant to passively accept or even re-enforce this harmful (di)vision of the 
accounting field. Although it could be criticised, by using the term 'sustainability accounting' this research 
aims to overcome this arbitrary distinction. 
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 As we shall see, in the contemporary CSR debates this divide voluntary or not has created much confusion. 
According to the reflexive sociological approach adopted by this research, whether CSR should be voluntary 
or not is considered itself a matter of struggles to define what CSR is. Furthermore, this struggle is far from 
over, as recent developments towards mandatory non-financial disclosure suggest. Lastly, Crouch wrote this 
definition in 2006, possibly having in mind the EU definition of CSR as ‘over and above the law’. This very 
definition has been eventually modified, in 2011, further justifying a general re-thinking about the position 
that CSR should be classified as ‘voluntary’. 
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protection as well as long-term economic growth (Porter and Kramer 2006; Eccles and Saltzman 
2011; Fasterling 2011).  
As I have already mentioned, in order to go beyond the conventional explanations of the 
emergence of sustainability reporting regulation, the research object should be addressed as a 
historical and social construction. Therefore, the research strategy adopted by this study implies a 
‘double historicisation’, meaning a historicisation of the object of the study, the regulation of CSA 
in Europe, which has been mainly developed in the next chapter; but also a historicisation of the 
‘tradition’, the academic construction of the object, which should be already sketched out here and 
continued through the whole study. From this starting point, it is possible to empirically research 
the disappearance of social accounting from the early 1980s until the late 1990s and its re-
emergence, following the course in which this subject area has been constructed.  
Looking at the accounting ‘tradition’, this has been constructed on the notion of economic 
calculus as a rational technique for efficient decision making. Major sociologists and economists 
like Weber, Shumpeter and Sombart had already stressed the close relation between calculability; 
accounting and the emergence of capitalist societies and modern rationality (see Carruthers and 
Espelands 1991). According to Weber, "The most general presupposition for the existence of this 
present-day capitalism is that of rational capital accounting as the norm for all large industrial 
undertakings which are concerned with provision for everyday wants" (Weber [1927] 1981: 276). 
Also Shumpeter argued that: "Capitalism develops rationality and adds a new edge to it in two 
interconnected ways. First it exalts the monetary unit – not itself a creation of capitalism – into a 
unit of account. That is to say, capitalist practice turns the unit of money into a tool of rational cost-
profit calculations, of which the towering monument is double-entry book-keeping (...). We will 
notice that, primarily a product of the evolution of economic rationality, the cost-profit calculus in 
turn reacts upon that rationality; by crystallizing and defining numerically, it powerfully propels the 
logic of enterprise" (Schumpeter 1950: 123). Sombart claimed about double-booking that, "The 
very concept of capital is derived from this way of looking at things; one can say that capital, as a 
category, did not exist before double-entry bookkeeping. Capital can be defined as that amount of 
wealth which is used in making profits and which enters into the accounts" (Sombart 1953: 38). In 
building on this tradition, however, most of the studies overwhelmingly stress the technical uses of 
accounting as a system of purposive rationality, overlooking the idea that accounting has been a 
‘creative’ force beyond the emergence of economic capital and modern capitalism. As Prof. Stefano 
Zambon pointed out, “this restrictive view ignores the increasingly important role of accounting as 
a symbolic device and thus closes off the opportunity to examine the many social arenas in which 
the calculative practices of accounting have emerged as significant.” (2002: 26) Only a cluster of 
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prominent critical accountants have started to contend that “accounting is much more constructive 
than reflective of social values; more active than passive in social ordering.” (Fleischman 2004: 18) 
Looking behind the mask of a universal ‘rationality’ and ‘calculability’, prominent authors such as 
Burchell (1980); Hopwood (1983); Hines (1988); Miller (1994) have convincingly demonstrated 
that rather than there being an ‘economic realm’ which is independent of, and pre-existing 
accounting, the relationship is reversed or, at least, much more dialectic
71
.  
Drawing on the reflexive ‘thinking tools’ elaborated by Bourdieu, I should attempt to further 
expand their analysis of the symbolic power of accounting. In particular, the study maintains that 
the accounting field has a historically specific relation with the economic field: there is a structural 
homology between the two fields that will be further considered in the next chapter. That means, in 
Bourdieu’s terms, that there has been an identical structuration of two social spaces over time 
producing specific effects that he notably called ‘imposture légitime’, legitimate imposture. As 
Weber already noted, the accounting practice has been the single most general presupposition for 
modern capitalist economies. However, I would add to this the claim that, exploring the accounting 
field, we are entering a space of ‘symbolic violence’, where professional accountants have 
progressively claimed a monopoly over the socially recognised capacity to render activities, 
individuals and objects, in possession of the specific attributes that are potentially relevant for the 
economic field, capable of evaluation, comparison and hence transformation into economic capital. 
Crucially, the accounting profession has been granted this symbolic power by the state, 
which successfully claimed the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence on a 
determined territory and its population. Nonetheless, this is a major symbolic power that accountant 
exert, as we shall see, in an increasingly autonomous manner. Similarly to lawyers, physicians and 
other professions, the perception of independence and autonomy of the accounting profession is 
important to obtain the social recognition that is at the basis of their role but it is also an illusion, 
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 For instance, Hines (1988) sees accounting as part of society’s battery of reality creating and sustaining 
institutions. She maintains that this practice construct reality, making a valuable resource for those social 
actors wishing to promote a certain version of reality. Therefore she maintains that it is crucial to study the 
role played by various constituencies in shaping and mobilizing changes in accounting standards. Miller and 
Power (1995: 36) noted that, “accounting does not function as a mirror that reflects an underlying economic 
reality, one that law has only to acknowledge and regulate. Rather, the calculative technologies of accounting 
provide financial norms around which complex processes of negotiation of domains and outcomes can take 
place.” As Zambon (2002) points out: “This symbolic power of accounting was first revealed in Burchell et 
al. (1980) which highlighted the problematic nature of the relationship between accounting and decision-
making – a relationship which so far remains uncontested in the wider body of mainstream accounting 
research.” Miller (1994) elaborates on the idea that there are three facets of accounting that contributed to its 
symbolic power. First, its ‘transformatory capacity’: the ability to translate the qualities into quantities that 
‘seek no further referent’; Secondly, its ability to resonate with the language, vocabularies and concerns of 
other bodies of knowledge; the third facet concerns accounting as a constitutive device, that concerns the 
relation between accounting and the economic space. 
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whose first victims are accountants themselves. In fact the total independence of accountants from 
economic and political power is also a social construction, which constantly registers, sustains and 
legitimises a state of power relations. It converts into ‘economic value’ what has value for the 
groups of actors that dominate the economy.  
For example, as the power of trade unions, in the 1970s UK, increased, accountants started 
to consider the possibility of changing their indicators in a way that reflected this shift. Similarly, 
the rise of global institutional investors, in the 1980s and 1990s, led to a symmetric change in 
accounting standards that had specific effects back into the economic field. In fact, the practice of 
recognising specific attributes that are economically valuable is, theoretically, not an end in itself, 
this interpretation of reality is designed to have practical effects in the economic field. Therefore, 
for instance, the standardisation of financial-only accounting has been certainly the effect of a shift 
in corporate power relations in favour of financial actors, however it also legitimised this power and 
locked the victory of shareholders contributing to making shareholder value maximisation the 
guiding principle of managers’ activities. The recognition of accounting standards in the economic 
field and its symbolic power over the economic field mutually re-enforce each others. This 
‘legitimate imposture’ creates trust in the logic of economic rationality and in the universal value of 
economic capital and, at the same time, makes appear accounting as if it was a priori in the ‘natural’ 
laws of the economy
 72
. Therefore, while accounting actually imposes a social order which is, above 
all, a mental order, this imposition is not generally perceived as such. On the contrary, this arbitrary 
order is seen as a ‘matter of fact’.  
Accounting has been one of the most fundamental tools for the establishment of what 
Bourdieu called the ‘well founded illusio’ of neo-classical economics (1997). The author stresses 
that anything that the economic orthodoxy tend to present as a pur donné, a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
reality – such as the notions of ‘economic rationality’, ‘markets’, ‘demand’ and ‘offer’ – is, in fact, 
the product of a social construction that can be attributed only to historical ‘reasons’73. Without 
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 The arbitrary and constructive nature of accounting has been famously illustrated by the episode of 
German car-maker Daimler-Benz that in 1993 became the first German company to be listed at the NYSE 
and it was therefore required to adjust its book from German accounting rules to US GAAP accounting 
standards. The firm had published two sets of annual accounts accounting earnings on the basis of the two 
standards. However, one set under German accounting rules showed profits of 615 million DM, which 
permitted payments of some bonuses, dividends and taxes. On the other hand, the accounting earnings under 
US GAAP for the same year showed a loss of 1.8 million DM and within a year of its US GAAP adoption, 
Daimler Benz announced 20% labour force reduction in its German operations, the firm’s first employee 
layoffs since World War II.  
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 According to Bourdieu (1997), if one goes at the bottom of the work of historical reconstruction of the 
philological and ontological origins of this economic orthodoxy, behind the abstractions of concepts that are 
impossible to define such as ‘markets’, the demand and offer can only be defined in relation with a 
historically contingent state of the offer. A state that is determined by specific social conditions and legal 
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going into the details of the arguments that Bourdieu puts forwards about the economic field there 
are two elements that I want to underline here. The first is that contemporary ideas the economic 
rationality and interests of the actors is nothing else than a specific form of illusio (in the 
Bourdieusian sense of the word) that is not universal per se, although it has reached a universal 
status following the process of economic globalisation. However, like for any other field, this illusio 
only works as the result of the investments and trust of individuals that believe in the ‘economic 
game’. According to Bourdieu, there is not such a thing as the homo oeconomicus. He claims that 
this “anthropologic monster” is a scholastic construction of the economic practice that should be 
replaced with a more scientific notion of habitus oeconomicus. This economic rationality is an 
extremely efficient principle for social action, based on calculation and, in particular, of calculation 
of time, a particularly scarce resource. Therefore, the capacity of accounting of providing a trustful 
measure of economic actions is, above all, settling crucial questions about what has value in the 
economic field.  
Drawing on this perspective, the conventional wisdom that pictures accounting as merely 
reflecting economic conditions appears fundamentally flawed and should be largely reversed. Also 
the distinction between financial and non-financial, rather than a ‘matter of fact’, has to be located 
in a precise historical and social context that marked an identical transformation of the economic 
field and the accounting field, starting from the end of the 1970s. As Sombart had already claimed, 
accounting practices defined capital and capitalism. The most striking consequence of the success 
of this venture has been that economic rationality is widely perceived as ‘universal’ and even 
‘natural’. This makes the pursue of the accumulation of material capital the dominant, if not 
exclusive, rationale that guides today’s social actions, overlooking at the existence of many other 
forms of immaterial values (reputation, consideration, culture) that are “invisible” in our 
materialistic perception of the world. It is only considering this symbolic power of accounting and 
its role in defining what has value that the current debate about integrating non-financial aspects of 
corporate performance appears in its potential relevance. Bourdieu, taking into account various 
forms of capitals, has been able to indicate the antidote to the narrow materialist perspective that 
characterises neo-classic economics, which implicitly considers alternative forms of social 
rationalities as suboptimal solutions. This materialistic illusio has been paradoxically reinforced by 
the fact that counter-hegemonic struggles came to be organised, in the Marxist tradition, most 
frequently, within this materialist and economicist framework (see Burawoy 2012). As Burawoy 
noted, Bourdieu understood that “a classification or representational struggle has to precede class 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
norms that allows that demand to be satisfied. This is why he contends that the notion of ‘economic fields’ is 
more appropriated to study the so-called ‘markets’ 
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struggles, that is class struggles have to be constituted symbolically before they can engage in 
struggles.” (2012: 31)  
 Adopting this perspective, the current debate about CSA regulation appears as one re-
defining corporate responsibilities and liabilities. In fact, corporate accountability and disclosure is 
never an end in itself, rather it is a means to an end (see Power 1997; Newell 2008). Therefore, it is 
crucial to assess what is the actual aim of transparency mechanisms and cui bono (who benefits) 
from changes in its regulation. CSA is therefore about power and conflicts amongst groups of social 
actors, in particular, it concerns the division of rights and responsibilities among states, 
corporations, managers, investors, civil society, etc. (see Pellizzoni 2004; Newell 2008; Mason 
2005). As Colin Crouch (2011:1-2) rightly pointed, the growing recognition, by the giant 
corporations, that they have social and environmental responsibilities that go beyond their market 
role(s) “is just the beginning of the story”.“The fact that corporate responsibility is increasingly 
being seen as a potential form of economic governance, not just of corporate governance, renders it 
explicitly political. However, there is still insufficient discussion and debate on “the political 
implications of major firms shaping regulatory frameworks and taking on social responsibilities that 
go beyond their market activities.” (Crouch 2011: 1). Therefore, besides the internal rationale for 
accounting for non-financials and intangible assets, there is also an external rationale that demands 
the accounting field to respond to external pressures for taking into account corporate externalities.  
These other aspects are closely related to the second ‘negative’ definition of CSA as ‘non-law’. 
 
Law, accounting and symbolic violence. Changing regulation in a transnational 
space 
A central theme of this study is the relation between the nomos of the accounting field, its 
fundamental principle of internal coherence, and formal accounting law. The study implies that they 
rely on two different principles of resources allocation. Accounting principles operate according to 
marginal productivity and on the laws governing the economy as a wealth-creation machine. On the 
other hand, accounting law (should) respond to collective choices of democratic politics. In reality, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, accounting law has been consistently aligned to the nomos of the 
accounting field, re-enforcing the divide between financial and non-financial and addressing the 
latter as a ‘non-law’. Therefore, here the central divide I identified is between law and ‘non-law’, 
which is one of the most debated questions in ‘Law and Society’ studies74. The reference to ‘non-
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 As Lawrence Friedman (1986: 780) provocatively noted “law is far too important to be left to lawyers.” 
The vital interaction between law and non-law is at the hearth of socio-legal researches ever since Durkheim; 
Ehrlich and Gurvitch. For an excellent example of the contemporary socio-legal thought on non-law, one of 
the key references is the work of Jean Carbonnier (2001). 
73 
 
law’ is referred to traditionally ‘voluntary’ non-financial disclosure, presented as a matter of going 
“over and above the law”, as compared to highly regulated financial accounting (see Chapter 3).  
This debate is rooted in one of the most heated controversy in legal history and legal 
philosophy, the one on the ‘essence’ of the corporation. On the one hand, ‘corporatist ‘nominalism’ 
traditionally asserts that the corporation is merely a contractual association of shareholders, in 
opposition to ‘corporate realism’ that claims the legal personality is nothing more than an external 
expression of the real ‘organisational’ personality of the firm in society75. The 1980s’ agency theory 
turn in company law has led to the temporary prevalence of a nominalist perspective. According to 
what is still the dominant view in corporate governance studies (see Soederberg 2010), corporations 
are mere “nexus of contracts” between managers and shareholders, therefore their primary, if not 
sole, responsibility is to create profits respecting the law. More precisely, they have to create value 
for their stockholders, being the latter narrowly defined on the basis of the financial performance of 
listed companies. Accordingly, accounting standards have been developed, during the last three 
decades, as a tool that provides shareholders with the key financial information they need in order 
to be able to discharge their legal role as the ‘owners of the company’. That would largely exclude 
non-financial information from accounting laws, because they were considered not ‘material’ 
information. Therefore, setting the puzzle of how to reconcile the principle of ‘shareholders 
primacy’ with growing pressures for legally binding forms of reporting that take into account the 
externalities (non-financials) produced by companies’ market behaviour has become a key issue in 
company law and CSR studies. In other words, the question is how to reconcile the nomos of the 
field with growing evidence of the regulatory failure of accounting laws, which are not taking into 
account crucial information about both positive and negative corporate externalities.  
However, this is still a superficial analysis of the problem of integrating non-financials into 
accounting regulation. The way I have been looking at this tension could be better understood 
briefly elaborating on Bourdieu’s approach to the study of the legal fields. A comprehensive account 
of Bourdieu’s approach to the ‘legal field’ has been already provided by other authors (Madsen and 
Dezalay 2002; Madsen 2006; Dezalay and Madsen 2012; see, also, Salento 2003 and 2004). The 
only work that Bourdieu entirely dedicated to this subject, The Force of Law (1987), however, does 
not account for his full contribution to Sociology of Law. In fact, his approach must be seen within 
his reflexive sociological framework (Dezalay and Madsen 2012). Namely, Bourdieu places law, its 
institutions and agents, in a broader context, in the larger scheme of law’s interrelationships with 
other social spheres and in particular with the state. Like the field of accounting with respect to the 
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von Savigny 1884). For a comprehensive review of this early debate about various theories of corporate 
personality see Hallis (1930). For a critical overview of the contemporary debate see Iwai (1999).  
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economic field – the legal field has developed a historically specific relation of structural homology 
with the state or, more precisely, with ‘the field of power’76. The latter is a sort of sociological 
‘translation’ of the state: the site where the ‘dominating principles and forces in a given society can 
be found and scientifically revealed. However, as demonstrated by one of his major works, The 
State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power (1999), he does not locate the state where we 
tend to look for it. As Madsen and Dezalay (2002: 194) summarised: rather than a theory of the 
state, Bourdieu’s aim has been to produce an explanatory sociological framework concerned with 
the particular power deriving from the practices in the field of power: the symbolic power. 
Therefore, clearly using Weber as starting point, he defines the state as a political entity that 
successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence. Then, the state 
could be understood as the  “central bank of symbolic power”, which “endorses all acts of 
nomination whereby social divisions and dignities are assigned and proclaimed, that is, promulgated 
as universally valid within the purview of a given territory and population.” (Wacquant in Bourdieu 
1996: xvii-xviii). In practice, Bourdieu perceived the state not simply as a ‘ruling class’ or a set of 
institutions but an arena of struggles that produces nomenclatures, professions, modes of education 
and paths of power in general, exercising ‘symbolic violence’. According to Bourdieu, this ‘field of 
power’ exercises the monopoly over granting the ‘right’ of constructing and imposing dominant 
mental structures, categories of perception and thought, which then become institutionalised as both 
symbolic and social structures, finally presenting themselves as ‘a matter of fact’, as ‘natural’.  
On the basis of this abstract conceptualisation of the state/field of power, it is possible to 
track down the genesis of accounting laws as the by-product of both the legal field and the 
accounting field. As Bourdieu (1987) suggests in The Force of the Law, the law
77
 is a social 
construction, engineered by certain professional groups, the legal agents – jurists, lawyers and law 
professors – that through the centuries have gradually built a strategic position for themselves, in 
the management and evolution of modern national states’ structures. Similarly, I should claim that 
other professions – particularly accountants; auditors and accounting professors – have constructed 
an area of social practice, the accounting field, which developed a crucial position in the 
management and development of modern market economies. As the legal doctrine and, in 
particular, the legal language has a special power of turning social reality into legal reality, 
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forms of power, or different forms of capital. It is also, and inseparably, a field of power struggles among the 
holders of different forms of power, a gaming space in which those agents and institutions possessing enough 
specificcapital (economic or cultural capital in particular) to be able to occupy the dominant positions within 
their respective field confront each other using strategies aimed at preserving or transforming these relations 
of power.” Wacquant in Bourdieu (1996: 264-265) The State Nobility.  
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75 
 
according to Miller, as a technology, accounting has the “tranformatory capacity” of converting 
“qualitative attributes into quantitative measures.” (Miller 1994 in Zambon 2002) However, what is 
crucial to briefly introduce here is the relation between CSA regulation and these two ‘fields of 
power’: law and accountancy.  
Starting from the above working definition of CSA as a form of reporting by which firms 
take into account the externalities produced by their market behaviour, Crouch (2006) crucially 
clarifies that, while externalities identification is not a normative exercise, normative judgement 
enters when one distinguishes between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ externalities. Crucially, this 
distinction cannot be made a priori, it depends from a historical process of construction of ‘social 
distinctions’ based on different normative perspectives (economic; political; legal; religious). For 
instance, Crouch refers to the example of a western transnational corporation (TNC) that decide to 
establish one of its plants in a traditional Islamic society might deeply affect local relations and 
costumes. Women working for them and their wider circles might decide to stop wearing head 
scarves. This externality – this impact of the firm’s activities not captured by its market transactions 
– is positive or negative? For many commentators it could be seen as positive in the sense that it 
constitutes a moment of women’s autonomy and liberation. However, many locals might consider it 
negatively, as a moral degradation. A crucial advantage of this working definition of CSA is that it 
drives the attention to the fact that, “Very little exists to require transnational enterprises to come to 
terms with the externalities of their activities [...]. The organisational hierarchy of the firm is often 
the only source of their governance, not only internally but also externally.” (Crouch 2006: 1533)  
The emergence of CSA law therefore marks a major shift in both accounting and law. From 
being located in between an accounting field that excludes non-financial aspects and a legal field 
that has considered them, for many years, as “over and above the law”, CSA is becoming an 
integral part of these two fields of power and of their struggles. Therefore, I would suggest that we 
should look at the construction of CSA regulation as a rift confronting the advocates of legally 
binding standards for corporate social accountability – aimed to bring standard-setting bodies into 
the universal legal domain – and the promoters of technical extra-financial accounting standards – 
aimed at creating universally recognised, market-based standards for CSA. There is a long tradition 
of ‘territorial disputes’ between accountants and lawyers about which professional has ultimate 
control (see Freedman and Power 1992). Accountants tend to see the law as a technical device that 
can be changed and to look at the ‘substance’ (materiality) of the information to be disclose. They 
have therefore often perceived lawyers and law-makers as too formalist, potentially provoking 
illogical results. On the other hand, one could reply that lawyers’ conception of reality, based on 
legal rights and relationships, do not ignore substance, it simply differs from economic substance. 
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While this is a caricature of the issues at stake, undoubtedly the future of CSA regulation will be 
fundamentally depend on whether it will be constructed through the accounting language of 
economic rationality or using the legal language of corporate accountability, human rights and legal 
liabilities (see McBarnet et al. 2007).  
I will argue that, in more contextualised terms, this major dispute can be analysed as part of 
what Wolfgang Streeck recently defined as the underlying tension between the two conflicting 
principles, or regimes of resources allocation, that constructed the political-economic configuration 
of European (and Western) advanced-capitalist societies ever since the end of the Second World 
War: ‘democratic politics’ and ‘market efficiency’. The case for CSA regulation is particularly 
interesting as it requires both principles to remarkably stretch themselves: economic rationality in 
the terrain of ‘non-financials’ and legal rationality in the territories of ‘non-law’.  
 
2.5 The argument in brief. Law, accounting and regimes of capital accumulation 
At this stage, I can present some of the key elements of the argument outlined by this study 
to explain the emergence of a multi-level regulatory regime of CSA in Europe. I will argue that the 
conventional wisdom, which sees sustainability reporting regulation just as a ‘legitimising device’ 
that strengthen existing mechanisms of control over corporate resources’ accumulation, illuminates 
only one part of the picture. It crucially overlooks the role of the accounting field as a structuring 
structure, a site of struggles for the production of the dominant vision of what economic capital is 
and what has economic value. Seen from this perspective, rather than just a PR corporate strategy, 
the emergence of mandatory CSA becomes a very different matter that begs a more structural 
explanation able to link changes in the area of accounting with changes in the broader economic 
field.  
This research develops an argument suggesting that the current emergence of mandatory 
‘accounting for sustainability’ constitutes the latest response to the crises of the social formation 
that Streeck (2011) calls ‘democratic capitalism’. Using this approach, the study presents CSA 
regulation as one of the cornerstones of the emergence of a new regime of economic governance 
that is supposed to obviate to the exhaustion of the ‘corporatist compromise’, which emerged in 
Europe at the end of the WWII between capital and labour, and to the collapse of financial-led 
capitalism, following the 2008 global economic crisis. Going back to the first crisis of ‘democratic 
capitalism’ in the 1970s, the next chapter briefly recalls the cyclical steps of the ‘construction’ of 
non-financial accounting regulation until now. This preliminary process of ‘double historicisation’ 
reveals the precise historical context in which currently dominant ideas of financial versus non-
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financial reporting were shaped. It also shows that an identical process of transformations marked 
the economic field and the accounting field, revealing the structural homology between the two 
fields. Finally, it highlights the current shifts along the continuous financial-non-financial and law-
non-law, which characterise the present debate on CSA regulation. 
As Streeck accurately described, the ‘democratic capitalism’ regime began to collapse 
starting from the 1970s, before and more intensely in the UK and the US and, from the mid-1990s, 
also in Continental Europe. There is an extensive literature and a heated debate on the reasons 
behind this shift from Keynesianism to what Colin Crouch called ‘Privatised Keynesianism’ 
(2011)
78
. However, most of the studies coincide in stressing two elements that characterised this 
shift and that we can find also in the accounting field: economic financialisation and business self- 
and co-regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, the 
progressive financialisation of the economic field – particularly noticeable  starting from the end of 
the 1970s – coincided with the sudden abandonment of the regulatory debate about ‘social 
accounting’ and the extraordinary development of financial accounting standards. Secondly, the 
globalisation and autonomisation of the economic field – particularly embodied by the emergence 
of giant transnational corporations – coincided with the ‘privatisation’ and internationalisation of 
accounting standards. During the 1980s and 1990s, global corporations became increasingly 
powerful and autonomous from the regulatory control of national states, supported by  transnational 
financial markets, creating what Sol Picciotto calls ‘global corporate capitalism’ (2011).  
In the corporate governance literature this shift coincided with a partial global convergence 
towards the ‘money concept of control’ and the erosion of the ‘productive concept of control’ that 
had dominated industrial relations on both sides of the Atlantic during the post-war period (see 
Jessop 2007). In this context, a growing portion of companies’ resources was devoted to 
shareholders and top managers – Soederberg (2010) calls this model of governance the ‘corporate-
financial nexus’ – and subtracted from long-term investments, employees’ training and innovation. 
Managers were incentivised to create value for shareholders-only through bonuses and 
remuneration packages which aligned their behaviour. Shares price rather than production rate 
became the measure for corporate success and short-term profit maximisation the legitimate 
objective of top managers’ decisions. Significantly, social (non-financial) aspects of corporate 
performance lost currency, as the result of the separation between aspects of corporate governance 
and corporate social accountability. This distinction led to the emergence of a new nomos of the 
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accounting field, based on the di-vision between financial/non-financial, but also changed the 
nomos of the economic field, which symmetrically stressed the maximisation of financial value. As 
famously claimed by Milton Friedman (1970), “the business of business is business”. A nomos 
which excludes ‘societal’ aspects from the economy. 
In order to fully understand the current re-emergence of mandatory disclosure of non-
financial information it is necessary to understand why ‘financial-led’ capitalism eventually failed 
to provide a solution to the Achilles’ heel of ‘democratic capitalism’. This is, according to Streeck 
(2011), due to the fact that this social formation has been based on the instable compromise 
between two conflicting principles of resources allocation – popular ideas of market justice, based 
on marginal productivity, and of social justice, based on democratic collective choices.  
Without considering here the details of his argument, what is crucial to highlight for the 
scope of this research is that this regime in order to work needs high levels of economic growth and 
resources consumption. In highly stylised terms, during the 1970s it appeared already clear that the 
‘democratic capitalism’ regime was unsustainable. However, the general attention was more 
urgently attracted by questions of economic declining growth and high levels of inflation, driven up 
by trade unions members’ demands, rather than social or ecological sustainability. In order to 
sustain growth and avoid social conflicts over resources’ distribution, public authorities decided to 
expand public debt, therefore increasingly drawing on future resources in addition to those already 
on hands. By the early 1990s, however, this system was no-longer sustainable because public debt 
had become very high. Therefore, the US and UK, but also many European countries, drew heavily 
on the deregulation of the financial sector that had already started during the 1980s. In order to 
achieve growth and full employment, the regulator established the conditions for citizens and firms 
to indebt themselves under a credit regime of unprecedented generosity that was supposed to create 
‘indefinite growth’. Doing so, governments shifted ‘social responsibilities’ for job creation on ‘the 
market’, determining a new ‘division of labour’ that would leave business free to autonomously 
govern itself, supporting a narrower view of corporate governance. They offered back to business a 
‘favourable regulatory environment’ seen as the pre-condition for economic growth. This 
practically meant not only policies boosting consumers’ confidence but also measures making 
labour markets more flexible. In exchange, they demanded business to become more ‘responsible’. 
In other words, if corporations want to be operate ‘freely’, they need a ‘social licence’ (see 
Kinderman 2012), that is, they should be willing to create ‘shared value’: profits respecting 
(voluntary) social and environmental standards. This shift took place before in the US and arrived in 
the EU only at the end of the 1990s. As we shall see, this turning point marked the re-emergence of 
non-financial reporting regulatory debates, though in a completely transformed institutional 
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environment as compared to the first regulatory cycle, in the 1970s. Left-wing governments, led by 
Clinton, Prodi, Schroeder and Blair, effectively broke with the corporatist tradition of ‘social 
bargains’, which had been at the origin of ‘democratic capitalism’, and promoted a ‘third way’ 
between markets and states. As Crouch (2011: 118) pointed out, they took an “enormous moral 
hazard” recognising “financial irresponsibility as a collective good”.  
The 2008 financial crisis left this ‘voluntary’ approach to corporate social accountability in 
ruins, but it posed ever more strongly the question of the tension between markets and democracy. 
As I already mentioned in section 1.3, in order to study more in details the current changes and 
struggles in the field of CSA regulation, I have adapted the coalitional approach developed by 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005). In their book, Political Power & Corporate Control, the authors have 
developed an inclusive framework of the possible varieties of corporate governance regimes and 
their evolution over time. Their work is based on an actor-centred approach which attempts to close 
the gap between agency and structure as well as among the different economic; political and 
sociological theoretical perspectives. This study argues that their conceptualisations can be useful to 
enhance our comprehension of the struggles that are taking place within the field of accounting as 
struggles for corporate resources control.  
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) approach draws on both law-and-economics explanations 
based on legal families – in particular the supply of high or low protection of minority shareholders 
– as well as neo-institutionalist accounts, in particular on the VoC distinctions between more or less 
coordinated market economies. The result is a comprehensive map of the variety of corporate 
governance regimes that can possibly emerge. Drawing on the seminal work of Scharpf (1997) as 
re-elaborated by Aguilera and Jackson (2003), the authors have been able to design a robust 
descriptive framework based, in particular, on a coalitional approach to institutional changes. It 
highlights the full range of conflicts and coalitions that can feasibly emerge among capital, labour 
and management. Overall, their conclusion reached by Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) is that three 
possible cleavages can arise between capital, labour and management: class coalitions; cross-class 
coalitions and accountability coalitions.  
Starting from the familiar class coalition, this arises when interests of shareholders and 
management oppose the interests of labour. This divide is based on the class struggle derived from 
political economy and from Marx, it reproduces the classic antagonism left versus right. It implies 
that when right-wing parties are strong, we should get policies that support shareholder diffusion, 
income inequality and weak workers’ protection. Conversely, when left-wing parties are strong we 
get policies that support block-holding and the ancillary policies that protect income equality and 
labour. This approach reflects one of the key debates in corporate governance: do incomplete 
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contracts apply only to the shareholders-managers relationship or to the human capital contribution 
that labour can make to the firm? In the latter case, CGR should also include questions of 
employees control over managers typical of co-ordinated market economies (CMEs), like German 
‘stakeholder’ variety of capitalism.  
Another way of interpreting the corporate governance cleavage is to look at sectoral 
conflicts that lead to cross class alliances and coalitions that pits labour and management (insiders) 
against shareholders (outsiders). Practically, employees tend to join managers to lobby for tariff 
protection and subsidies for certain sectors of business. According to the authors, this sectoral 
cleavage leads either to a corporatist compromise or to oligarchy. In the former case managers and 
workers have common cause in promoting the stability and size of the firm as well as their insiders’ 
claim on the profit stream. As a result, regulation and policies tend to favour a constructive relation 
among managers, workers and inside owners. The minority shareholders are left out, sheltering 
companies from hostile takeovers and instability and corporate owners – some out of choice, others 
out of necessity, had to accommodate the bargaining influence of organised labour. This corporatist 
compromise typically emerged as a response to intense social conflicts; hyperinflation and the Great 
Depression of the interwar years in many countries like the US, the UK and the Scandinavian area, 
or in others, for instance in Japan, shortly after the WWII. The key aim had been to build a system 
of ‘democratic capitalism’ that could reconcile the class conflict between capital and labour on the 
basis of which both full employment and private property rights were guaranteed in the framework 
of constitutional democracy. While this ‘social bargain’ outcome is the most familiar in the 
literature on European corporate governance, Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) maintain that there is 
also its reverse: the emergence of oligarchic regimes of corporate governance in which owners 
arrive not just to exclude minority shareholders but to ‘win it all’ at the expenses of all others 
actors, including managers and labour. In that case owners can set the rules of the game with very 
limited or no constrains, as it happen historically in the US during the ‘robber baron’ period (after 
the end of the Civil War) or in Russia following the fall of the Soviet Empire.  
Finally, the authors identify a third coalitional pair, this time based around the classic 
corporate governance concern about managerial agency and accountability, which had been first 
identified by Berle and Means back in the 1930s. It is the tension between managers (agents) and 
shareholders (principals), which dominates the ‘standard’ approach to CGR of law-and-economics 
and managerial studies, that is central in this cleavage. While most of the scholars have outlined 
their explanatory models having in mind the UK and US examples, in which the conservative 
parties have crashed organised labour and favoured shareholders’ diffuse control, this case is 
different. In many other countries, minority shareholders may need help if they intend to overcome 
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managerial action and corporatist blocks of power. In that case we may see the emergence of a 
strategic alliance based on the common interests of shareholders and labour vis-à-vis management. 
As the authors admit: “The class and sector alignment are quite familiar to students of political 
economy [...]. Less familiar is the third coalitional alignment: the link of labour to minority 
shareholders against managers and insider capital.” (Gourevitch 2007: 35) However, “an alliance 
between managers and block-holders, sustained by a closed network of interlocking directors, can 
take many actions that negatively affect job security. This risk can push workers away from the 
corporatist compromise and towards a transparency coalition.” (2005: 211)  
The authors took the idea of a ‘transparency coalition’ from a variety of contributions of 
other neo-institutionalist scholars (Streeck 2001; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Hopner 2003; Cioffi 
and Hopner 2006), which had reflected, in particular, on some paradoxical developments within 
some European co-ordinated market economies. In particular, Hopner’s (2003) ground-breaking 
studies of changes in the German model, first driven the attention on the puzzling situation where 
trade unions and the SPD favoured corporate governance liberalisation reforms. During the same 
years, something very similar was happening also in Italy (Deeg 2005)
79
. Aguilera and Jackson 
(2003: 461) clarify that: “Here, managerial accountability to different stakeholders is not a zero-sum 
relationship.” In countries like Germany, for instance, where organised labour is actively committed 
in monitoring management and institutionalised in the supervisory board, share-holders and 
employees’ interests are not necessarily divergent. They may form coalitions to engage with badly 
performing managers and to demand higher corporate transparency. However, as for the other 
cleavages, Gourevitch and Shinn predict also an alternative outcome: where the interests of capital 
and labour for many reasons start to diverge too sharply, such coalitions may break down and give 
management increasing autonomy to pursue its own agenda, and thereby damage corporate 
accountability. In that case the authors see the emergence of a corporate governance regime that 
they call ‘managerialism’. Managers’ dominance would result in weak minority shareholder 
protection as well as low block-holding. “Managers’ ideal world is a balance between the two: 
enough minority shareholder protection [...] to dilute the blockholders, but not enough to permit a 
hostile takeover.” (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 66)  
I will argue that looking at cyclical changes in the regulation of CSA using Gourevitch and 
Shinn’s framework can be very illuminating. Rather than focusing on legitimacy as the key driver 
of sustainability reporting, seen as a mechanical adjustment of firms to external pressures, it would 
allow to start looking at changes in the regulation of corporate accountability as the result of a 
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social and historical construction continuously re-structured through the struggles among a plurality 
of social, political and economic actors. As the authors maintain, “There are many forms of capital 
and many forms of labour, each forming sub-groups within the whole. Sometimes these groups 
cooperate with their class neighbours, but other times they may clash with them, reaching across 
class lines to find common ground on other principles of cleavage. This provides the elements for 
more complex political explanation of policy outcomes in fields as varied as trade, welfare, labour, 
and competition.” (2005: 150) This coalitional systematisation allows to look at the 1970s’ rise and 
fall of national debates on ‘social accounting’ legislation that will be analysed in the next chapters 
as part of the historical development of a ‘corporatist compromise’, which used to characterise 
European industrial relations during the 1970s. I will also argue that the re-emergence of non-
financial reporting, starting from the late 1990s, has been driven by a ‘transparency coalition’ 
including NGOs, part of the European trade unions and led by large institutional investors.  
 
2.6 Questions of research methods 
Questions of empirical research methods are, in the case of this study, necessarily informed 
by its reflexive socio-legal methodological approach and its epistemological assumptions (see 
section 2.3). However, rather than being an aprioristic decision, the choice of opting for this 
conceptualisation has gradually emerged. In particular, it has emerged on the basis of the pilot 
interviews; the regulatory and literature review (see Annex I and section 2.2); and after discarding 
other possible explanatory frameworks. This preliminary work, completed by the end of the first 
year of PhD (2009/2010), showed a cyclical emergence of corporate sustainability reporting as part 
of corporate governance regulatory changes. Therefore, the adoption of a reflexive methodology 
reflected my attempt to build an integrated and holistic approach to the field of research, adequate 
to investigate this rapidly evolving transnational regulation.  
The fieldwork and preliminary élite interviews with EU regulators and investors played a 
fundamental role in helping me to identify, relatively early, both the shortcomings of existing 
explanations  and the coexistence of different ‘texts’ that constructed the official stories of CSA 
regulation. The consideration that different theoretical options and academic fields supported 
different regulatory developments led me to intuitively realise the need for a ‘double rupture’. This 
need has been soon systematised drawing on Bourdieu’s sociological thought, which I had already 
studied during my training as a Sociologist but that I had to further deepen during the last three 
years. Therefore, the decision of adopting this approach in conjunction with existing studies 
emerged from the growing recognition that the ‘analytical tools’ developed by Bourdieu could shed 
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light on my research questions and were progressively demonstrating their explanatory value in 
relation with the data that I was collecting. In particular, I have recognised their capacity to 
integrate macro and micro socio-legal analyses, structures and conflicts, objective structures and 
subjective phenomena already discussed above ( see Dezalay and Madsen 2012; Madsen 2012).  
In order to develop a suitable answer to the main research question, I have designed a 
research project that developed step by step, gradually building my knowledge of the field. During 
the research process, I had to face a number of methodological challenges, starting from the choice 
of the right point of observation that could reveal the way different actors have been shaping this 
field. Furthermore, I had to gain access to these institutions and actors I wanted to study. Lastly, 
there has been the issue of finding the right way to empirically study the relation between agency 
and structure that explains changes both in the content and in the mode of CSA regulation.  
Being the CSA regulatory field still relatively underdeveloped (at least it was at the moment 
when this research started), adopting snowball sampling and interviews research strategies, I have 
been able to identify rather early the main groups of players and sketch a preliminary map of the 
key individuals and institutions involved. However, this preliminary assessment also showed me the 
relevant challenges related with studying a legal field that is fragmented and rapidly evolving. In 
order to design a tailored research method, I had to better define the scope and the object of the case 
study (Chapters 4 and 5). In fact, while the broad subject area – sustainability reporting regulation – 
and the research questions have been identified since the very beginning and they have never 
changed, crucial decisions concerning the focus and methods of the empirical enquire have been 
reached only around April 2010, on the basis of a series of considerations, including my own 
limitations in terms of research skills, time, economic and intellectual resources. The choice has 
been to design a research project that combined a macro-analysis of changes in the European 
regulatory arena with a more detailed and narrow qualitative research. The preference for the EU 
arena is due to the fact that this is conventionally recognised as the pioneer in regulating 
sustainability reporting. Furthermore, although other regions are rapidly catching up, this is still 
widely considered the area of the world where disclosure is more advanced, both in terms of quality 
and quantity of CSA.  
As regards the case study, the final choice has emerged pragmatically, excluding other 
options, considered as less effective, unattainable or unrealistic. First of all, I have seriously 
considered the possibility of adopting a comparative approach, based on ‘multiple case studies’ (e.g. 
GRI; CDP; UN Global Compact). However, this option has been discarded because any 
comparative study, in a regulatory field that is still in its infancy and is therefore rapidly changing 
and fragmented, would have been too selective to address my research question. Eventually, at the 
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beginning of 2010, I have learned that the EC was hosting a number of workshops on ESG 
disclosure, actively involving six key groups of actors interested in the perspective of developing an 
EU legislative proposal. Therefore, I decided to follow this initiative, focusing on a qualitative 
analysis of the EU-level regulatory process, considered as a privileged point of observation from 
which it is possible empirically capture the multi-levels and polycentric character of this emerging 
regulatory field. By that time, it was far from sure whether the EU would actually proceed to 
develop a legislative proposal. Nonetheless, I thought that the qualitative research of EU-level 
regulatory developments and of the desk analysis of broader historical and regulatory changes 
would be mutually re-enforcing. In effect, they helped me to shed light on the role of the main 
players in shaping this regulatory field.  
The study demonstrated the value of this choice of strategically positioning the ‘camera’ at 
the EU-level, at the crossroads of many regulatory developments and struggles: between law and 
non-law; national law-making and global norm-making processes; financial and non-financial 
reporting regulation. In fact, I have progressively learned that the EU has been working on the 
elaboration of a regulatory framework ever since the late 1990s and that in 2008/2009 it had showed 
a renewed interest in this field. As many Member States had adopted legal provision that goes 
beyond EU Accounting Law, a further harmonisation at the EU-level was a possibility. 
Furthermore, access to EU policy documents and stakeholder groups is comparatively easier than in 
other context and it is guaranteed by EU ‘access to documents’ regulation. In particular, the desk 
researches periodisation covered by the study goes from the 1970s until 2011, as regards the broad 
analysis based on the ‘double historicisation’ method. As I mentioned above, this is a research 
strategy aimed at revealing how both the research object – the regulation of CSA in Europe – and 
the academic construction of this object have come about. In my case, this reflexive method helped 
me to reveal the arbitrary distinction between financial/non-financial and law/non-law, through 
which the accounting field was structured and which is at the basis of this analysis (Chapter 3). 
Narrowing down the empirical research to consider recent changes in the EU-level regulation of 
CSA, actually focuses on a more limited period of time, particularly on the decade 2001-2011 (see 
Chapter 4 and 5).  
As regards the main groups of actors interested in shaping CSA accounting regulation, I 
have chosen to rely on the very categorisation that the European Commission has elaborated 
throughout a decade-long process of CSR consultations with stakeholders
80
. Therefore, I have 
identified six broad groups of actors that have been present and active in the European process of 
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See in particular the experiences of the EMSF-CSR (2002-2004) and the series of workshops on non-
financial disclosure hosted by DG ENTR between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. 
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CSA regulation
81
. (1) the preparers of corporate sustainability reports, typically financial and non-
financial large corporations, generally represented by and organised into business associations, 
such as BusinessEurope at the EU-level. Afterwards, there are the users of such information: the 
main groups of actors that are interested in shaping CSA regulation according to their preferences. 
Here the focus has been on four main groups: (2) organised labour and trade unions (TUs); (3) large 
institutional investors; (4) civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); (5) public 
authorities, particularly governments (Member States in the case of the EU) and the EU 
institutions
82
 (the European Parliament; the European Council and the Commission). Lastly, we 
identified a sixth group of actors made of (6) professional experts (accountants; financial analysts; 
lawyers). Overall, this conceptualisation appears consistent with the existing literature on CSR and 
corporate governance (CG) (see Aguilera and Jackson 2003). This categorisation broadly coincides 
with the literature. In fact, it refers to the ‘trinity’ – capital, management, labour – that is central in 
most CG analyses. Moreover, it recognises the growing role of transnational experts in shaping 
global business regulation. Furthermore, it acknowledges the rise of an active, transnational, civil 
society (including NGOs; consumers and media). Lastly, the category of ‘public authorities’ 
broadly represents the positions of the state (in the broad sense), articulated at different levels of 
regulation (international, European, national, regional). While the list of actors could have been 
come complete, the rationale for choosing these groups of actors is related to the attempt of building 
a reflexive sociological approach (see section 2.2). Therefore, rather than creating new 
categorisations, the challenge has been to critically use the ones that are already widely in use.  
More specifically, the research strategy adopted uses three main sources of data:  
1. the existing literature on the regulation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
corporate governance regulation (CGR) and secondary data sets have been used to provide a macro 
analysis (financialisation; corporatization; reporting) that provides the background to the empirical 
                                                          
81
 It is worth to stress that, within each group, we can identify a ‘plurality’ of voices, interests and positions. 
Groups are more or less organised and structured through various modes of political (government and law), 
social (association, network, communities) and economic (market, organisations) governance (see Crouch 
2006) that allow them to operate not just at the European but at multiple levels. For instance, while TUs and 
large European companies are typically joined through associational national and international mechanisms 
of governance; investors and NGOs tend to be more freely organised through loose social and regulatory 
networks that allow them to operate across borders, on a transnational scale. While a detailed account of the 
specificities and heterogeneity of those different ‘constellations’ has been already developed elsewhere and 
cannot be discussed here (see Cafaggi 2005), it has been constantly taken into consideration through the 
research. 
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 The role of the EU deserves some further comments. In the context of this study, its role is both crucial 
and ambivalent: it ultimately acts both as actor (public authority) and structure (regulatory arena). However, 
the object of this Doctoral Thesis is not primarily related with European studies. The EU is rather used as a 
political laboratory, from which it is possible to effectively assess broader changes in the regulation of non-
financial disclosure at different levels of regulation and through varying modes of governance. 
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research. In some case, the literature has been used to integrate my understanding of the position of 
the actors analysing my findings on the light of the broader literature and more specific studies 
dealing with this subject area (see section 4.2).  
2. the analysis of the key documents produced at the EU-level by EU regulators and by the 
six key groups of actors: companies, public authorities, trade unions, NGOs, professionals (i.e. 
accountants; financial analysts), investors. The analysis covers in particular the period 1995-
2011and it is aimed to provide a dense understanding of the role the different actors played in 
shaping this emerging regulatory field, at different levels of regulation and through varying modes 
of governance (See Annex II). This analysis tremendously contributed to my understanding of the 
relations between actors and the strategies of the different groups, together with the interviews. 
3. 26 in-depth qualitative interviews have been completed with key informants from the six 
groups of actors involved (see Annex III). The length of the interviews has been usually around 40 
minutes, although, in a number of cases, the interview has been longer than one hour. In only one 
case (interview # 25 with Prof. Michel Capron), the questions/answers have been exchanged by 
email. The interviewees have been identified through snowball sampling, looking at the relevant 
documents and asking, after each interview, to identify who were the individuals that, according to 
their knowledge, I should seek to interview, for each of the six groups of actors. Two EU officials, 
who played a key role in the development of EU regulatory policies, have been interviewed twice – 
in 2010 and in 2012. The second interview turned out very useful to assess actual changes in the 
understanding and recognition of CSA regulation by public authorities. Some of the interviewees 
have been purposely chosen because of their ‘multiple identities’ (e.g. accountant/regulator; 
academic/activist; financial analyst/member of the EU ad-hoc Expert Group). The vast majority of 
the interviewees have been actively and directly participated to the development of EU CSA 
policies.  
The analysis has been strengthened by a participant observation of five months at DG 
MARKT, from March to July 2012, as part of the EU traineeship programmes. During this period, I 
have been writing the Impact Assessment and drafting the legal proposal for the EU initiative as 
well as participated to many meetings on disclosure of non-financial information by companies 
(Commission 2013)
83
. The empirical value of this experience is limited by a) the fact that trainees 
are not allowed to reveal information that are not publicly available and b) the fact that, by the time 
the writing of this Thesis was completed, the legislative proposal on which I have been working has 
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 All the relevant documents on the proposal can be downloaded from the website of the EU Commission. 
See: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/non-financial_reporting/index_en.htm. 
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not been made public yet
84
. However, on 16 April 2013, the European Commission has adopted it 
and it is currently under discussion at the European Parliament. This first-hand experience has 
certainly contributed to my understanding of the ‘politics’ of CSA regulation and of the positions of 
the different actors on the field. However, it has not radically changed my broad conceptualisation 
and explanatory framework. My position as a PhD researcher on this subject-area has been 
communicated to the EC hierarchies since the very beginning and towards the end of my stage I 
have asked for the permission of making a stream of interviews. The colleagues and hierarchies 
were very helpful and collaborative.  
As regards the interviews with EU officials, I thought to keep all of them anonymous. 
Although there is nothing really contentious in their statements, revealing the identities could be 
still an issue, particularly for those civil servants that are still working on issues of CSR and CSA 
regulation. Furthermore, in several cases the interviews have been extraordinarily frank and open. 
Perhaps because of my temporary position ‘inside’ the EC, I received very sincere answers to some 
difficult questions about law; accounting and economic power. This allowed me to obtain insightful 
comments as part of some in-depth interviews that, in some cases, lasted almost two hours and from 
which it was clear the trust and confidence of the interviewees. In order to be sure that this trust and 
confidence will be kept intact, I opted for keeping their identity anonymous, a possibility that I had 
already offered at the beginning of every interview. Overall, this is NOT, or only marginally, a 
study based on a participant observation. Particularly because the analysis goes from the 1990s until 
2011, largely excluding the events and regulatory actions in which I have been involved. This 
ensures that some of the most problematic ethical issues often associated with participant 
observations had been neutralised in the first place.   
 In sum, the research adopted a qualitative research method that triangulated in-depth 
interviews with desk researches – literature review and document analysis – designed to underpin 
and validate the empirical findings that slowly emerged from the fieldwork. The general objective 
has been to contrast the positions of the actors within the field in a critical analysis that benefitted 
from the use of different sources of data. The methodological reflexive background on which the 
data have been analysed has been extremely useful. This approach concretely allowed me to assess 
the various resources, alliances, networks, competences and capitals that have been ‘invested’ by 
the various actors in the field of CSA regulation. In this sense, Bourdieu’s work provides untapped 
resources and analytical tools to dredge up the many assumptions and ‘non-dit’ that emerged from 
the interviews.  
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 The legislative proposal has been finally made public on 16
th
 April 2013, when the writing of this Thesis 
was largely completed. Therefore, its content has been briefly presented in Annex I.  
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The research methods used are clearly too limited to offer a complete analysis of the 
emergence of this multi-level EU regime of CSA regulation. More interviews and more researches 
could have further improved the analysis. However, by the time I decided to stop with the 
interviews I had reached a level of saturation in which the data were largely repeated by different 
interviewees.  
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3. Exploring the field. Forty years of struggles for 
regulating non-financial reporting 
 
 
Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the country who asks 
to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the 
moment. The man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in sometime 
later on. “It is possible,” says the gatekeeper, “but not now.” 
Franz Kafka, Before the Law, 1915 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Through a literature review and documents’ analysis, this chapter presents changes both in 
the content and in the mode of corporate sustainability accounting (CSA) regulation, drawing and 
elaborating on Graz’s (2006) topology of international standardization presented in Chapter 1. It 
identifies four phases in this development: 1. Before the 1980s. 2. Between the 1980s and the late 
1990s. 3. From the late 1990s to 2008. 4. After 2008. The object of this chapter is to provide the 
reader with a long-term overview of the emergence of CSA regulation as an historical and social 
construction and identify the key turns in its history. In order to do so, it considers both the research 
object – the regulation of CSA in Europe – and the academic construction of this object – 
integrating the parallel fields of financial disclosure (CGR) and non-financial disclosure (corporate 
social accountability). This approach is drawing on the ‘double historicisation’ reflexive 
sociological research strategy presented in Chapter 2. This reflexive approach allowed me to reveal 
the relation between changes in accounting regulation and in the economic field (CGR), therefore 
contextualising the cyclical emergence of non-financial reporting regulation.  
During over four decades, the idea of mandating large companies to regularly issue timely, 
accurate and reliable information about their social and environmental impact has been discerned, 
criticised, ignored, silenced, weighted and announced as imminent by academics, regulators and 
policy-makers. On the contrary of most of the literature, which tends to give currency to a linear 
and progressive narrative of the emergence of corporate social and environmental disclosure (see 
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for instance two recent books, Esty and Wiston 2009; Visser and Hollender 2011), this overview 
relies on a more cyclical account (broadly inspired by Ireland and Pillay 2010 account of CSR 
development). Furthermore, the existing literature tends to arbitrarily isolate non-financial from 
financial accounting standards and issues of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from questions of 
corporate governance and control, while the following account attempts to assess the two areas of 
study as complementary institutional developments (Kinderman 2012). This chapter suggests that 
looking at them together is possible to better understand the drivers for changes in European 
sustainability accounting regulation in relation with changes in the regimes of economic capital 
accumulation.  
As regards the content of accounting regulation, it is possible to highlight the following 
turning points: the 1970s proposals for mandatory social reporting have been abandoned from the 
early 1980s until the late 1990s, in favour of detailed disclosure of financial-only and tangible 
information. At the same time, financial accounting rules that were rather under-developed and 
peripheral in company law became increasingly structured and detailed. During the 1990s, financial 
transparency and disclosure standards became the central tool for global business regulation (see 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). At the same time, as concerns changes in the mode of CSA 
regulation, we are witnessing a striking shift from a largely national and legislative-driven 
accounting regime to a global convergence towards transnational and privatised accounting 
standards, driven by the accounting profession. Non-financial reporting regulation only re-emerged 
during the early 2000s, as a first nucleus of rather ill-defined but broadening global regulatory 
frameworks for environmental and social reporting, seen as separated from financial accounting, 
gradually evolved into a multi-level regime for reporting Social, Environmental and Governance 
(ESG) information. Finally, after 2008, there has been a first attempt to integrate the two ‘parallel 
universes’ of financial and non-financial accounting that could represent the first step towards a 
new regime not just of accounting but of economic governance.  
Looking at parallel changes in the regimes of capital accumulation, it is clear that they 
proceed symmetrically with changes in the accounting field. There is an established body of studies 
(Jessop 1992; Aglietta and Reberioux 2005; Overbeek et al 2007) that has showed how the end of 
the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s marked the crisis of the dominant regime of Western 
capital accumulation, the so called Fordism, that during the post-war period had been astonishingly 
successful in creating economic expansion and establishing material consumption as a norm and a 
lifestyle (see Koch 2011). The crisis of Fordism was overcome by the expansion of an economy of 
debt that allowed people to borrow more money and therefore to consume more. In order to achieve 
this objective, before in the US and UK and only during the 1990s in Continental Europe, 
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governments proceeded towards a global integration and deregulation of financial markets, which 
was based on common accounting rules that had to be only providing financially material 
information relevant to finance-driven capitalism. However, as Streeck (2011) points out, this 
regime of Privatised Keynesianism (Crouch 2011) did not solved the fundamental contradiction that 
characterised the Fordist era: the physical and social limits of economic growth. In a way it made 
the situation worst. In fact, establishing a regime of capital accumulation based on private (and 
public) debt, it started borrowing resources from the unborn generations. As Streeck (2011) notes: 
governments allowed to “draw on future resources in addition to those already at hands”.  
Here is the crucial link between ‘finance-driven’ capitalism and the rise of ‘sustainability’ 
accounting regulation. The underlying rationale for mandatory sustainability reporting, which is 
often masked, is intimately related with the sustainability of this economy based on debt. However, 
looking at the academic and regulatory debate on CSA, this issue only barely emerged since the 
2008 financial crisis and it has been often neglected or silenced even after the onset of the crisis. 
The study argues that there is a strong link that needs further analyses between the construction of 
an autonomous accounting field, based on the distinction between financial/non-financial, and the 
autonomy of a regime of economic accumulation, based on debt and financial accumulation; the 
crisis of financial institutions that have become “too big to fail” and the current emergence of new 
regime of accounting for sustainable companies. However, as we shall see in this chapter and in the 
following one, nothing is determined a priori in this development – it is not simply ‘an idea whose 
time has come’. Changes in the regulation of CSA are the result of social conflicts between several 
groups of actors engaged in reshaping concepts of economic capital and value; struggling to 
continuously redefine fundamental issues such as: who controls modern corporations? how it is 
governed and for what purpose? 
Unfortunately, legal responses have been, so far, rather modest or fragmented, failing to 
‘make sense’ of a world that is rapidly changing. Like in Kafka’s (1915) short novel, ‘Before the 
Law’, many seasons have passed since early ideas of measuring and reporting corporations’ impact 
on society first emerged. Those who have sought the introduction of such rules for business by law 
have not been ‘received’ for over two decades. Meanwhile, corporate social reporting, which used 
to be seen, at first, as an intermediate, procedural objective, towards corporate democracy has 
become an end in itself. Only after the onset of the global financial crisis, the conventional legal 
approach, which tends to separate financial/non-financial, slowly started to fade away. Since 2008, 
the CSA regulatory debate has become more radical, going back to fundamental questions about the 
role of shareholders and the nature and purpose of the modern corporation that had been already 
discussed during the 1930s and 1970s. However, the responses to such questions appear more 
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complex than ever, they require a new approach to corporate sustainability accounting as a field of 
transnational law. 
 
3.2 The origin of the debate  
It is appropriate to begin with questioning when we should trace the origin of the current 
debate on the power and accountability of corporations.  
As pointed out by Sir Adrian Cadbury (2006: 15) “the governance of business did not 
effectively begin to attract the attention of politicians, economists, or the wider public until after the 
First World War.” While the threats posed by the corporate form were recognized much earlier (see 
Adam Smith), in those formative years corporate misconducts and scandals were not attributed to 
lapses in governance. Rather than focusing on companies’ directors responsibilities, there were a 
generally robust view that it was up to investors to judge the quality and honesty of their 
investment. The key change came with the introduction of the concept of ‘limited liability’ in 1862. 
In order to increase national productivity and the use of private investments to create national 
wealth, this innovation enabled members of a company to limit their liability to their stake in the 
business and not to be exposed to claims beyond their stake in case of bankruptcy. As a 
consequence, companies’ directors accepted certain responsibilities in the conduct of their 
companies but, on the other hand, gained a greater, unchallenged power and were left relatively free 
to govern corporations. This freedom was first challenged by the introduction in Europe of the 
supervisory board in 1870 by German chancellor Otto von Bismarck. This structure was designed to 
strengthen shareholders’ control – in particular banks’ – over the companies in which they invested 
and represent the first political move to limit corporate power. Nevertheless, at the time the 
influence and power of corporations and therefore their public exposure was still relatively small. 
Things radically changed when stock markets in the US and in Britain expanded to the degree that 
corporate fortunes started to affect broader constituencies. Ideas about the social responsibilities of 
corporations can be traced back to this epoch, around the 1920s and 1930s. As pointed out by 
Ireland and Pillay (2010) the ideas about the ‘socially responsible corporation’, which emerged in 
the 1930s and rose to prominence in the post-war era, cannot be considered as mere precursors of 
contemporary CSR and were markedly more radical than contemporary ones. While in the previous 
decades companies’ shareholders were involved in the management or in its monitoring, by the late 
1920s they, for the most part, “assumed the role of purely passive, rentier owners of titles of 
revenues, uninvolved in, and external to, the process of production.” (Ireland and Pillay 2010: 80) 
This situation created an evident problem of “corporate accountability”. As maintained by 
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sociologist Thorstein Veblen (1904, 1919, 1923), among many other authors, shareholders had been 
reduced to the status of ‘anonymous pensioners’, ‘absentee owners’ possessing ‘prescriptive rights 
to get something for nothing’. According to this school of thought, corporate shareholders were 
increasingly likened to bondholders, arguing that the differences between debt and property; credit 
and capital; stocks and bonds were becoming increasingly blurred. The appearance of Adolf Berle 
and Gardiner Means famous book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), seemed 
empirically confirm this claim. It stated that shareholders of many US corporations had become 
widely dispersed and most of them took little interest in the company’s day-to-day management. As 
a consequence they had lost control of the corporations in which they held shares. Berle and Means 
thesis highlighted the separation of management (directors acting as agents) and control 
(shareholders acting as principals) and constitutes the basis for modern theories of corporate control 
and corporate governance. What is relevant for the scope of this research is that during the 1930s 
there was a harsh debate on the separateness of corporations from their shareholders, mirrored by 
the famous public debate between Dodd and Berle on the purpose of corporations. Adolf Berle had 
been advocating for a strengthening of the fiduciary duties of directors in the attempt to align them 
to the interests of all shareholders and solve the accountability gap (Berle 1926, 1931). Dodd 
contested this position claiming that the idea of separate corporate personality needed to be taken 
more seriously and therefore contesting the identification of corporations with their shareholders. 
Society, he argued, was going through important changes in the public opinion on business that 
should be considered not merely as a private enterprise but as a public institution with wider social 
obligations. He contrasted the idea of the company being an aggregate of stockholders with a view 
of corporations as truly separate entities that should operate, through their managerial agents, as 
‘good citizens’ with a sense of social responsibility. When The Modern Corporation was published, 
in late 1932, Berle’s own position was closer to the one of Dodd. He argued with Means that 
shareholders were now the owners of ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’ property and, having 
relinquished so many of the rights traditionally related with ownership, they could no longer 
properly, or accurately be called the corporations owners. The community was entitled “to demand 
that the modern corporation serve […] all society”. Various groups should be “assign[ed] […] a 
portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity” (Berle and 
Means 1932: 355-6)  
After the end of WWII, the legitimacy of the principle of ‘shareholders primacy’ had been 
further eroded and references to the existence of broader social responsibilities beyond and above 
shareholders’ returns became commonplace. Ireland and Pillay (2010) refer to this period as the 
epoch of ‘transformative’ CSR. On both sides of the Atlantic, those were the heydays of Keynesian 
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economics; ‘social democracy’ and what in the previous chapter we referred to as ‘democratic 
capitalism’ (Streeck 2011). During this period, many commentators started to argue that 
shareholders rights needed to be diminished, corporations re-conceptualized and directors duties 
redefined as a new post-capitalist society – less obsessed with profit motives – had emerged (see 
Dahrendorf 1959 or Galbraith 1956). Edward Mason (1959: 2-6), for instance, influentially claimed 
that private property ownership, still valid in relation with individual possessory holdings, did not 
apply to corporations whose ‘owners’ had been converted into functionless rentier. He added that 
with shareholders having “only the vaguest idea where ‘their property’ is or of what it entails”, the 
traditional justification for private enterprise and private property had “gone forever” (1959: 14-15). 
Similar conclusions were reached in the UK by prominent company lawyers L.C.B. Gower (1955), 
George Goyder (1961), K.W. Wedderburn (1965) and in the US by Chayes (1959, 1966) and 
Manning (1958). During this period, “it became widely believed not only that corporations should 
be run in the wider social interest but that they were in fact increasingly being run in this way.” 
(Ireland and Pillay 2010: 83) Free from both strict shareholders’ control and the rigors of market 
competition – as a consequence of growth in oligopoly and monopoly – managers were increasingly 
seen as balancing the interests of a wider range of actors. Significantly Berle and Means, in their 
1967 edition of The Modern Corporation, were describing managers as “administrators of a 
community system”, arguing that the American corporation “should not be seen as a business 
device but as a social institution.” The emergence of ideas of CSR and ‘managerialism’ obviously 
encountered the criticism of the advocates of shareholders-centred capitalism. Famously, Milton 
Friedman (1962) called CSR, “a fundamentally subversive doctrine”, representing a threat to 
capitalism itself and the anteroom for socialism. Burnham (1942) drawing the attention to the risks 
connected with managers using their power to pursue their own interest. Nevertheless, a widespread 
view was perceiving capitalism radically shifting away from “traditional ruthlessness and 
aggressive individualism” (see Crosland 1956 and 1962). From the mid-1950s, ideas of ‘industrial 
democracy’ led to corporate innovations such as German ‘co-determination’ and the 
institutionalization of the role of workers’ representation all over Europe. Ireland and Pillay (2010: 
84) summarize the ‘transformative’ nature of 1950s and 1960s ideas of corporate social 
responsibility maintaining that it “frequently entailed a radical re-conceptualization of the nature of 
the corporation and an explicit rejection of the principle of shareholder primacy: it was underlined 
by the belief that it was perfectly legitimate to subordinate the interests of shareholders to those of 
other groups, or of the society as a whole.”  
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3.3 The history of a contested idea: the rise and fall of social accounting 
1960s and 1970s. The historical compromise’ and the rise of national 
debates about regulating social accounting 
It is in the broader socio-economic context described in the previous section that first 
emerged in Europe a lively debate about the need for creating, along with the traditional rules for 
financial statements, a set of standards for mandatory corporate social accounting. Although first 
examples of corporate social and environmental reporting date back to the first decade of the 20
th
 
Century (Hogner 1982; Guthrie and Parker 1989), the regulatory debate only began in the late 
1960s, at the zenith of Fordism, in a politico-economic and politico-ideological context dominated – 
particularly in Europe – by ideas of ‘industrial democracy’ and workers’ participation.  
In Europe organised labour and the ‘working class’ were exerting a growing influence on 
political and corporate leadership. This role appears clear considering the content of companies’ 
reporting, which was particularly concerned with the kind of information relevant to employees and 
trade unions (TUs). This largely differs from the US case
85
, where labour forces were traditionally 
less organised (see Marens 2012) and stock markets and institutional investors much more 
developed. From a quantitative point of view, the number of companies practicing social accounting 
was relatively conspicuous. In a series of reports, based on the analysis of annual reports from 
Fortune 500 companies, Ernst and Ernst arrived to count that, at the end of the 1970s, 90% of the 
reports contained socially oriented information. Interestingly, only 1 percent of the Fortune 500 
companies (six companies) were publishing such information separately from the annual report. 
According to Dierkes and Ullmann (1979), in the Federal Republic of West Germany, 50% of the 
largest companies were reporting on their social performance, although only in 40 to 60 cases this 
practice is defined as methodologically ‘at a quite advanced level’. According to Rey (1980), in 
France the percentage of large companies disclosing social information was even higher (see also 
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 In the US, the rise of non-financial disclosure was chiefly driven by ethical investors interested in 
information on whether a company was investing in South Africa or in tobacco stocks; on the number of 
female directors or environmental and industrial safety records (Simon et al. 1973; Bloomberg 1973: 1026) 
For instance, Dierkes notes that: “While the reports by business in the US usually focus on the external 
environment (consumer issues, physical environment, community relations), the European counterparts 
heavily emphasize the internal environment, company-employee relations.” (1985: 364) As recently argued 
by Marens (2012), the way CSR evolved on the two sides of the Atlantic was greatly influenced by the 
different outcome of the 1920s debate on the regulation of corporate control and responsibilities. Without 
going into the details of his interesting argument, the author maintains that the American labour movement, 
on the contrary of the European one, was defeated by the new giant American corporation. As a result, while 
in Continental Europe regulators allowed a greater control of workers’ organisations on the governance of 
large corporations (stakeholders model), US executives responded by claiming to manage according to 
principles of social responsibilities.  
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Chevalier 1976). He maintained that an estimated 200 to 300 companies were already involved in 
social reporting before 1977, when this practice became mandatory for all French firms above 300 
employees.  
Focusing on regulatory aspects, they were widely debated across different European 
jurisdictions; however, in most of the cases, they failed to produce actual legislative changes. 
Ullmann (1979), for instance, provides an excellent account of the legislative and political debate 
on social accounting that was taking place in West Germany. He maintains that: “Individual 
corporations as well as business organizations, have stressed the voluntary character of CSR, 
pointing out that legislation would bring experimentation to a standstill and thus stifle further 
progresses. [...] However in view of the legislative efforts in a number of neighbouring counties the 
probability of future legislation in Germany is slightly increasing. Indeed, should the companies 
involved in CSR conclude that future legislation is unavoidable their warnings against the 
regulation of CSR in the absence of demands for it would have an altogether different meaning, 
[...].” (1979: 131) In the UK, the Accounting Standards Steering Committee published, in 1975, the 
far-reaching The Corporate Report, aimed to “re-examine the scope and aims of published financial 
reports in the lights of modern needs and condition.” (ASSC 1975) This cutting-edge discussion 
paper constitutes an extraordinary document of the kind of debate that characterised this period, not 
only in Continental Europe but also in the UK, particularly because its focus was not on corporate 
social accounting but on accounting practices in general. It states, for instance, that: “The 
complexity of modern business enterprises and public utility services has brought a growing 
awareness of the mutual inter-dependence of all sections of the community and is reflected by a 
change in balance between the owners of businesses, employees and to a lesser extent customers 
and the public acting as members of organised groups.” (p. 36) It also maintains that “recognition of 
changes in public attitude” is leading to a “trend in recent proposed and actual legislation towards 
the imposition of disclosure requirements not directly linked to the needs of shareholders”, which 
are “likely to lead to a greater recognition in company law of the rights of employees.” (p. 39 - 40) 
The Report clearly states that profit maximisation for shareholders represents the past: “Because 
neither business nor the public regards the maximisation of owners’ profit as the only legitimate 
aim of business, distributable profits can no longer be regarded as the sole or premier indicator of 
performance.” (p. 38) The Report includes a detailed explanation of prospective changes in 
accounting requirements and identifies a number of issues that need further researches. It concludes 
that: “We recognise the trend in new and proposed legislations towards the recognition of the rights 
to information of a growing number of groups including employees and the public. We recognise 
there is need for additional indicators of performance in the corporate reports of all entities.” (p. 75)  
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Considering the mode of regulation (see Figure 3.1), the debate was largely legislative-
driven, anchored in the sphere of public law and conducted at the national-level, although there was 
a strong attention to regulatory trends and developments in the US and in other European countries. 
Only in the late 1970s, we are witnessing the emergence of some international frameworks, 
concerned also with corporate social disclosure, in an early attempt to regulate the emergent 
transnationalisation of business
86. In particular, the OECD issued for the first time its ‘Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises’ in 1976, as part of the Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises. The principles outlined in this universal instrument offer guidelines to 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), governments, and employers' and workers' organisations in such 
areas as employment, decent conditions of work and life, and impact of the industrial activities. 
Furthermore, in a clear attempt to translate the corporatist compromise to a global level, in 1977, 
the Governing Body of the International Labour Office (ILO) first adopted the Tri-partite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policies
87
.  
 
Figure 3.1 The European field of accounting (1970s): changes in the mode of regulation  
 
                                                          
86
 For instance, in 1977, the creation of the Global Sullivan Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility – 
launched by Reverend Leo Sullivan to persuade large US companies to disinvest in South Africa – already 
prefigured the internationalisation of this field of regulation; the global rise of US-style CSR and the 
emerging power of large institutional investors. 
87
 The ILO Tri-partite declaration’s provisions have been afterward amended in November 2000 and March 
2006 are reinforced by certain international labour Conventions and Recommendations which the social 
partners are urged to bear in mind and apply, to the greatest extent possible. 
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As regards the content of regulation (see Figure 3.2), accounting standards were still largely 
underdeveloped and experimental as compared to today. As Mathews pointed out, “financial 
accounting standards had not been developed to any extent at this time”, except for the US and 
UK’s jurisdictions (1997: 11). It is perhaps difficult to even imagine it today. However, less than 
three decades ago companies’ financial reports were extremely reduced, made of only a few pages 
and only communicating to shareholders the basic information, often only changing the bottom-line 
compared to the previous year (Eccles and Krzus 2010). Indubitably, that situation allowed 
regulators and companies for greater freedom to engage and experiment forms of non-financial 
accounting, including social accounting. From a summary review of this early debate on social 
accounting, emerges a widespread acknowledgement that “there is little merit in treating social and 
economic issues as though they were clearly separated from each other.” (Ackerman and Baur 
1976: 12) During this period experimentations were typically associated with employees reporting 
and the elaboration of organizational performance indicators (see Gray and al. 1996; Mathews 
1997; Gray 2002 and Owen 2008). As Matthews (1997: 484) points out, “environmental concerns 
were ‘invisible’ at that time”: a series of surveys conducted by Ernst and Ernst in the period 1972-
1978 included only three environmental categories out of 27 (Ernst and Ernst 1978: 22-28). As 
Ullmann commented with regards to West Germany, “on the political level CSR seems to focus 
more and more on employees’ affairs, reflecting, thereby, the current economic situation and the 
relative power of the constituencies involved.” (1979: 132)88  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
88
 Social reporting was seen by corporate owners and management as a means to deal with the growing 
influence of organised labour and to legitimise managers’ position during a period of intensified conflicts. 
On the other hand, the goal of part of the labour unions’ became to orient the discussion of social reporting 
regulation towards the subject areas for which traditionally they have developed policies: “[...] the long-term 
aim of their strategy is to increase the control of labour unions on business affairs.” (Ullmann 1979, p. 130) 
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Figure 3.2 The European field of accounting (1970s): changes in the content of regulation  
 
 
According to Mathews’ (1997), during this period two approaches to social accounting 
emerged: those who were attempting to modify historical financial accounting and to find financial 
measures for new identities and those who attempted to develop new measures, including non-
financial ones. A certain interest was attracted by the rise of forms of Human Resources Accounting 
(HRA) concerning financial and non-financial information about companies’ human capital and 
intellectual capital (see Blau 1978; Caplan and Landekich 1974). The example par excellence of the 
social accounting regulation that characterised this period is, however, the introduction in France of 
the bilan social by the 77-769 Law 12 July 1977. Strongly supported by President Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, this legislation mandates large companies to prepare a social account annually and 
submit it to a committee of workers and mangers that have to discuss and approve it. The law was 
highly prescriptive and mandates companies to prepare a report on the basis of 134 quantitative and 
statistical measures and indicators, including chapters on employment, training, health and safety, 
labour relations, working conditions and living conditions (see Harribey 2009).  
As a concluding remark, it is worth to note that the introduction of social accounting was 
widely perceived as a necessary modernisation of accounting practices, again ‘an idea whose time 
had come’. In fact, during the 1970s, Anglo-Saxon (US and UK) companies were consistently 
outperformed by their German and Japanese competitors. Therefore the rationale for discharging a 
broader approach to corporate accounting was largely due to pressures for converging toward the 
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German model of co-determination, seen as better equipped to deal with the upcoming crisis of 
Taylorism. Recognition of ‘changing public attitude’ was given, for instance, in the 1973 CBI 
(Confederation of British Industry) report
89
; the Bullock Committee arrived to propose the adoption 
of a form of employee representation on companies’ boards (Bullock 1977); close 53 of the 1973 
UK Company Bill (which lapsed following a change in government) stated: “The matters to which 
the directors of a company are entitled to have regard in exercising their powers shall include the 
interests’ of the company’s employees generally as well as the interests of its members.” In France 
the introduction of mandatory social accounting was the direct consequence of the work of the 
Sudreau Commission. This was established with the explicit aim of addressing the emergence of 
new instances due to the crisis of Taylorism that motivated a reform of Company Law. While the 
Commission decided to reject the idea of adopting a German co-determination model of corporate 
governance, it elaborated the notion of ‘co-surveillance’ by both shareholders and trade unions’ 
representatives. Another remarkable example of the influence of the ‘German model’ is the EC 
Proposed Fifth Directive on Company Law (Commission 1972) published in October 1972 by the 
EEC Commission, which would have required all large European companies (above 500 
employees) to adopt a German-style two-tier board structure and some form of employee 
participation in corporate decision-making. Eventually, it was abandoned because of strong 
opposition by the UK. 
1980s and 1990s. Accounting standards, financialisation and modest CSR. 
By the early 1980s, however, the debate radically changed and the first cycle of non-
financial reporting regulation was interrupted for over two decades. Transformative ideas of 
changes in corporate law and workers’ participation were abandoned and the primacy of 
shareholders’ interests was reaffirmed.  
In the new politico-economic and politico-ideological climate of the 1980s (see Jessop 2007; 
Dicken 2007) ideas of social accounting barely survived. As summarised by Colin Crouch, “Partly 
as a result of changes in technology, it was becoming feasible for major corporations to arrange 
their sourcing, production, distribution and management systems on a transnational scale in order to 
maximize economies of different commodity, labour and product markets. To realize the gains of 
such a scale of organization, firms required a deregulation of national financial regimes, so that they 
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 “We think that the government may consider, as part of their doctrine of wider disclosure, a general 
legislative encouragement for companies: to recognise duties and obligations (within the context of the 
objects for wich the company was established) arising from the company’s relationship with creditors, 
suppliers, customers, employees and society at large; and in so doing to exercise their best judgement to 
strike a balance between the interests of the aforementioned groups and between the interests of those groups 
and the interests of the proprietors of the company.” (CBI 1973) 
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could move money around the world in line with the production activities [see Table 1, below]. This 
was forthcoming in a series of changes during the 1980s, which quite quickly produced an almost 
global financial market. This, in turn, made possible the rise of a global financial sector.” (2010: 32)  
 
Table 1: National regulatory changes in relation to 1992-2008 
 
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
 
Number of countries that   
    introduced changes 
 
43 
 
66 
 
70 
 
103 
 
55 
Number of regulatory  
    Changes 
77 114 150 270 110 
Number favourable to    
    FDI 
77 98 147 234 85 
Less favourable 0 16 3 36 25 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2009: 31) 
 
 
Indeed, this shift has been labelled as the ‘financialization’ of the global economy (Aglietta 
and Riberioux 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) that has resulted in a dramatic growth in trading 
volume and the complexity of financial products (Turner et al. 2010). Crucially for our analysis this 
shift has magnified the economic power of institutional investors: pension funds, mutual funds and 
insurance companies. This deep transformation has emerged before and more bluntly in the US and 
the UK. While in the 1970s individuals held almost 80% of equity in the US, by the end of the 
1990s their holdings had fallen below 45% and institutional investors’ had risen to almost 50%. 
Similarly in the UK individual ownership dropped from over 50% in the early 1960s to about 15% 
in 1999. At the same time, institutional ownership rose from 30% to over 50% (see Hawley and 
Williams, 2000). Table 2 (below) illustrates the rapid financialisation of the world economy, 
showing the expansion of ‘financial capitalism’. 
 
 
Table 2: Development of the global nominal GDP and financial stocks: 1980-2006 ($trillion)  
 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2006 
Nominal GDP 10 22 29 32 48 
Financial Assets 12 43 66 94 167 
 
Source: Farrell et al. (2008: 3) 
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Share prices rather than production became the guiding lights of top managers’ activity with 
a fierce reassertion of the principle of shareholder primacy and of the shareholder-centred model of 
corporation (see Soederberg 2010). Mainstream CG literature started to treat the Anglo-Saxon 
shareholder-centred model as the ‘standard’, claiming that, in the context of growing global 
competition, this model had “no important competitors” left and predicting that we will witness the 
“end of history for corporate law” (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001: 50).  
Following the emergence of what Susanne Soederberg called (2010) the transnational 
‘corporate-financial nexus’, CSR rapidly dropped from the regulatory agendas. As synthesised by 
Ireland and Pillay, while the advocates of contemporary CSR struggle to modify corporate 
behaviour through voluntarism and self-regulation, a “ruthlessly shareholder-oriented, Anglo-Saxon 
model of the corporation which is antithetical to meaningful CSR is being entrenched around the 
world by legal and other means.” (2010: 91) Solomon (2006: 25) noted that, “It is almost 
impossible to pursue ethical business unless it is demonstrated to be profitable, not only because of 
the attitudes of managers and shareholders but also because of our legal system and corporate 
governance structures.” Kinderman (2012) recently showed that, since the late 1970s, in the UK 
CSR has become “a quid pro quo for lighter regulation”, legitimising unleashed financial 
capitalism. Contemporary CSR, in effect, has been labelled as ‘modest’ (Parkinson 2006) and 
increasingly criticized for having little impact on the world’s most pressing problems (Dowell-Jones 
and Kinley 2011; Visser and Hollender 2011).  
The key point in relation with this study is that, as a consequence of the global convergence 
toward (absolute) shareholders primacy in corporate law and CGR, mandating social and 
environmental disclosure became unthinkable, because this information was not considered as 
‘material’ by investors and financial analysts. This change was so sudden that a clear sense of 
dismay and frustration can be perceived in the work of those who had been at the forefront of the 
social accounting debate during the 1970s
90
. In 1985, for instance, Dierkes notes that: “The 1960s 
and 70s witnessed a re-examination of the relation between business and society, the emergence of 
a new awareness of the breath of the positive and negative impacts of business activities, and a 
concomitant reformulation of the concept of corporate interests and responsibilities. [...] Since the 
early eighties, the situation has changed. Although the companies which pioneered concepts of 
corporate social reporting are still continuing their effort, few are joining their ranks, except in 
countries where legal requirements for social reporting have been established.” (1985: 334-335) 
                                                          
90
 As recently evoked by Rob Gray: “Whilst social accounting enjoyed considerable experimentation and 
currency in the 1970s it fell off the public agenda in the 1980s, so much so that there was considerable 
hostility to the concept during the 1980s and beyond.” (2001: 9) 
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Debates on accounting standards and social reporting – likewise CG and CSR debates – became 
completely isolated from each other. This separation was legitimised, above all, by the force of the 
law. In fact, this period sees a remarkable structuration of (financial) accounting and reporting, 
through the adoption of accounting standards and legal provisions to reduce the degree of individual 
interpretation in financial reporting (Nobes and Parker 2000). As Whittington (2005) points out, the 
expansion and internationalisation of large corporations and capital markets since the 1970s led to a 
regulatory momentum for harmonising and standardising financial accounting, in order to meet the 
need for comparability between companies and to make the preparation of group accounts easier.  
Therefore, during the period from the 1970s to the 2000s we are witnessing the development 
of international financial standards “as a product of the marketplace” (Whittington 2005: 128). This 
process was dominated by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) now called 
IASB (International Accounting Standards Board). The Committee was founded in 1973 in London. 
It is a private transnational organisation of professional accounting bodies, considered already in the 
early 1980s as the “premier international body and the most productive issuer of international 
accounting standards”. (Evans and Taylors 1982: 117) In Europe, this situation led the ECC to issue 
the Fourth (1978) and Seventh (1983) Directives, which significantly enhanced the financial 
accounting landscape and to seek some form of agreement with the SEC to achieve a certain level 
of harmonisation with the US. However, following the failure of bilateral and international 
accounting negotiations, the EU Commission started to look at the IASC as a promising alternative 
to legislative harmonisation. Finally, in 1995, the European Commission aligned with the 
harmonisation efforts of the IASC. As long as it was not incompatible with the European 
Directives, Member States could allow companies to report under the International Accounting 
Standards issued by the IASC.  
However, little of this accounting structuration applied to social and environmental 
accounting, which was largely seen as independent from the conceptual framework that dominates 
such standards. It is crucial to note that that during this period and to a lesser extent even today, 
transparency and disclosure has emerged as the single most powerful and ever-expanding principle 
for regulating business-society relations (see Power 1997; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; 
Braithwaite 2008). As Power (1997) already perceived with extreme clarity in the mid-1990s, since 
the 1980s there has been a global explosion of ‘rituals of verification’ derived, more or less directly, 
from financial accounting and auditing practices. The well-known thesis is that, as the Welfare State 
is increasingly displaced by the Regulatory State, new forms of auditing and outcome-based 
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performance measurement have become central in regulatory and political debates
91
. Considering 
this established regulatory trend towards transparency and disclosure, it is even more striking that 
this phase sees governments and policy-makers almost completely ignoring the area of corporate 
non-financial disclosure. 
 
Figure 3.3 The European field of accounting (1980s and 1990s): changes in the mode of regulation 
 
Particularly during the 1990s, the rise of legislation related to environmental protection 
provided a limited support to the case for regulating corporate environmental reporting. In 
particular, environmental reporting attracted some attention following major disasters such as the 
Exxon Valdez in 1989. Throughout the 1990s, no-profit environmental organisations such as 
CERES sown the seeds for the development of environmental reporting and provided the first 
examples of voluntary guiding principles for companies wishing to disclose such information
92
. 
However, this development has not led to accounting standards that specifically deal with 
environmental liabilities or their inclusion in the annual report. However, a key distinction here is 
                                                          
91
 See, for instance, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) “Reinventing Government”, which effectively translates 
private sector managerial ideas about quality into the context of public administration. On the Regulatory 
State see Majone (1997) and Levy-Faur (2011) 
92
 The Coalition for Environmental Responsible Economies (CERES), created in 1988, has been one of the 
early pioneers of contemporary environmental reporting and had a central role in the development of a 
network of organisations devoted to the development of non-financial reporting (see www.ceres.org) In 
particular in 1989 CERES produced the Valdez Principles, a 10-point code of corporate environmental 
conduct that represent a milestone in the field of corporate environmental accountability. 
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between corporations reporting directly to the public or reporting to public authorities. In fact, while 
the former was not developed, the latter became a widespread practice, often linked to the licensing 
conditions that allow a business activity to take place
93
. The 1983 UEC’s (Union Européenne des 
Experts Constables, Economiques and Financiers) recommendation for introducing structured social 
reporting (see UEC 1983) and the 1990s’ introduction of mandatory social accounting in Belgium 
are isolated initiatives that failed to re-engine the interest for this form of accounting.  
 
Figure 3.4 The European field of accounting (1980s and 1990s): changes in the content of regulation  
 
 
The distinction between financial and CSR aspects was also crucially re-enforced by an 
academic and professional tradition, portraying accounting as restricted to strictly financial issues 
and the reduction of CSR and social accounting to a ‘non-issue’ in management studies. As Rob 
Gray clarifies, it is fair to say that “for the vast majority of teachers, students, researchers and 
practitioners in accounting management and organisational studies, social and environmental 
accounting is a matter of sublime irrelevance. They know little about it and care even less.” (Gray 
2006: 6) Penetrating and significant charges against conventional accounting can be found in many 
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 The practice of environmental reporting to public authorities was pioneered in the US by the introduction 
in 1986 of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). 
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critical accounting studies (see Tinker 1984; Cooper and Hopper 1990; Power and Laughlin 1992; 
Laughlin 1999)
94
.  
Isolated from the mainstream accounting and corporate governance debate; ignored in 
accounting text books and absent from regulatory debates, in a few years social and environmental 
accounting was reduced to a mere theoretical exercise devoid of any actual validation or 
acknowledgement
95
. The struggles for keeping alive a meaningful research programmes and a 
limited practice led to a transformation of the content of such reports, which increasingly moved 
away from social matters and towards environmental issues. As Buhr (2007: 61): “By the end of the 
1970s social reporting was fading out and it took until the late 1980s and into the early 1990s for 
the next stage, environmental reporting, to emerge. Because of the hiatus of the early 1980s, 
environmental reporting hit the scene fresh and new, even though it was a recycled phenomenon 
arising from its earlier associations with social reporting.”  
Overall, during this phase, the regulatory debate on social and environmental reporting 
seems ordained to vanish in the CSR area: a ‘grey zone’ external to both national legal intervention 
and emerging transnational corporate governance regulation (see Mares 2008). In effect, as 
mentioned above, contemporary ideas about corporate responsibilities radically differ from the 
previous phase. The main difference is that contemporary CSR is a mere adjust to the dominant 
shareholder-oriented model of corporation that re-emerged in the 1980s. As maintained by Ireland 
and Pillay: “Its objective is the much more modest one of trying to ensure that maximization of 
shareholder value is not purposed by corporations without their having some regard to the impact of 
their activities on the society at large.” (2010: 89) It is therefore a mere adjustment to the way 
corporations operate and do not purport to be transformative in its nature but only ameliorative. 
John Parkinson referred to the current situation as ‘modest’ because it has not the aim of aligning 
the public interest and the interest of shareholders. It relies on responses to the external preferences 
largely mediated through the market, not attempting to a more fundamental reshaping of corporate 
objectives.  
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 Inter alia, traditional accounting is criticised for: being too attached to rules and procedures; positivist and 
oppressive; serving vested interests; its identification with power; conservative and risks and innovation 
avoidance.  
95
 The isolation of social and environmental accounting from mainstream accounting led to the creation, 
during the 1980s, of dedicated journals where a circle of scholars and practitioners interested in the subject 
could discuss and publish their works (e.g. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy in 1982; Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal in 1988; Critical Perspectives in Accounting in 1990). In fact, as 
recalled by Mathews, “leading accounting research journal were almost as inaccessible then as they are now” 
(1997: 484). 
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3.4 The emergence of a transnational regulatory regime of sustainability 
accounting 
 
The end of the 1990s marked the beginning of a new cycle of regulatory initiatives in the 
field of non-financial reporting. While the first cycle of regulatory initiatives, in the 1970s, was 
predominantly legislative-driven and taking place at the national level, this second cycle is taking 
place at different levels of regulation and through varying modes of governance and it is 
predominantly market-driven. So far, this cycle has been composed of two episodes: the first one 
was already exhausted by the mid-2000s while the second episode started in 2008, after the onset of 
the global financial crisis, and by the time this work has been completed, its outcome is still 
contended and uncertain.  
 
Voluntary CSR reporting and the internationalisation and privatisation of 
accounting standards 
Considering changes in the mode of accounting regulation, the period between the end of the 
1990s and the early 2000s is characterised by the rapid emergence, next to existing well-structured 
standards for financial reporting, of a first nucleus of largely voluntary regulatory frameworks for 
non-financial/sustainability reporting. This polycentric and multi-level regulatory regime defies 
traditional conceptualisations and has represented a puzzle for many scholars that attempted to 
categorise it starting from different theoretical perspectives, including international relations; 
regulatory studies; political sciences and organisational studies (see section 2.2).  
One of the main features of this period is represented by the rise of private or hybrid global 
voluntary frameworks and guidelines for the disclosure of sustainability reporting. Organisations 
such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO); 
the UN Global Compact and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) re-designed the landscape of 
corporate extra-legal and extra-financial reporting (see Annex I). The archetype of this approach has 
been the GRI – a no-profit global organisation created in 1997 in the US but based in Amsterdam. 
This applies a truly global voluntary, multi-stakeholders- and consensus-based approach to the 
elaboration of standards for sustainability reporting. The GRI has represented an astonishingly 
successful prototype for voluntary regulation of globalising business. Furthermore, it has almost 
completely reshaped sustainability reporting, inventing a new language and creating ties between 
preparers and all the different users of such reports. However, by the mid-2000, the groundbreaking 
role of the GRI and the UN GC appeared already exhausted. Their stakeholder-based, voluntary 
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approach increasingly demonstrated its limits: asymmetric power relations between social and 
economic stakeholders; conflicting interests and objectives; fragmentation of the regulatory 
landscape; failure to empower civil society and transform business organisations (see Dingwerth 
and Eichinger 2010).  
 
Figure 3.5 The European field of accounting (2000s): changes in the mode of regulation 
 
 
It is worth to stress that this regulatory approach, based on competing private or hybrid 
standards, was very common in the US. On the contrary, it was still largely extraneous to the 
European regulatory landscape
96. As noted by Graz “standardisation in the US hinged upon 
hundreds of private sectoral bodies, with public agencies involved when societal concerns or 
defence contracts are at issue.” (2006: 120) This difference perhaps explains the fact that a parallel 
regulatory debate emerged since 2000 also in many European countries and at the EU-level – but 
not in the US - on the possibility of introducing a legal requirement for reporting on corporate non-
financial performance. Within this European regulatory debate, it is possible to recognise two broad 
regulatory strands: on the one hand, a largely voluntary approach, focusing on social and 
environmental information; and, on the other hand, ‘corporate governance’ policies and debates.  
                                                          
96
 Notably, despite having its headquarters in Europe (Amterdam) and being a truly global initiative, the GRI 
was formed in 1997 in the US by the Boston-based Tellus Institute and the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES), with the support of the UNEP (United Nation Environmental Program). 
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As regards the former, a momentum for creating a legal framework for corporate social and 
environmental accountability emerged at the end of the 1990s. Around 2000, in fact, both Norway 
and France approved new accounting laws mandating companies to include detailed non-financial 
information in their management reports. The UK was contemporaneously discussing an ambitious 
Company Law reform, including the project of strengthening narrative reporting (Villiers 2006). 
The launch of the Lisbon Agenda, in 2000, seemed to confirm that non-financial disclosure was 
about to become an integral part of EU Company Law. However, the EU Commission soon scaled 
down its ambitions, facing hard and fast opposition from business organizations. Already in 2001, 
the Green Paper that had to translate the Lisbon commitment for CSR into policies ruled out any 
imposition of direct obligations on companies. It contained a very ‘modest’ definition of CSR as a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns on a voluntary basis 
(Commission 2001: 366). However, the idea to create an EU regulatory framework that would 
encourage corporate CSR, through transparency and disclosure, was still there. In October 2002, 
the Commission launched the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum (EMSF) on CSR but the debate soon 
resulted in a deadlock on the issue of mandatory versus voluntary rules. The only, rather modest, 
result of this EU-level debate was the Directive 2003/51/EC that introduced into EU Law the 
requirement on companies to include “both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key 
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to 
environmental and employee matters.”  
In 2005 the new Barroso Commission explicitly suggested that non-financial disclosure 
should be regulated through voluntary guidelines, principles and standards that had been created by 
global regulatory networks, such as the UN Global Compact and the GRI. The outcome of the EU 
regulatory debate mirrored what was taking place elsewhere, implicitly confirming that the 
momentum for regulating this practice was gone. At the national level, in particular, the case of the 
UK has been symptomatic. In fact, after historic victory of the Labour Party in 1997, there were 
great expectations for fundamental company law reforms that would take into consideration social 
and environmental aspects. In effect, in 2000 the first drafts of the Modern Company Law Review 
appeared to extend company law to tackle social, ethical and environmental issues broadening 
directors’ responsibilities. However, in 2006, after many years of exhausting debates, because of the 
opposition of the business sector, the government decided to introduce a more modest requirement, 
which met only the minimum European requirements (Villiers 2012). This fiasco to impose 
reporting through national legislation was mirrored by the unfortunate fate of the ‘UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights”. The Norms had been the result of a UN debate that lasted several decades in the 
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effort of creating global human rights standards for businesses, following closely the cyclical 
evolution of corporate accountability regulation
97
. By 2003, the final draft of the Norms 
encountered significant opposition from the business sector and the Commission on Human Rights 
ultimately decided, in 2004, that the framework had no legal standing (see Miretski and Bachmann 
2011). 
On the other hand, as part of a wave of reforms emphasizing minority shareholders’ rights; 
board independence; accountability to shareholders; and transparency, institutional investors used 
the strong ideological consensus in favour of the (absolute) shareholder model to obtain the 
adoption of binding and comprehensive corporate governance (CG) reforms. A key role in this new 
framework was played by the widespread adoption of new guidelines and codes for CG reporting, 
inspired by the UK Cadbury Report. Finally, following the Directive 2006/46/EC, even Continental 
European countries, introduced this non-financial reporting practice. Justified by the necessity of 
avoiding new Enron or Parmalat cases, the codes affirmed the principle that shareholders are 
ultimately best-placed to effectively monitor CG arrangements made by directors, even in countries 
characterized by the stakeholder-model. As we shall see in the next two chapters, during this period, 
the accounting regulatory debate was monopolised by the completion of the process of 
harmonisation of European and international standards that had started in the 1990s. As argued in a 
series of recent critical corporate governance studies (Overbeek et al. 2007; Horn 2011), the reforms 
represented a rapture with the stakeholder tradition that characterised the German and Central 
European model of capitalism.   
As regards changes in the content of CSA regulation, through the continuous, open 
elaboration and confrontation amongst different stakeholders within global networked-
organisations, a relatively more coherent and defined nucleus of KPIs for reporting finally emerged. 
The backbone of ‘sustainability reports’ has been the ‘triple bottom line’ approach to sustainability 
popularised by John Elkington (1997), the founder of AccountAbility, which provided the basis for 
defining sustainability reporting as disclosure of ESG information. The guidelines and principles for 
reporting elaborated by the GRI, the UN GC and other similar regulatory initiatives, typically 
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 In the early 1970s, the United Nations Economic and Social Council requested that the Secretary 
General create a commission group to study the impact of transnational corporations (TNCs) on development 
processes and international relations. The UN created the Commission on Transnational Corporations in 
1973, with the goal of formulating a corporate code of conduct for TNCs. The Commission’s work continued 
into the early 1990s, however the group was ultimately unable to ratify an agreeable code, due to the 
disagreement between developed and developing countries and it was dissolved in 1994. In August 1998, the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights established a Working Group on 
Transnational Corporations. The Working Group similarly attempted to create standards for corporations’ 
human rights obligations. However in 2004 the Norms produced by the Working Group failed to be 
approved due to the opposition of large sections of business. 
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converged towards four key areas: social; environmental; human rights and, more recently, anti-
bribery and corruption policies. However, this is still an open list and the content of CSA has 
proved magmatic and still evolving. Reporting and transparency became the ‘first port’ for defining 
the content of future regulation concerning areas as diverse as: sustainable investors; green public 
procurement; human rights due diligence; remuneration and the composition of the board of 
directors. On the one hand, the emergence of reliable, accurate and relevant frameworks for 
disclosure constituted a preliminary condition for any further step towards corporate social 
accountability. Therefore, it became a battlefield between different visions of the role of business in 
society. However, on the other hand, the excessive reliance on transparency and disclosure per se 
diverged the attention from the real objective, which was not to provide the market with the right 
information – as suggested by the dominant law-and-economics view of ‘transparency’ – but to 
empower stakeholders; improve corporate justice and sustainable and equitable economic growth.  
 
Figure 3.6 The European field of accounting (2000s): changes in the content of regulation 
 
 
By the mid 2000s, the increase in stock markets prices and in giant corporations’ profits, 
implicitly, de-politicised and marketised the initial transformative intentions of the GRI and of other 
organisations, mirroring a loss of engagement of public authorities. ‘Voluntary’ CSR was pointing 
towards a form of ‘corporate noblesse oblige’ (Crouch 2008) that were leaving to the management 
of the corporation the freedom to decide whether or not to engage in CSR practices and how. 
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Sustainability and CSR struggle to be integrated in the ‘black box’ of business undertakings and 
public authorities and law-makers decided to develop social and environmental policies in isolation 
from, or subordinated to, core decisions of economic efficiency. Nonetheless, ‘sustainability’ and 
responsible investments continue to grow, greatly contributing to changes in the sensitivity of 
business, political and social leaders on this issue. The dramatic increase in the number of reports 
issued, during this period, by large multinational corporations (see Figure 3.7) speaks volumes 
about the rapid establishment and structuration of this reporting practice. Data from KPMG 
Sustainability, which has regularly produced (every three years) a survey on non-financial 
reporting, confirm this sharp rise
98
.  
 
Figure 3.7: A snapshot of the rapid growth in sustainability reporting worldwide (source: corporateregister.com 2012) 
 
 
In conclusion, during this phase (from the late 1990s until the mid-2000s) governments and 
public authorities largely opted for a voluntary approach, not imposing regulation to enterprises. 
They decided to rely on self-regulation, soft-law and the progressive establishment of initiatives 
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 Since 1973, KPMG has regularly produced (every three years) a survey on non-financial reporting which 
interestingly follows closely the evolution of this corporate practice. In 1999 it began to consider not only 
environmental but social and environmental and later on sustainability reporting. Furthermore, starting from 
1999, surveys considered a broadening sample of companies and countries. In 2002, only 24% of the top 100 
companies in 11 countries used to publish a sustainability report. Six years later they were already 53% and 
by 2011 the percentage rose to 64%. Considering the G250 companies, reporting has progressively become 
the norm (95%). The KPMG survey also shows that in some countries, in particular UK (100%) and Japan 
(99%), adherence to ESG reporting has become almost unanimous among their top large companies (KPMG 
2011). 
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such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the UN Global Compact. The conventional 
wisdom was that companies should be induced to disclose by the pressure of the public opinion and 
the ‘business case’ for sustainable and responsible behaviour, not by law.  
This regulatory episode marked a terrific growth in the practice of voluntary corporate 
sustainability reporting, and the success of global regulatory networks, such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), issuing guidelines and standards for environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
disclosure. In effect, this strategy led to a rapid institutionalization of disclosure that has become the 
norm among large corporations and to better system for undertaking substantial social, 
environmental and sustainability reporting. Moreover, ESG disclosure developed also into the third-
sector and public sector. However, it is also worth to strongly underline that the success of this 
voluntary approach has been the ‘other side’ of the failure of imposing legal norms and obligations 
to TNCs as regards their social and environmental responsibility (Morgera 2009; McBarnet et al. 
2007). The success of corporate social and environmental accounting paradoxically coincided with 
its failure. Instead of being ‘combative’ and challenging with regard to corporate power, the 
practice of ESG disclosure was fundamentally ‘captured’ by vested interests. Left to corporate self-
regulation, CSA risked being of none or very limited interest for authorities, consumers, workers 
and the public opinion.  
 
The current debate. Towards integrating financial and non-financial reporting?  
After the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, the landscape of social and environmental 
disclosure regulation has experienced a further transformation, which is still underway. While it is 
still hard to predict the outcome of this transformation, there are some trends that can be already 
outlined.  
First of all, as regards changes in the mode of non-financial reporting, we are witnessing an 
acceleration of the process of structuration and standardisation of CSA. In particular, there is a 
renewed pressure for a stronger activism of the state in its regulatory role, to ensure a minimum 
level of disclosure and risk prevention (see KPMG et al. 2010). While in the 1990s the debate 
focused on strictly voluntary business disclosure, it gradually shifted during the 2000s to stress the 
alternative between mandatory and voluntary approaches. Finally, since 2008, we are witnessing the 
overcoming of this deadlock. Since 2008, in fact, several EU countries proceeded towards varying 
approaches to the regulation of this practice (including the UK, Sweden, Spain, Denmark and 
France). More details on key developments in EU Member States are given in Annex I. However, 
this is just one aspect of a broader international trend away from purely voluntary disclosure. 
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Regulatory initiatives have been taken by stock exchanges, such as the SEC in the US and the 
Shenzen and Shangai Stock Exchange in China. The governments of China, India, Indonesia and 
South Africa, among others, have recently strengthened their regulation in this field. There is now a 
strong tendency towards the creation of a multi-layers regulatory regime structured as a 
combination of mandatory and voluntary approaches, for instance at a global level, the ISO 26000 
guidance on social responsibility has been finally released in 2010. Since the fiasco of the UN 
Norms, in 2004, the new UN Special Representative, Prof John Ruggie, has been developing a new 
UN Framework for business and human rights that has been unanimously approved by the Human 
Rights Council after three years of extensive research and consultations. The UN Guiding Principles 
on ‘Business and Human Rights’ stress that appropriate levels of transparency and disclosure are 
key corporate-level mechanisms to provide a measure of accountability to groups or individuals 
who may be impacted and to other relevant stakeholders, including investors. The OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have been extended in 2011 to include the human rights 
aspects developed in the UN Guiding Principles. As we shall see in the next chapter, after 2008, at 
the EU level there have been a series of initiatives starting from a new Communication on CSR 
(Commission 2011) and a new proposed directive on non-financial reporting (Commission 2013). 
This wealth of codes, guidelines, standards and laws raises new questions about their emergence, 
the relation among the different levels of regulation and the role of the actors involved.  
Secondly, as concerns changes in the content of regulation, there is a certain trend towards 
attempting to integrate the two parallel worlds of financial and non-financial reporting and issuing 
only one report (Eccles and Krzus 2010; IIRC 2011). For the first time since the early 1980s, the 
accounting profession attempted to establish a preliminary contact with the worlds of non-
financial/sustainability, particularly as regards intangible assets that are traditionally absent from 
annual reports. This represents both a sign of maturity of CSA and the recognition of the limits of 
traditional financial reporting. Although this development is still in its infancy, it is strongly 
supported by influential organizations such as the Big Four (KPMG; Deloitte, Ernst & Young and 
PwC); the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the International Network for Corporate 
Governance (INCG). The latter is an association of institutional investors, representing assets of 
over US $15 trillion, that has contributed to shaping global CG ‘best practice’ during the last two 
decades and has created a ‘Non-Financial Business Reporting Committee’ aimed to influence 
regulatory proposals for integrated reporting. In particular, in 2010 an International Integrated 
Reporting Committee (IIRC) has been set up with the objective of creating “a globally accepted 
integrated reporting framework which brings together financial, environmental, social and 
governance information in a clear, concise, consistent and comparable format.” Although a recent 
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report (CorporateRegister.com 2012) highlighted that only a small number of companies are issuing 
an integrated report, the emergence of this idea marks the recognition that, by any realistic vision of 
markets and corporations, social and environmental considerations have a material impact.  
Lastly, the rise of sustainability as the main challenge that public and private governance are 
currently facing has, on the one hand, further broadened the issues that are covered in the reports 
(biodiversity, climate change, etc.) and, on the other hand, crucially widened the potential audience 
and prepares of non-financial information. In fact, although corporations are still the main issuers, 
the number of public authorities and NGOs that are experimenting with sustainability reports is on 
the rise. For example, sustainability reports have been issued by municipalities (i.e. the city of 
Amsterdam), national and international public authorities, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), Trade Unions (TUs) and even the US Army (see US Army 2008). They are bringing 
innovative practices and perspectives for integrating the different platforms into a global regime of 
socio-economic governance. At the same time this explosion of reporting represents a challenge for 
its codification, coherence and regulation. 
 
3.4. What explains changes? Sustainability accounting and the crises of 
‘democratic capitalism’ 
This section attempts to explain the cyclical development of social and environmental 
reporting regulation that has been described throughout this chapter. Drawing on the explanatory 
framework outlined in the previous chapter, the key argument is that changes in the regulation of 
the accounting field can only be explained looking at broader changes in the accumulation of capital 
in the economic field, assuming there is a relation of structural homology between the two fields.  
A clear parallel can be drawn between the different phases of changes in the content and 
mode of accounting regulation in Europe and in what the Regulation School called the prevailing 
accumulation regime (see Boyer and Saillard 2002; Jessop and Sum 2006) or, even more clearly, 
what  Streeck (2011) called the progressive crises of ‘democratic capitalism’. In general terms, the 
disappearance of social accounting at the end of the 1970s mirrors the contemporaneous 
disintegration of the so-called Atlantic Fordist regime of capital accumulation. (see Jessop 1992) 
The 1990s’ process of structuration and standardisation of financial accounting – combined with a 
less than lukewarming development of non-financial reporting – tunes with the dominance of 
‘financial capitalism’ and the rise of institutional investors. The privatisation of accounting 
regulation of the late 1990s and 2000s accompany a period of growing self-regulation and 
autonomisation of the economy from the influence of other (political; religious; legal; etc) fields. 
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Academic and quasi-academic theories of corporate governance and corporate control that emerged 
in the UK and the US in the 1980s, by the 1990s became ‘the new standard’, overcoming, even in 
Central Europe, the model of corporatist industrial relations. They were based on the affirmation of 
the contractual theory of the firm, seen as the legal property of shareholders. The prioritization of 
shareholder value creation over a broader approach considering other stakeholders – for instance 
employees – was based “not so much on the (problematic) grounds of shareholder ‘ownership’ 
rights as on the consequentialist grounds that shareholder-oriented corporations are more efficient 
and deliver higher rates of growth than their rivals.” (Ireland and Pillay 2010: 86).  
Accounting had a major and rarely acknowledged role in the ‘structuration’ of financial 
capitalism. In effect, if ‘neo-liberalism’ has been based on the idea of capital share price 
maximisation as the dominant goal of the corporation (Harvey 2005), then the triumph of financial 
capitalism has been build upon the disclosure of timely, accurate and relevant information about the 
financial performance of companies. The result has been the empowerment of shareholders that 
could better control that companies were actually managed in a way to maximise only shareholder 
value. Simultaneously, excluding from the company report any information that was not affecting 
the ‘bottom line’, this approach to accounting regulation effectively changed the notion of capital, 
which came to coincide with financial capital. The very idea of shareholder value creation as the 
main – if not the only – purpose of giant corporations, constitutes, in my view, the other side of the 
failure in designing new forms of ‘social accounting’ and management reports that would be able to 
recognise and universalise other forms of extra-financial and even extra-economic value.  
Then the question is: what explains the re-emergence at the end of the 1990s of a lively 
regulatory debate on non-financial/sustainability disclosure? This appears as a rather counter-
intuitive development, considering the dominance of the principle of shareholders value 
maximisation and of the ‘standard’ approach to corporate governance, firmly pivoted on the dyadic 
relation between managers and shareholders.  
I suggest that considering the struggles for CSA regulation in a broader historical framework 
of conflicts for corporate governance and control would allow better explaining its cyclical 
development. My argument is based on the idea that the political-economic configuration of 
advanced-capitalist societies during the post-war period, based on the compromise between labour 
and capital, has gradually collapsed, because of the inner tension between what the author calls 
“popular ideas of social justice and economic insistence on market justice” (2011: 24). The author 
identifies four phases in this endemic conflict between capitalist markets and democratic politics, 
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which characterised the post-war social formation that we call ‘democratic capitalism’99 since the 
1970s. This tension, he argues, arises from the fact that “under democratic capitalism, governments 
are theoretically required to honour both principles simultaneously, although substantively the two 
almost never align.” (2011: 7)  
During the 1960s and 1970s period of economic Keynesianism and corporatist employment 
relations, the economic field was largely under political control, therefore responding to collective 
choices of democratic politics. This has been the period of first elaboration of ‘social accounting’ 
debates. In Europe, the very concept of ‘corporate governance’ was seen as a sub-system of the 
state’s ‘governance of the economy’, a triangular partnership between employers and employees 
with governments playing the crucial role of facilitators of this ‘historical bargain’. This model 
proved astonishingly successful in rising standards of living and warranted three decades of 
economic expansion. It was based on the Fordist principle that higher wages would be good also for 
employers, because workers would have been able to buy and consume more, eventually making 
them richer. However, this model of economic accumulation had two major problems. First of all, it 
is very resource-intense: social peace is guaranteed by the attractive prospective of infinite material 
accumulation. However, in a world of limited and unevenly distributed resources this is an illusion. 
Secondly, as Streeck (2011) points out, the collective rationale of democratic resources’ entitlement 
ultimately conflicted with the laws of economic rationality and efficiency based on marginal 
productivity.  
‘Democratic capitalism’ entered its first major crisis in the second half of the 1970s, when it 
appeared clear that wages’ automatic increase was creating very high levels of inflation. However, 
within the Atlantic Fordism, the reaction of Anglo-Saxon Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and 
that of more co-ordinated Continental European economies was different. The collective bargain 
mechanism that had been developed in most of Continental European economies seemed, at least 
initially, better suited to face the crisis and keep inflation down. It is in this context that ideas of 
social accounting became increasingly popular and debated also in the UK and the US. Social 
accounting introduction in Company Law was seriously considered and often presented as 
‘inevitable’ and as a way to ‘modernise’ Anglo-Saxon capitalism, to keep pace with German and 
Japanese enterprises. In this sense, it should be seen as one of the features of the establishment of 
more democratic industrial relations, an issue that today is almost completely neglected in the 
literature. Social accounting was widely discussed in Parliaments and it was seen as a 
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 Wolfgang Streeck (2011) defines ‘democratic capitalism’ as a political economy ruled by two conflicting 
principles, or regimes, of resources allocation: one operating according to marginal productivity (‘the free 
play of market forces’) and the other based on social need or entitlement (‘as certified by the collective 
choices of democratic politics’). 
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‘transformative’ device which would have valued human capital and other forms of capitals and 
given much more power to trade unions to control managers, partly replacing shareholders, reduced 
to the role of passive rentiers. It is clear that this conjunction has represented a major turning point 
that shaped not only the accounting or the economy but the kind of society we live in. Two models 
of corporate governance. Two responses to the crisis of ‘democratic capitalism’: the first one 
modelled on employees co-determination, mirrored the prevalence of a political principle of 
resources allocation, based on social need or entitlement. The other, based on the economic laws of 
marginal productivity and the ‘free play’ of market forces, was based on the maximisation of 
‘shareholder value’ and therefore on strictly financial disclosure.  
In the UK and US, finally, the latter approach prevailed, together with a deregulation of 
financial markets, accompanied by the notion that the economy should be freed from political 
control in order to create jobs and operate efficiently. Dispersed investors re-organised themselves 
as investment funds and large institutional investors, fostered by growing reliance on private 
pension schemes. Together with the re-assertion of the principle of shareholder primacy, the UK 
and the US governments pursued an aggressive anti-unions campaign. A ‘law-and-economics’ 
approach to company law, which identified the problem in ‘strong managers and weak owners’, 
excluding employees from the control of companies’ resources, became ‘the standard’. In 
Bourdieu’s terms, it became the nomos of the corporate field. The autonomy of large companies 
was promoted through a nominalistic approach to company law: the company was seen as a nexus 
of contract, free from the strings of social, political, religious or ethical obligations. The nomos of 
the economic field could be synthesised in the idea of Milton Friedman (1970) that “the business of 
business is [just] business”. The ‘neo-liberal’ cure seemed to work. During the 1990s, the US and 
UK economies started to grow much faster than Europe, which was still dominated by the ‘old’ 
corporatist system of ‘industrial relations’ and collective bargain. Therefore, the whole decade was 
dominated by a great debate on which of the two models of capitalism was the best (see Albert 
1993) and, progressively, on whether the Rhine Capitalism should or, had to converge towards the 
‘neo-American model’ of capitalism introduced in the US by Ronald Reagan and in the UK by 
Margaret Thatcher (Crouch 1997).   
Eventually, by the end of the 1990s, also the European Union and many Continental 
European countries were progressively converging towards a ‘money concept of corporate control’ 
(Jessop 2007). Even Germany had to adjust its model of labour relations and corporate governance 
(Overbeek et al. 2007; Horn 2011). However, the economic success of Anglo-Saxon economies had 
been based on what Colin Crouch later called ‘Privatised Keynesianism’ (2011): the substitution of 
Keynesian public welfare (and public debt) with private debt. The deregulation of the labour market 
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and the ‘retreat’ of the welfare state were ‘mitigated’ by unprecedented new opportunities for 
families, individual and firms to indebt themselves. Therefore, democratic governments gave up 
their social responsibility to guarantee full employment to companies. They offered a favourable tax 
regime, a flexible labour market and left employers free to abandon the ‘collective bargain’ with 
trade unions, in exchange for ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR). Financialisation and an 
economy based on debt allowed for more economic growth and further and faster economic 
development, keeping alive the promises of full employment and infinite growth implicit in post-
war democratic capitalism. The economic field became more and more autonomous and truly 
ubiquitous, while the economic habitus and rationality became extremely pervasive, organising 
almost every aspects of contemporary societies
100
. Furthermore, the economic ‘success’ of the 
1990s and 2000s was achieved at a very high price, in terms of environmental resources; social 
insecurity (the ‘risk society’ theorised by Ulrich Beck) and rising social inequalities. The effect of 
Privatised Keynesianism was to make worst the ‘collective addiction’ to economic growth (see 
Teubner 2011) that had already been one of the worst side effects of the three decades of 
uninterrupted growth that followed the end of the WWII. It strengthened the idea that the economy 
is just a market and that companies are only profit-seeking machineries.  
However, during the period, together with a further globalisation and harmonisation of 
mandatory financial disclosure, corporate social and environmental reporting started to emerge as a 
complementary institutional development to ensure business’ responsibility and accountability 
(Kinderman 2012). The re-emergence of non-financial disclosure coincided with the first major 
signs that revealed the structural fragilities of Privatised Keynesianism. The Asian financial crisis, 
anti-capitalist protests and the intense consumption of Planet resources showed that the expansion 
of debt was a potentially destructive solution to the crisis of democratic capitalism. When the 
financial crisis reduced Privatised Keynesianism’ theoretical and practical constructions to ruins it 
also made apparent the need for a more sustainable, long-term oriented regime of capital 
accumulation. As Colin Crouch pointed out (2011), it finally appeared clear that CSR debates – and 
indeed CSA – were serious; they were more than corporate public relation. They have the potential 
to evolve into a fully fladged regime of political-economic governance, not only corporate 
governance. Once again, there is a structural homology between the economic field, which seems in 
search of a ‘long-term’; green and sustainable regime of capital accumulation and the accounting 
field, where there is a strong debate about sustainable reporting and the integration of financial and 
non-financial disclosure.  
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 See, for instance, on the relation between education; democracy and the expansion of economic 
rationality, Nussbaum (2010), Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities. 
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The re-emergence of non-financial accounting, however, takes place in a completely 
transformed situation as compared to 1970s’ ‘social accounting’, in which a globalised economic 
field is out of political control. As we shall see in the next two chapters, European accounting 
regulation and the accounting field are currently crucial, though often misrecognised, terrains on 
which a major strife is taking place: they are torn by the tension between flows of global financial 
capitals and territories. On the one hand, there is the force of democratic ideas of corporate 
accountability, which are based on the legal and political right of the states to control economic 
activities and on the ‘right to know’ about the impact of large corporations’ activities on people’s 
everyday lives. This is basically driven by the growing mistrust of citizens in the current ‘out of 
control’ state of global finance-led capitalism (Strange 1996) and it is based also on non-marketised 
notions of social justice that have resisted efforts of economic rationalisation. On the other hand, 
there is the economic logic of corporate accounting, which interprets confidence crises as “deficits 
of knowledge of the laws governing the economy as a wealth-creation machine, or from disregard 
of such laws in selfish pursuit of political power.” (Streeck 2011: 8)  
A critical question is whether this tension can be potentially creative of a new, more 
sustainable regime of capital(s) accumulation that takes into account more values than just 
economic value. The next two chapter (Chapters 4 and 5)will focus on the case study of EU-level 
regulation of sustainability reporting during the period between the mid 1990s and 2011, in order to 
narrow down this broad framework analysis into a more dense and detailed account.  Therefore, this 
study will focus on explaining the re-emergence of a strong regulatory debate on non-financial 
disclosure during the 2000s. It suggests the argument that, when the tenure of the corporatist 
compromise finally felt apart, during the second half of the 1990s, a ‘transparency coalition’ (see 
Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; section 2.5 of this study) emerged in the context of the European 
corporate governance model. This argument will be further developed throughout the rest of the 
study. The key insight provided by Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) is that over wage share of income 
and job security, the interests of owners and trade unions have always been divergent, even during 
the corporatist period. Quite simply, starting from the beginning of the 1990s, employers 
organisations started to use the arguments of a loss of competitiveness towards other economies – 
particularly UK and US – and need for a more ‘flexible’ organisation of industrial relations to make 
a series of ‘make it or break it’ deals with trade unions, menacing to leave the system of collective 
bargain
101
. The so-called ‘social pacts’ that were reached between business associations and trade 
unions in different EU countries throughout the 1990s can be now considered as the last attempt to 
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 Ideas of the need to make employment relations more ‘flexible’ were strongly supported by various IOs 
such as the OECD. 
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save what was left of the great ‘historical compromise’ that emerged after the end WWI (see Regini 
2001). By the end of the 1990s, the bargaining power of trade unions was dramatically decreasing 
while the one of large European corporations’ was growing more and more. The possibility of 
reaching new social bargains became less attractive to both parties. Trade unions (TUs) arrived to 
the point that were not able to ask more sacrifices to their members while large companies 
increasingly lost interest in keeping in place an extremely costly system of labour rights and 
industrial relations (see Hyman 2004). At the same time, business’ threats to relocate where the cost 
of labour is cheaper or business taxes are lower created a growing asymmetry not only towards 
trade unions’ power but even towards democratic control. Given this situation, the likely possibility 
of a complete triumph, in Continental Europe, of a CG model based on what Gourevitch and Shinn 
called block-holders ‘oligarchy’ created the condition for the objective convergence of the interests 
of different actors (large pension funds and investors; part of organised labour and global civil 
society) and the rise of a ‘transparency coalition’.  
It is important to note that the European corporatist compromise was taking place 
substantially behind closed doors, mutually accommodating the wishes of trade unions, managers 
and block-holders to conduct their negotiations over corporate governance arrangements away from 
public scrutiny. “Public accountability would expose practices and agreements that could be 
challenged by outsiders such as consumers, managers, and minority shareholders.” (Gourevitch and 
Shinn 2005: 207) In particular, dispersed shareholders suffer from the agency problem: they 
struggle to gain the necessary information to monitor the financial performance of firms across 
industries and markets
102
. Crucially for our study, this situation is mirrored by the different attention 
that insiders and outsiders pay to the provision of accurate financial information contained in the 
annual report. Insiders might need them only as a means to compare themselves with similar firms 
within the same industry and across national markets; while outsiders see them as crucial tools to 
control managers’ behaviour. As for workers, in many EU jurisdictions where they have formal 
representation in the board, such as Germany, the Netherland, some French boards, and many 
Scandinavian countries, they have gained direct access to privileged information as insiders
103
. 
However, as the position of workers has been increasingly ‘externalised’ and marginalised within 
the corporation by dominant managerial theories of the firm, they found themselves in the need for 
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 Despite its other merits, the ‘corporatist compromise’ is for investors a “bad governance deal” They fear 
that managers and block-holders will use their direct access to information as a manner to extract private 
benefits from the firm. 
103
 Japan is also a case in point. There the auditing system is internal, rather than external, guarantying 
control to insiders In Japan, instead of having an external auditors’ system, this is run by retired members of 
the financial bureau or former main bankers. A system known as ‘kansayaku’. (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 
208) 
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more information in order to monitor managers’ behaviour. Together with governments, minority 
investors, consumers associations and new global civil society and NGOs organisation they are 
demanding giant corporations to become more publicly accountable. I will argue that it is around 
this cornerstone of transparency and both social and financial accountability that a new regime of 
corporate governance is emerging driven by portions of the financial sector; parts of the trade 
unions and some groups of NGOs.  
Likewise the ‘corporatist coalition’, the ‘transparency coalition’ should not be seen as a 
formal alliance. In fact, the social bargain between capital and labour was never an alliance but 
rather a convergence of interests between archenemies in order to set the ‘rules of the game’ and 
exclude the others (namely minority shareholders) from the control of corporate resources. 
Similarly, the ‘transparency coalition’ sees, in particular, the convergence of interest between two 
transnational archenemies, large transnational investors and the global network of social forces and 
NGOs. They have radically different ideas about what should be disclosed in CSA and to whom 
managers should be accountable. However, they share the goal of making managers more 
transparent and accountable. The current global rise of CSA regulation, therefore, is above all 
explained as a potential manner to oppose the unchallenged influence and power of large 
corporations’ executives.   
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4. The case study. EU Accounting Law and non-
financial disclosure 
 
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful to success, nor more 
dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in 
all who profit by the old order and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit 
from the new order. This lukewarmness arises partly from fear of their adversaries, who 
have the law in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind who do not truly 
believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. 
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter VI, 1513 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As revealed by a normative analysis of the relevant provisions of the Treaties recently made 
by Law Professor Beate Sjåfjell (2012), sustainable development in EU Law is enshrined as a 
legislative objective and also as a legal principle and it is codified with the aim of promoting it
104
. 
As she pointed out “sustainable development constitutes an – or perhaps even the – overarching 
objective of the European Union.” (2009: 15). However, moving from principles to policies 
involves political struggles that shape coalitions in favour and against specific regulatory provisions 
in a relational space that is constructed by such struggles. Indeed, this has been the case for the 
elaboration of a European regulatory framework for corporate sustainability reporting, which was 
developed through a dynamic relation between the ambitions of EU regulators – operating, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, in a multi-levels and polycentric field of corporate governance 
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 The argument of Prof Sjafjell is that there is no need to juxtapose what EU Law is and what it should as 
regards sustainability, “as that may render the law induly rigid.” (2009: 14) She stresses that EU Law already 
contains potential for developing sustainability as a overarching objective and perhaps the objective of the 
Union. Prof. Sjafjell shows how EU Treaty law, “taken seriously”, may be used as a tool to ensure that EU 
law itself and the national laws of its Member States truly work towards a global, sustainable development. 
She maintains (2012) that particularly the codification of the sustainable development principle in Article 11 
TFEU has significant legal implications for the institutions of the European Union, entailing direct 
obligations on all levels: Law-making, administration, supervision and judicial control. For EU company 
law, this requires a whole new approach. The implications for the Member States are rather more indirect, 
but nevertheless highly relevant, influencing: the interpretation, implementation and application of EU law; 
the justification of Member State initiatives that restrict free movement; entailing a possible duty to act to 
promote overarching objectives under certain circumstances, and perhaps also indicating a coming general 
principle of sustainable development on Member State level.  
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regulation – and the practice of corporate social and environmental accounting – which until the end 
of the 1990s barely existed and only recently has become more widespread. This is the narrative 
that this chapter will develop on the basis of documents analysis; a series of interviews and the 
literature review. The analysis has been strengthened by a participant observation of five months at 
DG MARKT, from March to July 2012, as part of the EU traineeship programmes. During this 
period, I have participated to the draft of the Impact Assessment and of the legislative proposal for 
an initiative on disclosure of non-financial information by companies. The empirical value of this 
experience is limited by a) the fact that trainees are not allowed to reveal information until they are 
not publicly available and b) the fact that, by the time the writing of this Thesis was completed, the 
legislative proposal has not been made public yet
105
. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is not a study 
based on a participant observation and leaving outside the events that I have been directly involved 
in implicitly excludes some of the most acute ethical problems that a full participant observation 
would have implied. I must acknowledge that this invaluable experience has greatly enriched my 
knowledge of the subject matter, although it has not radically changed my understanding of the 
dynamics involved in its regulation. I would say that it has been useful to largely confirm and 
strengthen the work that has been done before the traineeship.  
The chapter considers in more details the EU debate on corporate social accountability 
regulation and the struggles of the different groups of actors in shaping it. It provides an empirical 
account of the developments in the area of CSA regulation during the period from the mid-1990s 
until 2011. The rationale for choosing this specific period; the choice of focusing on the EU level as 
an intersection between national law-making and global norm-making processes; and the research 
method adopted by this empirical study have been already discussed in section 2.6. This chapter 
will further assess the research area explored by the previous one, narrowing down the analysis in 
order to better test the explanatory value of a reflexive socio-legal approach and the hypotheses that 
have been outlined in Chapter 1. The chapter is divided into two large sections. Within the recursive 
development of a European regulatory framework for CSA, I would identify three distinct phases. 
A) From the mid-1990s until 2000, when at the EU-level the ‘corporatist bargain’ gradually lost 
ground and it emerged a policy framework on social and environmental disclosure. B) After the 
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 While the writing of this Thesis has been completed in during the first months of 2013, the legislative 
proposal has been finally made public on 16
th
 April 2013, therefore once the writing of this Thesis was 
largely completed. However, the final proposal has not been radically different from the one developed at the 
time when I have been working at DG MARKT, therefore it has not been a complete surprise. Despite being 
only a proposal, this is rather interesting in the economy of this study. Therefore, I have briefly developed a 
preliminary analysis in Annex I. 
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launch of the Lisbon Agenda officially regulatory episodes or cycles
106
: from 2000 until 2006 and 
C) from 2008 to date. The chapter considers six groups of actors as the main ones shaping the 
emerging European regulatory landscape of CSA: public authorities; trade unions; investors; 
companies’ managers and block-holders; professional experts (lawyers; accountants; auditors; 
financial analysts; academics); NGOs and civil society.  
The chapter puts forwards the argument that the emergence of CSA regulation should be 
understood within broader changes and struggles in European corporate governance regulation. 
First of all, it argues that the rise of CSA in Europe has been the result of the exhaustion of the 
‘corporatist coalition’ between employees and employers that had dominated European industrial 
relations throughout the post-war period. The need for overcoming the consequent stalemate and the 
attempt to build a new regime of corporate governance, more adequate to deal with economic 
globalisation, already emerged by the mid-1990s, when the employers decided to progressively 
abandon the ‘social bargain’. In order to overcome this impasse the leaders of the centre-left Third 
Way, controlling the EU Commission and most of Member States’ governments, opted for 
introducing more corporate accountability and transparency rules in two manners. On the one hand, 
they enhanced corporate governance mechanisms that strengthened minority shareholders rights, 
board independence and managers’ accountability. On the other hand, they promoted corporate 
social responsibility, which was meant to encourage companies’ ‘good’ behaviour by the 
introduction of meta-regulatory mechanisms, again based on transparency and accountability (i.e. 
eco- and social-labels; social and environmental reporting). Both strands of regulation were 
marking the shift from a ‘corporatist’ compromise towards the emergence of what Gourevitch and 
Shinn (2005) christened the ‘transparency coalition’. The appointment of the Barroso Commission 
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 This analysis of the emergence of social and environmental disclosure regulation in the last decade can 
benefit also from the one hand from the socio-legal literature on recursivity of global normmaking 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Halliday 2009) and on the other hand from a substantial literature on the 
regulation of corporate governance (CGR) in Europe (Horn 2011; Overbeek et al. 2007; Aguilera and 
Jackson 2003; Hopner 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). According to Halliday (2009) recursive cycles of 
norm-making evolve dynamically, through iterations among transnational state and non-state organizations 
and actors operating at different levels of regulation. This norm-making process has a beginning (Time I), 
when either there are too few or too many conflicting norms. It also has an ending (Time II), “when the 
normative framework has a qualitatively different character, when behaviour of individuals, groups, and 
nations is constrained in relatively routinized, orderly, and predictable ways by norms widely held to be 
legitimate and authoritative.” (Halliday 2009: 16.12) Between Time I and Time II there can be quick or slow 
norm-making cycles or episodes that produce each time a new set of norms. An Episode begins when the 
problem attracts public attention and it appears in the regulatory agenda. As maintained by Halliday, the 
beginning of the episode requires the building up of an underlying set of policy problems and the initiative of 
charismatic norms-entrepreneurs “who mobilize organisations to institutionalise norms that cascade across 
states, IOs, and networks, eventually to be internalised and taken for granted.” (2009: 16.12) [emphasis 
added] 
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in 2005 temporarily halted this development towards corporate accountability and transparency, 
substantially giving free reign to managers in their approach to CSA practices (i.e. the European 
Alliance for CSR). However, the sudden outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis shuffled the cards 
again, giving rise to a second regulatory episode of CSA initiatives, both at the EU-level as well as 
different levels of regulation. While it is certainly too early to assess this ongoing cycle of 
regulatory initiatives and the catalyst role that the financial crisis had in boosting deep changes in 
EU corporate governance and company law, the study will highlight two points that seems already 
more defined. The financial crisis has: 1) made the distinction financial-non-financial increasingly 
blurred. There is a remarkably strong shift towards integrating the two spheres of financial and non-
financial reporting, although they are not yet supported by integrated accounting standard (and 
indeed, perhaps may not for some time); 2) worked as a catalyst for a stronger legislative and 
political role of public authorities (‘market shaping’) in the regulation of corporate social 
accountability. As the result, also the line law-non-law (voluntary/mandatory reporting) is not as 
clear as it was in 2007. While it may be too early to say that the ‘mantra’ of ‘light touch’ regulation 
and leaving ‘the market’ free to operate is gone, yet the epoch of business self-regulation is over. 
The first victim has been the concept of CSR as it emerged 10 years ago – as a voluntary activity 
that companies undertake “over and above legal requirements”. 
A valuable contribution to this analysis has been provided by a review of a recent strand of 
critical literature that focuses on EU-level corporate social responsibility (CSR) debates and, in 
particular, on the key rifle between mandatory and voluntary approaches to CSR (including social 
and environmental disclosure). In particular, insights came from recent researches by Daniel 
Kinderman (2013), who has studied the role of business in shaping the EU CSR agenda from the 
mid-1990s until 2012. Fairbrass (2012) has explained the emergence of EU-level CSR policies as 
the result of the prevalence of a large, organised and powerful business advocacy coalition 
favouring a ‘voluntary’ approach against the smaller, more disparate coalition favouring a 
‘mandatory’ approach. Ungericht and Hirt (2010) have analysed the CSR discourse as a “political 
arena” in which “differing conceptions of CSR are pitted against one another” (2010: 17). The 
authors assess the positions and interests of different stakeholders and fundamental changes in 
power relations between 2001 and 2006. Kröger (2011) reflected upon the “abandonment of CSR as 
public policy” and the “abandonment of the formal equality of social partners in favour of 
business.” The author concludes that there has been the victory of the business case over the social 
case (Kröger, 2011: 248).  
Although this chapter builds on the above contributions, it also attempts to go beyond them 
in three fundamental ways. First of all, consistently with the aim of this research, it attempts to 
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insert them in the broader historical and institutional context in which they came about and that has 
been outlined in the previous chapter. On the basis of the ‘double historicisation’ reflexive method, 
I claim that the re-emergence, during the last decade, of a lively regulatory debate on non-financial 
reporting cannot be fully understood without considering why it disappeared in the first place and 
the collapse, during the 1990s, of the ‘corporatist coalition’ that had characterised European 
industrial relations until then. Therefore the object of analysis is not limited to EU policies per se, 
they provided me with a lens through which broader changes in business and society relations could 
be studied.  
Secondly, I am considering sustainability reporting as anchored within changes in the 
regulation of corporate governance (CGR). Again, this is not conventionally done, but so doing it 
becomes possible to overcome not just the arbitrary distinction between ‘social’ and ‘economic’ 
aspects of corporate governance but the distinction between the two academic traditions and bodies 
of knowledge that structured this distinction. This is a change in the perspective that might 
illuminate broader dynamics that would be missed focusing only on CSR policies or CGR. In this 
case I adapted Gourevitch and Shinn’s framework, elaborated for the analysis of CGR changes, to 
the study of sustainability reporting. In the future, this approach could be done more systematically 
for other areas such as remuneration, public procurement, employees’ participation, etc. This 
approach allowed me to move the key line of struggles from the classic division between ‘social’ 
actors and ‘business’ lobbies that characterises the literature on EU-level CSR towards the historical 
analysis a struggle based on agency and of the emergence of a European ‘transparency coalition’ 
challenging managers’ power.  
Lastly, consistently with a reflexive approach to Sociology of Law, this analysis does not 
treat EU Accounting Law or emerging CSA regulation as the mere result of interest groups 
lobbying activities. Nor it takes regulation for granted, as an independent variable like many 
managerial and law-and-economics studies do. Both law and accountancy emerged as historically 
constructed social practices that have been granted a special ‘symbolic power’ of ‘naming’ and 
legitimately exercise symbolic violence. The Law “creates the things named, and creates social 
groups in particular. It confers upon the reality which arises from its classificatory operations the 
maximum permanence that any social entity has the power to confer upon another, the permanence 
which we attribute to objects.” (Bourdieu 1984: 838)  
The following sections will consider the gradual shift away from ‘voluntary’ disclosure of 
corporate non-financial reporting, towards the steady, although still unaccomplished, integration of 
ESG information in the EU Accounting Directives. Two regulatory episodes are identified. The first 
one really began only in 2000, with the launch of the so-called Lisbon Agenda (see O’Riordan and 
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De Smedt 2009) and lasted until 2006, while the second one started after the onset of the current 
financial crisis and it is not over yet. 
 
4. 2 Managing change. The collapse of the European ‘corporatist coalition’  
Most of the literature tends to present corporate sustainability reporting as an example of 
‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) policies, meaning a pro-active initiative that a certain 
company spontaneously decide to undertake. However, at least in Europe, the struggle for non-
financial reports had a much broader ‘political’ significance of economic changes management. It 
arrived later than in the US and the UK and it was largely different from ‘explicit’ Anglo-Saxon 
CSR (see Matten and Moon 2007; Morgera 2009; Marens 2012). In the European context public 
authorities and in particular the EU institutions played a crucial role in promoting and almost 
(re)inventing corporate social accounting as a public policy tool. I suggest that the ‘European way’ 
to corporate social accountability represented a often ambiguous and hesitant political response to 
the exhaustion of the ‘corporatist coalition’, the ‘great historical bargain’ between capital and labour 
that had been at the basis of post-war ‘democratic capitalism’ (Streeck 2011) and, until the mid-
1990s, dominated European industrial relations.  
According to my analysis, social accountability policies were first elaborated by centre-left 
governments – the so-called ‘Third Way’ that evolved from Delors to Blair, Jospin, Prodi, and 
Shroeder – between 1995 and 2005. They believed that in order to address the worst employment, 
environmental and social consequences of otherwise positive markets integration, legal provisions 
and the state alone were not sufficient and the mechanisms of ‘collective bargain’ had become 
inadequate. In fact, due to high public debt, the state had limited capacity to directly intervene in the 
economy. There was the need for an act of responsibilisation of business actors in order to tackle 
global social and environmental challenges. At the broad EU-level of analysis chosen by this 
research, the ‘Third Way’ represented also the political project of using the single market project to 
integrate more liberal market economies (LMEs) – such the UK and part of the Scandinavian and 
new eastern bloc – and more co-ordinated market economies (CMEs) – such as France, Germany, 
Austria, Benelux and to a lesser degree the ‘Mediterranean capitalism’ – into one single “dynamic, 
competitive and cohesive” social market economy. A political ‘oxymoron’ that the EU has being 
redefining but that was never fundamentally abandoned ever since, as demonstrated by the recent 
EU Agenda2020 on ‘sustainable growth and jobs’ (Friedrich Ebert, Stiftung 2010). From the 
documents analysis and interviews clearly emerges the role of the Commission in managing the 
transition from a corporate governance regime based on what Gourevitch and Shinn would call 
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‘sectoral conflicts’ to one based on ‘agency, transparency and accountability’. In this new context, 
only few immediately understood the new relevance that mechanisms of corporate social 
accountability and methods of assessment, verification and disclosure were assuming in re-
structuring and negotiating a new ‘division of labour’ between states and markets (see for instance 
Zadek et al. 1997).  
The origins of the current regime of European corporate social accountability regulation can 
be identified in 1993, when Jacques Delors, as President of the EC, made an unprecedented, 
ground-breaking, appeal to business to address structural problems of unemployment, 
restructuration and social exclusion. He invited companies to adopt a ‘European Declaration against 
Social Exclusion’. As an EU policy-maker recalls, the political strategy of the Commission was to 
“put some pressure on the employers and to break their ranks”107 because the European employers 
association, UNICE, was “kind of a monolith against any progress or any move.” In fact, around 
1993-1994, the so-called ‘tri-partite concertation’ involving governments, employers and 
employees was already “frozen”108 and characterized by a strong opposition between the two social 
partners. Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the ‘new international division of 
labour’109, there was a need for a more comprehensive strategy, adequate to a complex and 
globalised economy which were seeing Continental Europe growing slower and creating fewer jobs 
than in the US and the UK. The EU was in the middle of an economic stagnation, characterised by 
high unemployment rates and major industrial restructuring process. Employers were increasingly 
fractious towards the rituals of the corporatist collective bargain. They were demanding 
governments for a more flexible labour market, more in line with LMEs standards, in order to 
become more competitive. European trade unions initially accepted deep sacrifices – particularly 
reached through the 1990s ‘social pacts’ – but soon exhausted their bargaining power (see Regini 
2001). As emerged in another interview with an EU official who had worked with Delors
110
, job 
was the argument of the industry to “sort of hijacking us” and “so the growth and jobs took too 
much place.” Delors’ Commission intended its call for business responsibility as a political 
opportunity to separate the most pro-active and progressive group of business entrepreneurs – ‘good 
business’ committed to social causes and willing to go further, beyond its legal obligations – from 
the “ranks” of employer federations. This file was handled by Jan Noterdaeme, from the Directorate 
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 Interview # 13 (23.07.2012) 
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 Interview # 13 (23.07.2012) 
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 “Globalisation leads to worldwide business netweorks, contractual arrangements and new forms of 
division of labour. This means that companies must increasingly consider the international dimension of their 
social responsibility.” COM (2002/C 125/11) Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Green 
Paper: Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility. 
110
 Interview # 16 (27.07.2012) 
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General on Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs (DG EMPL), who was asked to 
promote good companies that would be more proactive in terms of relations with workers.  
The 10th January 1995, 20 business leaders and Jacques Delors adopted and announced the 
Business Declaration against Social Exclusion
111
. In March 1996, the European Business Network 
for Social Cohesion (EBNSC) was established, with the financial support of the European 
Commission. By the end of the 1990s, almost sixty large companies had joined the EBNC, having 
to commit themselves to what started to be called the “social responsibility of enterprises”. As 
Kinderman (2013) points out this EU initiative preceded and fostered similar initiatives across 
Europe, at the national level. Backed by both the European Commission, at the highest level, and 
some of the largest industrial groups operating in the EU, the success of the initiative was put over 
by the multiple identities of some key agents. In particular, Noterdaeme, who moved from DG 
EMPL to directly organise and coordinate the EBNSC but, more importantly, the Viscount Etienne 
Davignon, a Belgian politician, businessman and former vice-president of the EU Commission, who 
became the long-term President of the new organisation. Notably, as Internal Market 
Commissioner, in the 1980s, he had already been one of the main architects of the European Round 
Table of Industrialists
112
. Despite its half a dozen staff (Kinderman 2013: 9), with the support of the 
new EC President Santer before and of his successor, Romano Prodi, the EBNSC used its strong 
ties to shape the EU way towards enhanced business responsibility, launching a series of initiatives 
including the European online research centre on CSR, in 1998.  
In 2000, Davignon managed
113
 to promote the idea of corporate social responsibility at the 
heart of the Lisbon Agenda, which was setting the targets for the next decade of EU economic 
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 See http://www.csreurope.org/pages/en/declaration.html. 
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 According to the ERT website, while Internal Market Commissioner, Etienne Davignon, had challenged 
industry to produce an initiative, posing the simple question: “whom do I call when I want to speak to 
European Industry?” The ERT, was created the 6-7 April 1983 under the impulse of as a group of 17 
amongst the most influential businessmen in Europe. The original Round Table included: Karl Beurle 
(Thyssen), Carlo De Benedetti (Olivetti), Curt Nicolin (ASEA), Harry Gray (United Technologies), John 
Harvey - Jones (ICI), Wolfgang Seelig (Siemens), Umberto Agnelli (Fiat), Peter Baxendell (Shell), Olivier 
Lecerf (Lafarge Coppée), José Bidegain (Cie de St Gobain), Wisse Dekker (Philips). Antoine Riboud (BSN), 
Bernard Hanon (Renault), François-Xavier Ortoli (EC), Pehr G. Gyllenhammar (Volvo), Etienne Davignon 
(EC), Louis von Planta (Ciba-Geigy), Helmut Maucher (Nestlé).  
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 According to the information retrieved from the website of CSR Europe: in 1999 at the European Day 
dedicated to ‘Business & Government Joining Forces for Employment and Social Cohesion’, the 
forthcoming Portuguese EU Presidency (centre-left) invited Etienne Davignon, together with other leaders of 
CSR Europe and the Copenhagen Centre for CSR, to provide input into the European Summit on 
Employment, Economic Reform and Social Cohesion to be held in Lisbon in March 2000. It is stated that 
President of the European Commission Romano Prodi (centre-left) and European Commissioner Anna 
Diamantopoulou (centre-left) provided strong backing for this Portuguese invitation.  As the result, plans for 
promoting CSR to Portuguese Prime Minister were presented to Prime Minister Antonio Guterres (centre-left 
Portugal Prime Minister from 1995-2002). European business leaders met with Guterres on 8 March 2000, 
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policies
114. At point 39, the text states: “The European Council makes a special appeal to 
companies' corporate sense of social responsibility regarding best practices on lifelong learning, 
work organisation, equal opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable development.” Despite 
frequent ‘corporatist’ references to employment, social inclusion and training, the backbone of the 
Lisbon Agenda has to be found in the duo ‘fiscal sustainability of public finances’ and ‘economic 
growth’ through the completion of the internal market that ‘will be able to improve citizens’ quality 
of life and the environment’. The ‘mantra’ became that, in order to maintain the leadership in a 
globally integrated knowledge-based economy, European business should be given more 
responsibilities and the opportunity to combine economic competitiveness with the creation of 
welfare. As explained by an EU officer working on CSR
115: “There was quite a move 5 to 10 years 
ago that business ‘knows best’; ‘business should be allowed to make business, do business, and 
create wealth for the economy. What do we want? We want growth! We want employment! We 
want competitiveness! We want profitability! Companies said they can do it? They proved 
themselves in the 1990s? So let them carry on…” From another interview116 emerged that: “Around 
2000, in the conclusions of the Lisbon Summit there was stated that the EU is supporting that more 
companies are getting into CSR. And then the language started to change. It started to look a bit 
beyond workers, trade unions and employers, looking at the bigger picture. At what was happening 
in the US. It was also the time when ethical investment was increasingly growing in the US.”  
The launch of the Lisbon Strategy represented the turning point between the marginalisation 
of corporatist industrial relations and the promotion of corporate governance policies based on 
agency theory and accountability. In between, according to my interviews, there has been a strong 
clash between the network of companies organised in the EBNC and the UNICE, the largest 
federation of European businesses
117
. As showed by Kinderman (2013), this turning point also 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
just 16 days before the EU summit in Lisbon. Etienne Davignon, stressed that the Lisbon Summit was the 
right moment for governments and the European Commission to recognise that business can successfully 
combine economic competitiveness and social responsibility. He presented a document elaborated by twenty 
CEOs and addressed to all EU Heads of State and Governments, which proposes 12 concrete ways to build 
an “entrepreneurial and inclusive knowledge society; develop a culture of communication and multiplication 
of best practices; expand teaching of corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship and business 
ethics; invest in public-private partnerships for effective responses to economic and social challenges.” The 
document presented by Davignon can be retrieved here: 
http://www.progressiofoundation.org/projects/documents/Lisbon2000TCC.pdf 
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 The Agenda "to make Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion by 2010." 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm 
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 Interview # 12 (26.06.2012) 
116
 Interview # 13 (23.07.2012) 
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 According to one source, around 2000, during a high-level meeting to which participated the EC 
President, UNICE leader publicly reminded CSR Europe’s members: ‘remember you are companies before’. 
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marked important tensions and changes within the business network coordinated by Noterdaeme 
and Davignon. That corresponded to a change in the name of the organisation, from EBNC to CSR 
Europe and a growing convergence towards the position of UNICE. Kinderman’s researches 
demonstrate that, during the period after 2000 national organisations promoting CSR multiplied 
across Europe but the membership of CSR Europe almost stop growing. That might imply that 
companies were not perceiving anymore the advantages of being part of CSR Europe rather than 
UNICE. Secondly, Kinderman highlights that, by the year 2000, all German companies, except 
from one, had left the EBNC, despite they had been amongst its founders
118
. There is also a second 
element that emerges from the data on the membership of EBNSC, which concerns the sharp rise of 
US and French companies right after 2000. In my opinion, these trends show the complexity of the 
shift from ‘corporativism’ to ‘transparency’ that characterised the EU economic regime. CSR was 
‘in tune’ with global US multi-national corporations operating in Europe but why French 
participation increased while German one declined? A possible explanation is that, as one EU 
official put it
119, “If you look at the system, in Germany trade unions are quite strong, or were quite 
strong, and the main system was negotiation with employers. In France social dialogue has never 
been very effective so trade unions were looking for new tools, for new ways to have an impact, so 
they were more open. Central Europe did not get into CSR: Germany, Austria said: ‘no, thank you!’ 
Their system was working, so they saw no need.” This argument suggests that, beyond the 
emergence of CSA in Europe, there has been a new coalition that defies the traditional categories of 
corporatist or class conflicts divisions and which was constructed bit by bit as the ‘corporatist’ 
social configuration started falling apart.  
The outcome of the 2000 Lisbon European Council, however, was very much open to 
different interpretations. What the ‘special appeal for corporate sense of social responsibility’ meant 
was unclear. No one really knew what that would exactly lead to, in terms of policies or regulation: 
it was a work in progress. The late 1990s had seen a number of signals clearly showing that markets 
globalisation was creating wealth but also waves of social inequalities and strong opposition and 
discontent (see Strange 1996 and 1998; Klein 2000; Bazan 2004)
120
. That created high public 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
The accusation is of not behaving accordingly to the nomos of the economic field “the business of business 
is business”. Interview # 13 (23.07.2012) 
118
 The author maintains that German companies perceived the Commission’s activities as threatening, in 
particular the initiatives from DG EMPL, fearing that it would impose standards, guidelines and directives 
that were not welcome (Kinderman 2013: 13-14) 
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 Interview # 13 (23.07.2012) 
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 For instance, NGOs like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth attracted universal attention to the negative 
impact of business on the environment, forcing many companies to issue environmental reports. Other NGOs 
used new communication strategies for ‘naming and shaming’ TNCs for their exploitation of sweatshops in 
less developed countries and lack of any respect for fundamental labour rights. Exploding in 1997, the Asian 
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expectation for regulatory interventions promoting more and better corporate accountability, driven 
by the growing protagonism of global NGOs. At the same time, as Peter Utting (2008) pointed out, 
“the root to justice through liability is fraught with obstacles” and, in any cases, there was no real 
political will to reach an international agreement on human rights or environmental regulation.  
DG EMPL was assigned the task of leading the follow up initiatives on CSR launched in 
Lisbon. However, this appeared immediately wider than more familiar issues of addressing social 
exclusion, employment restructuration and adaptation to changing working conditions. The 
arrangement had changed since Delors first appeal to ‘business responsibility’ to tackle social 
exclusion. Looking at it in retrospect, it represented the merger of two major regulatory strands, as 
CSR was expanding to cover also environmental issues under the umbrella of achieving sustainable 
development. In fact, as regards issues such as environmental reporting or eco-label
121
, DG ENV 
had developed a system for voluntary mechanisms that paralleled the work developed by DG EMPL 
on social labels (see Zadek et al. 1998). There were also CSR instruments such as the codes of 
conduct and ‘fair trade labels’ which had been mostly developed outside the European Commission. 
The uncertain nature of the baby that was born in Lisbon is also illustrated by the many documents 
issued in between the 2000 and the 2001 Green Paper on CSR. Given the situation, the Lisbon 
pledge for ‘business responsibility’ could have been interpreted by business either as a threat or as a 
capitulation. As I already mentioned, some – particularly the German employers’ associations (BDI 
and BDA) – feared it could mean, as the word might also imply, that business had to accept extra 
responsibilities beyond the ones it already had. However, CSR Europe gamble was that ‘more 
responsibility’ would signify ‘soft’ regulation and more autonomy from the state. The latter position 
substantially prevailed, before in the 2001 Green Paper, aimed to promote a European framework 
for CSR, and much more explicitly in the 2002 Communication concerning ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility: a business contribution to sustainable development’. According to one interview I 
had at the EU Commission
122, “So it was a time where there was more demands expressed towards 
companies but, at the same time, not willingness to regulate. So the way in between was to ask for 
transparency, and the consumers and investors would judge.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
crisis first signalled that the huge financial sector was irrational and potentially destructive, raising fear of a 
global economic meltdown due to financial contagion and it represented, in effect, a ‘dress rehearsal’ of the 
2008 global. Lastly, an unprecedented rage of anti-capitalist demonstrations across the world had exploded 
in 1999 in Seattle, contesting the dominant power of the WTO, WB and FMI and chanting that ‘another 
world is possible’. 
121
 The EU ecolabel helps to identify products and services that have a reduced environmental impact 
throughout their life cycle, from the extraction of raw material through to production, use and disposal. 
Recognised throughout Europe, EU ecolabel is a voluntary label promoting environmental excellence which 
can be trusted. 
122
 Interview # 13 (23.07.2012), emphasis added. 
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As already mentioned above, from the fieldwork emerged that the original aim for launching 
an appeal to business’ sense of responsibility, in the mid 1990s, was to divide the ranks of business’ 
federations and attract a group of large companies willing to discuss employment policies and a 
further involvement in the community. The gamble was that this move would have forced the 
others, for reputational reasons, to follow their best practices. In fact, markets’ globalisation was 
increasingly transforming the traditional reference points of European industrial relations. The 
epicentre of conflicts was not anymore, like in the 1970s and 1980s, national labour markets – 
where trade unions demanded politically guaranteed full employment. The conflict had shifted to 
create a tectonic tension between global and local dimensions. The rise of institutional investors and 
liberalisation of trade and finance had originated a dimension of almost ubiquitous ‘flows’ of 
economic capital. This had become increasingly autonomous from the territorial dimension, the 
‘locus’ where relatively smaller businesses are embedded in communities’ and social relations and 
organised, at least in Europe, accordingly to the norms of democratic polities (see Bonomi 2006). 
Giant corporations were now able to exploit both dimensions, gaining an enormous bargaining 
power in their relation with trade unions but also with governments. That is why collective 
bargaining and social dialogue was formally still in place but had lost most of their structuring 
power.  
However, the initial gamble of Delors, who attempted to use his authority to divide business, 
largely failed. As it appears already clear from CSR Europe response to the 2001 Green Paper, in a 
strange ‘boomerang effect’, this organisation had become the most influential advocate of business 
interests at the EU Commission, effectively ensuring support for a ‘flexible approach’, based on the 
idea that companies voluntarily do CSR because it increases their profitability. As we shall see in 
the next section, after 2000, also the political strategy of the Commission became more ‘pragmatic’, 
recurring to the idea of using market-based meta-regulatory tools to discipline multinational 
companies. In other words, they accepted that regulation was not feasible, collective bargaining was 
not working anymore and therefore they turned to ‘the market’ as the best way to discipline ‘the 
market’, de facto acknowledging its ‘autonomisation’ from legal and political control. As emerges 
from one interview
123, “So I think it was the time for the call for self-regulation and it was also the 
time when the principle of self-regulation came to Europe. It had started 20 years earlier in the US 
but only in the early 2000 there was the mind that there should be self-regulation and that it could 
be a good approach to, let’s say, the relations between the state and companies.”   
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4.3 [2001-2006] ‘Voluntary’ CSR, corporate governance reforms and the 
emergence of a European ‘transparency coalition’ 
The history of the birth of CSR has been already exhaustively retraced elsewhere (Fairbrass 
2011; De Shutter 2008) and it is usually considered as starting from this point in time: the 2001 
Green Paper, ‘Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility’ (except 
Kindeman 2013). The literature tends to focus on the rift between mandatory and voluntary CSR, 
respectively supported by business and social groups of actors. However, this research tried to move 
the angle from which we are looking at this rift, gaining three original elements.  
First of all, I underline what I would call the symbolic power of non-law: the fact that CSR 
was legally constructed as a voluntary practice, which is rather different than simply being 
undertaken by companies on a voluntary basis. In fact, it entails, in the specific case of EU company 
law, a remarkable shift from the traditional ‘corporatist’ Continental European view that structured 
corporate governance as a sub-system of public economic governance and industrial relations 
policies. However, it also differs from shareholder-centred voluntary CSR, a difference that has 
been often negated, for opposite reasons, by what Bourdieu called activist-academics, both from the 
conservative and the progressive camps. I would therefore simply claim that voluntary regulation is 
law and it carries the symbolic violence of law.  
Second, I maintain that the analysis of the emergence of a European framework for CSA 
regulation should be made considering the parallel development of two regulatory trends that are 
conventionally isolated. The first trend, usually labelled as ‘corporate governance regulation’, 
emphasises accountability, transparency, board independence and maximisation of long-term 
returns and produced, amongst other requirements, an EU obligation for listed companies to 
produce a non-financial corporate governance statement in the annual report on a comply-or-explain 
basis (Directive 2006/46/EC). The second trend, conventionally labelled as ‘corporate social 
responsibility’, also concerned corporate transparency, accountability, long-term sustainable 
investments and disclosure and – at the EU-level – produced a requirement for all companies to 
include, “where appropriate”, information about their social and environmental performance 
(Directive 2003/51/EC). As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the long-term the two strands 
are de facto converging, particularly after the financial crisis. In practice, the overwhelming 
majority of large firms started to issue ESG information and triple bottom line reports. However, 
the puzzle is why they have been widely kept separated? They clearly deal with the same issues and 
increasingly overlap. However, the EU regulator and the academic literature have systematically 
treated them as two completely distinct realities. This arbitrary isolation can be demonstrated 
empirically confronting the scarcity of references to CSR in the EU financial accounting and 
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corporate governance official documents and discussion papers with the lack of references to 
financial accounting in the CSA and CSR regulatory debate. One possible answer which has been 
often suggested is that CSR regulation, supported by NGOs and trade unions, has been co-opted by 
business and kept voluntary while powerful business lobbies successfully promoted CG reforms 
(Shamir 2005; Gill 1998). In other words, social forces have lost their battle against economic 
lobbies and the regulator has accommodate social and environmental issues in the ‘bush league’ of 
voluntary policies and the protection of shareholder minority rights in the ‘first league’ of legal 
enforcement. This explanation is intuitively and descriptively convincing, if we look at the two 
policy areas (CSR and CGR) as separated. Yet, leading towards my third point, I claim that 
considering them together might be more useful and revealing.  
In fact, third, I maintain that setting the clash between business lobbies and advocates of 
social and environmental rights would, paradoxically, reproduce and reinforce the dominant 
representation of the division between economy and society that it tries to refute. It is an 
intellectually comfortable position, as it ‘gets back to’ the categories of class conflicts between 
dominant and dominated economic actors. However, in doing so it misses the possible ‘objective 
convergences’ and the many trespassing, soft coalitions and compromises that are possibly creating 
multiple and different cleavages. After all, temporarily but quite successfully, the corporatist 
compromise had already overcome this conflict creating ‘shared value’ for business and society. 
However, in my opinion, a ‘new green deal’ or a ‘great sustainable bargain’ (see Stern 2008; NEF 
2009) does not come from neutralising or denying conflicting rationalities nor trying to mark the 
distance from one to the other ‘reasons’ (democracy versus capitalism), it only arises from the 
institutionalisation of social conflicts and the recognition of different instances. This means that 
only from a confrontational search for finding not a ‘rational’ but a ‘reasonable’ compromise it is 
possible to overcome the existing crisis and see different groups of actors working together
124
.  
From a scientific point of view, this way of proceeding, led me to identify the main divide 
that characterised this phase of EU corporate accountability policies in the clash, all internal to the 
economic field, between a more globalised ‘transparency coalition’ and a dominant ‘oligarchy’ of 
Continental European firms, dominated by managers and block-holders. The former, supported by 
the centre-left parties of the Third Way, was seeking to create a broader convergence amongst 
minority shareholders, workers and other social forces (NGOs and civil society), all of them 
interested in enforcing more transparency and accountability in managerial decisions. They have 
been the drivers of both the corporate governance and the CSR agendas that emerged between 2000 
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and 2005. The ‘oligarchy’ suffered a number of ‘retreated’ in the field of company law and 
corporate governance, which was ‘modernised’ to break ownership networks, pyramids and other 
mechanisms that had been built during the corporatist period to shelter companies from take over 
and cut minority shareholders off from companies revenues. However, managers prevailed in the 
area of CSR where CSR Europe and BusinessEurope progressively joined forces and managed to 
postpone and finally largely empty the initial EU regulatory ambitions.  
To start with the ‘symbolic violence’ of ‘non-law’, the CSR Green Paper (Commission 
2001) was meant to launch a public consultation on the concept of CSR and it contained a statement 
affirming that: “Most of the definitions of corporate social responsibility describe it as a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” As the statement implies, this was not 
the EU definition of CSR, it was rather to affirm that, as the following sentence clearly explain: 
“Being socially responsible means not only fulfilling legal expectations, but also going beyond 
compliance and investing ‘more’ into human capital, the environment and the relations with 
stakeholders.” (p. 6) After considering the 250 responses to the Green Paper public consultation, 
this ‘voluntary’ standing of the Commission was made much more explicit by the CSR 
Communication issued in July 2002,
125
 which states: “CSR is behaviour by businesses over and 
above legal requirements, voluntarily adopted because businesses deem it to be in their long-term 
interest” (Commission 2002: 1). 
The symbolic violence that the regulator exerted through this definition can be illustrated 
using as an example the interview I had with Penny Clark
126
, a trade unionist who had been 
following for the ETUC the first years of EU-level debates on CSR, after the launch of the Lisbon 
Agenda. The way she explained me the development of a ‘voluntary’ conceptualisation of CSR has 
been: “We have a number of things that come from Europe, concepts. The European Commission 
says, sometimes, that Member States don’t let them do things on social policies. But it is the 
Commission that has the power of proposal.” Despite the fact that recently some of this power has 
been given to the European Parliament, “in reality, is the Commission that has always been the 
driver of all this. They both drive and they block and they came up with this concept of CSR, which 
is not workable.” And, again, she explained me that trade unions could have decided to boycott the 
whole process, however, “Looking back, it is difficult to outright reject things. And that also is the 
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 Notably, the 2002 Communication instrumentally used the statement contained in the Green Paper as if it 
had already provided the EU definition of CSR being ‘voluntary’. “The Green paper defined CSR as ‘a 
concept whereby companies [...] on a voluntary basis’ as they are increasingly aware that responsible 
behaviour leads to sustainable business success.” (COM 2002 347 final: 1) 
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problem with the EU. Because they have the monopoly of this, I could have say that we boycotted it 
but, you know, you think that something good might come out of it and to be frank, I don’t think we 
had enough people that wanted us to pull out either. So we did take part and the ETUC put quite a 
substantive input into this [Multi-stakeholders Forum on CSR].”  
From the excerpt it emerges both the special power of policy- and law-makers “to do things 
with words” (Bourdieu 1984: 809) that recent developments towards ‘soft law’ and ‘better 
regulation’ have not diminished. Secondly the excerpt reveals the symbolic violence by which this 
social process takes place: the imposition of concepts, thoughts and mental categories. The most 
striking aspect, perhaps, is that the ‘classificatory operation’ performed by the Commission was 
able to objectivise and shape the reality of CSR for over a decade, right until 2011, when the 
Commission wrote a new definition of CSR. However, in affirming that CSR is ‘over and above the 
law’ EU policy-makers brought this symbolic power of law to a new, paradoxical, end and did 
something truly creative and innovative. The fact that companies are socially responsible is a ‘pre-
evident’ concept. Therefore, by definition, law-makers cannot impose a ‘responsible behaviour’ 
neither on companies nor on individuals
127
. However ‘naming’ that business has social 
responsibilities, the EU Commission created them almost ex nihilo – it was not business that created 
CSR in Europe, it was the regulator. At the same time the law could do that only stretching itself 
beyond its limits, affirming that they exist over and above the law
128
.  
In my opinion, however, there were already two crucial but almost imperceptible differences 
between the Green Paper and the Communication. First, in the former there were frequent 
references to the law, which played a critical function of implicitly defining what could not be 
explicitly regulated. On the contrary, in the Communication they are absent or much more scant. 
Secondly, the Communication is much clearer in affirming that CSR is “adopted because businesses 
deem it to be in their long-term interest”129 (Commission 2002: 5), therefore espousing the rather 
weak ‘CSR business case’ approach suggested by CSR Europe and the idea that such case would be 
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 In that sense, Milton Friedman (1970) was absolutely right in affirming that imposing by law to 
companies to become ‘socially responsible’ was either talking nonsense (demonstrating “analytical looseness 
and lacking rigor”) or “preaching pure and unadulterated socialism.” 
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 Notably, the definition of CSR contained in the 2001 Green Paper and the 2002 Communication have 
widely circulated across the world and they have been copied and pasted in virtually all the text providing a 
definition of CSR and had a huge echo both in the outside Europe. In this sense the Commission has been 
truly creative of a new use of the concept by public regulators. 
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 Emphasis added by the author. The whole passage states: "Despite the wide spectrum of approaches to 
CSR, there is large consensus on its main features: CSR is behaviour by businesses over and above legal 
requirements, voluntarily adopted because businesses deem it to be in their long-term interest; CSR is 
intrinsically linked to the concept of sustainable development: businesses need to integrate the economic, 
social and environmental impact in their operations; CSR is not an optional "add-on" to business core 
activities - but about the way in which businesses are managed.” COM (2002) 347 final p. 5. 
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sound enough to support the creation of a whole new set of EU policies. Therefore, more than the 
definition of CSR as ‘voluntary’ per se, which is pre-evident and tactical, it has been the 
disappearance of politics and law that revealed this was a retreat of the State (see Strange 1999), the 
dismissal of a whole European tradition that was still embodied not just in the 1995 ‘European 
Declaration of Business against Exclusion’ but even in the ‘Strategy for sustainable development’ 
(COM(2001)264 final) proposed by the Commission and approved by the Goteborg European 
Council in 2001, which was still stressing the key role of public policy in establishing a CSR 
regulatory framework
130. “In fact”, told me an EU official who had been involved in the process131, 
“CSR was promoted because of the failure to impose legislation. The ideal of governments is to 
impose legislation. But when you see that politically you will not pass, you start to reach the same 
objective via another way which is acceptable.”  
Ideas of ‘better regulation’ and ‘meta-regulation’ were introduced to shape and legitimise 
this new geography of power relations between states and markets. During this phase, these 
regulatory approaches started to be actively promoted at the EU-level. However it has been mostly 
since 2006, with the re-formulation of the Lisbon agenda, that ‘better regulation’ became 
instrumental for a pro-business agenda (see Radaelli 2007) and were ‘usurped’ to justify 
deregulation
132. Following this ‘voluntary’ framework, DG EMPL, charged with the task to 
elaborate an ambitious EU framework on CSR, had to exclude a priori any proposal entailing direct 
legal obligations on companies. The DG faced the dilemma: how to enforce CSR by law if it is not 
law? As a solution, it was agreed to focus on meta-regulatory mechanisms of corporate 
accountability (see Parker 2002 and 2007) based on what was already the dominant regulatory 
principle in business regulation: transparency and disclosure (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). In 
fact, as explained by Parkinson, “while CSR refers to conduct that is voluntary, the techniques 
relied on to promote it might themselves involve the imposition of binding obligations.” (Parkinson 
2006: 6)  
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 For instance the Communication states: “The sustainable development strategy should be a catalyst for 
policy-makers and public opinion in the coming years and become a driving force for institutional reform, 
and for changes in corporate and consumer behaviour. Clear, stable, long-term objectives will shape 
expectations and create the conditions in which businesses have the confidence to invest in innovative 
solutions, and to create new, high-quality jobs.” (p. 3) “public authorities have a key role in providing a clear 
long-term framework” (p. 5) “Public policy also has a key role in encouraging a greater sense of corporate 
social responsibility and in establishing a framework to ensure that businesses integrate environmental and 
social considerations in their activities.” (p. 8) 
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 Looking at BusinessEurope’s position and open support of ‘better regulation’ as “central to strengthening 
competitiveness and supporting sustainable growth and employment”, it appears clear what Zumbansen 
called the “a strange turn and usurpation” of originally progressive ideas of ‘post-interventionist’, ‘post-
regulatory’ law, as expressed, for instance, by concepts such as ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992), “into a market-oriented functionalist agenda.” 
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The idea, therefore, became to create a European regulatory framework that would 
encourage corporations, through transparency and disclosure, to become more socially and 
environmentally accountable to their stakeholders. In particular, from the fieldwork it also emerged 
that the tactical position found by the Commission between 2000 and 2002 was to say that there 
were three levels of regulation
133
. There are rules that are defined by legislation and imposed by the 
state. There are rules that are the outcome of negotiations between employers and employees, 
through collective bargain and collective agreement. Then there is a “third layer, which is CSR, 
which is self-imposed, when a company takes certain behaviour because they anticipate 
expectations from consumers, from investors, also from workers, but it’s because they respond to 
expectations, not to rules.”134 On the basis of this framework, the Commission proposed the 
establishment of a CSR European Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR (EMSF-CSR) “promoting 
transparency and convergence of CSR practices and instruments” (Commission 2002: 17). At the 
political level, the reason for establishing the EMS Forum was motivated within the Commission by 
the need to secure the support of the parties, including TUs and employers
135
.  
The EMSF-CSR had been originally proposed, in 1999 and in 2001, by the EP Rapporteur 
for CSR, the British MEP Richard Howitt. However, in the original proposal advanced by the 
Parliament the Forum was meant to be a way to enhance transparency and credibility of codes of 
conduct and social and environmental reporting. The idea was to have an independent monitoring 
and verification body, composed of ‘highly skilled’ persons, where the business and industry would 
have to provide information about their voluntary initiatives to verify their compliance with 
international standards and – if adopted – voluntary codes of corporate practice. After three 
exploratory meetings that took place between April and June 2002, the Forum was restricted to the 
main groups of stakeholders
136
 and began its activities, in October 2002. However, the mandate of 
the platform had been further restricted, not just compared with the original proposal of the 
Parliament but even to the wording of the 2002Communication. The objective of “identifying and 
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 The reference about the three levels of regulation categorization has emerged in several interviews (# 13; 
# 20; # 10). 
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 According to my fieldwork research, this support was far from obvious. In fact, the employers’ 
federations were against the CSR because they “did not want any more pressure.” Also trade unions were 
very much against. In fact, they perceived it as a process in competition with social dialogue. Furthermore it 
would have been a situation in which they were not anymore in bilateral (or tri-lateral including public 
authorities) negotiations but in a broader context including potential competitor social actors: organised civil 
society and NGOs.  
136
 Members of the CSR EMS Forum included three main blocs: employers (e.g. Eurocommerce; 
Eurochambers; CSR Europe; UNICE), trade unions (e.g. ETUC), NGOs (Green 8 and Oxfam).  
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exploring areas where additional action is needed at European level” had been dropped137, possibly, 
as hypothesised by Olivier De Shutter, to convince the business to participate. Therefore, the Forum 
had become a mere relational space for dialogue amongst the main stakeholders, starting from very 
distant positions.  
Intervening at the first meeting of the EMSF-CSR, Philippe de Buck, UNICE Secretary 
General stressed that it would have been “inappropriate to conceive the forum as a place where the 
participants are expected to negotiate or define guidelines or guiding principles.” (UNICE 2002) 
Using the same dilatory arguments that the industry used in the 1970s to avoid mandatory social 
accounting, the Secretary General of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), made clear 
that the current development of companies’ practices “should not be placed at risk through 
development of specifically European standardised approaches, certification procedures or reporting 
requirements that may frustrate innovation and damage competitiveness.” (ERT 2002) On the 
contrary, Anne-Sophie Parent, as spokesperson of the European Platform of NGOs, declared “it is 
clear that the Forum must make strong recommendations on how to establish a convergence of 
standards on CSR, in order to promote credible, verifiable systems of reporting and auditing.” 
(Parent 2002) In between the two extreme, trade unions, CSR Europe and the Commission were 
more open to find some middle-ground position
138
. In effect, the hope of the Commission was that 
from the simple fact of bringing together a number of actors with different positions in the same 
place during two years, they would have come out with a common understanding of CSR and some 
points on which they could voluntarily converge.  
The Forum worked during 18 months, with the participation of about 30 member 
organisations and observers but it was not open to members of the public. It operated on two levels. 
From December 2002 to July 2003, a series of high level meetings took place to evaluate progresses 
while four thematic roundtables were convened in three occasions each, between the beginning of 
2003 and early 2004. Notably, during this process, the three levels of regulation mentioned above 
had become two: either voluntary or mandatory; either law or non-law. Despite the efforts of trade 
unions representatives, the link between CSR and social dialogue was progressively dismantled and 
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Diamantopoulou said: "Corporate Social Responsibility is the business contribution to sustainable 
development. The purpose of this Forum is to help business and other stakeholders to agree on how to make 
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http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-1487_en.htm?locale=it 
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marginalised from the debate and finally dropped. Instead of converging, at the end of the works of 
the Forum, the position had become more polarised between business actors, strenuously defending 
the position that CSR should be business-driven, and trade unions and NGOs, who remained on 
their position that it should be legislative-driven.  
Business representatives were very skilful in shaping the debate on the need for further 
researches that would prove the existence or not of a ‘business case’ for CSR as the preliminary 
step for them to undertake it ‘on a voluntary basis’. On the other hand, NGOs and TUs kept blaming 
the Commission for failing to ensure that the EU would directly tackle the ‘real issues’ of 
companies’ misbehaviour within and outside the Union. For them transparency and disclosure talks 
were already perceived as a renunciation to direct legal liabilities. Therefore they insisted on 
obtaining, at least, binding and detailed disclosure rules that had to be independently monitored. 
The debate resulted in a deadlock on the issue of mandatory versus voluntary rules. The final 
outcome, in 2004, is a document that leaved everyone firm on its position and which met the 
scepticism of TUs and was never endorsed by the platform of NGOs. 
In its opening remarks at the EMSF-CSR, Davignon seemed almost hoping that some 
external event would have pushed forwards the works of the Forum. He stressed: “It is a dynamic 
process. What we are going to treat in 2004 is not what we are treating in December 2002. The 
world will change. We are going to change with the world.” (Davignon 2002) In effect, during the 
period between 2001 and 2003, a series of major corporate scandals in the US (Enron, Worldcom) 
and in Europe (Vivendi, Royal Ahold and Parmalat) erupted. They involved managers’ 
manipulation of annual reports and the expropriation of company’s resources, further underlying the 
need for business’ responsibility in order to rehabilitate investors’ and the people’s trust. The 
scandals boosted voluntary CSR initiatives, starting from social and environmental reporting and 
attracted a remarkable number of managerial researches on the issue of CSR reporting (see Gray 
2008). It also boosted European ethical investment that so far had been a US phenomenon 
(EUROSIF 2003)
139.  However, business’ instrumental use of CSR was stigmatised as ‘cynical 
marketing’ by many NGOs and trade unions that denounced CSR reports were little more than PR 
practices
140
. Overall, business reaction to the scandals strengthened the general perception that the 
key driver for CSR disclosure was reputation, further shifting the attention from the regulatory and 
public policies dimension of social and environmental reporting to their use as a management tools. 
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 A famous example of exposure is ChristianAid (2007) Behind thye Mask. The real Face of Corporate 
Social Responsibility. 
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However, Enron-style scandals also provided the Commission with an unprecedented 
consensus for approving comprehensive reforms of EU CGR and company law. For the scope of 
this study, this wave of corporate governance regulation is extremely interesting because it was also 
pivoted on transparency and corporate accountability
141
 (Overbeek et al. 2007; Armour and Ringe 
2010). In this sense, likewise the call for corporate social responsibility, it represented pressures for 
reforming the traditional features of the corporatist ancien regime, which was perceived, not only 
from Brussels, as fundamentally flawed. By the beginning of the 2000s, in Continental Europe only 
few listed companies were widely held. Instead, the typical feature of firms in German, French or 
Italian (relatively underdeveloped) stock exchanges had a dominant shareholder, often an 
individual, a family or a very restrict number of individuals, who controlled the majority of the 
votes (block-holders). In very general terms, block-holders typically exercise control owning only a 
fraction – sometimes a relatively small fraction – of the cash flow rights, exploiting sheltering 
corporate governance mechanisms such as pyramidal ownership
142
; shareholder agreements and 
dual classes of shares that were not allowed in the US and the UK (see Enriques and Volpin 2007). 
While this can have positive aspects, because the dominant shareholder(s) has the power to 
discipline management, resolving the problem of agency that exists in Anglo-Saxon, more 
dispersed, systems of corporate ownership, very concentrated ownership tends also to exclude 
minority shareholders from the firm’s income stream (Pagano and Volpin 2001). Until the 1990s, 
the power of block-holders was politically supported by European TUs, in exchange for collective 
bargain, some mechanisms of management supervision (i.e. German co-determination) and jobs 
preservation, depending from the size of the company. However, as I already mentioned, European 
employers and managers had become increasingly hostile to the idea of keep going with the 
corporatist arrangement, pictured as a burden that limited their global competitiveness. By the mid-
1990s, Central Europe was invested by a dramatic wave of industrial restructuration and 
redundancy, often publicly justified as the inevitable outcome of an historical shift towards post-
Fordism. This eventually broke the corporatist ‘solidarity’ between employers and employees.  
A major insight offered by the work of authors such as Hopner (2003) Cioffi and Hopner 
(2004); Deeg (2005) and later re-elaborated by Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) in analysing this phase 
has been that, under some circumstances, trade unions and labour parties developed a preference for 
corporate governance reforms that enhanced managers accountability and transparency reforms, 
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typically considered by most of the literature as prerogative of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. This might 
lead to a – so far little studied – ‘objective convergence’ of interests between different social and 
economic forces ‘federated’ against the unwarranted power of managers and block-holders, 
including global institutional investors and part of trade unions. This is what Gourevitch and Shinn 
(2005) have defined as a ‘transparency coalition’143. According to Hopner (2003) this has been the 
case in Germany under the SPD government during the first half of the 2000s
144
. Deeg (2005) 
reached a similar conclusion as regards the Italian wave of corporate reforms – also promoted by a 
centre-left political majority - favouring minority shareholders protection, enhancing transparency 
and dismantling the most antic features of Italian family block-holders’ capitalism. A similar 
explanation has been recently applied to the US by Gelter (2012), although the origins of 
‘transparency coalition’ in the US are much more focused on the ‘double identity’ of employees as 
‘labour’ and ‘investors’ in private pension schemes that are still much more developed than in the 
EU
145. However, the ‘transparency coalition’ was first elaborated to explain the very European 
political paradox of ‘financial capitalism’ being promoted by centre-left parties (Hopner and Cioffi 
2003). In the European context the weight of pensions should not be overemphasised. 
In Europe, the stalemate of EU corporate reforms that characterised the 1990s had seen the 
advocates of block-holder ownership systems (as diverse as Germany, France and Italy can be) 
under opposing pressures for converting or resisting to the overwhelming magnetic attraction of 
Anglo-American systems of corporate governance, based on liquid equity markets and diffuse 
shareholding. In practice, the Commission put in place a CG strategy that favoured deep changes in 
financial accounting, audit and disclosure standards. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, during 
the 2000s, the Commission and in particular Commissioner Bolkestein, after long and complex 
debates, obtained that all EU listed companies were required to prepare consolidated financial 
reports in accordance with the IFRS starting from 2005. The year 2001 represented a watershed in 
this long historical development as it showed the prospective of an eventual convergence of US, EU 
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and international standards (which actually did not take place). In fact, the Enron scandal had 
shaken the credibility of US accounting standards, otherwise widely considered as ‘best in class’.  
As argued by Dewin and Russell (2007: 150-151), this shift is “a case in point where the 
profession, or perhaps more correctly the Big Four accountancy firms and their alumni, acting in the 
public interest may play a critical, but not fully recognised, role in maintaining and improving 
national and international financial architecture.” At the same time, the authors pointed out, “acting 
in their own interests or their clients’ private interests” they may represent a critical “threat to the 
stability of these architectures.” The introduction of such shareholder-centred mechanisms of 
corporate governance by a centre-left political majority was justified by the aim of developing the 
comparatively modest European stock market, a fact that some authors have seen as making 
decisions less contentious (see Armour and Ringe 2011). At that time it also seemed that the idea of 
strengthening managers’ accountability would have also benefitted employees, as transparency 
allowed both insiders and outsiders to monitor the health of their firm. In line with benchmark 
corporate governance best practices promoted, among others, by the OECD
146
, EU reforms were 
aimed to emphasise board independence, accountability to shareholders, maximisation of 
shareholder value and transparency. This approach was designed to make block-holders and 
managers more difficult to hide losses or “manage” earnings, which may lead to sudden 
bankruptcies, with the aim of avoiding new Enron or Parmalat cases.  
Between 2001 and 2005, 17 Member States adopted corporate governance codes, largely 
inspired by the United Kingdom approach of ‘comply-or-explain’ CG principles147. This movement 
lasted until 2007/2008, when such codes were adopted by the remaining EU Member States, under 
the impulse of the 2006/46/EC European Directive. The latter introduced for the first time in 
European Law the comply-or-explain principle. This is a flexible approach to create a pan-European 
corporate governance framework. It amended EU Accounting Law, mandating the application of 
national corporate governance codes by all listed companies that will have to either comply with the 
code or explain why they do not. Overall, this wave of CG reforms was in the interests of global 
institutional investors which, as outsiders to the day-to-day management of the firm, need reliable 
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and comparable information about the risks of their investments. Although it is crucial to 
understand and stress that the attitude of institutional investors might vary greatly and that the large 
majority of them often demonstrated a rather passive approach towards managers. On the other 
hand, though there are major national differences in trade unions’ position to be considered, 
transparency might also be seen as in the best interest of trade unions and workers, which are 
generally interested in reducing the risks of exploitative management practices that dissipate 
companies’ resources and put jobs in danger.  
While the 2000-2005 CSR debate on social and environmental disclosure requirements has 
been traditionally analysed in isolation from the contemporary debate on corporate governance 
regulation (CGR), I would suggest that the two areas could be better understood if considered 
together
148
. In effect, both strands of regulation were hinged on transparency and disclosure as a 
strategy to build a new architecture of governance able to overcome the exhaustion of the 
corporatist coalition. Both represented a major departure from the traditionally prescriptive 
approach adopted by the Commission until the 1990s, towards greater reliance on ‘meta-regulatory’ 
mechanisms of corporate accountability. The desire of improve enterprises’ risk management is a 
powerful factor behind both CSR and CGR. However, while in ‘corporate governance’ regulation 
area the EU regulator succeeded in pushing for transparency and disclosure imposing significant 
regulatory changes, in the area of CSR it largely failed to deliver. In effect, going back to the 
development of EU-level CSR policies, the main result of this phase has been the Directive 
2003/51/EC that introduced into EU Law the requirement on companies to include “both financial 
and, where appropriate, non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, 
including information relating to environmental and employee matters.”  While this change in the 
EU Accounting Directives was meant to be the first step towards the creation of an EU framework 
on social and environmental disclosure, it turned out to be the only one. After the end of the CSR 
EMS Forum, a Communication containing a number of regulatory measures to promote CSR and 
taking into account the outcome of the Forum was draft and it was ready in 2004. However, the 
Prodi Commission had arrived to the end of its tenure. So it was “purely because of administrative 
reasons”149 that DG EMPL services decided to wait until the end of 2004, when the new 
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Commission would have come. However, the change from Prodi to Barroso proved to be a ‘sea 
change’ for EU policies in this area.  
In 2005, the Barroso Commission replaced Prodi’s and the EU initiative on CSR lost 
momentum. From that moment a long stalemate began.  The new Commission first decided to 
assign the CSR file 50/50 to DG EMPL and DG ENTR (traditionally more business-oriented). In 
the early 2005 the Communication was jointly draft by both DGs and presented to the respective 
Cabinets and it was rejected. In the same year, in order to celebrate its 10th anniversary, CSR 
Europe organised the first ‘European MarketPlace on CSR’, which gathered some 400 business and 
CSR practitioners. At this occasion, Frank Welvaert, Chair of the Board of CSR Europe, presents 
the “European Roadmap for Businesses. Towards a Competitive and Sustainable Enterprise". In 
response to the Roadmap, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso offered businesses 
a new partnership. Commissioners Günter Verheugen (Enterprise and Industry) and Vladimir Spidla 
(Employment and Social Affairs) invited Etienne Davignon and CSR Europe's member companies 
to elaborate on this partnership. Barroso decided to transfer from the DG Employment to the 
Enterprise the mandate for elaborating CSR policies. This political decision – described as ‘brutal’ 
by one of my key informants - was followed by the publication, on 22 March 2006, of a second 
CSR Communication ‘Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs: making Europe a pole of 
excellence on corporate social responsibility’ (EC 2006).  
The 2006 Communication signalled the political failure of the European ‘transparency 
coalition’ to deliver in the area of CSR policies. As Gourevitch and Shinn (2005: 66) highlighted: 
“if owners and workers fail, then managers prevail” and so it happened. “Between 2000 and 2005 
the line was to say ‘you need a good social and environmental environment for competitiveness’. 
Then there was a complete reversal”, told me an EU official150. “It was ‘No. You need good 
competitiveness first, before you can afford social and environmental performance’. Putting rules 
and constrains on companies was not fashionable anymore.” Then it came the 2006 
Communication, “which basically gave the baby to CSR Europe” saying that they should lead the 
Alliance and they should organise the workshops. According to another EU official, the 2006 
Communication was politically driven by DG Enterprise Commissioner Gunter Verheugen and the 
Alliance has been “agreed by the Cabinet directly with CSR Europe”, while the people at the 
service were “not sure what it was”151. In response, the EU Parliament passed, by a large majority in 
plenary, a resolution urging the EU executive to extend legal obligations to some key aspects of 
corporate accountability, such as directors’ duties, foreign direct liability and mandatory disclosure 
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for lobbyists (European Parliament 2007). The EU executive’s reaction was to reaffirm once again 
that CSR is a uniquely voluntary measure which “should not be regulated at the EU level.” As a 
result, NGOs and TUs started to boycott and, finally, abandoned the High Level Forum for CSR, 
which soon became a privileged partnership between BusinessEurope, CSR Europe and DG 
Enterprises. On 1
st
 March 2008 a European Alliance for CSR led by corporate representatives was 
created by the EU Commission. The ‘Alliance for CSR’ was “a slightly strange animal.”152 
Companies were encouraged to express support for the Alliance, which means writing a letter to the 
Commissioner, but “they did not have to commit to do anything. It was slightly odd and there were 
quite though discussions within the Commission.” 153  As I have been told by a responsible 
investment (SRI) expert, who had been previously an intern at CSR Europe and participated to 
some of the ‘laboratories’ organized by the ‘European Alliance for CSR’, “I have seen the 
laboratories. So, basically, five people, meeting twice a year, writing a leaflet to say what a 
company should do to have a better looking packaging; writing on what is responsible marketing; 
an publishing it on their website. And this was at the centre of the European Commission’s strategy 
on CSR!”154 
 Managers had succeeded in keeping EU social and environmental disclosure confined 
within a self-regulatory scheme. As requested by BusinessEurope, the Commission explicitly 
suggested that non-financial disclosure should be regulated through voluntary guidelines, principles 
and standards that had been created by global voluntary regulatory networks, such as the UN Global 
Compact and the GRI.  
 
4.4 [2008-2011] “Footprints on the beach”. From ‘voluntary’ and ‘non-financial’ 
accounting to corporate social accountability? 
In November 2008, few months after the creation of the ‘Alliance for CSR’ and the 
triumph of managers, the collapse of the financial sector rapidly turned upside down the EU 
debate on CSR policies. The impact of the crisis emerges clearly from all the interviews carried 
out within Commission as well as with the various stakeholders involved in the broader debate on 
corporate sustainability regulation, although opinions about the nature of the changes that it 
provoked might vary. In effect, the consistency of the references to the crisis as the catalyst for 
changing not just European but the global politics of CSA seems to confirm that a close relation 
exists between accumulation of economic capital and the sustainability reporting debate. This also 
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emerges in a number of interviews. For instance, ECCJ, the NGOs’ platform that represents and 
co-ordinates at the EU-level over 250 CSOs (civil society organisations), confirmed
155
 that the 
crisis transformed the debate: “Even BusinessEurope was asking for mandatory reporting and 
accountability for the finance sector!” One EU policy-maker remarked156: “The fact is that the 
financial crisis revealed just how much the market depended on short term: short term activities, 
short term profitability: never thinking about long-term. Sustainability means thinking about long-
term, taking into account civil society and the environment more broadly. It is very broad, not just 
traditional social and environmental matters but also things like corruption, anti-corruption and 
bribery; and things like, ethic in the workplace, ethic in the boardroom.” An experienced EU 
official, who had a key role in the EU CSR debate, stated
157, “I think what came was the financial 
crisis. Because it showed that you cannot trust business.”  
While it is still too early to assess the outcome of the current EU regulatory debate, this 
section will briefly outline some aspects concerning changes in the mode of regulation, in its 
content and in the socio-economic forces that are driving those changes as compared to the 
previous phase. 
The first consequence of the 2008 shift, which emerges from the research fieldwork, 
concerns a more active role of public authorities in their regulatory capacity. This shift widely 
emerges from every single interview with EU officials currently working on CSR. One 
affirmed
158
  that, in “ways that we cannot really appreciate or calculate”, the financial crisis 
begins to “re-open the question of the role of regulation generally”, it begins to make regulation 
“a less dirty word.” A top official stressed159 that the overall thinking before the financial crisis 
was “not to regulate with the strictness necessary. It was more a ‘light touch’ approach to 
regulation both in financial services but also in the area of CSR. Yet, another official described 
the current shift saying that today it is “no longer a question purely of mandatory or voluntary. 
The days of the mantra of voluntary are gone. We are now talking about this ‘mix’. An 
appropriate mix for each situation to bring about the best combination, whatever it could be.” This 
shift in the mode of regulation primarily concerns a reconsideration of the relation between the 
state and companies as compared to the previous phase. More specifically, it regards the line 
between law and non-law that had been set back at the very beginning of the 2000s, officially 
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acknowledging the existence of a space, a field of economic activities, which is “over and above 
the law” and relatively autonomous from the control of the regulator.  
In the economic field of practice, which increasingly coincides with the sphere of 
influence of giant corporations, managers became able to set their social policies, write their 
codes of conduct and issue corporate governance statements on a comply-or-explain basis. This 
regulatory activity has an unprecedented impact on the lives of millions of people, considering the 
leverage of TNCs. However, this new regime had foreseen only a weak mechanism of corporate 
social accountability to check whether TNCs were actually doing what they claimed and what 
was their social and environmental impact. The only information required were ‘financial’ 
information, the large sphere of non-financial disclosure was left to the willingness of managers 
to pro-actively communicate on those issues. Today, after the financial crisis, regulators are 
increasingly under pressure for building a new framework of rules of the ‘economic game’ and, as 
an interviewee acknowledged
160
 this is “a big challenge for us” because “things are not as simple 
as they were.” The ‘deal’ between states and markets that had emerged during the 1990s is gone, 
companies have to prove that they do what they say and they say what they do. The respective 
spheres of influence of states and companies return to be blurred and themselves subject to power 
relations. The very idea of CSR as a public policy tool has been almost ‘suspended’ as a 
consequence of the fact that the crisis has turned into a complicated “tug-of-war between global 
financial investors and sovereign nation-states” (Streeck 2011) of which Brussels is the epicentre. 
As maintained by an EU official, in the economic field we are definitely, we are seeing a return to 
legislation, “the time of self-regulation by the industry is lost”. In this context CSR is not a 
priority, at least not in the short-term, as it was 10 years ago
161. At the same time, “if something 
will come, it will be stronger” because, after the bailout of banks and the financial crisis, “the 
power relationship has changed.” 
In this new context, it is extremely significant that the first ponderous step the 
Commission has taken towards the (re)construction of a meaningful strategy in the area of 
corporate social accountability has been to write a new definition of what CSR is, contained in the 
2011 Communication, ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility’. 
The new definition makes some important steps forwards. First of all, exactly ten years after the 
publication of the 2001 Green Paper, it wipes out the notion that CSR is something that 
companies do “on a voluntary basis”, therefore voiding what has been at the origin of endless 
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ambiguities
162
. CSR is now officially defined as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts 
on society” (p. 6). As it emerged from the interviews163 carried out at the EU Commission, the 
new definition is meant to make sure that “the word ‘responsibility’ is used in the way the word 
responsibility is meant to be used: so you are responsible to somebody or for something.” 
Namely, you (company) are responsible for your impact on society.  
The first major implication of this change is that “every company has a social 
responsibility. It is unavoidable: positive or negative. So if every company has an impact, every 
company has a social responsibility. So, the all starting point is completely different.” Companies 
have a social responsibility, they don’t do CSR. Starting from this perspective, the question 
whether CSR is mandatory or voluntary, according to one of my interviewee
164
, just does not 
make any sense. “It is voluntary or mandatory leaving footprints on the beach when you walk 
across the beach? Meaningless question.”   
Secondly, the Communication adopts and legitimises a new vocabulary, a new 
terminology more adequate to the challenges of a field which has enormously evolved during the 
last decade and which, after the crisis, will have to face new challenges. This language is 
“consistent with new and updated international principles and guidelines” such as the ISO 26000, 
the OECD Guidelines. In particular, the contribution to the debate made by the UN Guiding 
Principles on business and human rights has been rather distinctly taken into account. For instance 
it states that, “in order to fully meet their social responsibility”, enterprises “should have in place 
a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical and human rights concerns into their business 
operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders.” (Commission 
2011:6). Therefore, “without being legal about it”, the Communication became much more 
explicit as regards its expectations from business in the areas of social and environmental matters 
and human rights stressing that, in order to meet their corporate responsibility, all companies 
should integrate those issues in their core strategy and operations, in collaboration with 
stakeholders.  
However, it is clear that the end of purely voluntary corporate social responsibility and a 
stronger role of the state also mean the end of CSR as we used to know it. “I wonder whether that 
will be the last Communication of the Commission on CSR”, acknowledged one165 EU officials 
that has been working on this issue for many years. “It is possible. But I think that if you break 
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down some of its component parts, they potentially go up in importance. Non-financial disclosure 
is one part.” In effect, as the idea of a purely voluntary approach to CSR is giving way to a ‘smart 
mix’ of mandatory and voluntary approaches, a series of fragmented regulatory initiatives that in 
2006 would had been impossible to approve were included in the new CSR strategy 2011-2014
166
, 
including a proposal for expanding the current EU requirements for non-financial reporting. 
However, they are emerging in a completely different context and in a rather paradoxical political 
situation.  
On the one hand, there is a far stronger momentum and support for mandatory non-
financial disclosure, as compared to the early 2000s. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the 
European ‘transparency coalition’ continues to expand at different levels of regulation and 
through various modes of corporate governance, from global to national initiatives. As I should 
argue in the next Chapter, it has actually become much more structured and organised than it was 
in the early 2000s and it is now more equipped for designing high quality legislative and policy 
proposals. Both responsible investors (EUROSIF) and NGOs (ECCJ) have transformed and 
consolidated their organizational networks and structures, while TUs had “a difficult time since 
2005”167, which may be challenging them to seek in corporate sustainability regulation the basis 
for “creating alliances with NGOs and other actors” (Vitols and Kluge 2011: 35).168  
On the other hand, however, the 2008 financial crisis has also revealed the symbolic 
violence of financial markets and their capacity to directly threaten European stability. This has 
provoked a ‘tug-of-war’ (Streeck 2011) between EU states and global financial markets in which 
the ‘pro-business’ and ‘not really keen on regulating markets’ Barroso Commission had to 
measure itself with a new unexpected scenario. When the crisis exploded, infact, the EU 
Commissioners in charge for CSR (EMPL, MARKT, ENTR) were culturally inadequate to grasp 
the possible value of elaborating a strong proposal for non-financial disclosure. They were more 
in favour of a ‘market-making’ than a ‘market-shaping’ approach to EU economic policies 
(Quaglia 2009).  
In sum, the crisis has objectively changed the EU policies landscape, forcing regulators to 
become more active. However, when it erupted, the Commission services were led by the 
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champions of ‘soft’ regulation and market liberalisation169. The result has been a late and 
problematic understanding of the relevance and potential of corporate sustainability as a response 
to this deep crisis. The ‘mindset’ of EU regulators seems still pivoted on the very ‘law-and-
economics’ vision of the world that has been at the origin of the crisis. Meaning, a vision of 
companies as purely ‘market actors’ and not also as social organisations that are also becoming 
major political players. Some EU law-makers only see the value of financial reporting. In fact, 
paradoxically, the relevance of adopting non-financial disclosure has been still largely assessed on 
the basis of financial and economic criteria (see Commission 2013a).  
Despite this paradoxical situation, already in February 2009, at the annual high-level 
meeting of the EMSF CSR, it was possible to perceive that something had changed because of the 
crisis. In its speech, DG ENTR Commissioner Verheugen highlighted, for the first time since the 
Borroso Commission took office, the need for talks among all stakeholders on ESG disclosure
170
. 
As a consequence, in September 2009, DG ENTR took the initiative of hosting a series of 
workshops on ESG disclosure each exploring the position of six groups of stakeholders: enterprises; 
investors; TUs; NGOs; public authorities; and professions (academics, accountants, financial 
analysts, etc.). Significantly, in the summary of discussion of the final workshop, it emerged that “a 
decision not to change EU policy would send a strong political message to enterprises and other 
stakeholders that the European Union believes business-as-usual is desirable and feasible, whereas 
the multiple sustainability challenges we face demand fundamental change. […] ESG disclosure is 
a political issue not just a technical issue. Tinkering is not a political message”. (Commission 2009: 
3) The conclusions of these workshops have been discussed during the conference organised by the 
Spanish Presidency on 25-26 March 2010 and further debated in a plenary meeting of the EMSF-
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CSR in November 2010, confirming the broadening interest for reviewing the existing regulation on 
non-financial disclosure. However, the real turning point was when the new Commission took 
office, the 10
th
 of February 2010, still led by José Manuel Barroso and supported by a 
‘conservative’ majority in the European Parliament. According to all my interviews with EU 
officials, the rather controversial appointment of Michel Barnier, a French politician widely seen as 
having ‘market-shaping’ economic views, as Internal Market Commissioner had a major impact in 
boosting support for a more active role of the EU.  
According to one EU official I interviewed, the shift in the EU debate on regulating NFR
171
 
“can be reduced to two words: Barnier plus the financial crisis.” Perhaps, the discontinuity appears 
even more pronounced as Barnier succeeded the Irish Charlie McCreevy, who has been a champion 
of market ‘light touch’ regulation. According to my source, “French Commissioners are by nature 
more interventionist and he comes from a country that already has non-financial reporting law in 
place.” In 2010, the issue of companies’ non-financial reporting moved in the hands of the 
Accounting and Financial Reporting Unit of the DG Internal Market, which had the “legal 
instruments”172 for drafting a legislative proposal on non-financial disclosure. DG MARKT had 
been “involved but, to be honest, not very involved”173 in the 2009-2010 series of ESG workshops. 
In February 2010, the Commission launched a ‘Public consultation on disclosure of non-financial 
information by companies’ open to all interested stakeholders “with the view of improving existing 
policies on disclosure of corporate social and environmental information, and respect for human 
rights, including possible proposals for new initiatives and/or revised legislative measures.” 
(Commission 2011: 2) The consultation attracted an extraordinary number of responses - over 300 - 
and in April 2011 the Commission officially announced that it will put forward a legislative 
proposal by the end of the year on non-financial disclosure.  
Significantly, the 2011 ‘Single Market Act I’, an initiative strongly bolstered by Barnier, 
states: “The tremendous financial lever of the European asset-management industry (EUR 7 000 
billion in 2009) should be used to promote the development of businesses which have chosen – 
above and beyond the legitimate quest for financial gain – to pursue objectives of general interest or 
relating to social, ethical or environmental development. In order to ensure a level playing field, the 
Commission will present a legislative proposal on the transparency of the social and environmental 
information provided by companies in all sector.” (Commission 2011a: 14-15) According to a high-
ranking EU official the inclusion of non-financial disclosure as one of the twelve priorities of the 
Single Market Act I happened “because it was a political priority for the Commissioner [Michel 
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Barnier], who really wanted to demonstrate that the Single Market is also about the social 
component of Europe and sustainability. So it clearly was a strong political signal.”174 This 
announcement represents the completion of a U-turn in the EU Commission’s standing as compared 
to June 2007, when it explicitly excluded the need for further legislative initiatives (“CSR should 
not be regulated at the EU level”).  
This point in time – the year 2011 – has been also the temporal limit of this research. It 
ideally represents the point in which the two negative definitions of CSA as non-law and non-
financial have been overcome. However, since the publication of the SMA I, the regulatory process 
has further advanced. In 2011 and 2012, the EU Commission has strongly, officially, renewed its 
pledge to present a legislative proposal (Commission 2011b; 2012).  However, the opposition inside 
the Commission and from managers has been considerable. As pointed out in a recent press release 
by the ECCJ, the coalition of NGOs, after the meeting with Barnier, in February 2013, “The ECCJ 
was very pleased to see Commissioner Barnier’s openness and ambitiousness. He showed a great 
interest in the points raised by the participants and reiterated his support for regulation and 
accountability, refusing that the crisis is misused in order to deregulate. He wants a credible and 
effective reform. Among other things, he agrees that non-financial report has to be mandatory for 
all large companies; that the non-financial report must have a legal status and be voted by 
shareholders; that providing general information instead of risks and impacts might not be enough. 
He seems ready to fight the battle in the College of Commissioners. However, realistically, other 
DGs and the strong opposition from the business community might water down the text and it will 
have to leave flexibility to companies on how to report. (ECCJ 2013)
175
 Far from contradicting the 
hypothesis of this study, the current struggle that surrounded the EC proposal on NFR confirms the 
tension between managers and a ‘transparency coalition’ that existed even before the crisis. 
However, it adds a new dimension. Some politicians and representatives of public authorities, 
embodied here by the conservative dirigisme of Commissioner Barnier, are supporting a stronger 
role of the State in the economy. After the crisis, regulators appear uncertain between the old 
habitus of law-and-economic ‘market-making’ policies and the strong temptation to reclaim their 
legitimate role and function of democratic control and initiative (market-shaping) over the 
increasingly autonomous power of economic actors. 
Finally, on April 16 2013, the European Commission adopted on 16 April 2013 a proposal 
for a directive enhancing the transparency of certain large companies on social and environmental 
matters (Commission 2013). This Directive amends the Accounting Directives (see Annex I). 
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Presenting the proposal, Commissioner Barnier said: “Today we are proposing important legislation 
on business transparency across all sectors. This is about providing useful information for 
companies, investors and society at large - much demanded by the investor community. Companies 
that already publish information on their financial and non-financial performances take a longer 
term perspective in their decision-making. They have lower financing costs, attract and retain 
talented employees, and ultimately are more successful. This is important for Europe’s 
competitiveness and the creation of more jobs. Best practices should become the norm.” 
(Commission 2013a)
176
 The companies concerned will need to disclose information on policies, 
risks and results as regards environmental matters, social and employee-related aspects, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and diversity on the boards of directors. This 
statement will include a description of the policy pursued by the company in relation to these 
matters; the results of these policies; the risks related to these matters and how the company 
manages those risks. If a company fails to do so, it has to explain why they have not included such 
information. The new requirement would apply only to large companies, above 500 employees. 
This is about 18 000 companies across Europe, substantially increasing the number of companies 
reporting ESG data. The proposal also specifies a number of frameworks on which companies 
might rely in disclosing such data
177
 but it does not require information to be externally verified or 
certified.  
However, the EC proposal on NFR does not represent the end of the debate. Quite on the 
contrary, it hopefully marks the beginning of a comprehensive discussion about the integration of 
ESG information in financial report, therefore responding to a structural societal transformation 
prompted by the crisis of accounting practices too narrowly focused on short-term accumulation of 
financial capital. 
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 Emphasis added 
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 “In providing this information, companies may rely on national frameworks, EU-based frameworks such 
as the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), and international frameworks such as the United 
Nations (UN) Global Compact, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights implementing the UN 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
26000, the International Labour Organization (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of principles concerning 
multinational enterprises and social policy, and the Global Reporting Initiative.” (Commission 2013) 
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5. Shifting grounds. From corporatism to agency 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter integrates the framework outlined in Chapter 4, looking at the actor-level 
analysis of changes in CSA regulation, and it expands the narrative outlined in the previous chapter. 
As Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) hypothesised, the end of the ‘corporatist compromise’ marked a 
shift in the economic field, with the emergence of new coalitions and new struggles. This trend was 
further strengthened by the accounting and financial scandals (2001-2003) and the economic crisis 
(2008-date), which worked as catalyst for changes. 
How has the current EU debate on CSA regulation come about? Which social and economic 
forces have driven changes in the content and the mode of CSA regulation over time? Consistently 
with a reflexive socio-legal approach, this section further outlines the drivers of regulatory changes, 
focusing on the relation between the six groups of actors that have been empirically studied during 
the research: public authorities; trade unions; investors; companies’ managers; block-holders; 
professional experts (lawyers; accountants; auditors; financial analysts; academics); NGOs and civil 
society. Specifically, the chapter is organised into four sections: Section 5.2 elaborates on the idea 
of the emergence of a ‘transparency coalition’, providing some evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. Section 5.3 focuses on the opposition of large companies’ and their associations to 
mandatory disclosure of non-financial information. EU law-makers and regulators is the object of 
section 5.4 while section 5.5 concludes considering the role of professions – accountants, lawyers 
and financial analysts – in the development of NFR regulation. 
 In rather stylised terms, which would need further analyses at the national and global levels, 
I have identified the emergence and confrontation between two coalitions promoting different 
visions of the future of CSA regulation in the EU. European managers, backed since 2005 by the 
Barroso Commission, have been largely defending their ‘prerogatives’ to freely implement 
sustainability reporting on a voluntary basis. They are against the introduction of more non-
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financial transparency and accounting rules and any further change in the Accounting Directives 
that goes in this direction. They rather support international voluntary initiatives – such as the GRI 
and the UN Global Compact. Since 2000, they have been challenged by the rise, of a broad 
‘transparency coalition’ which can count on the financial muscles of a steadily growing number of 
global institutional investors. This is characterised by the ‘objective convergence’ of a large number 
of NGOs and part of the European trade unions (TUs) on the idea of enhancing companies’ 
transparency and accountability. This coalition demands EU regulators to broadening the 
Accounting Directives’ requirements in order to include mandatory disclosure of ESG data in the 
annual report.  
In between the two coalitions, lawyers, accountants and financial analysts are sizing the 
momentum for shaping the new architecture of corporate accountability in their own ways. In fact, 
the current explosion of CSA regulation has created a regulatory competition between various 
initiatives for reporting and verification: standards, guidelines, frameworks, etc. (GRI Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines; IIRC integrated reporting; EFFAS KPIs; ISO 26000; etc). Also regulators are 
under pressure for responding to a crisis of trust in markets’ mechanisms of self-regulation. 
Therefore, EU law-makers have a crucial role to play in shaping the future of CSA regulation. 
However, they seem turned between a narrower (sustainability accounting) or broader (sustainable 
companies’ accountability) approach. They will play a critical role in determining whether CSA 
regulation will be developed by public authorities (i.e. German Sustainability Code) or by 
accountants and financial analysts (i.e. IIRC). In the near future, considering the likely prospective 
of having more non-financial disclosure EU requirements
178
, law-makers will also have to face the 
issue of regulating the verification of the conformity of companies’ reports. 
 
5.2 A ‘transparency coalition’ for European CSA regulation 
Analysing the data that emerged from the empirical study, the findings seem to confirm the 
hypothesis as regards the emergence of a ‘transparency coalition’ (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005) led 
by a growing section of investors together with a network of NGOs engaged against corporate 
abuses; and parts of the EU trade unions. This original finding suggests the need for further 
researches in this direction, particularly at the national and global levels. However, the word 
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 In 2011, both the Single Market Act I and the CSR Communication stressed the need to improve 
transparency of companies’ operations, particularly regarding environmental, human rights and sustainable 
development aspects. This pledge has been confirmed the 12 December 2012 by the Action Plan: European 
Company Law and Corporate Governance. Finally, on April 2013, the EC has adopted a legislative proposal 
for the disclosure of non-financial information by large companies. 
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‘coalition’ should not deceive the reader and it should not be understood as a formal and formalised 
‘alliance’ (although official contacts, networks and ties exist) between social actors representing 
different and often conflicting social constituencies, but rather as an ‘objective convergence’ of 
interests. In order to properly understand its meaning we should think about the ‘corporatist 
coalition’ that emerged in the post-war Europe, which was a convergence of interests between two 
‘archenemies’, large capitalism and organised labour, to build a shared framework of political-
economic governance, what Streeck (2011) calls ‘democratic capitalism’. Similarly NGOs, trade 
unions and investors are strange bedfellows, which in fact maintain distinct position on about 
anything, but that have one important common interest in building an effective EU regime of 
corporate governance and accountability, which should include also social and environmental 
aspects. As Gourevitch and Shinn (2005: 221) noted: “Confronted with the pressures for 
transparency and accountability of shareholder-worker[-civil society] alliance, many managers 
recall the “closed doors” of the corporatist compromise with some fondness. Public accountability 
of management exposes practices and agreements that could be challenged by outsiders such as 
consumers, taxpayers, and minority shareholders. Not surprisingly, managers prefer governance 
practices that minimise disclosure, independent oversight, and minority shareholders.” Because of 
these characteristics, this coalition might also appeal to ‘market-shaping’ public authorities, both 
from the political right and from the left. In the context of complex globalised economies, it 
provides the state with the kind of oversight and information about cash flows and taxes payment 
that might be otherwise hard to access when dealing with transnational corporations.  
Evidence of this convergence of interests can be found in the interviews I had with NGOs 
and investors, confirmed by some documents and by other interviews from EU regulators.  
For instance, in June 2011, I interviewed Yolaine Delaygues, from the European Coalition 
for Corporate Justice (ECCJ). “Are you talking with investors?” I have asked her. “Yes, we are in 
contact with EUROSIF.” She explained me that, after the Commission started the consultation on 
non-financial reporting, in February 2011, they started to have more contacts with the responsible 
investors’ side. So they started to discuss about doing together a press release. “EUROSIF was 
invited but for strategic reasons they preferred to step aside and do it by their own” and “we did it 
with ETUC and the GRI
179
. Although, with the GRI we don’t agree on everything and eventually 
they said that they would not go any further, otherwise many of their members [the GRI has many 
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 February the 3th 2011, United call for mandatory company reporting. Joint press release: “The GRI, 
ECCJ and ETUC call for regulation that must ensure: Mandatory reporting, using clearly defined indicators 
developed with the involvement of stakeholder groups; Reporting throughout the supply chain; Objective 
information on whether the company has been involved in, or risks being involved in, violations of 
international standards for human rights and environmental protection.” 
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corporate managers as members] would not be very happy.” The GRI position is more leaning 
towards a comply-or-explain approach to CSA regulation, which finds both investors and NGOs 
strenuously adverse. Delaygues stressed that, “EUROSIF, on the contrary, is thinking that a 
comply-or-explain approach would be like going few years backwards, so sometimes is pretty 
funny to see how coalitions are working.” Then again she elaborated: “Their position is very close 
to ours, except that what they want is more from the investors’ point of view. So in this respect it is 
different from what we want, because more transparency is not for investors, is to make companies 
accountable. So, I would say this is the main difference. And also there may be some differences of 
wording and if you go into technicalities, may be there could be more differences. But from the 
discussion we had in February, we really kind of agree that reporting should be mandatory on 
human rights and the environment.”  
Delaygues alsorevealed that, after the Commission launched the public consultation ‘on 
disclosure of non-financial information by companies’, on 22 November 2010, EUROSIF and 
ECCJ shared each other positions before sending it. As she explained, however it is not a formal 
collaboration. “You know, for us sometimes already working with Trade Unions is not easy, 
because we have kind of different perspectives. Sometimes is complicated”, so working with 
investors would add to this more complication. “But with EUROSIF we are just very very very 
close. Strategically we work together and we are in contact.” Crucially, I asked her whether this 
‘closeness’ concerned only transparency. She pondered whether on the other two main issues of 
ECCJ campaigns – access to justice and directors’ liability – there could be any convergence and 
she concluded that no, there was possibly not other connection than through ‘disclosure’. This is 
consistent with the idea of the ‘transparency coalition’ as it emerges in Gourevitch and Shinn 
(2005).  
This could be seen as a rather narrow ‘objective convergence’ between vast groups of social 
forces over one rather secondary aspect: transparency and disclosure. However, as I have already 
pointed out (Chapter 2), accounting rules have a ‘structuring power’ and on this basis it is easy to 
imagine the emergence of a whole legal framework, the width of which is already illustrated by the 
enormity and depth of the four main areas that are already at stake in the EU debate on non-
financial reporting – environment and climate change; human rights; employees-related matters; 
corruption and bribery – on which TUs, NGOs and investors might well modulate different 
positions. As Delaygues stressed, this convergence “is really strategical, I don’t see any other 
reason for that.” For the moment, I am leaving a little aside the relation between NGOs and trade 
unions (ETUC), as it has been already addressed by the existing literature on European CSR 
mentioned above and it is in practice more visible and established (although not less problematic) 
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(see Vitols and Kluge 2011). Interestingly enough, from my interviews emerges that, while the 
convergence between NGOs and TUs is more on issues of human rights and labour conditions and 
qualitative disclosure, they are less in line on environmental issues. Conversely, the convergence 
between NGOs and investors is stronger on disclosure of carbon and environmental information, 
mainly because such information is more quantitative (or at least measurable and comparable)
180
. 
As regards the involvement of consumers, Delaygues affirmed, “We have been trying to work 
sometimes with the European Consumer Organization (BEUC) but is not very easy for them, 
especially because they don’t have one position on non-financial reporting. But we have been 
working with them on other issues, for instance collective redress.”  
One year and half later, in 2012, I interviewed François Passant, the executive director of 
EUROSIF
181
, which represents assets totalling over € 1 trillion through its affiliate membership of 
institutional investors. By that time, this ‘objective convergence’ had already become more 
structured. I questioned him about EUROSIF’s affinity with the positions of various big players in 
the field of CSA regulation
182
. When it came to ECCJ, he stressed that the level of affinity was very 
high, because they shared the same policy objective of strengthening EU policies on corporate 
transparency and accountability. “Yes we have a lot of affinity with ECCJ. We actually wrote a 
letter together to the Internal Market Commissioner, Barnier; together with ETUC [the European 
trade unions] and BEUC [the European consumers’ organisation]. There are nuances, we are 
stressing more the materiality of the data, ECCJ might go, may be, a bit further. But there are a lot 
of communalities.” On 8 November 2012, the whole ‘transparency coalition’ met with 
Commissioner Michel Barnier (DG Internal Market). The representatives of ECCJ together with 
ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), BEUC (The European Consumers’ Organisation) 
and EUROSIF (The European Sustainable Investment Forum) decided, according to ECCJ 
websites
183
 “to send a strong political message from key stakeholders with regard to the upcoming 
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 As George Soros said as regards carbon emissions trade, “the system can be gamed […] that’s why 
financial types like me like it, because there are financial opportunities.” (2008) In general, it has been 
forecasted that it is very likely that most industrial sectors will be affected directly or indirectly by the 
consequences of climate change itself or by carbon governance policies. Therefore, investors are increasingly 
in need for reliable GHG information to project what will be consequences of CC on their assets. In 
particular, in the case of long and medium-term institutional  investors – that in Europe are around 80% of 
the total – carbon disclosure is becoming a vital piece of information (EFFAS 2010). 
181
 Interview # 22 (22.01.2013). EUROSIF (the European Sustainable Investment Forum) is a pan-European 
network whose mission is to develop sustainability through European Financial Markets.  
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 See Chapter 2.5 on research method 
183
  According to the press release of ECCJ “Participants expressed their concerns about this reform 
potentially being a missed opportunity […]. The ECCJ was very pleased to see Commissioner Barnier’s 
openness and ambitiousness. He showed a great interest in the points raised by the participants and reiterated 
his support for regulation and accountability, refusing that the crisis is misused in order to deregulate. He 
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legislative proposal on non-financial reporting which Barnier’s DG is currently drafting.” 
EUROSIF newsletter stresses that, “The goal of the meeting was to reiterate our support for an 
ambitious reform to Non-Financial Reporting (NFR) by EU companies that would ensure the 
relevance, the materiality and the consistency of NFR by large companies.” “Legislation is for me 
one of the key drivers”, Passant (EUROSIF) told me, stressing that national pension’s reforms in 
France and UK had a key role in their leadership as regards responsible investment (SRI). He 
maintains that EU-level mandatory reporting regulation is moving, but too slowly and if the 
Commission does not require companies to disclose material and relevant information “we are back 
to square one” and “we will have to wait another five or ten years” at this pace of development.  
 “For investors it is very important that we have concrete information, connected with the 
business, comparable and somewhat measurable”. In that sense, there seems to be a convergence 
with ECCJ about their dissatisfaction with existing international voluntary frameworks, like the 
GRI and the UN Global Compact, and the request for rules and legal certainty.  Furthermore, from 
investors’ perspective, such voluntary frameworks “have not been designed for investors, they have 
been designed for companies”184 and do not provide the kind of reliable, relevant and material 
information that investors need. The real question is “how prescriptive should regulators be? It 
should be a mix, because if regulation is too prescriptive, it becomes a compliance exercise, ticking 
the box.” Therefore, he maintains that the ideal ESG reporting regulation is “a mix of principles, a 
bit of KPIs, material, substantial narrative information that is connected to the business strategy and 
risk and opportunities of a company.” 185 If regulators make it only a “compliance exercise”, he 
argues, it would result in an administrative burden for the issuers and a rather useless data for users, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
wants a credible and effective reform. […] He seems ready to fight the battle in the College of 
Commissioners. However, realistically other DGs and the strong opposition from the business community 
might water down the text and it will have to leave flexibility to companies on how to report. From what was 
discussed during the meeting, it is expected that the new legislation will require companies to disclose a 
statement with regard to environmental, social and employee-related matters, respect of human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery aspects. This statement will most likely include a description of policies, results of 
these policies and risks, and the information will most probably be based on international accepted 
frameworks (UN Global Compact, OECD Guidelines, ISO 26000, ILO Tripartite Declaration, GRI). The 
materiality, sanctions and boundary of the reporting obligations will most probably remain key issues since 
they won’t be addressed in the Commission’s proposal. The draft proposal was already expected to be 
released several months ago, however, some delay occurred and it now seems that the final legislation will 
be due for February 2013.” The document can be retrieved at http://www.corporatejustice.org/ECCJ-BEUC-
Eurosif-and-ETUC-meet.html   
184
 The only existing framework for investors has been designed by EFFAS and it is organised by sectors but 
it has to be used together with some narrative framework. Ref. 
185
 Passant affirms that regulation should be based on principles – timely, material, accurate, etc.; it should 
specify which topics are to be covered in the reports – i.e. environmental information, human rights, etc. and 
they should include also ‘governance’ issues; lastly, it should identify some KPIs (Key Performance 
Indicators), “very limited, like five KPIs, not fifty, but that apply across the board, like ‘waste’ for example, 
and than leave companies decide which KPIs are relevant for their business.” 
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so why not to “do the extra-mile” and make it “good sound risk management”. A “useful tool for 
both civil society, investors, etc. and the companies themselves.” “We argue that risk should not 
only include financial risk but also non-financial risk, to the extent that it has an impact on the 
financial performance. Human rights in your supply chain, for instance.” Therefore, according to 
him, “the only way to make this really relevant for business strategy and the board is to integrate, to 
ask for an integrated reporting that is connected to the strategy, not just to risks but to business 
opportunities created by those ESG or CSR factors.” It is striking to see how this position is in line 
with ECCJ press release after the meeting with Commissioner Barnier which states: “if the end 
result will be a legislation that imposes more burdens to companies, while not providing relevant 
and comparable information to companies, NGOs, investors, trade unions, consumers. It was 
emphasized that without meaningful identification and disclosure of social, environmental and 
human rights risks and impacts, it was impossible for workers, investors, consumers, affected 
communities, to assert their rights and fulfil their role.” (ECCJ 2013)  
Further researches I made, confirmed by the interviews, show the existence of national 
structural ties between NGOs and investors that work as bridges and bonds for dialogue and co-
ordination. Although, there may be more that could emerge from a systematic assessment of all the 
NGOs and investors platforms of the EU, they already represent a strong starting point – at least 
two case studies– for mapping out this complex transnational and multi-layered ‘transparency 
coalition’. In the Netherland, the Dutch SIFs, the Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable 
Development (VBDO) – which is one of the members of the EUROSIF – is also a member of the 
Dutch MVO Platform – which is one of the most active members of the ECCJ. The existence and 
relevance of this institutionalised link was confirmed by Delaygues. A second institutional bond 
between investors and NGOs that I have identified through my empirical research is in France. It 
emerged from an interview with Prof. Michael Capron
186
 – a French scholar and activist, who is 
currently the President of the French ‘Forum Citoyen pour la RSE’ (ECCJ French member) and 
who has also participated, on behalf of ECCJ, to the ESG workshops organised by the EU 
Commission. He pointed me to the fact that, “In France, there are often meetings between the FIR 
(the French representative of EUROSIF) and the NGOs. The ‘Centre Français d’Information sur les 
entreprises’ works as a link because it is at the same time member of the FIR and member of the 
Forum Citoyen.” 187 Capron seems also to provide stronger evidence to the hypothesis of a multi-
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 This ‘interview’ has been the only one that I have done sending by email few questions because it was 
impossible to agree on a phone interview and Prof Michael Capron is based in Paris while I was in Brussels. 
He replied in French to my questions and here I translate in English his words. 
187
 This is the author’s translation from the original text in French, which I have received by email on 
02.03.2013: “En France, il y a souvent des rencontres entre le FIR (représentant français d'EUROSIF) et des 
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levels ‘transparency coalition’. Particularly as he told me, “Investors are interested in extra-financial 
information to the extent that social and environmental risks might affect financial risk. This 
situation led to an objective alliance with NGOs during the meetings. However, this alliance has not 
been very ‘rooted’ – if we exclude socially responsible investors (SRI) – because the objectives are 
different. They both agree that there should be KPIs, however not about which KPIs.”188 Prof 
Capron maintains that “this objective alliance has been mostly informal: during the official 
meetings one could observe the convergence of positions of investors and NGOs. Although, in the 
halls, there have been attempts to build a ‘common front’ between NGOs, investors and certain 
governments (France, Sweden and Denmark) […]. But there have never been formal meetings, 
[…]. This was in 2010, during the meetings of the CSR Multi-Stakeholder Forum”189  
If the most visible and dynamic facet of the ‘transparency coalition’ has to be found in the 
networks of SIFs and Social Forums that are growing across Europe, the financial weight and 
economic muscles are in the rising interest of large insurers and pension funds in ESG data and in 
the often covert relation between investors and trade unions/workers. In fact, large institutional 
investors, during the last decade, have become increasingly interested in the social dimension of 
investment which is becoming steadily “more a feature of the mainstream, more common.”190 As it 
emerged from the interviews, it is not a niche market anymore but, at the same time, it has not yet 
become institutionalised. ESG data are now distributed by Bloomberg on a global scale. There are 
sustainability indexes, such as MSCI ESG Indices, and global specialists in sustainable investment 
analysis, such as Sustainalytics. However, there is not a supportive legislative framework that 
would boost its expansion in the EU, particularly limited by the fiduciary duties of pension found’s 
trustees that, in some context, such as the UK, can be interpreted as not allowing them to invest 
following SRI criteria. In very general terms, large investors can be divided into two broad 
categories: asset managers and pension funds. As regards asset managers, there are more and more 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
ONG. The Centre Français d'Information sur les entreprises fait le lien car il est à la fois membre du FIR et 
membre du Forum citoyen. » 
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 This is the author’s translation from the original text in French, which I have received by email on 
26.02.2013: “Les investisseurs s’intéressent à l’information extra-financière dans la mesure où les risques 
sociaux et environnementaux peuvent avoir des effets sur les risques financiers. Cela a conduit à une sorte 
d’alliance objective avec les ONG pendant les réunions. Mais cette alliance ne peut pas être très profonde 
(sauf peut-être avec les « investisseurs socialement responsables ») parce que les buts ne sont pas les mêmes. 
Cela se voit lorsqu’on discute des indicateurs-clés (KPI) : tout le monde est d’accord pour des KPI, mais ce 
ne sont pas les mêmes ! 
189
 This the author’s translation from the original text in French, which I have received by email on 
02.03.2013 : « Cette "alliance objective" a surtout été informelle: pendant les réunions officielles, on pouvait 
constater la convergence des positions des investisseurs et des ONG. Dans les couloirs, il y a eu des 
tentatives de constituer un "front commun" entre ONG, EUROSIF et certains gouvernements (France, Suède, 
Danemark) […]. Mais il n'y a jamais eu de rencontres formelles, […]. Cela se passait pendant les réunions du 
Forum Multistakeholder en 2010. » 
190
 Interview # 12 (26.06.2012) 
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players looking at ESG information and data. However, they are still doing it in a very diverse way. 
Some of them, like the largest UK insurer Aviva, have been strongly advocating for social 
responsible investment (SRI) regulation, while many others are not really active on this issue. The 
situation is similar as regards pension funds. All the largest pension funds in Europe have 
progressively embraced or are already doing SRI. So they invested money, resources and their 
critical mass in demanding corporations ESG information and are interested in seeing laws passed 
that would make companies non-financial disclosure mandatory. Small and medium funds are “not 
even started looking at this issue”191.  
It is worth to stress that this is a global phenomenon. In effect, as many authors pointed out, 
investors and financial analysts have showed a growing activism in shaping the sustainability 
debate (see Newell and Paterson 2010; Richardson 2011). This progressive interested is rooted on 
the pioneering experience of a small group of US and UK ‘responsible institutional investors’ 
(CalPERS; Hermes) that back in the 1990s developed metrics for their investment based on social 
and environmental  criteria and aggressively engaged with corporations on issues such as human 
rights and pollution. However, the dimension of the current commitment of institutional investors is 
unprecedented. Considering three major examples. The UN Principle for Responsible investment 
(UN PRI) is an initiative and a set of voluntary guidelines for investors wishing to address 
environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues. The initiative has been launched just 
only in January 2006 and it had only 20 signatories. Nowadays the signatories rise to 870, 
accounting for a combined $ 25 trillion in assets with a sharp increase starting from 2008. The 
Carbon Disclosure Project is a secretariat for the world’s largest institutional investors 
collaboration launched in 2000 whereby many institutional investors collectively sign a single 
global request for carbon disclosure that is sent to all the largest corporations in the world. The 2010 
request was sent on behalf of 551 institutional investors with a combined $ 72 trillion in assets and 
it has obtained GHG reports from over 3000 companies. In 2007, for instance, they were ‘just’ 385 
investors with a combined $ 4.5 trillion in assets and they had received little more than 1000 
sustainability reports from companies. Lastly, the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change 
that represents a combined Euros 6 trillion in assets from about 70 among the largest pensions funds 
and asset managers in Europe. Up to January 2008 the combined assets were Euro 4 trillion and the 
members 60. At the top of the agenda for all three initiatives is a request to corporations and public 
authorities for disclosing measurable and consistent ESG information.  
The active role that investors, together with trade unions and NGOs have played in pushing 
for amending EU non-financial regulation is confirmed by the interviews with EU policy-makers. 
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 Interview # 22 (22.01.2013) 
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Immediately after the onset of the crisis, they were surprised by the high attention and growing 
interest coming from the financial sector towards their proposals on non-financial reporting. An EU 
official summarised the positions of the actors on the field saying, “Business representatives were, 
since the very first moment, against any move towards mandatory disclosure; NGOs were of course 
happy to discuss this and investors also were happy to discuss the issue of increase transparency, 
this was already clear.” The EU official further stressed the role of investors: “In a way, the fact that 
investors are discussing this, for us, we have also considered that one of the key evidence of the fact 
that markets were demanding for increase transparency. So we don’t do this for the regulators’ 
sake, we do this because there is a demand which is not met by current supply.” As explained by 
another EU official: “I think if I look at it objectively, one of the roles of the investors’ interest is to 
make it no longer a ‘black versus white’ debate. Because, if you take the investment community 
out, you have NGOs, sometimes to be honest with quite an anti-business agenda, saying ‘we want 
business accountable!’, and you have business, on the other side, saying ‘get lost, we don’t want 
more rules and regulation!’ Very black and white... But the investment community, who is, by 
definition, pro-business, who do understand business, understand about the creation of financial 
value and all those kind of things. Once they set in a room – it doesn’t matter if they say ‘we want 
law’ or not, that’s not the point – but when they say ‘we want better non-financial information’ or 
‘the information we got are not good enough for this, this and this reasons’. And, critically, this 
discussion is not only coming from SRI people [...] but when you got some mainstream analysts 
saying, ‘there is something in here that we need to know more about’, and ‘the information we get 
is not good enough.’ Then the debate is, at least, triangular... and I think, for a policy-maker, it 
opens up a number of new series of challenges, or questions, if you like. ‘Are our financial markets 
working properly?’ May be the lack of credible, reliable non-financial information is meaning they 
are not working properly or working as well as they could do. Then it is not simply the NGOs’ 
agenda. It becomes, if I am honest, an easier agenda to sell.” 
To conclude on the ‘transparency coalition’ I should consider also its limits. First of all, 
although European SRI has been growing rapidly, it is not widespread yet and to reach this ‘tipping 
point’ it critically needs a supportive legislative framework in the areas of pensions and investors 
rules. Furthermore, while the crisis has been a catalyst for changes it has also hurt the financial 
sector, which is in a phase of major internal restructuration that, without regulatory support, risk to 
penalise those investors that make an effort towards more ethical and sustainable practices that are 
still widely seen as a luxury by the others. Thirdly, major differences between the three main 
components/constituencies that constitute this coalition might lead to the victory of managers. 
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5.3 Public authorities. The ‘law and economic’ habitus of regulators 
Looking at public authorities using the EU institutions as a laboratory, a point of observation 
for broader developments, I have been mapping the whole spectrum of institutional relations that 
can arise. Broadly speaking public authorities are organised on three levels: international/global 
norm-making; regional (EU); and Member States/local dimensions. The EU has a critical role in 
this debate and the main body of reporting requirements has to be found in the Fourth Council 
Directive (24 July 1978) on the annual account of certain types of companies and Seventh Council 
Directive (13 June 1983) on consolidated account. Therefore, the EU has the right to act in this area, 
also because the disclosure of non-financial information is already regulated at the EU level
192
 and 
increasingly diverging approaches within the EU suggest the need for a greater level of 
harmonisation in this field.  
First of all, there is the national level and its relation with the EU. As it emerged from 
several interviews
193
 and from the review of relevant documents
194
 there is, broadly speaking, a 
division between ‘supporters’ of a mandatory approach to non-financial disclosure, led in particular 
by France, UK and the Scandinavian countries. They have already in place a variety of national 
disclosure requirements. On the other hand, Germany and the ‘Mediterranean’ countries (with the 
exception of Spain) rely on a voluntary approach. According to a broad explanation confirmed by 
Prof. Chiara Mio’s interview195, this appears as a division based on varieties of capital 
accumulation’s regimes (see Hall and Soskice 2001). Notably, between a ‘patient capitalism’, 
where stock markets are relatively underdeveloped and banks are strong, and a more globalised 
‘fiduciary capitalism’, which is increasingly interested in non-financial information196. This is 
particularly confirmed by the fact that from all the interviews emerged that the key player in 
opposing an EU regulation of CSA has been Germany and the German employers’ association 
(BDA/BDI). However, also within Germany there is an interesting dynamic and tension between 
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their approach. Finally, it should be considered the difference between large German undertakings and micro 
family-owned Mediterranean capitalism. 
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the financial community and the enterprises’ organisation197. As it emerged from the fieldwork, this 
internal debate could be described as a “Frankfurt versus Berlin” strife, meaning that the work of 
the German Council for Sustainable Development (GCSD) has been opposed by the employers’ 
federation because it has been perceived that “they wanted to work with the capital markets and the 
investment actors rather than working with or trying to work with the employers’ association”198.  
The GCSD, however, managed to involve some large German companies in the development of the 
German Sustainability Code, which was finally published in 2011 and it has been signed, to date, by 
a remarkable number of companies
199
. Finally, when it has been publicly stated that the 
Sustainability Code will be only a voluntary tool for companies, it has been endorsed also by the 
BDA and the German conservative government of Chancellor Angela Merkel
200
. The strong 
opposition demonstrated by the largest economy of the Union heavily delayed the development of a 
pan-European framework, although it is difficult to exactly value its weight. In a different direction, 
the issue of the relation between the EU and its Member States also emerged around 2000s, as the 
UK – and the English large institutional investors and insurers’ community – were broadly in 
favour of mandatory disclosure of ESG data, however “they would take a national approach and not 
accept an EU approach.”201  
Moving up, to the EU-level of analysis, the first issue concerns the question of the internal 
differences and variety of positions within the EU institutions. Most of the analyses refer to the 
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struggles between the three ‘I’. The institutions that are at the heart of the EU: the Parliament, the 
Commission and the Council. However, as Georgakis and Weisbern (2010: 96) pointed out, 
“Considering institutions as a whole leads to overlooking many nuances. For instance, there are 
often more differences between a director-general of agriculture and a DG of internal market than 
between the latter and a central banker or a member of the European Central Bank.” In my research, 
it emerged certainly a tension between the Parliament – supporting mandatory CSR meta-regulation 
– and the Barroso Commission – stressing that CSR has to be ‘voluntary’. However, the fieldwork 
also revealed a tension within the Commission. I have attempted to reveal this tension, particular, 
through a question – almost a game – that I have often asked to the EU officials that I interviewed. 
‘What if this policy had been led by DG ENV?’ or ‘What if it had been led by DG ENTR?’202 The 
answer to the first option typically has been that there would have been “a detailed and rather 
prescriptive regulatory approach to ESG disclosure” while, in the second case, there would be 
(possibly) “the idea to do nothing.” This result is consistent with the official documents and 
regulatory output of the two DGs. DG ENTR has been supporting a voluntary approach to non-
financial disclosure, broadly based on the recognition of global standards, initiatives and framework 
(such as the IIRC, the GRI and the UN Global Compact). On the contrary, DG ENV tends to be 
more critical of business ‘self-regulation’ and it has developed, in parallel with the non-financial 
reporting initiative taken by DG MARKT a narrower regulatory initiative on business 
environmental reporting.
203
 Notably, the latter would create a detailed EU framework for business’ 
environmental disclosure, rather than recognizing existing standards, on the basis of the 
consideration that existing standards are not adequate to achieve the EU policy objectives
204
. This 
approach goes in the opposite direction of DG MARKT’s conclusions. After an assessment of the 
various regulatory options, it maintained that the EU should not develop its own 
standard/framework for non-financial disclosure
205
. As it emerged in several interviews at DG 
ENTR and DG MARKT, the rationale has been that “there is no need to reinvent the wheel”206. 
What interested me is to further investigate why the ‘economic’ DGs are more ‘careful’ in 
proposing ‘social and environmental’ rules, therefore almost aligning with the anti-regulatory 
position of business? My conclusion has been that this has to do with the ‘law and economics’ 
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habitus of regulators, meaning the individual and collective disposition to act, of some of the EU 
policy-makers that have been in charge of writing CSR and sustainability policies (on the habitus of 
EU regulators see also Georgakakis 2009). 
I might well introduce this argument with a little personal experience, which concerns my 
first days as trainee at DG Internal Market, in March 2012. The standard question for the 
newcomers was: “are you an economist or a lawyer?” This superficial empirical observation is 
strengthen by more scientific analyses that confirm the dominance of legal and/or economics as the 
main element of the Commission’s top civil servants’ training. Georgakakis and de Lassale (2008), 
for instance, demonstrated that lawyers and jurists integrated very early the rankings of the 
Commission, acquiring a dominant position, particularly between Hallstein and Delors’ 
Presidencies. However, economists increasingly contested and challenged this domination, starting 
from the Delors’ era, who was himself an economist. On the basis of this idea, it is possible to argue 
that, in order to actually transform EU corporate governance and company law policies, as now 
required by the EU Treaties, more civil servants trained in e.g. environmental studies or economic 
sociology are needed. In effect, this would explain why social, environmental and sustainability are 
making the titles of recent initiatives of the EU Commission while they are still absent from their 
contents.  For instance, the 2012 Communication, containing the much anticipated, post-financial 
crisis, new European corporate governance legal framework, contains the word sustainability only 
in its title, while inside there is no reference at all to human rights and the environmental 
protection
207
. It is clear that if the personnel working on drafting the Communication and the 
hierarchies valuing that draft are narrowly specialised in company and securities laws, they will 
tend to be more comfortable with a traditional law-and-economics approach to corporate 
governance. However, it should be reported that this instrumental use of sustainability is not in line 
with the principles and objectives of EU Law. As Law Prof. Beate Sjåfjell (2012) from Oslo 
University, stressed sustainable development is recognised as one or even the overarching principle 
of the Union and that would clearly include EU company and security laws. This is an aspect that 
also Jan Cremers, the Dutch trade union leader, sociologist and former MEP, underlined when I 
interviewed him. He remarked that now, with the enter into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we are in a 
new phase “because article 3.3208 states that the internal market is not a goal as such but it is an 
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instrument to get to a stage of full employment and social progress, sustainability, etc. and that, in 
my opinion, urges the European institutions to redefine this hierarchy that it has developed in the 
past when there was a primacy of the internal market.”  
However, when I refer to the ‘law and economic’ habitus of the EU regulator, it is not only a 
question of training and background nor of the fact that, as emerged from many interviews, there is 
a modest investment of human resources in CSR and sustainability issues.
209
. Habitus, in Bourdieu, 
has a much broader and deeper meaning that I tried to investigate in my interviews
210
. In particular, 
in one interview, in my opinion, it emerged more clearly. A top EU official argued that it is difficult 
to change regulators’ mindset because we “are on a bicycle, so it’s very difficult to slow down 
without falling.” The official continued, “When you are in power, people think you are in power, 
you make decisions, but in fact the space to make decisions is very narrow and you are only there to 
incarnate the only decision that can be taken. But, of course, the representation goes otherwise. […] 
In reality there is a general climax which puts huge pressure on people on the top. So that they have 
to pretend they have power. But, in fact, they just are the mouth of what has to be decided. There is 
a very huge constrain, through the fact that, of course, you need to be re-elected; you need money; 
you need to campaign. So you need not to hurt some actors and if you do it, you just disappear. 
There is no way to stay there, if you don’t decide what has to be decided.”  
One of the most interesting aspects of this law-and-economics habitus has been to further 
understand how public authorities arrived to almost dismantle their very function and role in 
society, which is to regulate. In the 1990s, as an EU official put it, regulation became “a dirty word” 
and my perception from the fieldwork has been that, even after the crisis, regulators are almost 
unconsciously self-censuring themselves
211
, preventing themselves from “regulate [the market] with 
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 It emerged that the whole European CSR strategy occupies only three officials (one in DG EMPL and two 
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the strictness necessary”212. An EU official that had worked with Delors acknowledged that, “I 
think we sort of ‘post-Lisbon’. I now feel that we are still seeing that [‘free market’ approach], but 
it’s more like in a vaccine. We are seeing that but it’s not virulent anymore.  People are still trying 
to convince but, even the people that were convinced now keep talking like that, but they are not 
convinced.” From this interview also emerges the difficulty of many policy-makers in overcoming 
‘thinking-as-usual’. “I always ask my colleagues: ‘Why do we speak about the industry as if they 
were sort of sport people who need our help to be ‘competitive’? It’s a really strange metaphor! 
And they just write like this, all their briefings. They just don’t realize it anymore!”213  
I identified two aspects in this habitus of the regulator: one concerns the historical 
development of the EU institutions as progressively based on law-and-economics ideas. The second 
element is the ‘symbolic violence’ of ‘better regulation’.  As for the first element, Jan Cremers 
provided me with a fascinating historical mise en perspective of the evolution of the Commission. “I 
still remember the time when Internal Market was not a DG but just a task within DG Industry” he 
told me. “It was a very small group. Later on it became the General Directorate and with a very 
strong neoliberal agenda, they dictated the game together with DG Competition, Enterprise, etc. 
often pushing DG Social Affair in a corner.” Cremers stressed the role of different Presidents of the 
EU Commission: “I always said that with Delors we did not need the Social Commissioner. 
Because Delors guaranteed that attention is given to social issues.” “At the beginning there was a 
very idealistic thought as well: we go to harmonise! Then we went from harmonisation, to 
comparison, to convergence, not even mutual recognition, which would work as a sort of 
automatism. That was combined quite soon with what became a deregulation agenda. From the 
mid-1990s”, Cremers maintains, “it was more and more about the economic freedom, take out the 
barriers to the market, etc. and this has been accelerated in the period since Barroso is there.”  
The second, interrelated, element in regulators’ habitus concerns the emerging ‘better 
regulation’ EU agenda214. This strategy had been initiated in 2003, by Prodi’s Commission, which 
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intended to modernise the EU law-making mechanism according to the most advanced debate on 
market regulation. In fact, this is a meta-regulation that sets the key criteria that EU policy-makers 
should follow to assess their legislative initiatives and, in theory, provide better regulation avoiding 
unduly administrative burden to business. From a socio-legal point of view, this is a very interesting 
piece of EU legislation, because it is supposed to make sure that decisions are scientifically sound 
and that all the possible main legislative options have been objectively assessed. Nonetheless, as 
one EU official told me “this is the least scientific method for elaborating a legislative proposal”. In 
effect, the process has become relatively more transparent. Despite the claim of objectivity, 
decisions are (inevitably) always political. However, a further problem with the ‘better regulation’ 
agenda is that ‘sound decisions’ must be economically and scientifically based. That means that the 
regulator is more likely to go a priori for ‘soft law’ and avoid ‘unnecessary’ and ‘hard’ regulation. 
According to Penny Clark, from ETUC, since Barroso is at the head of the Commission, this 
mechanism has been systematically used to ‘water down’ legislative proposals and to promote an 
agenda that favour big business instead of the large majority of citizens. “I think [better regulation] 
is a smoke screen, [aimed] not to deregulate, because they are not de-regulating. If you look at the 
Single Market Act, there are many proposals that are coming to improve companies’ rights: copy 
right protection; bankruptcy protection.”  
The subtle bias contained in this mechanism can be effectively illustrated looking at the case 
of non-financial reporting regulation. This approach demands that in order to impose business this 
onerous requirement, the Commission’s service provides enough evidence of the benefits that it will 
bring to business and/or society. However, by its nature, immaterial and non-financial aspects are 
hardly quantifiable and cannot be easily monetised. On the contrary, financial reporting is both 
‘material’ and quantifiable. The rather paradoxical result is that ‘better regulation’ criteria force EU 
officials to find ‘material’ and ‘financial’ arguments for ‘intangible’ and ‘non-financial’ disclosure. 
This can be also observed focusing on many little references that appear in the interviews with EU 
officials and that they almost mechanically use. For instance, one EU official, talking about the new 
Danish Law which had introduced a comply-or-explain requirement for the disclosure of non-
financials, argued: “of course you cannot establish that scientifically but they must have made sure 
that the benefits would out rate potential costs of companies having to do it.”215 It can also be seen 
rather well in the difference between the documents elaborated during the EU Workshop on ESG 
reporting, the working document of the Expert Group and, finally, the Impact Assessment of the 
current EU proposal for non-financial. The rationale and the language for regulating social and 
environmental reporting are, at each stage, more and more based on eminently law-and-economics 
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arguments: “market efficiency”; “regulatory failure”; “insufficient/uneven incentives”; “companies’ 
performance”.  
However, I believe there is an even more subtle and pernicious misconception in the idea of 
regulation that is implicitly advanced through the ‘better regulation’ agenda. Again, I would use the 
example of the decision whether introduce binding non-financial reporting. A law-and-economics 
perspective would typically see in the demand from investors of non-financial information or the 
growing number of reports from companies the necessary confirm that “business is demanding for 
such information”216. Conversely, the lack of such demand would be seen as showing that it would 
just be “an imposition” of the EU regulator, forcing economic actors to report on non-financials 
while there is no demand for such information. It all sound very rational, however this is not the 
way it actually works. In the real life, things are more ‘irrational’. As one policy-maker told me, 
“one of the things that fascinate me about this issue is the fact that you might be able to change the 
expectations of mainstream investment analysts by getting companies to put more information in 
the field, whether or not there is a demand today from all mainstream financial analysts. For me 
that’s critical. Because it is too easy to say that mainstream financial analysts are not interested in 
that and therefore we don’t need to provide them with this information. As a forward-looking 
policy-maker you have to ask yourself: if I did put out the information, would they use it? This is 
why I think that, as policy-makers, we shouldn’t think just about one dimension. Yes we should 
think about the efficiency of capital markets, but then you also need to think about sustainable 
development and the sustainability of the whole system.”217 In practice, far from being ‘better’, this 
regulatory approach risks to be rather short-sight and one-dimensional.  
Lastly, I would introduce some preliminary considerations on the relation between the EU 
regulator and the international/global norm-making dimension. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, at the global level several international regulatory initiatives emerged in order to provide 
generally accepted frameworks and guidelines for reporting non-financial (see also Annex I). 
However, there is not yet a standard for reporting ESG information. The International Organisation 
for Standardisation, in dealing with corporate social responsibility, had the ambition of issuing the 
standard: ISO 26000. However, after an unprecedented six-year long debate, ISO only deliberated 
to issue a guideline that “cannot be certified to unlike some other well-known ISO standards. 
Instead, it helps to clarify what social responsibility is, helps businesses and organizations translate 
principles into effective actions and shares best practices relating to social responsibility, globally. 
It is aimed at all types of organizations regardless of their activity, size or location.” (ISO 26000: 
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2010) The closest thing to a standard is the GRI Guidelines for Sustainability Reporting, which is 
also the most widely applied international framework and it is based on a so-called stakeholder 
approach, involving NGOs, trade unions and government in its preparation. In the official 
documents published by the Commission and the European Parliament, there is a quintet of 
‘internationally accepted’ frameworks for non-financial reporting: the GRI; ISO 26000; the UN 
Global Compact; the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles (see Annex I). However, according to most of my interviewees, the UN 
‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework has been “the most influential regulatory initiative”. 
Although it does not focuses on all aspects of corporate non-financial disclosure but only on human 
rights, there is a general consensus that it has been the initiative that has influenced EU regulators 
the most. “Very pivotal indeed. Not just for the Commission but also for the Parliament. So the 
Parliament used it to put pressure on us”, said one policy-maker. Another official confirmed: “I 
think the Ruggie Framework seriously start to redefine corporate social responsibility. Generally 
what we mean by it and what actors need to promote it.”  
Nonetheless, in my opinion the most intriguing aspect of the EU relations with the global 
dimension of corporate responsibility is that, after the financial crisis, this has become an area of 
struggles between public authorities and markets; between the rationale of European democracy and 
the global laws dictated by the flows of economic capitals. As Streeck (2011) affirmed: this is a 
“tug-of-war between markets and voters”. It is within this new and unusual dimension that all the 
positions of the actors and the very meaning of the word ‘business responsibility’ has been recently 
changing. An excellent explanation of what are the legal implications for policy-makers has been 
offered by socio-legal scholar Gunter Teubner (2009). In its sharp analysis of the financial crisis, he 
outlines two points that are relevant for this analysis. First, he argues that we should be sceptical 
about the effectiveness of the variety of regulations that have been proposed because “they do have 
one problem in common: fatta la legge trovato l’inganno. No sooner has the law been passed than 
the loophole appears. The Achilles heel of such regulation is that national and international rules 
can always be effectively avoided; in the face of such enormous efforts at avoidance, ex-ante 
regulation is impossible.” (2011: 3)218 This gives a capital importance to serious attempts to 
implement meta-regulatory mechanisms such as reporting and transparency, as far as they are seen 
not as an end in themselves but as a means to an end (Manson 2005). Secondly, Teubner argues that 
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in order to understand the recent financial crisis, we should not rely on factor analysis alone but 
look for its underlying causes that he identify in a ‘self-destructive collective addiction to growth’. 
Drawing on Huber (2009), he shows how this mechanism works: massive creation of money ex 
nihilo by private banks is responsible for the current excesses of the compulsion to growth in the 
global financial sector. This serves, through advance financing, to compel the real economy to 
growth to an extent that is socially and environmentally harmful. “At the same time, this private 
money creation is exploited for an unforeseen increase in self-referential financial speculation.” 
(Teubner 2011: 4)  
This collective addiction would explain the paradoxical reaction to the crisis of most 
governments and markets actors that are seeking to return as soon as possible to ‘business as usual’. 
However, the risks of such a shortcut are highlighted in alarming declarations such as the one by the 
UN Secretary General arguing that “the world’s economic model is environmental suicide” (UN 
General Secretary, The Guardian Jan 28
th
 2011). However, Teubner concludes offering also a 
possible solution to this dilemma recalling that: “Only Beelzebub can cast out the Devil!” (Teubner 
2011: 12) Meaning, the financial sector is currently so powerful that needs to be forced to change 
itself. Drawing a parallel with the political system that has gradually “subjected its own expansion 
to its self-limitation”, we need “massive external intervention from politics, law and society” 
(Teubner 2011) in order to obtain that the financial-corporate nexus limits its own possibilities
219
. It 
is in this sense that public authorities could possibly see in the ‘transparency coalition’ outlined 
above the first expression of financial actors self-limiting themselves. However, it is still uncertain 
whether they understand what has changed and the external position that they are required to take in 
order to legitimately impose rules to business and rights for people. As the Commission has 
recently affirmed, “The economic and financial problems of the last two years have contained 
important lessons for regulatory policy. Most importantly, they have confirmed that markets do not 
exist in isolation. They exist to serve a purpose which is to deliver sustainable prosperity for all, and 
they will not always do this on their own.”220 (Commission 2010: 2) 
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5.4 The barrage of European business. From industrialists to global risk 
managers 
Managers have emerged from the reshuffle of European industrial relations that took place 
between the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s as the ‘winners’. However, they soon had to face 
the growing global scrutiny for the corporate financial, social and environmental sustainability of 
their businesses. This rise of managers, which progressively took over many companies from block-
holders owners, provoked a whole shift in the terrain of European corporate governance, situating 
‘managerial agency failure’ at the centre of the scene. As Gourevitch and Shinn (2005: 237) 
maintain, “According to the Chandlerian view, managers begin as very junior partners in their 
alliance with blockholders-owners, and gradually assert their independence on the basis of technical 
competence and superior “professional” judgement. [...] As firms continue to grow in scale and in 
international distribution, this trend towards independent managerism has a continual impetus.” In 
effect, if during the late 1990s, Europe had a problem with ‘strong block-holders and weak 
managers’ (Becht 1997)221, bock-holders were progressively weakened implementing company law 
and corporate governance reforms that were meant to empowered minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, also the traditional and often underestimated control exerted by organised labour has 
been dismantled (see Zumbansen 2006). The result has been the ideal situation for managers: 
neither internal (block-holders and workers) nor external (minority shareholders) forces are strong 
enough to really control their operations. The breadth of managers’ victory can be measured 
looking at the hubris that characterises their position towards public authorities. They are against 
any imposed regulation and, specifically, any imposition of rules as regards social responsibilities, 
which is, according to the long-term Director General of Business Europe, “should continue to be 
business-driven, focused on practical, company-level solutions which take into account the diversity 
of company approaches to CSR.” (de Buck 2010) 
Globalisation gave to large firms the autonomy to exploit both dimensions: the dimension of 
transnational economic capital flows and the other of European territories, workers and 
communities. However, it also attracted much more attention and scrutiny from all the other actors: 
minority shareholders, trade unions, NGOs and, to a certain extent, public authorities to join forces, 
despite their different and often conflicting interests. As Colin Crouch pointed out “TNCs are not 
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 “In Europe, small owners are potentially exploited by large voting blockholders - and the managers these 
blockholders appoint to run the companies; in turn, the managers are constrained to devising company 
strategies that are subject to the non-transparent obligations blockholders impose on them. This situation 
does not necessarily call for further attempts to move towards a European company law, or for restrictions on 
the behaviour and investment possibilities of existing and potential blockholders. It does call for major 
improvements in European mandatory disclosure regulation; to make current arrangements transparent for 
European investors and to fully preserve the interests of blockholders.” (Becht 1997: 4) 
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the passive price takers and respondents to demand signals envisaged in theory. They shape their 
markets and have high visibility. Operating across the globe, they are also partly beyond the 
regulatory reach of national governments. The associated rise in the number of economic issues that 
cannot be resolved at the level of individual nation states means an increase in those that are 
governed by individual firms or groups of firms rather than by public authorities. These include 
standardization and the management of multinational supply chains. Whether or not one calls this 
globalization, it cannot be claimed to be the operation of markets tout court, and it presents 
interesting questions to formal, national politics and for issues of governance.” The conclusion that 
Crouch reach is that the prominence that this situation accords to giant firms makes them, “whether 
they want it or not, political actors, vulnerable to criticism.” Therefore, it is increasingly difficult for 
them to respond to accuses of social irresponsibility “by proclaiming that they are only in existence 
to make money, as this can damage their reputations with important groups of customers, possibly 
even investors and employees. They therefore find themselves under pressure to develop political 
sensitivities alongside their financial, marketing, and technical competences.” (Crouch 2011: 2) 
Despite this shift has pushed some individual large corporations to become gradually more 
open to corporate accountability mechanisms, the position of European business in general is still 
largely hostile to the including non-financial information in the annual report. The latter is seen as 
an additional burden. “What annoys me”, told me one EU official, “is that from CEOs and other 
managers, you get often, not always, much more enlighten discussion and understanding of where 
their interest lies. And the business federation, they always seem to be defensive. They always seem 
to be anti-regulatory. And it is frustrating.” From the interviews and the documents emerges that 
regulators fund the complete opposition of employers’ organisations, such as BusinessEurope (ref.). 
In the 1990s, the federations of European employers (UNICE) erected a barrier not only against 
mandatory sustainability reporting but primarily against any possible regulation. In fact, looking at 
the motivations that UNICE/BusinessEurope provided against the introduction of mandatory CSA, 
they could be largely applied to any piece of regulation, a position that cannot be maintained for 
much longer after the financial crisis. First of all, employers often stressed that each and every 
business is unique and different. In that sense, there is not ‘one size fits all’ regulatory solution. 
They claim that even sector-based standards are not a panacea because many companies within the 
same sector are very different and comparing them may prove difficult. Furthermore, as it appears 
in their response to the 2001 Green Paper, attempts to regulate CSR are deemed 
“counterproductive”, because “a prescriptive or regulatory approach or framework-setting could 
undermine business commitment to CSR.” (UNICE 2001)  Lastly, there is the question of costs, as 
reporting and (particularly) auditing can be rather costly for companies. The problem with costs 
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goes usually together with the request for ‘evidence’ of the real economic benefits of reporting. This 
is followed by the conclusion that more debates and evidence is need. However, enterprises also 
advanced some more specific objections that BusinessEurope adopted specifically against non-
financial transparency, starting from the definition of such disclosure. They stress that there is not 
yet a common terminology, starting from a universally recognised definition of what 
sustainability/ESG/non-financial disclosure means. As it emerged during the EU Workshop on the 
disclosure of ESG information dedicated to enterprises: “ESG information is not commensurable, 
and distracts enterprises from focusing on the considerations that are really important to their long-
term performance.” Therefore, only ‘material’ non-financial information should be included in the 
annual report that can result in “too much data”. Furthermore, employers maintain that CSR is 
about changes in the internal processes of operational and middle-level management. Disclosure is 
encouraging “bureaucratic window-dressing” and raises “difficult questions of costs, and the need 
for control and assurance.” (EU Workshops 2009a: 5) According to BusinessEurope, if there must 
really be a regulation, then it should be at the global level (international standards) or, at least, a 
‘maximum harmonisation’ of European standards, in order to avoid the duplication of costs of 
compliance and create a level regulatory playing field.  Conclusion, legislation is not required, it 
would be counter-productive. The best solution is not to impose it by law but encourage a 
development that has already emerged on a voluntary basis.  
Using this argument, business managed to prevail, in the early 2000, against an rather weak 
and ill-defined ‘transparency coalition’ in the making. However, this defensive position is so 
excessive that, in my opinion, alienated many support to BusinessEurope, even among pro-business 
EU policy makers, creating the image of a narrow-minded organisation that does not provide any 
constructive contribution to the debate
222
. One EU policy-maker said: “I think is an ideological 
opposition to mandatory CSR.”223 Another EU regulator noted: “Industry is [against codifying 
CSR] because ‘no-more-burden’; ‘we-do-what-we-want’; ‘we deliver jobs: it’s good enough’; ‘let-
us-alone’! They fear ‘straight-jacketing’; ‘red-tape’; all that… I think they still would prefer ‘the 
free lunch’: that means pretending that they are doing the good thing while they are not doing 
that.”224 When Commissioner Barnier finally announced the proposal for non-financial reporting, 
the reaction has been “BusienssEurope is disappointed by the European Commission’s decision 
today to propose a legislative initiative on disclosure of non-financial information. The proposed 
regulatory approach to Corporate Social Responsibility is running the risk of demotivating all 
companies that have embarked on genuine CSR activities on their own. Instead of applying a 
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ticking-the-box approach, the business-driven purpose of CSR - to contribute to business goals by 
addressing social and environmental challenges over and above what is required by law - must be 
safeguarded.” (BusinessEurope 2013) 
According to Prof Chiara Mio it is the autonomy of managers’ control what is menaced by 
disclosure, “They fear disclosure. They say that it would create administrative burden. However, 
this is a specious argument. Material non-financial information means information that has an 
impact on the creation of long-term value. Therefore, if an enterprise is well managed, they should 
be already governing those aspects. Then either they are saying that their firms are badly managed 
and they do not have adequate mechanisms of governance – and that already is extremely worrying 
– or this is still a ‘robber barons’ approach to capitalism. It may be a bit of both.”  
 
5.5 Accountants, lawyers, and financial analysts. The architects of a new regime 
of economic governance  
Behind the battle between large social groups to reshape the governance of the economic 
field, there is a struggle between different ‘tribes’ (Dezalay 1991) of professional experts for 
transforming the field of accounting. It is in between these two levels that the new regime of 
corporate accountability is emerging. In fact, as I have argued throughout this study, the accounting 
field has developed a historically specific relation of structural homology with the economic field. 
This is the field within which occurs a confrontation over the socially recognised capacity, 
performed by professional accountants, to render activities, individuals and objects, in possession of 
the specific attributes that are potentially relevant for the economic field, capable of evaluation, 
comparison and hence transformation into economic capital. It is a major field of symbolic power 
that accountants administrate: they have been granted by the state the right to translate the ‘world’ 
into economically valuable information.  
As many early theorists of capitalism already noted (i.e. Weber and Sombart) this is one of 
the key, if not the key, tools that fostered the universalisation and globalisation of economic 
rationality and capitalism
225
 (see Chapter 2). The problem is that economic rationality has become 
so pervasive and the economic field so ubiquitous that accountants increasingly struggle to perform 
their fundamental social role. In other words, the ‘world-capitalism’ in which we currently live 
made the economic relations so veritable – and large corporations and financial structures so 
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 Accounting made it possible for capitalists to evaluate ‘rationally’ the consequences of their past 
decisions. It allowed the entrepreneur to calculate exactly the resources available and the ones that are 
expected to come in the future. It finally gave investors the information necessary to compare and assess 
various alternative investments. 
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unrestricted – that traditional accounting standards and, in particular, the traditional 
conceptualisation of capital as ‘financial’ capital, are not capable anymore to ‘translate’ the world in 
‘economic’ language.  
One of the side effects of this huge transformation has been the subject of this research: the 
emergence of a new area of accounting, corporate sustainability reporting, initially external to the 
field of mainstream accounting, but now increasingly integrated in companies’ annual reporting. 
What I am going to consider here is the manner in which accountants are managing the progressive 
emergence of non-financial disclosure and their relation with two other professional groups that are 
increasingly expanding the area of ESG reporting, therefore implicitly challenging the ‘monopoly’ 
of accountants: activist lawyers and financial analysts. Hereafter, I briefly consider the parallel 
between corporate and financial crises and crises of accounting that I have already considered in the 
previous chapter. Afterwards I address how the changing relations between the three professional 
groups are transforming the accounting field and the relation between economy and society. 
The financialisation of the global economy, which started in the US during the late 1920s, 
had a paradoxical effect on ‘financial’ accounting. There are many authors, indeed many of them 
are accountants, who would agree with the authoritative position of Robert Howell who pointed out 
on Fortune that “the big three statements – income statement, balance sheet and statement of cash 
flow – are about as useful as an 80-year-old Los Angeles road map.” (see Gazdar 2007:13) This is 
nothing really new, it has been said for years that the annual report should be remodelled (see Porter 
and Denham 1995) to consider intangible assets. However, there has been an understandable 
resistance from accountants and auditors that see their business thrown into question. It is clear that 
including intangibles and non-financials would be extremely problematic. It would require change 
in the framework of accounting that could undermine the monopoly of the accounting profession.   
During the last decade, evidence that the accounting system is fundamentally flawed became 
increasingly significant. The accounting scandals of the early 2000s (Enron and Parmalat) attracted 
the attention of regulators and seemed to start putting existing standards into question. However, the 
regulatory outcome was favourable to professional accountants. Traditional accounting was 
strengthened rather than radically transformed. Furthermore, the decision of the EU Commission 
that, starting from the year 2005, all EU listed companies had to prepare their financial statement in 
accordance with IFRS standards gave new, unprecedented autonomy and regulatory power to the 
profession (Dewing and Russell 2007). However, it was question of time, the pressure for including 
non-financial aspects was steadily growing, therefore the accounting world started to look at the 
inevitable merger with the non-financial nebula also as a business opportunity. All the Big Four 
auditing and accounting global firms – Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst & Young and PwC – created internal 
182 
 
units which were starting to gather knowledge; testing frameworks and pushing on the issue of 
sustainability reporting. In particular, in 2004, Deloitte published a ground-breaking survey 
significantly called In the Dark that revealed an astonishing 92% of the 250 corporate executives 
interrogated by them believed that financial indicators were not capturing their own strengths and 
weaknesses (Deloitte 2004). Even before the eruption of the 2008 financial crisis, there was 
evidence that accounting needed fundamental changes or it would have soon been wiped out.  
The growing acknowledgement of the relevance of ESG data appears clear looking at the 
document produced by one of the laboratories created by the European Alliance for CSR. Between 
2007 and 2009 the largest European companies and the European Federation of Financial Analysts 
(EFFAS) organised a series of workshops on “Valuing non-financial performance”. The final report 
of the workshops (CSR Europe 2010) provides striking evidence of the actual economic 
significance of ESG information and of its relation with broader changes in the dominant financial-
driven regime of capital accumulation. The report provides evidence that currently 80% of the value 
of the S&P 500 Index could not be measured in conventional accounting terms. The collective 
market value of that Index was equivalent to four times the asset value showed in the balance sheets 
of those companies, indirectly demonstrating that accounting had been the ‘victim’ of its own 
success in boosting the financialisation of the economy. Furthermore, it emerged that, during the 
last 25 years, the explanatory capacity of traditional material and financial accounting has 
constantly decreased. Annual reports used to account for 80% of the market value of a company in 
1980s but this percentage decreased to 55% in 1990 and it has been calculated that today it is below 
20% (see Ocean Tomo; Accenture 2004). Considering the value of the global stock markets at US$ 
50 trillion (March 2010), 80% represents a US$ 40 trillion gap between tangible and intangible 
assets. The report argues that this historical trend can be only partly explained by a post-industrial 
shift from manufacturing to services and the emergence of technology and knowledge-based 
industry. It maintains that “the real story is the growth of future earnings as the primary determinant 
of company market value. This is the projection of current or immediate past performances into the 
future.” But the report acknowledges that future earning streams are “by their nature, difficult to 
quantify and control. The ability to recruit and retain people with skills and knowledge to maintain 
and develop products and services and drive innovation. The loyalty of customers to brand and their 
willingness to forsake new or more innovative competitors. The continued supply of resources of 
the right quality and at the right price. The management and mitigation of risk. Reputation 
management and avoidance of regulation impingement on licence to operate.”  
The 2008 financial crisis, which exploded while this laboratory was still running, gave an 
extraordinary relevance to these data and provided financial analyst (EFFAS) with a strong 
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arguments to demand enterprises to disclose non-financial information, pushing public authorities to 
issue binding rules for ESG data disclosure. Suddenly, accountants faced the accusation of being 
amongst the responsible for the financial disaster. Accounting standards, it was claimed, were based 
on short-term value of the performance of the firm. They could not provide investors with the kind 
of long-term and intangible information that explain where economic value comes from and where 
pension funds and large asset managers could invest on a 20-30 years basis. Management guru 
Michel Porter suggested the new notion of valuing ‘shared value’, which gives an idea of how far 
accounting and accountants were demanded to transform themselves. Significantly, Porter and 
Kramer (2006) idea of shared value is based on the consideration that in the socially embedded 
capitalism in which we live, creating material social benefits and creating profits has to coincide. 
He affirms that the new mantra is not anymore ‘what is good for business is good for society’ but 
‘what is good for society is good for business’. The rationale is that we operate in such a resources-
constrained economy that social and environmental aspects cannot be anymore externalised to 
society and kept isolated from financial companies have become so large that in order to create 
economic ‘value’ they cannot avoid to get involved in ‘social and environmental’ issues. Therefore, 
according to Porter and  accounting has to move away from narrow and one-dimensional 
assessment of what is ‘material’, it needs to expand to create a more comprehensive picture of 
companies’ activities.  
However, this managerial account is still rather narrow. It overlooks the ‘political’ 
dimension of this transformation. It takes for granted that this is a private question that should be 
managed between shareholders, as the owners of the company and managers, their agents. 
However, as Prof Maclean and Crouch (2011: 2) pointed out, “Corporations and firms have been 
and continue to be exhorted to ‘behave responsibly’. Indeed, many corporations do now accept that 
they have social and environmental responsibilities that go beyond their market role(s); but for 
politics and political science, this is just the beginning of the story of what it means to accept 
corporations as political actors.” To start with markets are operating – at least in Europe – within 
democratic states, where the power belongs to the people. Then, the issue of ‘non-financial’ 
disclosure and the creation of ‘shared value’ becomes a completely different matter, one that 
concerns the ‘right to know’ about the impact of transnational corporations on society and the 
environment. Clearly, the two visions might overlap (and this is the common basis for the current 
emergence of a ‘transparency coalition’) however this is not necessarily the case. I should therefore 
introduce a new professional group that stepped into the debate: activist-lawyers. In order to 
understand the position of the different professional groups on the field and their approach, I have 
systematically analysed the available secondary sources concerning the activities of these three 
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groups of professional experts immediately after the onset of the financial crisis, until the 
2011Commission’s announcement to issue a legislative proposal on non financial reporting (Single 
Market Act I) (see Annex II). The aim of this method has been to triangulate this material with the 
interviews and the EC official documents in order “to break up the ‘officialised story’ into its many 
overlapping and even opposing texts and identify its many co-writers” (Madsen 2006: 114) This 
analysis allowed me to map changes in the field of research and unveil the existence of conflicting 
narratives that ultimately reflect the many stakes and the central conflicts that characterise the 
emergence of CSA regulation. In particular, it emerges the attempt of lawyers-activists and 
financial analysts, two professions previously external to the field of accounting, to reshape it. Each 
force is the ‘advocate’ of the different approach to mandatory non-financial disclosure. Despite 
having to concede profound changes that finally will open the door to the integration of non-
financial aspects in the accounting standards, the study shows also the ability of accounting 
profession to maintain their control. However, the game is still on. 
In order to understand the key difference between the ideas of non-financial which is 
projected by financial analysts and the one proposed by activist lawyers, one should look at the 
difference between transparency and materiality in ESG disclosure. As it emerged by the documents 
of the first EU Workshop on the disclosure ESG information (2009: 4), “Although they are not 
mutually exclusive, transparency and materiality correspond to different stakeholders with different 
constituencies and agendas, each legitimate in its own right, and they can sometimes be conflicting. 
Transparency values the disclosure of data for its own sake, sometimes as a question of principle. 
Materiality seeks to define which data is actually important in terms of influencing the decisions of 
the intended recipients of the information.” In my analysis, stressing transparency means bringing 
accounting standard-setting bodies into a universal legal domain. In other words, it is a first step 
towards the construction of a new regime of ‘corporate accountability’. On the contrary, stressing 
materiality means advocating for a futher commodification of social reality, creating a new market-
based technical standard that better captures economic value and serves to affirm the power of what 
Soederberg (2010) calls the ‘corporate-financial nexus’ over all aspects of our lives. This approach 
advocates the integration of ESG data into the annual report as the first step towards the creation of 
a global corporate regime of ‘sustainability accounting’. However, it is the role of politics and 
public authorities to find a middle ground between the two positions. It is clear that any equilibrium 
between the two principles will be the outcome of struggles about the autonomy of the economic 
field from external – social and political control. At the two extreme of the accounting ‘battlefield’ 
there are financial analysts and activists-lawyers that, for the moment, were united in demanding for 
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mandatory disclosure of ESG information but that have a radically different ideas about what 
should be the content of such reports. 
Looking at the EU-level debate on CSA regulation, some of the feature of this struggle 
already appear considering the growing role of ECCJ (activist-lawyers) and EFFAS (financial 
analysts) in the ‘sustainability accounting debate’.   
Starting from financial analysts, the key preliminary point is that financial markets in 
Europe developed slower as compared to the US. This fact influenced also the development of SRI 
and CSA. Therefore, European financial analysts only started very recently to look at non-financial 
aspects of companies’ performance. However, they have been able to develop a strong argument for 
the materiality of such information, linking it to the need for long-term growth and risk 
management in addiction to business social responsibility and environmental accountability. As one 
of the EU officials who have been working on CSR reporting in the early 2000s told me, back then 
the argument of the Commission was already that “investors need to know not just about economic 
performance but also social and environmental performance”, “they need to know that there is a risk 
or there is an opportunity”226. However, this argument was true for the UK but rather specious as 
regards all the other European countries. In fact, “Financial markets, 10 years ago, they did exist in 
the UK, and it was about it. In relative terms, even French or Germany stock markets were 
relatively small.”227 In sum, most of Europe lacked of the minimum financial infrastructures even 
for traditional large-scale financial trading: SRI was, therefore, considered as a “luxury” and a very 
small niche of the market.  
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, this has radically changed during the 2000s 
and the financial crisis provided a window of opportunity for further expand this expansion. It is 
perhaps because of this challenge of the financial sector in establishing itself in Continental 
European countries traditionally dominated by large banks and stakeholder capitalism that most of 
financial analysts’ initiatives on ESG reporting came from Germany (DVFA).  
On December 2008, financial analysts stepped in the European debate on non-financial 
reporting, when the DVFA, the German Society of Investment Professionals, designed a set of KPIs 
for ESG disclosure. This is a set of indicators applicable to any individual company, ensuring 
materiality by limiting the number of indicators
228
. The KPIs were soon endorsed by EFFAS and 
proposed, at the EU level, as the first major framework for ESG reporting tailored to the needs of 
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investors and not designed thinking about the companies that are issuing the report.
 229
 This 
potentially set EFFAS in competition with both accountants and the big players in the sustainability 
reporting area – such as the GRI, CDP and ISO 26000.  
On September 2009, EFFAS held its second Conference on ESG disclosure significantly 
titled ‘ESG Mainstreaming: Looking for something that has already found us?’ One of the most 
intriguing arguments that emerge from the Conference is that, after years looking for evidence of 
the relevance of ESG information, following the crisis, this became so universally evident that there 
was suddenly no need for more proofs. “Demanding proof for the effects of good ESG performance 
on the bottom line of corporates has been a volkssport in capital markets for many years. Many of 
us have been eager to produce this sort of proof. Taking ESG into Account 2009 goes one step 
further: we simply assume (or for agnostics: pretend) that a corporate managing, measuring and 
disclosing ESG is the default. And we likewise simply presuppose that taking risk factors (and thus 
accordingly ESG factors) into account is the default for recognizing fiduciary duties in making asset 
management decisions, and consequently the default of an industry delivering service for asset 
managers.”230  
Drawing on Bourdieu, this belief and presumption appears as the necessary foundation for a 
new ‘illusio’, a new vision of the economic field through the field of accounting, able to overcome 
the traditional divide ‘financial/non-financial’. It seems to confirm Bourdieu’s sociological 
approach that capital is a relational concept that is socially and historically created on the basis of 
categories and categorizations and, particularly, by struggles for imposing certain categories instead 
of others. The key argument of financial analysts is that more non-financial disclosure is critical but 
complete transparency may be counterproductive, it might result in too much data and irrelevant 
information. Disclosure must be ‘material’ and it is on the definition of what is material that the 
exercise of symbolic violence is taking place. The materiality, in fact, is not objectively but 
subjectively determined. It is the answer to the most important question of all, the one that is 
usually taken for granted, to whom the information should be material? Should they include 
stakeholder groups such as employees, governments, local communities, NGOs or only 
shareholders?  
However EFFAS soon decided not to continue developing its own standard but to join a 
global alliance of all the economic stakeholders interested in developing a framework for integrated 
reporting. In fact, in December 2009, a meeting was held in London hosted by The Prince of Wales’ 
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organisation Accounting for Sustainability Project (A4S), to which intervened some of the key 
financial and non-financial standard-setting organisations. The ambitious plan was to establish what 
was still called an International Connected Reporting Committee, the first embryo of the future 
International Integrated Reporting Council
231
 (see Annex I). The latter is possibly – although it is 
too early to make any conclusion – the body which is going to write the first widely accepted 
standard for accounting which integrates financial and non-financial information. The European 
Parliament has recently voted to support the objective of the IIRC “of making ‘integrating report’ 
the global norm within a decade” (European Parliament 2013: 6).  
On the other hand of the ‘battlefield’ for shaping sustainability accounting, one could find 
the lawyers that have been assisting the platform of European NGOs successfully supporting the 
inclusion of human rights and anti-bribery and corruption policies in the requirements of EU 
Accounting Law. One might be surprise about ECCJ’s (European Coalition for Corporate Justice) 
amount of policy proposals and their quality, considering its tiny office in Rue d’Edimburg, not far 
from the European Parliament in Brussels, where they can barely fit the four members of its staff. 
CSR Europe alone can count on, at least, 25 staff members
232. Their ‘secret’ has been that, despite 
the very limited economic resources, they can count on a competitive level of social, human and, 
especially, legal resources. As Vaclav Havel said, this is the ‘power of the powerless’. The 
‘weapons’ of this organisation are legal and the network is filled with lawyers specialized in human 
rights and environmental law. The whole strategy of ECCJ can be summarized in re-radicalising 
CSR bringing it into a universal legal domain. This aim can be easily recognized looking at the 
name of its campaign ‘right for people, rules for business’233 and by considering the three broad 
chapters in which it has been organised: “better access to justice”; “direct liabilities of directors and 
companies in Europe”; and “mandatory transparency and disclosure”.  
As it emerged from my interviews, ECCJ provided important resources and relevant 
information to the Commission’s services, in particular, contact with the main academics in the 
field
234
. This was possible thanks to the legal and academic resources that are provided by its 
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network. “We are a coalition using the strengths of our member. For instance, our Czech member 
[ELS
235
] is an environmental law service, it is an organisation composed of 30 lawyers. So, 
basically, the legal proposal has been developed by them.” Furthermore “we have as a member 
FIDH, the International Federation of Human Rights
236
. Other proposals have been developed by 
the French platform called Sherpa
237, which is a lawyers’ organisation.”238 During my research I 
carefully reconstructed the actors’ role in the CSA regulatory debate at the EU-level and it emerged 
a key role of ECCJ in pushing for a legal approach to corporate accountability, framing it within a 
legal structure of human rights protection and directors’ liabilities. “Information is essential to 
uphold human rights because it helps to prevent abuses, hold companies to account and seek 
remedies. ‘Abuses always happen in the dark’. Disclosure can also prevent abuses by enhancing the 
participation of people whose rights might be affected. The right to know is also a human right. 
Courts need information in order to function, and in this way ESG disclosure is linked to provision 
of remedies.” (EC ESG Workshop 3: 2 ‘Civil society view on ESG disclosure’) They are perhaps 
the group of actors recurring more to a legal argumentation and rationale (SOMO 2013; CORE 
2011). The aim, in my opinion, is to use the symbolic power of law to re-construct the dominant 
vision of the field of corporate accountability, which has been organised around the division 
between financial and non-financial capital. However, as the result, NGOs are entering in a field 
that is not merely legal and which is the territory of accounting profession, with whom ECCJ did 
not have any relations
239
.  
One intriguing aspect is that NGOs and financial accounting have been traditionally distant 
social universes and mindsets. However, after the financial crisis, they increasingly became, 
perhaps for the first time, much closer because of the issue of ESG reporting. As Yolaine Delaygues 
(ECCJ) noted, DG MARKT had “to introduce non-financial reporting/corporate accountability into 
something that is pure accounting.”240 The polycentric and dynamic organisational structure and the 
‘patrimony’ of intangible human and legal capital allow ECCJ to be ready if a “political 
opportunity” for a new regulation in a certain area of EU Law arises. This has been the result of a 
re-thinking in their strategy from one that demanded “one directive gathering all this” to a more 
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 http://en.eps.cz/ In particular, the key legal expert that actively participated in the EU meeting on non-
financial reporting is Filip Gregor, the Head of the Responsible Companies Division. 
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 http://www.fidh.org/-FIDH-s-Role- The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) is a non-
governmental federation for human rights organizations. Founded in 1922, FIDH is the oldest 
international human rights organisation worldwide and today brings together 164 member organisations in 
over 100 countries. 
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 http://www.asso-sherpa.org/association/organisation The website is mostly in French. 
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 Interview # 12 (17.06.2011) with Yolaine Delaygues (ECCJ) 
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 Ibid. 
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 Interview # 12 (17.06.2011) 
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flexible approach that size windows of legislative opportunities
241
. This capacity appears very 
clearly in ECCJ readiness to engage with the Commission after the financial crisis on issues on non-
financial reporting and transparency on which was starting to emerge a certain regulatory 
momentum (see Annex II). 
Professional accountants have been able to place themselves right at the centre of the 
scene. The Federation of European Accountants (FEE), soon after the onset of the financial crisis, 
issued (December 2008) a discussion paper on ‘Sustainability Information in annual reports – 
Building on the Modernisation Directive’. An analysis of the document shows that it was aimed to 
send out three messages. First of all, that sustainability reporting was a matter of accounting 
standards and EU Accounting Law, as this requirement had been already introduced by the 2003 
Modernisation Directive and implemented by all EU Member States. Secondly, despite the message 
might look similar to ECCJ – the need for strengthen the existing Accounting Law requirements – 
the request was for ‘guidance’ from public authorities, not yet regulation, on this issue and it 
mentioned the existence of international accounting standards (IAS) which were already able to 
address the problem. Thirdly, as regards the content, references to the environment and human 
rights are almost accidental, while the key problem is identified in the lack of ‘materiality’ and 
‘relevance’ of existing sustainability reporting. 242 Crucially, while ECCJ reference were on the 
‘right to know’, the FEE stresses that non-financial is aimed to meet the growing demand of 
shareholders and investors.  
On 29 April 2009 FEE together with EUROSIF organised a successful roundtable hosted by 
the European Parliament, which was later used as a model by DG ENTR for the EU Workshops on 
ESG disclosure that the Commission hosted between 2009 and 2010. After the Conference the two 
organisation released a joint ‘call for action’, “In the current climate of financial and economic 
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 For instance on the reform of Brussels I regulation on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of 
judgements on civil and commercial matters. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/index_en.htm 
242
 The document can be retrieved at the following link. Here there is a short simple, the emphasis has been 
added to highlight the use of a language that is not legal but it come from the accounting tradition: “In 
identifying the type of non-financial information, in particular on sustainability, that can be included in the 
annual report the concepts of relevance and materiality play an important role. Materiality is considered in 
the context of the other qualitative characteristics of information, especially relevance and faithful 
representation. Materiality judgements are made in the context of the nature and the amount of an item, as 
well as the entity’s situation. Materiality has a different connotation in a sustainability and financial reporting 
context. For sustainability information to be included in annual reports additional guidance would be helpful 
in deciding what constitutes relevant information and how to select any performance indicators, especially 
when an increasing number of entities combine their sustainability information with their financial 
information. FEE therefore welcomes further guidance on including sustainability information in the annual 
report. Exchange of good practice can play an important role. Guidance that has already been developed 
within some European countries can be a basis for further guidance, both at national and European level. 
http://www.fee.be/images/publications/sustainability/DP_Sustainability_Information_in_Annual_Reports_08
125122008561444.pdf 
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crisis, FEE and Eurosif wish to raise the strategic importance of sustainability disclosures in order 
to provide financial information in a more comprehensive and meaningful way. Greater 
transparency can play a role in helping to restore trust in business.” (FEE/EUROSIF 2009)  
At the global level, the publication, on December 2010, of the IFRS “Practice statement on 
management commentaries”, was widely seen as the confirm that IASB would have thrown its 
weight to support the IIRC initiative proposed by investors and financial analysts, under the 
auspices of the British Crown and the Prince of Wales Foundation.  
In 2011, financial analysts and accountants gathered all the private financial and non-
financial standard-setters into the IIRC, with the aim of “developing an International Integrated 
Reporting Framework that facilitate the development of reporting over the coming decades. The 
objective of the Framework is to guide organisations on communicating the broad set of 
information needed by investors and other stakeholders to assess the organisation’s long-term 
prospect in a clear, concise, connected and comparable format.” (IIRC 2011: 8) Paul Druckman, 
former Chairman of the FEE Sustainability Policy Group and the ‘architect’ who worked to bring 
together all economic stakeholders became the CEO of the IIRC. As we mentioned above, the 
initiative is truly impressive as it has been able to include: some of the largest companies, the GRI, 
the accounting profession, investors, standard-setting bodies, policy‐makers, regulators, assurance 
providers and academics. However, it significantly excludes – or includes only marginally – all the 
social stakeholders, NGOs, trade unions, consumers, etc. This fact might look surprising 
considering that for many years the model has been the GRI – based on an inclusive stakeholder 
approach to corporate sustainability reporting which was composed of both social and economic 
stakeholders. However, in my opinion, this is the sign that the sustainability reporting movement 
has become more mature and mainstream, or mainstream enough, to allow already an internal 
dialectic between the two instances of transparency and materiality. It seems that we are moving 
towards a clearer and articulated global regime of corporate accountability. 
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6. Conclusions: Beyond Transparency 
 
Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.  
William Bruce Cameron, Informal Sociology. A Casual Introduction to Sociological 
Thinking, 1963. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The study has explored the issue of the struggles for regulating the corporate practice of 
sustainability accounting (CSA) in Europe, as a lens for analysing broader changes in the field of 
corporate governance regulation (CGR); corporate sustainability and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).  
At the most general level, the key element that defines this study, and what most clearly 
differentiates this work from the burgeoning literature on ‘business regulation and corporate social 
accountability’, is that it takes CSA regulation as its main explanandum, without taking it for 
granted, as an independent variable – as it is the case in many managerial and law-and-economics 
studies – but equally differing from those studies that – stressing the role of agency and politics – 
tend to treat law as a dependent variable, the mere outcome of power relations and conflicts. The 
study applies a Bourdieusian approach to Sociology of Law, placing this analysis in between these 
two extremes. Law, its institutions and agents are seen in a broader context of interrelations with 
other social fields and social forces; nonetheless, attributing a historically specific position and 
relative autonomy to this field (see Chapter 2). This is an important point, because it helped me to 
focus on how the relation between law and accountancy has changed over time. The starting point 
of my analysis has been the striking recognition that financial and non-financial accounting are 
conventionally treated as completely isolated from each other, as different realities that have, in 
practice, little or none contacts. The academic debates are separated; the standards are different and 
they are crucially treated as separated by law-makers that considered the former as a matter of 
company law and corporate governance and the latter as a voluntary practice that should be left to 
the willingness of managers to take extra-financial aspects of corporate performance into 
consideration. This distinction is widely taken for granted and seen as ‘natural’. However, I have 
argued, this is a historically constructed and arbitrary division that has been socially accepted and 
taken for granted but that actually hides a form of unconscious imposition – what Bourdieu calls 
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symbolic violence – that excludes from the annual report all the information that are not strictly 
relevant to shareholders and investors. Therefore, it has played a crucial role in empowering them 
vis à vis other stakeholders and in strengthening their interests and control over corporate resources 
and activities (see Chapter 3). Seen that way, the ‘natural’ exclusion of non-financial information is 
closely related to questions of corporate governance regulation: Who controls the modern 
corporation, how is it ‘governed’ and for what purpose? The objective of the study has been to re-
assess how CSA regulation has been socially constructed over time in relation with broader changes 
in the regulation of European accounting and corporate governance.  
This attempt to ‘objectivise the research object’, “establishing the object of enquiry beyond 
these stakes and interests, yet in a way that allows them to be taken seriously as part of the object of 
enquiry [...]” (Dezelay and Madsen 2012: 437) is necessary to fully understand recent changes in 
accounting regulation. In fact, during the last decade, this distinction has been increasingly 
challenged. Social and political pressures have arisen for introducing mandatory social and 
environmental disclosure (see Annex I). Several European Member States and the European Union 
have introduced some requirements for disclosing environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
information. At the same time, the number of companies voluntarily disclosing non-financial 
information has multiply each year and CSA disclosure had become ‘the norm’ amongst large 
companies (KPMG 2008). Private and hybrid regulatory frameworks for sustainability reporting 
have been successfully launched – such as the GRI, CDP, UN Global Compact – and several stock 
exchanges around the globe have introduced some forms of disclosure requirements. In 2011, all the 
major financial and non-financial accounting standard-setting bodies have joined forces with large 
investment funds in creating the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). This 
transnational private entity, strongly supported by the EU and some European countries, has the 
ambition to create a worldwide standard for accounting that integrates both financial and non-
financial disclosure. Finally, in April 2013, the EU Commission has adopted a much anticipated 
legislative proposal for a directive enhancing the transparency of certain large companies on social 
and environmental matters
243
. It concerns all companies having more than 500 employees that will 
need to disclose information on policies, risks and results as regards environmental matters, social 
and employee-related aspects, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and 
diversity on the boards of directors. The main question that this study has addressed, therefore, has 
been:  
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 The proposal amends the Fourth and Seventh Accounting Directives on Annual and Consolidated 
Accounts, 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, respectively. Its objective is to increase EU companies’ 
transparency and performance on environmental and social matters, and, therefore, to contribute effectively 
to long-term economic growth and employment. 
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What explains the emergence of Corporate Sustainability Accounting (CSA) within the EU 
regulatory arena, at different levels of regulation and through varying modes of governance? 
  The broad research framework deployed by the study to investigate this subject area has 
been based on a Bourdieusian reflexive socio-legal approach. More specifically, it has benefited 
from Prof. Mikael Rask Madsen’s outline of a reflexive sociology of the internationalization of law 
and attempted to further develop it (Bourdieu 1986; Madsen and Dezalay 2002; Madsen 2006; 
Madsen 2011). Although this ‘reflexive’ approach does not provide ‘ready-made’ solutions, it 
supplies a set of open-ended ‘analytical tools’ (nomos; habitus; field; capitals; symbolic power; 
symbolic violence; illusio; etc) that I have used as an over-arching research strategy in conjunction 
with existing studies of Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR); Corporate Sustainability and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (in particular Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Crouch 2006, 
2009 and 2011; Graz 2006; Streeck 2011; Paterson 2009; Koch 2011)
244
. Although, given the 
novelty of this development, the nature of this study was necessarily exploratory, its ultimate goal 
has been explanatory as regards regulatory changes over time. I sought in particular to originally 
contribute to the debate offering a socio-legal contribution which attempts to integrate the two 
parallel universes of corporate governance regulation (CGR) and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) studies. In order to do so, I have designed a reflexive sociological research strategy based on 
the method of ‘double historicisation’ of both the research object – the regulation of CSA in Europe 
– and the academic construction of this object – integrating the parallel fields of financial disclosure 
(CGR) and non-financial disclosure (corporate social accountability) (Chapter 3). This reflexive 
approach allowed me to reveal the relation between changes in accounting regulation and in the 
economic field (CGR), therefore contextualising the cyclical emergence of non-financial reporting 
regulation.  
This research has been based on three main sources of data: documents analysis; literature 
review; in depth interviews (26) with key informants. It has also been strengthened by a participant 
observation of 5 months at the EU Commission collaborating to the legal drafting and Impact 
Assessment of the new EU directive
245
 (see sections 2.6 and 4.1). As explained in section 2.6, the 
criteria for designing the fieldwork have been based on the idea of mapping the position of the six 
groups of actors interested in shaping the emergence of CSA regulation in the European arena. The 
groups of actors that I have considered are: managers of large corporations; organised labour and 
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 This is consistent with Bourdieu’s own idea that his contribution should not been perceived as a ‘grand 
sociological theory’ but adapted, modified and practically employed for empirical sociological enquires. 
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 As regards the participant observation, for technical reasons, the actual impact of this experience on the 
Thesis has been limited. In fact the proposal has been published too late to be included in this work (the 16
th
 
of April 2013) and the empirical research had to be limited up to 2011. However, as I have already 
discussed, this experience has enriched the analysis and my understanding of the field of research. 
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trade unions (TUs); civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); institutional 
investors; public authorities; and professional experts (accountants; financial analysts; lawyers). 
The literature review has been used, in particular to provide the macro-level of analysis and 
examine the academic construction of the research object. The documents’ analysis and regulatory 
review have been useful to prepare and validate the interviews and to analyse the chronological 
emergence and social construction of CSA regulation. Chapter 1 contains a preliminary 
conceptualisation of the field of research and the research questions. Chapter 2 has been focused on 
the critical review of the literature and of existing explanations of the emergence of CSA regulation. 
Furthermore, it presents the socio-legal reflexive methodological and epistemological approach that 
has been adopted to explain the emergence of this new multi-level regulatory framework. A 
summary of the long-term development of non-financial reporting during over four decades has 
been provided in Chapter 3 while Chapters 4 and 5 narrowed down the empirical research, focusing 
on a more limited periodisation (mid-1990s to 2011) and on the case study of the struggles for 
shaping a EU-level regulatory framework for non-financial reporting. The aim of Chapter 4 and 5 
has been to empirically strengthen the broader analysis outlined in Chapter 3, on the basis of the 
data collected during the fieldwork.  
 
6.2 Research findings: The changing content and mode of European CSA 
regulation 
Chapters 3 and 4 have been dedicated to assess the social and historical construction of 
European non-financial reporting (NFR) regulation over time. In practice, the study has addressed 
in a unitary analysis the parallel stories of financial and non-financial reporting regulation in 
Europe. It broadly identified four periods in this development and it has shown that the distinction 
between financial and non-financial, rather than a ‘matter of fact’, has to be located in a precise 
historical and social context, at the end of the 1970s, which marked an identical process of 
autonomisation and internationalisation of the economic field and of the accounting field.  
Linking the historical development of NFR regulation with broader changes in the academic 
and regulatory debate on corporate governance, Chapter 3 reveals a robust relation between them. 
The analysis showed that the emergence over time of a distinction between financial/non-financial 
has corresponded with the key turning points in what the corporate governance literature calls 
changes in the regimes of capital accumulation. Here I briefly consider this periodisation and the 
key argument:  
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A) The first shift took place in the 1980s and coincided with the emergence in 
the US and the UK of ‘fiduciary capitalism’ and of a new theory of corporate governance 
stressing shareholder primacy and fiduciary duties. At that time, accounting standards were 
underdeveloped. Only the US and UK, due to their reliance on stock markets, had developed 
them and were considered as the benchmark in this area of regulation. This phase marked 
the abandonment of the European regulatory debate about ‘social accounting’ and the 
alignment of national and EU laws to the international trend towards financial-only 
reporting. During the 1980s and 1990s accounting became only a matter of financial 
disclosure and the accounting profession started to develop private financial accounting 
standards aimed to create one accounting standard globally recognised (IFRS).  
B) The second major shift took place at the end of the 1990s, when we are 
witnessing the emergence a first nucleus of global extra-legal norms, guidelines and 
frameworks for reporting extra-financial information. During the same period the EU 
decided to foster the global harmonisation of financial accounting rules adopting (from 
2005) the privately developed standards (IFRS) created by the accounting profession. 
Looking at broader changes in corporate governance, I have argued that this development 
coincided with the exhaustion of the European ‘corporatist compromise’ between labour and 
capital. Corporate governance reforms that strengthen fiduciary duties and minority 
shareholder rights were introduced also in Europe, contributing to a shift from a ‘productive’ 
concept of control to a ‘money’ concept of control. Colin Crouch (2011) recently called this 
phase ‘Privatised Keynesianism’ because the role of the State to ensure full employment and 
welfare was privatised and individual and firms were offered unprecedented access to debt, 
further expanding the financialisation of the economy.  
C) Finally, the third turning point that I have identified took place in 2008, when 
‘Privatised Keynesianism’ was overturned by the global financial crisis. The crisis was 
preceded by smaller financial shocks (national and regional financial crises and corporate 
scandals). The crisis worked as a major catalyst for changes. It showed that the dominant 
model of economic governance is fundamentally flawed and, as regards the field of 
accounting, is leading to a complex process of 1. integration of financial and extra-financial 
information. 2. inclusion of extra-legal NFR in Company Law.  
 
Rather than linear and progressive, as it has been conventionally pictured, Chapter 3 showed 
that the development of non-financial accounting regulation has been cyclical and recursive: the 
regulatory debate was more developed in the 1970s than in the 1990s and it finally re-emerged only 
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in the 2000s. Furthermore, the research process of ‘double historicisation’ revealed that both 
financials and non-financials are related with changes in corporate governance and capital 
accumulation, in that sense they are not mutually exclusive. The mix of financial/non-financial is 
not given, it depends from struggles amongst different groups of actors claiming a socially accepted 
definition of what has ‘value’ in an ever changing economic field. In particular, this is a function 
that public authorities have gradually left to professional accountants. The study suggests that 
considering financial/non-financial together might be helpful in strengthening corporate governance 
both as a body of knowledge and as a regulatory framework. The search for sustainable 
development would require a more balanced approach to accounting regulation.  
Chapter 4 and 5 narrowed down this broad field of research to scale, focusing on the 
empirical analysis of the EU regulatory debate on non-financial reporting regulation. The fieldwork 
allowed me to collect more data on the turning points of the late 1990s and 2008. Similarly to the 
previous chapter, the aim of this section has been to map the emerging field of European CSA 
regulation and to challenge the conventional wisdom that picture non-financial reporting in isolation 
from CGR debates. However, while Chapter 3 was more focused on long-term changes in the 
structure and content of NFR, this chapter has attempted to better understand the conflicts and 
struggles that have shaped those changes. Therefore, it has mapped out the position of the six main 
groups of actors mentioned above in the construction of the field of CSA regulation, from the mid-
1990s until 2011.  
Chapter 5 has empirically confirmed that the debate on CSA regulation in Europe is strongly 
related with the turning points identified in Chapter 3. Drawing on Gourevitch and Shinn’s (2005) 
analysis of corporate governance coalitions, I have argued that CSR policies in Europe represented 
a political response, supported by EU and national public authorities, to overcome the crisis of the 
‘corporatist coalition’ between labour and capital, which had dominated European industrial 
relations until the mid-1990s. Starting from the Delors’ Commission and more intensely after the 
launch of the Lisbon Agenda, the EU intended to build a new regime of meta-regulation of 
corporate governance, based on greater transparency and accountability of large undertakings. In 
fact, I have argued that, in the late 1990s, European managers and blockholders progressively 
abandoned the ‘corporatist compromise’ with trade unions that had emerged all over Europe after 
the WWII, exploiting the possibilities of expanded globalising markets. This freedom, however, 
was soon challenged by the emergence of a ‘transparency coalition’ led by large institutional 
investors, NGOs and part of the trade unions. In my interviews and in the empirical study I found 
evidence of the emergence of this ‘objective convergence’ of interest amongst the three groups of 
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actors to limit managers’ power and to obtain more corporate transparency and accountability. It 
also emerges the fierce opposition of managers to mandatory non-financial disclosure.  
I have argued that both corporate governance reforms and corporate non-financial disclosure 
of the 2000s have been driven by this new coalition, although, managers were able to temporarily 
halt the latter, claiming that this practice was “over and above the law”. The 2008 financial crisis 
has further shifted the debate. This new phase has seen a regulatory competition amongst different 
private standards-setters for re-defining financial and non-financial reporting boundaries. However, 
it also gave a more prominent regulatory role to public authorities to ‘interfere’ in the semi-
autonomous governance of the economic field. We are witnessing a stronger activism of the state in 
its regulatory role, expanding market regulation beyond transparency in new areas such as 
sustainable public procurement; green investments; social business. Although this expansion has 
been moderated by still powerful ‘law-and-economic’ approaches to corporate governance and 
company law. The specific variety that CSA regulation will take in Europe, therefore, is still 
uncertain and under construction. It will depend from the crucial role of public authorities and law-
makers in bringing standard-setting bodies into a universal legal domain. It will also depend from 
the success of accountants, auditors and financial analysts that are working on a globally 
recognised, market-based, private standard for ‘integrated reporting’. Possibly, the new corporate 
governance regime will emerge from the growing tension between those two poles of ‘economic 
accounting’ and ‘corporate accountability’ (McBarnet 2007; Picciotto 2011; Streeck 2011). 
 
6.3 The analysis in brief: Law, accounting and corporate control 
What explains changes in the regulation of CSA? What accounts for the symmetric 
development of economic crises and the turning points in non-financial accounting regulation? How 
it can be justified the arbitrary distinction between financial and non-financial accounting and its 
current overcoming? Finally, what explains the long exclusion of extra-financials as extra-legal and 
its current integration in Company Law and accounting standards? 
In the socio-legal analysis of the research findings, I have relied on many of the ‘analytical 
tools’ developed by Pierre Bourdieu in its outline of a theory of practice. I have tried to summarise 
here the three key tentative analytical arguments that I have outlined and developed during the 
Thesis. 1. The field of accounting has developed a historically specific relation of structural 
homology with the economic field. 2. Internationally recognised financial accounting standards 
contributed to create a universally accepted definition of the economic value and capital. This 
greatly contributed to make economic rationality and the economic field ubiquitous (symbolic 
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violence) and at the same time invisible (illusio). 3. Because of this enormous expansion of the 
economic field and of the concept of economic capital, the division between financial and non-
financial, the nomos of the accounting field, has become increasingly inadequate and had to be 
broadened to include non-financial information. 
Starting from the first point, my explanation of the parallel development of the accounting 
field and the economic field, which emerged from the ‘double historicisation’ analysis presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 can be explained assuming that the field of accounting practices has developed a 
historically specific relation with the economic field: there is structural homology between the two 
fields. That means, in Bourdieu’s terms, that there has been an identical structuration of two social 
spaces over time producing specific effects that he notably called ‘imposture légitime’, legitimate 
imposture. More specifically, this structuration marked an identical process of autonomisation and 
internationalisation of the economic field and the accounting field, starting from the 1970s. The four 
phases in this development of CSA in Europe, identified by the study, show this relation of 
homology. In the 1970s in Europe there used to be a lively regulatory debate about ‘social 
accounting’ at the same time the economy was dominated by ideas of industrial democracy and by 
industrial relations based on the ‘social bargain’ between capital and labour. Starting from the 
1980s, as the result of markets’ globalisation, the economic sphere became increasingly 
autonomous from social and political control. A symmetrical development interested the accounting 
field: financial accounting standards were progressively privatised and internationally harmonised, 
accounting became a transnational, semi-autonomous, field of practice. Starting from the late 1990s, 
however, the seemingly inexorable growth of financial markets showed its limits. Financial crises 
and corporate scandals undermined public trust in both accounting and financial capitalism. The 
crises of financial accounting led to a renewed attention towards non-financial aspects that exploded 
after the 2008 financial crisis made clear that the autonomy of the economic field was thrown into 
question. Once again, we can see a symmetric development of the accounting and the economic 
field in the current emergence of mandatory sustainability reporting and growing debates about a 
more ‘long-term’; ‘green’; ‘sustainable’ economy. The first element of analysis, therefore, that I 
have highlighted is the question of CSA regulation being closely related with changes in the model 
of capital accumulation (from ‘Fordism’ to ‘financial capitalism’ to ‘sustainable capitalism’). 
Therefore, the developments of financial and non-financial disclosure, far from being isolated, are 
actually intertwined. However, this is still a rather descriptive analysis which has been broadened 
using Bourdieu’s ‘thinking tools’ in conjunction with the literature.  
The second analytical point, in fact, further inquires this historically specific relation of 
structural homology between the accounting fields and the economic fields. I have maintained – 
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supported by a strand of critical accounting studies (such as Burchell et al. 1980; Hopwood 1983; 
Hines 1988; Miller 1994) – that the conventional wisdom that pictures accounting as a decision-
making aid, a technical device which reflects changes in the economy, is rather misleading. The 
homology between accounting and the economic field should be understood in a much more 
dialectic way: not as the economy changing accounting but, on the contrary, as the accounting 
contributing to define what economic rationality is and what has ‘value’. This approach reveals the 
special ‘symbolic power’ of accounting, performed by professional accountants, often invisible 
because taken for granted. This professional group has the socially recognised capacity to render 
activities, individuals and objects, in possession of the specific attributes that are potentially 
relevant for the economic field, capable of evaluation, comparison and hence transformation into 
economic capital (see Miller 1994). The very distinction between financial and non-financial, 
written in accounting standards and enforced by law, imposes a ‘vision of the world’. This appears 
clear from the historical analysis presented above of the distinction financial/non-financial. The 
very concept of shareholder value maximisation, which has been key in structuring contemporary 
corporate governance, driving economic financialisation and corporate globalisation, presupposes 
the distinction between financial/non-financial set by financial accounting standards.  
The summary historical analysis of the development of the accounting field in Europe 
(Chapter 3) suggested that European law-makers, with the aim of achieving a greater markets’ 
harmonisation and following the example of the US and the UK, gradually granted the accounting 
profession an exceptional level of autonomy to exert this symbolic power. While this happened on 
the basis of accountants’ higher technical expertise, they overlooked the political and social impact 
of this ‘disinvestiture’ of regulatory sovereignty and symbolic power. This is what I have called the 
‘law-and-economics’ habitus of EU regulators (Chapter 5), the acceptance of the autonomy of the 
economy from legal and political control. Given this relation of homology, the division 
financial/non-financial became the basis for excluding anything that was non-financial from 
corporate governance and from the legitimate concerns of managers. The increasingly autonomous 
and international accounting and economic fields have based their growth on this nomos, this 
principle of vision and di-vision, this ‘law’, which defined what ‘good’ business is and what is not: 
the distinction financial/non-financial. This distinction has been consecrated by the legal field 
affirming that financial is mandatory and non-financial is voluntary. Therefore, the current revision 
of accounting law to include non-financial aspects should not be easily dismissed, as most of the 
literature does, as a ‘legitimising’ move, I have contended that it concerns a profound change in the 
process of economic capital accumulation (see Chapter 3). Although, this shift does not means a 
necessary move towards sustainable capitalism either. I maintain that sustainability reporting 
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regulation will come from tensions and conflicts: it is not simply ‘an idea whose time has come’. 
This leads me to the third point that concerns accumulation of capital in a “world-capitalism” 
regime (Shamir 2011). 
Finally, a third key analytical argument that emerged from the research process concerns 
profound changes in the accumulation of capital and creation of value. This is a fascinating aspect 
that is however still little understood and developed. Drawing on Bourdieu, my starting point has 
been that economic capital is only one form of capital, although one of the most important, it is a 
social power that is determined by what has value in the economic field (see Chapter 2). However 
the globalisation of the economy, fostered by accounting transformative power, created a “world 
capitalism”. As Colin Crouch (2006) pointed out, there is no such a thing as ‘global polity’ or a 
‘global society’ but there is something very close to a global economy. Therefore, the economic 
field has become so ubiquitous and autonomous from external (political, social, religious, etc.) 
control that economic rationality is universally and pervasively applied and economic capital has 
become synonymous, even in the common sense, with capital tout court. We increasingly tend to 
think in economic terms and act on the basis of economic rationality. However, as Bourdieu (1997) 
explained, this is a ‘well founded illusio’ and the homo oeconomicus, actually is an ‘economic 
habitus’. As regards accounting, I developed the argument that, paradoxically, this ubiquity and 
pervasivity of economic life has made the task of professional accountants to finding the difference 
between financial/non-financial an impossible venture (see Chapter 3). As emerged from recent 
researches, a striking 80% of the market value of large listed companies cannot be explained by 
traditional accounting standards. This percentage has steadily risen during the last 30 years, during 
the period of markets globalisation and financialisation. Obviously this has been a strong argument 
for investors to join NGOs and trade unions in demanding for mandatory non-financial disclosure 
and integrating reporting. However, it shows also the ‘symbolic violence’ of economic 
financialisation that today presents itself both as ‘the problem’ and ‘the solution’ (see Chapter 5). 
The fieldwork showed that this loss of trust in the capacity of financial reports to explain value 
creation is reshaping the whole economic field and the relation amongst the actors. It represented 
for accountants and auditors a major challenge as they have to ‘change their game’ and broaden 
their view of what value is. Financial analysts and lawyers are competing with them for the 
monopoly of this crucial symbolic power. This process is also closely interesting giant corporations, 
that are looking for new ways to manage their ‘value’ creation chain and large investors, that have  
claim the role of ‘universal owners’ that control entire sections of the world economy, overseeing 
political stability and macro-economic performances. This is still a global regulatory field in the 
making and it is still difficult to understand how it will evolve. A vague idea of what this major 
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change means is emerging from the first draft of the IIRC reporting framework, which is working 
on a new standard for integrated financial and non-financial reporting (see Chapter 3). The IIRC 
(2011; 2013) identified six types of capitals – including ‘social’; ‘human’ and ‘intellectual’ 
‘environmental capital’ – that will replace traditional ‘financial capital’. The document presents 
striking similarities with Bourdieu’s idea of capital(s): the latter are defined by IIRC as “social 
relations”. As I have pointed out, recognising the ‘value’ of non-financial is only the starting point 
of the discussion, the real questions will concern how this value creation is ‘governed’ and whether 
it is disclosed only for shareholders’ needs or for the ‘right to know’ about business impact on 
society and the environment. It is a problem of governance that, as it emerged from this study 
(Chapter 3), was already discussed in the 1930s and 1970s: every time that the economy goes 
through a major crisis. I share Colin Crouch argument that large corporations have become so 
powerful that they are not ‘market actors’ anymore and cannot avoid political attention (Crouch 
2006: 1538). In my opinion, the IIRC project is encouraging, however it is too narrowly focused on 
investors’ needs and the standardisation process is privately held and controlled by professionals. 
This suggests a vision world in which everything is subsumed to economic rationality and to the 
judgement of investors and shareholders: it is a too narrow and unsatisfactory way of structuring the 
sustainability reporting debates. As noted by Mitchell and Sikka: “Corporations dominate all 
aspects of our lives. Their power affects the quality of life, food, water, gas, electricity, seas, rivers, 
environment, schools, hospitals, medicine, news, entertainment, transports, communications and 
even the lives of unborn babies… Unaccountable corporate power is damaging the fabric of society, 
the structure of families, the quality of life and even the very future of the planet.” (2005: 2).  
Certainly, the question of what is non-financial is still open and more problematic than ever. 
In a ‘world-capitalism’, nothing is external to the economic field: everything is (potentially) 
financially relevant. In this sense, not surprisingly, after several decades of debates non-financial 
information is still ill-defined. However, I would conclude that non-financial could also be 
understood and defined in a different way. It invites to search within the economy for different 
normative grounds: political, religious, human, artistic, natural, democratic values. This is a form of 
reasonable ‘positive deviance’ (Parker 2010) against the nomos ‘business is just business’, to re-
affirm that business is also social and social relations are valuable per se. 
 
6.4 Limitations and research perspectives 
The study has attempted to explore the field of European CSA regulation and explain its 
emergence while, despite decades of debate, it was still in its infancy. When I have started the PhD 
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research, in 2009, the field of research was completely different. For instance, the idea of 
integrating financial and non-financial reporting was ‘not at issue’. The EU Commission was still 
maintaining that CSR (reporting) should be kept as a “voluntary” and business-driven practice. The 
rapid development of CSA regulation in Europe and elsewhere has made this research project 
exciting, although, at the same time, extremely difficult. In this sense, the fact of going back so 
much in history, looking for the origins of non-financial reporting regulation, in the 1970s, helped 
me to look at present developments within a broader perspective. Nonetheless, this broad historical 
exploration has been necessarily patchy and the attempt of giving a broad picture has necessarily 
also created the need for further and deeper researches.  
A further limitation lies in the empirical research. This has been using a snowball sampling 
and interviews research strategy. While the latter allowed me to explore the field more freely, 
following developments that emerged step-by-step, in the future a more systematic approach might 
provide further insights. Also, the number of interviews completed can be extended, particularly to 
attempt covering the global and national levels in more details. This limitation has been partly 
obviated looking at documents and publications of the main actors. However, future research 
avenues could build on this exploratory experience to further verify some of the key findings. A 
clear option is to follow the implementation of the NFR Directive, once approved by the EU 
Parliament, by Member States, its relation with existing frameworks, standards and guidelines and 
its implementation.  
Lastly another limitation of this study has been that it has been focused only on certain type 
of reporting – disclosing social, environmental and economic (ESG) non-financial information. 
There is a strong need for expanding this analysis towards other forms of corporate disclosure (such 
as eco-labelling and carbon emission disclosure) and to better include new forms of non-financial 
reporting, concerning intangible assets – human capital; intellectual capital; etc.  
One of the most interesting findings of the study, concerning the emergence of a 
‘transparency coalition’, has been so far only sketched but there is potential for further 
investigations, particularly on the relation between investors and civil society and between pension 
schemes; TUs and sustainability reporting. This enquire, however might need a dedicated study that 
could benefit from this exploratory research. This rationale might apply, in a way, to all the main 
blocs of social actors that I have considered. 
Furthermore, an extremely promising research avenue concerns the relation between private 
sustainability reporting and public authorities’ disclosure and requirements. That would include the 
issue of public procurement regulation but also emerging initiatives e,g. the OECD for the 
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development of alternative measures of well-being. Another possibility is to work on the synergies 
between NGOs or governments’ reporting.  
Another future research strand concerns the application of Bourdieusian reflexive ‘thinking 
tools’ to non-financial reporting and corporate governance sustainability. As I have mentioned in 
the literature review, this is the first study applying this approach to the issue of accounting for non-
financials and sustainability reporting. In particular Bourdieu analysis of ‘capitals’ is potentially 
illuminating. This reflexive approach should be improved and broadened, but its holistic application 
has to be maintained in order to fully exploit its potential.  
Finally, a major contribution of this study has been to start looking at CSR and corporate 
governance not as separated or competing strands of research but as complementary and necessarily 
completing views. This approach could offer unlimited material for a fascinating review and 
integration of the two areas of corporate regulation that respond to a idea of the firm that has 
changed. This integrated research framework has proved extremely useful but it has been barely 
developed: there is need for further studies that would systematically consider how the actors shape 
a certain regulatory outcome and to anchor sustainability in the debate on corporate governance 
regulation and company law.  
The scope of this enquire should be extended to include issues such as the regulation of 
managers remuneration and the definition of their bonuses and targets; the fiduciary duties of 
pension trustees; employees representation and control over companies’ value creation process; etc. 
This method has the potential for giving rise to a interdisciplinary field of “governance of corporate 
sustainability” (Krose and Lundbergh 2010 and Vitols and Kluge 2011).  
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Annex I: Review of selected legislation, codes, 
standards and guidelines 
 
 
 
During the last decade and, particularly, after the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, we are 
witnessing a shift towards the codification of ESG disclosure (see KPMG et al. 2010 and 2013). 
Disclosure can be mandated by government legislation, accounting standards or securities 
regulation. In general, international instruments are voluntary while national ones present a mix of 
voluntary and mandatory standards, codes and guidelines. As it has been pointed out, this trend had 
made corporate responsibility reporting de facto law for large business undertakings (KPMG 2011). 
 What follows is a very brief review of some of the most significant developments that have 
emerged at different levels of regulation and through varying modes of governance. For reasons of 
space, it has been impossible to refer to all important regulatory developments. Descriptive and 
analytical studies that present an overview of social and environmental disclosure and its regulation 
already exist
246
 and this review has been largely based on them. The aim of the review is to provide 
the reader with an introduction to benchmark national and regional regulation and to some of the 
most influential international regulatory frameworks. In particular, the review focuses on those 
national and international frameworks that have been more frequently mentioned during the debate 
at the EU-level. 
 
The global-level: key standards, codes and guidelines 
United Nation Global Compact (UN GC) 
The GC has been launched in 2000 as both a policy platform and a practical framework and 
is the world’s largest voluntary corporate citizenship initiative (www.unglobalcompact.org). It is a 
multistakeholder initiative, which seeks to align business operations and strategies in support of 
broader UN goals – ten principles – in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-
corruption.  
 
                                                          
246
 See Van Wensen and others (2011), The State of Play of Sustainability Reporting in the European Union; 
KPMG et al. (2010), Carrots and Sticks – Promoting Transparency and Sustainability; KPMG et al. (2013), 
Carrots and Sticks. Sustainability reporting policies worldwide – taday’s best practice, tomorrow’s trends;  
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Source: United Nations Global Compact — Communication on Progress 2012 
 
 
Namely, the ten principles derived from other material including:  
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
• The International Labour Organisation's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work  
• The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development  
• The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
  
By 2011 it had more than 10 000 business participants, of which approximately 50% were 
companies with more than 250 employees. This UN Programme is one of the most influential 
examples of the voluntary approach to corporate accountability regulation that has dominated the 
first half of the 2000s. UN Global Compact participants are required to issue a Communication on 
Progress (COP), a public disclosure to stakeholders (employees, consumers, governments, etc.) that 
must contain the following elements: a statement by the CEO expressing continued support for the 
UN Global Compact, a description of practical actions the company has taken to implement the 
principles, and a measurement of outcomes. It may vary from a two-pages statement to a real 
237 
 
sustainability report. Practical guidance is available on how to use the GRI Reporting Framework in 
this process. The GRI level C template, with an additional “statement of continued support for the 
Global Compact”, is also accepted as a COP247. In 2010, a Differentiation Framework has been 
introduced in order to test different levels on the basis of companies’ sizes and experiences. Failure 
to issue a COP can eventually lead to expulsion. 
 
According to the GC website, over 25% of European business participants do not respect the 
deadlines for issuing their COP and over 4000 business partners have been expelled since its 
establishment. In general, UN GC’s voluntary approach has been increasingly contested as a public 
relations corporate instrument for ‘bluewash’248. In fact, it has been highlighted that this framework 
lack of mechanisms to sanction the participants that fail to comply. Furthermore, the continued 
participation of business does not imply any progress. 
 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
It would be hard to overestimate the role that the GRI has played in shaping corporate social 
and environmental disclosure (www.globalreporting.org). This global regulatory network provides 
the most recognised global standard for sustainability reporting. It has been attentively studied 
(Isaksson and Steimle 2009; Brown et al. 2009; Levy et al. 2009) and criticised (Dingwerth and 
Eichinger 2010).  
The GRI framework sets out the principles and indicators used by the overwhelming 
majority of the organisation that issue sustainability report
249
. The cornerstone of this framework – 
the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines – is continuously re-developed by the network through a 
multi-stakeholder consensus seeking process to which anyone can contribute. The third version of 
the Guidelines – known as the G3 Guidelines – was published in 2006. A G4 version has been 
recently published in 2013 and is a free public good
250
. Other components of the framework include 
Sector Supplements and National Annexes. Sector specific supplements provide, amongst other 
                                                          
247
 In June 2010 a formal collaboration has been signed between the two organisations, the aim is to build ‘a 
universal framework for corporate sustainability performance and disclosure’, aiming to focus on their 
respective strengths. 
248
 See Gregoratti (forthcoming 2013), The Rethinking the Un Global Compact: Alternative Voices. See also 
Georg Kell and Bart Slob (2008), UN Global Compact – Is the Compact raising corporate responsibility 
standards?  
249
 According to the KPMG Survey (2011: 20) 80% of the G250 and 60% of the N100 companies that are 
reporting on sustainability adhere to GRI Guidelines. 
250
 https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-
Disclosures.pdf 
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things, sustainability indicators specific to the needs of sectors such as tourism, finance, 
telecommunications, mining, logistics, apparel and the public service. As of now, three sector 
supplements have been finalised, the Financial Services Sector Supplement (FSSS), the Electric 
Utilities Sector Supplement (EUSS), and the Mining and Metals Sector Supplement (MMSS), but a 
number of others are available as Pilot versions. National Annexes include unique country specific 
or regional sustainability issues (KPMG et al. 2010: 18).  
 
Where to draw a boundary for reporting? 
 
Source: The GRI Boundary Protocol (GRI 2005: 3) 
 
A significant contribution of the GRI to the debate has been the development of a GRI 
Boundary Protocol, which explains the ‘boundaries’ of reporting251 (see figure above). As the GRI 
Boundary Protocol (GRI 2005) states: “In preparing a sustainability report, a reporting organisation 
needs to set a “boundary” that defines which entities are included in a report, and which are 
excluded”. 
After a decade of tremendous success during the 2000s, in which the GRI almost single-
handedly defined what sustainability reporting means, this organization appears today at the 
                                                          
251
 According to the G3.1 Guidelines (GRI 2011: 14), ‘boundary’ refers to “the range of entities (e.g., 
subsidiaries, joint ventures, sub-contractors, etc.) whose performance is represented by the report. In setting 
the boundary for its report, an organization must consider the range of entities over which it exercises control 
(often referred to as the ‘organizational boundary’, and usually linked to definitions used in financial 
reporting) and over which it exercises influence (often called the ‘operational boundary’). In assessing 
influence, the organization will need to consider its ability to influence entities upstream (e.g., in its supply 
chain) as well as entities downstream (e.g., distributors and users of its products and services). The boundary 
may vary based on the specific Aspect or type of information being reported.” 
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crossroads. While most stakeholders regard GRI schemes as a valuable tool to improve the quality 
and comparability of reporting, others argue that the GRI Guidelines are too complicated for SMEs 
(see van Wensen 2011: 48). Furthermore, it is still unsure whether the GRI will be able to 
adequately respond to the challenges of a rapidly changing landscape of CSA and keep its 
leadership
252
.  
 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines 
(www.oecdguidelines.nl) were drawn up in the 1970s and adopted by all Organisations’ Member 
States, plus other 10 states.  They provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible 
business conduct in areas such as: respect for labour standards; contribution to sustainable 
development; respect for human rights; environment (precautionary principle); bribery and 
corruption; whistleblower protection. Section III on “Disclosure” encourages timely, regular, 
reliable and relevant disclosure on financial and non-financial performance, including ‘high quality 
standards’ for environmental and social issues (OECD 2011: 27)253. Guidelines can neither impose 
sanctions nor offer compensation, however they are at present one of the few international legal 
mechanisms available for holding large corporations to account. Therefore, in 2003 a network of 
NGOs has founded the OECD Watch (www.oecdwatch.org) in order to monitor and test the 
effectiveness of the Guidelines. On 25 May 2011, the OECD introduced important new provisions 
on human rights, workers and wages, and climate change
254
.  
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, first introduced in 1999 and revised in 
2004, also require timely and accurate disclosure but only limited to ‘material information’ (OECD 
2004: 22).  During the 2000s, in line with a context dominated by a narrow approach to CGR, the 
OECD had a major role in establishing an imbalanced global regime for accounting standards 
characterised by the distinction financial/non-financial disclosure. For instance, in 2006 the OECD 
maintained that government should “avoid them [sustainability reports] becoming an unnecessary 
                                                          
252
 Namely, this organization will have to manage: the shift towards a more active role of law-makers in this 
area; the emergence of other frameworks (ISO 26000; CDP); the rise of integrated reporting; the challenge of 
communicating ESG and extra-financial information to mainstream investors and financial analysts (Sullivan 
2011; ACCA 2008). 
253
 http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf 
254
 In particular, the inclusion of human rights in the Guidelines mirrors the parallel development of the UN 
Guidelines on Business and Human Right. While the latter represents an historical step forth, OECD Watch's 
‘Statement on the update of the Guidelines’ concludes that procedural shortcomings remain, and therefore 
the Guidelines potential to become an effective and credible instrument for corporate accountability remains 
in question. (OECDWatch 2011) http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_3675   
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burden on companies and limiting the information that it provided in annual reports as far as 
possible to what is relevant for the financial position of companies” (OECD 2006: 28/29). After the 
financial crisis, the OECD had to admit that existing standards failed to provide the checks and 
balances that companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices. Nonetheless, the 
proposed improvements seem to maintain financial and non-financial issues largely isolated
255
. 
 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
 The ISO (www.iso.org) is the world largest developer and publisher of standards. It is a 
non-governmental network comprised of, mainly private, national standard institutes from 162 
developing and developed countries. While the organisation is well known for developing standards 
that deal with technical subjects across a large spectrum of sectors, more recently it has started to 
address organisational and managerial aspects. The ISO 9000 series, for instance, deals with quality 
management; ISO 31000 focuses on risk management; ISO 24510 standards concern water supply 
and treatment services; etc. In the field of environmental management ISO has developed since 
1996 its ISO 14000 series (Clapp 1998; Chastka and Balzarova 2008). Those standards are 
procedural and do not make in-principle statements on environmental protection and reporting. 
However other tools, such as the UN GC and the ILO core conventions could be used in 
conjunction with the standards.  
In 2004, ISO decided to develop a series on social responsibility, called ISO 26000, seizing 
the opportunity of entering a ‘market’ in which there were no important competitors (McKinley 
2010). Despite ISO’s experience and resources, the task proved being harder than expected. Only in 
late 2010 the working group produced a rather vague “guidance document” – not for certification, 
regulatory or contractual purposes – of over 100 pages256. ISO 26000 identified six core subjects 
and issues of corporate social responsibility (see page below) and recommends undertaking internal 
and external communication. One interesting element in the development of ISO 26000 is the fact 
that the final version complements all the major existing frameworks, paying particular attention to 
not replacing them. That might signal that the space for new regulatory frameworks is becoming 
narrower and regulators have to take into consideration what already exists.   
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 As the OECD admitted, the financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. In 
2010, the OECD published a set an action plan for improvements in four priority areas: remuneration, risk 
management, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights.  
256
 Possibly, it was the foreseeable outcome of a boundless consultation process that lasted for over five years 
and involved 450 experts and 210 observers from 99 member states and 42 liaisons organisations. For more 
details see http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_26000_project_overview.pdf 
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Source: ISO website. ISO 26000 – Social Responsibility 257 
 
 
UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework 
On 24
th
 March 2011, Special Representative Prof. John Ruggie issued ‘Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights’258, the result of a patient work that started in 2005259. The 
Principles had been endorsed by the UN Human Right Council (UN HRC) on 16 June 2011. They 
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 http://www.iso.org/iso/sr_7_core_subjects.pdf 
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 http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-Remedy-Framework 
259
 An excellent overview of the issue can be found in Radu Mares [Ed.] (2011): Business and human Rights 
at Crossroads: The legacy of John Ruggie. 
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are based on the state duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to respect and the access to 
remedies (see Ruggie 2008 and 2009; Mares 2011; Cata Backer 2012)
260
. The EU has strongly 
supported Ruggie’s Framework and there has been a European campaign, organised by the 
European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), asking the EU to fully implement the Principles 
in its legislation
261
.  
 
The framework rests on three pillars:  
 
• The state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business;  
• The corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and  
• Greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.  
 
More specifically, as regards corporate disclosure, a crucial role in operationalising the 
Framework is played by questions of communication, transparency and reporting. In particular, 
Principle 3 (UN HRC 2011: 4) states
262
 that: 
 
“In meeting their duty to protect, States should […] (d) Encourage, and where appropriate require, 
business enterprises to communicate how they address their human rights impacts.”  
 
Furthermore, Principle 21(UN HRC 2011: 23), as regards the responsibilities of companies, states 
that: 
“Formal reporting by enterprises is expected where risks of severe human rights impacts exist, 
whether this is due to the nature of the business operations or operating contexts. The reporting 
should cover topics and indicators concerning how enterprises identify and address adverse impacts 
on human rights. Independent verification of human rights reporting can strengthen its content and 
credibility. Sector-specific indicators can provide helpful additional detail.”263 
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 As maintained by L. C. Backer, this framework is extremely innovative as it “both recognizes and 
operationalizes emerging governance regimes by combining the traditional focus on the law systems of and 
between states with the social-systems of non-state actors and the governance effects of policy.” (2012: 102) 
However the Principles have been also criticized by several NGOs for relying too much on voluntary 
corporate initiatives rather than state regulation http://www.fian.org/news/press-releases/CSOs-respond-to-
ruggies-guiding-principles-regarding-human-rights-and-transnational-corporations/pdf 
261
 http://www.corporatejustice.org/right-for-people-rules-for.html?lang=en 
262
 See also Commentaries to Principle 3 (RHC 2011: 4) on the State’s duty to Protect.  
263
 In November 2011, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued the Interpretative 
Guide to the Guiding Principles in which it is better clarified when and why companies should publish a 
formal report including information of HR. Notably, the Guide underlines that: “Formal reports may be self-
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The publication of the Guidelines Principles on Business and Human Rights is having a 
relevant impact on the CSR debate, particularly within the EU regulatory arena
264
.  
 
United Nation Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) 
The PRI is a network of institutional investors backed by the UNEP Finance Initiative and 
the UN Global Compact (www.unpri.org). It is a set of six voluntary best practice principles aimed 
to assist investors in integrating environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) issues into 
their investment processes. While the PRI is voluntary, all signatories annually have to fill an online 
questionnaire, the annual Reporting & Assessment survey. Principle 6, in particular, asks each 
signatory to “report on their activities and progress towards implementing the Principles”265. 
Principle 3 demands signatories to encourage the entities in which they invest to disclose ESG 
information.  
By any means, the growth of this organisation has been impressive signalling that also 
mainstream investors are now looking at ESG information. Launched by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in 2005, the PRI started with 20 signatories, they became over 640 by 2009 
and at the end of 2011 are about 951. In 2009 it represented just over US$20 trillion in assets, in 
2011 it reached US$30 trillion in assets. In 2011, the PRI announced that will develop a 
“comprehensive new reporting framework that addresses the full range and diversity of investor 
organisations while remaining manageable for signatories to complete.” (UN PRI 2011: 1) On 18 
October 2011, the EU has announced that the PRI would be a joint recipient, with the International 
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) and the European Federation of Financial Analysts 
(EFFAS), of an EU grant to lead a new programme aimed to build the capacity of investors to 
integrate ESG information in their investment decisions
266
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
standing reports on the enterprise’s human rights performance alone, part of a wider report on non-financial 
performance covering social and environmental issues or part of an integrated report on both financial and 
non-financial performance. If the enterprise is able to integrate reporting on human rights into its financial 
reports, with appropriate metrics, this can start to demonstrate that respecting rights is understood as truly 
integral to the business and relevant to its bottom line. Reports may be in hard copy, in electronic form or 
both (and these choices should reflect an awareness of the report’s accessibility to its intended readers). They 
may be produced periodically (annually or more frequently) or when a particular impact arises or both.” (UN 
HRC 2012). 
264
 At the EU-level, for instance, as part of the EU CSR Strategy 2011-2014 three business sectors have been 
selected for the development of human rights guidance. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-
business/corporate-social-responsibility/human-rights/ 
265
 http://www.unpri.org/principles/ 
266
 http://www.unpri.org/news/2011_10_18-EC-press-release-FINAL.pdf  
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The Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol)  
The GHG Protocol (http://www.ghgprotocol.org/) is the most widely used international 
accounting tool for governments and business leaders to understand, quantify, and manage 
greenhouse gas emissions. The Protocol has been the result of a decade-long partnership between 
the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD). It has been developed working with businesses, governments, and environmental groups 
around the world to build a new generation of credible and effective programs for tackling climate 
change. 
The standard provides an accounting framework for the disclosure of all six GHG covered 
by the Kyoto  Protocol on carbon emissions, The module builds on the experience and knowledge 
of over 350 leading experts drawn from businesses, NGOs, governments and accounting 
associations. It has been road-tested by over 30 companies in nine countries. The GHG Protocol 
Initiative’s vision is to harmonize GHG accounting and reporting standards internationally to ensure 
that different trading schemes and other climate related initiatives adopt consistent approaches to 
GHG accounting. 
 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and the Climate Disclosure Standard Board (CDSB) 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is a global reporting scheme launched in 2000 
(www.cdproject.net) with the aim of accelerating solutions for climate change putting relevant 
climate information at the heart of business, policy and investors decisions.  
This network, based in London, currently represents over 7000 institutional investors (they 
were 551 in 2011 and 1500 in 2008), with a combined US$87 trillion under management
267
. That is 
more than half of the world’s invested capital. It operates in over 60 countries across six continents 
and actively engages with governments and regulators globally. As the result of CDP engagement, 
over 4100 organisations – including 80% of the world largest TNCs – started to use CDP to disclose 
information about their impact on the environment and use of natural resources. CDP and GRI have 
published a document explaining the similarities and differences between the GRI’s Reporting 
Guidelines and CDP’s 2010 Questionnaire, including the Supplier Module. The document outlines 
                                                          
267
 The source of the data is CDP website. Accessed last time on 18 June 2013. 
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how reporting companies can efficiently use or adapt the same data in both reporting processes (van 
Wensen et al. 2011). 
A special project of CDP, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board
268
 (CDSB) 
(http://www.cdsb.net/) is committed to the integration of climate change-related information into 
corporation’s mainstream financial reporting. According to the CDSB website, this project is about 
linking financial and climate change-related reporting to provide policy-makers and investors with 
clear, reliable information for robust decision making. Namely, the CDSB developed a global 
climate change reporting framework that is intended for use by companies making disclosures in, or 
linked to, their mainstream financial reports. The framework adopts existing standards and practices 
including the Greenhouse Gas Protocol and International Financial Reporting Standards as well as 
reflecting developments in regulatory and voluntary reporting and carbon trading rules. It is 
‘standard-ready’ for adoption by regulators contemplating the introduction or development of 
climate change disclosure practices. Potentially, this framework could be applied to other non-
financial issues other than carbon disclosure. At 2013, it covers information about the risks and 
opportunities that climate change presents to their strategy and seeks to filter out what is of most 
value to investors in understanding how climate change affects a company’s financial performance 
and condition. 
  
ILO Tri-partite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policies  
 
As we have seen in this Thesis, in the 1960s and 1970s, the activities of large enterprises 
operating across different jurisdictions started provoking intense discussions. One of the most 
significant attempts to provide a ‘corporatist response’ to this rising issue had been ILO’s Tri-partite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE 
Declaration).   
The ILO Principles outlined in this universal instrument have been first adopted by the 
Governing Body of the International Labour Office in 1977 and afterward amended in November 
2000 and March 2006. They offer guidelines to governments; employers' and workers' organisations 
                                                          
268
 CDSB and CDP are complementary. The former provides an important focus for formalising and 
advancing the significant progress CDP has made by bringing it into mainstream financial reporting. CDP 
act as secretariat to the CDSB, advancing CDP’s work programme in association with accounting, business, 
standard setting and regulatory professions. 
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in areas such as employment, decent conditions of work and life, and impact of the industrial 
activities
269
. Their provisions are reinforced by international labour Conventions and 
Recommendations that social partners are urged to apply, to the greatest extent possible, to their 
strategies and organisations.  
There are a large number of other initiatives including those by the World Bank Group and 
accountancy bodies and standard setters. For example, IFAC (the International Federation of 
Accountants) has published a sustainability framework. There are also efforts to integrate the 
various guidelines.  
International Integrating Reporting Council (IIRC) 
 Originally created in 2010 as International Integrating Reporting Committee, the Council is 
chaired by Prof Mervyn King, charismatic Chairman of the GRI and the key architect of ground-
breaking South African CG codes.
270
 According to its website, this is “a powerful, international 
cross section of leaders from the corporate, investment, accounting, securities, regulatory, academic 
and standard-setting sectors as well as civil society.”271 In effect, the IIRC has created a broad 
coalition that includes some of the key actors in the world of financial and non-financial 
reporting
272
 The Council has been able to size the momentum for going beyond traditional financial 
accounting that has emerged after the 2008 global financial crisis.  
The IIRC's stated objective is to develop an internationally accepted integrated reporting 
framework by 2014 to create the foundations for a new reporting model to enable organisations to 
provide concise communications of how they create value over time.  The IIRC refers to this 
process as “Integrated Reporting”. The latter shall be concise, clear, comprehensive and 
comparable, structured around the organisation's strategic objectives, its governance and business 
model and integrating both material financial and non-financial information
273
. 
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 http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm 
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 The Committee was originally chaired by Professor Mervyn King. Membership included Hans 
Hoogervorst (IASB Chairman), Leslie Seidman (FASB Chairperson), Maria Helena Santana, (Chairperson, 
IOSCO Executive Committee), Göran Tidström (IFAC President), Jim Quigley (former global Chief 
Executive Officer of Deloitte), and many others. Paul Druckman was appointed IIRC’s CEO. 
271
 http://www.theiirc.org/about/making-happen/  
272
 From 2011 until the end of 2013, the IIRC will be supported by a strengthened secretariat operating 
through a not-for-profit company established for the purpose under the same name. The company's board 
gives a fair idea of the leverage of the IIRC in the field of accounting. A part from Professor Mervyn King as 
Chairman, it sees Leslie Ferrar (Treasurer, Household of the Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall) 
and Christy Wood (Chairman of the Board of Governors, International Corporate Governance Network) as 
Deputy Chairs, together with Ian Ball (Chief Executive, International Federation of Accountants), Ernst 
Ligteringen (Chief Executive, Global Reporting Initiative), Jessica Fries (Director, The Prince's Accounting 
for Sustainability Project). Paul Druckman is IIRC's CEO. 
273
 http://www.theiirc.org/ 
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The new international framework is meant to bring together financial, environmental he 
objectives of the IIRC
274
 are: 
• support the information needs of long-term investors, by showing the broader and longer-
term consequences of decision-making 
• reflect the interconnections between environmental, social, governance and financial 
factors in decisions that affect long-term performance and condition, making clear the link 
between sustainability and economic value 
• provide the necessary framework for environmental and social factors to be taken into 
account systematically in reporting and decision-making 
• rebalance performance metrics away from an undue emphasis on short term financial 
performance 
• bring reporting closer to the information used by management to run the business on a 
day-to-day basis. 
Over 90 global businesses and 50 institutional investors are currently directly involved in the 
IIRC’s Pilot Programme275. On April 16 2013, a Draft of the International IR Framework has been 
made publicly available for a consultation period of 90 days.  
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 http://www.theiirc.org/about/ 
275
 This includes some of the world’s largest TNCs, such as Coca-Cola, Clorox, Microsoft, Hyundai, Tata, 
Unilever, Marks and Spencer, SAP and National Australia Bank. 
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EU regulation: Between global norm-making and national lawmaking  
At the beginning of the 2000s, a series of corporate scandals (Parmalat, Enron, Worldcom) 
worked as a catalyst for a twofold strand of EU regulation particularly concerned with greater 
transparency and information provisions on capital and control structures
276
 (see Chapter 4). On the 
one side, transparency became the key element of a string of CG reforms that strengthened minority 
shareholders’ rights; board independence and accountability to shareholders (Vander Bauwhede and 
Willekens 2008; Horn 2011; Overbeek et al. 2007; Enriques and Volpin 2007). On the other side, 
non-financial reporting and auditing gradually but steadily emerged as the cornerstone of the EU 
strategy to promote corporate social and environmental responsibility (Ungericht and Hirt 2010; 
Lozano et al. 2007: 51; van Wensen et al. 2011). As I have argued in this study, those parallel 
strands of regulation are increasingly converging, supported by the emergence of a ‘transparency 
coalition’. They might or not result, in the near future, in the emergence of a more sustainable 
approach to corporate governance, promoting long-term economic growth and social and 
environmental accountability (see Sjåfjell 2009; Kruse and Lundbergh 2010; Vitols and Kluge 
2011). 
 Focusing on ESG reporting regulation, a decade of intense debates at the EU level have produced 
two Green Papers, three Communications, a EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR and an Alliance 
with industry and relevant stakeholders
277
. Despite years of struggles and hesitations, several 
regulatory instruments regarding reporting on sustainability information have been adopted by the 
EU with implications for all Member States, such as: the Accounts Modernisation Directive; the 
European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR); the Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control Directive (IPPC); the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and the EU 
Emission Trading System (ETS), which is unique with regard to comparability and transparency. 
Given the complexity of the matter, several Directorate-Generals (DGs) have been involved in 
shaping non-financial disclosure policies, principally DG ENV; DG EMPL; DG ENTR; DG 
MARKT.  
In particular, after the onset of the 2008 financial crisis calls for a more comprehensive 
corporate accountability strategy have gained momentum. As the result, the Commission in its 
Europe 2020 strategy stressed the need for ‘a new agenda that puts people and responsibility first.’ 
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 See recommendations made in the final report of the High Level Group of Company Law experts of the 
European Union (EU) (The “Jaap Winter Report”) and in the 2003 EU Action Plan. 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm 
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With respect to existing mandatory instruments regarding reporting on sustainability information, 
European Law makes the following requirements on companies: 
 
Relevant provisions of the Accounting Directives 
The Directive 2003/51/EC amended the Accounting Directives
278
, introducing in EU 
Accounting Law an obligation to disclose non-financial information, starting from the reporting 
year 2005. Namely, Article 46 of the Fourth Accounting Directive states: 
 
1.(b) To the extent necessary for an understanding of the company's development, performance or 
position, the analysis shall include both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key 
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to 
environmental and employee matters.
 279
  
 
However, Member States’ governments could choose whether to except SMEs from this 
requirement. Furthermore, in 2006, the Accounting Directives were amended to introduce an 
obligation for all European listed companies to include a corporate governance statement in their 
annual report on a comply-or-explain basis (see Article 46a of the Fourth Accounting Directive).  
The two regulatory interventions contributed to attract governments and stakeholders attentions to 
the importance of non-financial disclosure. In effect, many EU Member States developed national 
policy initiatives that went beyond EU requirements, creating a fragmented regulatory landscape 
and suggesting the need for further harmonisation at the EU-level. Furthermore, according to the 
assessment made by the EC services and to a public consultation held by DG MARKT in 2011
280
, 
the current EU regime still fails to deliver high-quality non-financial information (Commission 
2013. Therefore, the EC has made a commitment to “present a legislative proposal on transparency 
of the social and environmental information provided by companies in all sectors” (Commission 
2011a).  
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 Art. 46 of the Directive 78/660/EEC (Fourth Accounting Directive) on the annual accounts of certain 
types of companies; Art. 36 of the Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts (Seventh Directive). 
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 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:178:0016:0022:en:PDF 
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 “Several respondents considered that this leads to difficulties in benchmarking between companies. Half 
of the respondents describe the current regime applicable in their respective jurisdiction as poor or very poor. 
For many, the current EU legislative framework lacks transparency. Several respondents think this translates 
into a lack of balance and cohesion of reporting by companies, making it difficult for shareholders and 
investors to make a reasonable assessment of the extent to which companies take account of CSR in their 
activities.” (EC 2011: 2) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/non-
financial_reporting/summary_report_en.pdf 
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In April 2013, MARKT Commissioner, Michel Barnier, presented a much anticipated 
legislative proposal for a Directive amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as 
regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large companies and 
groups. According to the EC legislative proposal on non-financial reporting, all European 
companies with more than 500 employees will have to disclose a statement in their Annual Report 
including material information relating to, at least, environmental, social, and employee-related 
matters, respect of human rights, anti-corruption and bribery aspects. Within these areas, the 
statement will include (i) a description of its policies, (ii) results and (iii) risk-related aspects
281
. A 
company that does not apply a specific policy in one or more of these areas will be required to 
explain why this is the case. It is estimated that, on this basis, the new requirement would cover 
around 18.000 companies in the EU, marking a significant increase in the number of companies 
reporting.  
Furthermore, also in April 2013, the EU Parliament found an agreement on the so-called 
‘country by country reporting’ (CBCR). The latter will require the disclosure of payments to 
governments on a country and project basis by listed and large non-listed companies with activities 
in the extractive industry (oil, gas and mining) and loggers of primary forests. As Accounting 
Professor Prem Sikka (2013) pointed out: “The EU proposals mark the beginning, but CbC is a 
much broader idea. It supplements the traditional model of publishing profit and loss account, 
balance sheet and a cash flow statement. These statements relate to the company as a single 
economic entity and do not provide any disaggregated information. So these statements do not 
reveal the taxes a company may have paid in each country, or the profits and losses made there.” 
 
The European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR) 
The PRTR Regulation 166/2006/EC, which came into force in February 2006, incorporates 
the United Nation Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) Protocol on Pollutants Release and 
Transfer Register under the Aarthus Convention. The Convention, adopted in Kiev during the 
Ministerial Conference ‘Environment for Europe’ in 2003 (Council Decision 2006/61/EC), requires 
operators of facilities specified in Annex I to report on carbon emissions and other specific 
substances
282
. The E-PRTR is the European-wide register of industrial and non-industrial releases 
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 The EC specified that, in providing this information, may rely on national, EU-based or international 
frameworks, such as the UN Global Compact, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
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into air, water and land, as well as off-site transfers of waste water and waste including information 
from point and diffuse sources. This Regulation obliges the European Commission to make this 
data publicly accessible and to organise it in a way to allow users to search for and identify releases 
of pollutants. Facility-level data is based on the consent of companies
283
. 
 
The Integrated Pollution and Prevention and Control Directive (IPPC) 
The 1996 IPPC Directive requires Member States to lay down permit conditions for 
operators to control, monitor and report emissions from IPPC installations. States also have to 
provide data on implementation to the Commission. All industrial and agricultural activities with 
high pollution potential are required to have a permit
284
. Data reported under the IPPC flows into 
the E-PRTR database. 
 
The European Emission Trading System (ETS) 
Launched in 2005 (following Directive 2003/87/EC), the ETS is the first and the largest 
international scheme for trading of greenhouse gas allowances as it covers some 11 000 power and 
industrial plants in 30 countries (the EU State Members plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway)
285
. 
Installations covered range from factories to power stations and combustion plans. In 2012 airlines 
joined the scheme and other industries are expected to join in 2013 when the scheme will enter its 
third trading period.  
The system has been widely discussed and criticised (see Newell 2008; Newell and Paterson 
2010). It is based on a ‘cap and trade’ principle, meaning that the number of allowances will be 
reduced over time, in order to gradually reduce emissions. The EU hopes that this scheme will be 
joined by similar regional initiatives in order to create a global carbon market. Article 14 of the 
Directive requires the EC to adopt guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of CO2 emissions 
under the ETS. Reports must be issued in accordance with legally binding Monitoring and 
Reporting Guidelines (MRG). Firstly MRG were established by the Commission Decision of 29 
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 When requesting a permit the following information have to be submitted: A description of the 
installation and the nature and scale of its activities as well as its site conditions; The materials, substances 
and energy used or generated; The sources of emissions from the installation, and the nature and qualities of 
foreseeable emissions into each medium, as well as their effects on the environment; The proposed 
technology and other techniques for preventing or reducing emissions from the installation; Measures the 
prevention and recovery of waste; Measures planned to monitor emissions; Possible alternative solutions. 
285
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm 
252 
 
January 2004 and then revised in on 18 July 2007 for the second trading period
286
. As it has been 
pointed out, “It is notable that only companies covered by the ETS are obliged to report on 
greenhouse emissions. There is currently no EU wide obligation for all enterprises to measure and 
report greenhouse gas emissions.” (EC Workshop n. 5 on ESG disclosure 2010: 5) 
 
On a voluntary basis, the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) is a 
management tool that has been established in 1995 and is aimed to help organisations to make a 
more effective use of resources and optimise their production strategies. It was recently revised
287
 
and, starting from January 2010, rules on reporting through KPIs were strengthened. Article 18 of 
the revised regulation (EC No. 1221/2009 of the European Parliament) recommends that “in order 
to ensure relevance and comparability of information, reporting on environmental performances 
should be based on generic and sector-specific KPIs, which should include: energy efficiency; 
water; waste; biodiversity and emissions.  
 
On 10 April 2013, the EC has adopted the Single Market for Green Products package. As 
part of this package, DG ENV has developed, together with the EC’s Join Research Centre, the 
Organization Environmental Footprint (OEF)
288
. This is a methodology for calculating the 
environmental performance of an organisation that can be used for corporate assessing, reporting, 
benchmarking.  As stated in the Communication Building the Single Market for Green Products and 
the Commission Recommendation on the use of the Product Environmental Footprint (PEF) and 
OEF methods, the EC promotes the voluntary application of this framework in policies and by 
private actors, including companies.  
 
CSA regulatory profile of key selected countries 
Governments played a key role in the corporate accountability debate and in the development of 
sustainability reporting (Lozano et al. 2008; Albareda et al. 2007). However, their regulatory 
engagement has been cyclical rather than progressive, with a more active role in the 1970s and the 
2000s than in the 1980s and 1990s (see Ireland and Pillay 2010 and Chapter 3). Even during the last 
decade, the re-emergence of an EU policy debate on extra-financial disclosure has been a recursive 
                                                          
286
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they have been aligned with reports made by Member States. Lastly, verification procedures of monitoring 
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rather than linear. In particular, around 2005-2006, some EU governments loosened their 
requirements on sustainability reporting, on the basis of the widespread credo that such obligations 
could represent the imposition of an unnecessary burden on companies – hampering their 
competitiveness – and that a ‘voluntary’ approach would have been more appropriate289. However, 
over the last years, after the onset of the global financial crisis, a trend is becoming visible towards 
more governments starting to make sustainability reporting mandatory.  
The role of governments is not confined to the introduction of regulation and legislation, 
crucially they are promoting cooperation internally, with different stakeholders groups, and 
externally, advancing policy coherence between various reporting and disclosure initiatives. They 
also are developing guidance on best practices to their business community and creating instrument 
to recognise and promote benchmark (Dutch Transparency Benchmark) and are partners in the 
development of initiatives such as the GRI (van Wensel et al. 2011). 
 
France 
Traditionally, the French system of CGR is characterised by little dispersion of ownership 
and a powerful role of the state in the economy, termed dirigisme. Even listed companies are under 
state influence, in particular financial institutions, banks and insurance companies, are either state-
owned or controlled. Overall, the system is clearly closer to the insider, rather than the outsider 
model of CG (Solomon 2007: 204). In 1989, 57 people accounted for one-quarter of all the board 
seats of the largest 100 listed companies (Monks and Minow 2001), a clear indication of strong 
managerial control.  
In line with this background, the French approach to corporate social and environmental 
accountability has always been a foremost example of legislation-driven regulation (see Harribey 
2009). As we already mentioned in Chapter 3, the first law on social reporting appeared in France in 
1977 when the President of the Republic requested a Parliamentary vote on obliging all firms with 
more than 300 employees to issue a social review
290
 (bilan social) based on over 100 performance 
                                                          
289
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 The French bilan social is often used as the translation for the English ‘sustainability reporting’. 
However, the word ‘social’ has a different meaning in the two languages and this difference has not only 
lexical consequences (see Harribey 2009: 38).  The French ‘social’ has a restricted meaning compared to the 
same English word and concerns only the social dimension of sustainability. It is closely related with the 
social welfare in general and in particular with issues of employment relations. This created further problems 
to French TUs to accept the very notion of voluntary CSR, seen as detrimental for workers’ rights. A similar 
remark might also be relevant for the Italian case, in which social and environmental reporting is generally 
translated as bilancio sociale. 
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indicators
291
 (Gond and Igalens 2012). However, it was mainly after 2000 that a substantial body of 
CSR legislation emerged. In 2001, with Article 116 of the “Loi sur les Nouvelle Régulations 
Economiques” (NRE), France was the first European country to adopt mandatory non-financial 
disclosure for publicly-listed companies
292
.  Companies have to report against a set list of 40 social 
and sustainability indicators, largely inspired by the GRI KPIs. The indicators include those related 
to human resources, community issues and engagement, labour standards and key health and safety 
and environmental issues
293
.  
The NER was enlarged a first time through the Grenelle I Act (Article 53, 9 August 
2009
294
), a law primarily aimed to respond to climate change and new ecologic challenges. 
Companies with more than 500 employees in high-emitting sectors have to publish their amount of 
carbon emissions by 1
st
 January 2011 at the latest, with an update at least every five years. Article 
83 of the Grenelle II Act (12 July 2010
295
) further enlarged the NER. All companies of 500 
employees and more have to present a social and environmental report (around 2500 companies). 
Subsidiaries controlled by parent companies are also required to disclose information. The Law 
does not specify the extent or quality of the information to be published, and no enforcement 
mechanism is currently active when companies do not comply, which makes it a soft law (van 
Wensen et al. 2011: 59). Provisions for the implementation of these laws were adopted only in 
2012, after a long iter. Notably the implementation decree increases the amount of information 
required – taking into account global and international developments (e.g. ISO 26000; UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights). It also introduces a ‘comply or explain’ approach. 
Lastly, the decree foresees that the report must be verified by an accredited independent third party. 
France host also a number of voluntary initiatives such as the ADEME Carbon footprint 
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(ORSE 2010) affirmed that the 2001 law had functioned as a catalyst for companies integrating 
environmental, social and economic issues and driven the creation of CSR and sustainability expertise. 
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methodology, issued in 2002 by the Environment and Energy Conservation Agency and which is 
compliant with the ISO 14064 standard and related to the EU ETS
296
.  
Overall, the French regime of sustainability disclosure is one of the most structured and 
developed and, according to a recent survey (KPMG 2011) it is greatly improving, jumping in three 
years from 59 to 94 percent of companies reporting. However, the country is experiencing both the 
advantages and disadvantages of this top-down approach. This accounting practice is well-
established, based on a detailed and legislative-driven approach and it is included in a substantive 
body of corporate social and environmental regulation. This regime supported the early emergence 
of what is nowadays one of the strongest European markets for SRI (see Vigeo 2011) and an 
innovative and lively system of sustainability rating and assurance. Reporting is the norm in France. 
However, the worldwide trend is towards a more light-touch, bottom-up approach based on general 
principles and France risks to be isolated in its prescriptive approach. Furthermore, most French 
companies take responsibility and sustainability into account “simply because they have no choice.” 
(Harribey 2009: 48) In other words, it could be argued that corporations have at length perceived 
sustainability reporting more as an obligation than as an opportunity to be embraced. Nowadays, 
France strongly supports the emergence of a mandatory European framework for social and 
environmental indicators that would harmonise national differences
297
. 
 
 
 
Denmark 
During the last few years, the Danish CGR model has been under pressure for promoting 
shareholder value and further integration of international capital markets, likewise many other 
countries in Scandinavia and Continental Europe. As described by Rose and Mejer (2003), the 
Danish CG model, embodied in the Corporate Act 1973, explicitly protects the rights of a broad 
group of stakeholders, including employees, creditors and the community as a whole. Foundations, 
run on a non-profit basis, are the traditional cornerstones of this model and control a substantial 
portion of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (Solomon 2007: 202). Danish companies present 
typical elements of the ‘stakeholder model’: a dual voting rights system and a supervisory board, a 
third of which, in large entities, is elected by employees. However, on the basis of OECD Principles 
for Corporate Governance and under the pressure of bodies such as the Danish Corporate 
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Governance Network, recent CG reforms have pushed the system further towards the outsider-
oriented model (Norby Committee Report 2001). 
During the last years Denmark has been at the forefront in the emerging regulation of 
sustainability disclosure, in particular after formulating its 2009 law on CSR reporting. Actually, 
the Danish Government first introduced mandatory information on environmental disclosure in 
1995 (Green Accounting Act). Thereafter, Denmark was one of the first European countries to 
include part of the EC’s recommendations on reporting into legislation. The legal provision was 
included in the Financial Statement Act with the aim of making Danish business internationally 
renewed for its leadership in sustainable growth. Lastly, in 2009, Section 99a was added to the Act: 
companies have to provide information on their policies for CSR and SRI
298
.  
In Section 99 of the Financial Statement Act, the Danish Government explicitly attempted to 
adopt a ‘smart’ regulatory approach, in order to overcome the voluntary versus mandatory debate 
that characterised non-financial disclosure debates.  
Firstly, it tried to conciliate a voluntary approach to CSR with the wish to promote ESG 
disclosure by legislation, opting for a comply-or-explain approach. CSR as such does not become 
mandatory; it is only mandatory to be transparent about the choices an enterprise makes in this 
regard. However, business without policies in this respect is now obliged to explain this position. 
 Secondly, it adopted a principle-based approach, which does not set out detailed 
requirements but only focuses on the basic, fundamental principles. Namely: what is the company 
policy? Does it respect international principles? How is the policy implemented and what are the 
results?  
Thirdly, Denmark opted for not developing its own standards but to refer to and encourage 
the use of existing international ones such as the UN Global Compact (UNGC) or the GRI.  
Since 2010, this comply-or-explain requirement applies to approximately 1.100 large 
companies with assets of more than 19 million Euro; revenues of more than Euros 38 million and 
more than 250 employees. Furthermore, it applies to all listed companies and state-owned 
companies. Moreover it applies to institutional investors, investment associations and listed 
financial companies following an executive order issued by the Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FSA).  
Sustainability reporting is only one element of a broader CSR action plan that includes 
guidance for SMEs, encouraging companies to sign up to the UNGC or the Climate Compass. Most 
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of the tools and instruments are web-based or have been elaborated in collaboration with 
stakeholder groups. While the Danish regulation has been generally met with interest and seen as 
innovative, the ‘comply-or-explain’ mechanism has been criticized by social stakeholders, such as 
NGOs and TUs, because reporting stay voluntary and companies are not obliged to publish certain 
information. Amnesty International, for instance, has pointed out that companies are not required to 
report on thorough due diligence or on improvement potential related to their CSR policies
299
. 
 
United Kingdom 
The UK is generally acknowledged as one of the world leaders in CG policies. In part as a 
reaction to corporate scandals, such as the Maxwell case in 1991 (Stiles and Taylor 1993), and in 
part “as a result of introspection by boards and shareholders following economic decline in the early 
1990s” (Solomon 2007: 50), a growing interest in CG issues emerged within the boardroom, among 
institutional investors and in the government. A first remarkable result of this attention has been the 
publication of the Cadbury Report (1992), a ground-breaking code that produced a far-reaching 
agenda for reforms not only in the UK but all over the world. This report formalised, for the first 
time, CG best practice in a written document, making explicit what was implicit in many UK 
company practice. As the British economy is characterised by strong ownership dispersion and 
expanding institutional investors’ control (‘money concept of control’), the reforms have been 
largely centred on the agency problem of aligning managers’ interests with those of their 
shareholders. Therefore UK CG codes stress the importance of transparency and disclosure to 
investors and shareholders. However, during the last decade, attempts have been undertaken to 
discharge a broader corporate accountability agenda, in particular through environmental and social 
disclosure.  
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, during the 1970s workers’ rights were recognised as 
needing government attention, as a consequence during this period a number of laws were passed 
aimed at strengthening employees’ protection (Idowu and Towler 2004). During the Thatcher era, 
however, emerged a modest approach to CSR and proposals of mandatory social reporting 
regulation lost momentum (Ireland and Pillay 2010). The historical victory obtained by Labour 
Party in 1997 created great expectations for fundamental reforms that would take into consideration 
broader corporate responsibilities. In effect in 2000 the first drafts of the Modern Company Law 
Review (Modern Company Law 2000; Modernising Company Law 2002) appeared to extend 
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company law to tackle social, ethical and environmental issues broadening directors’ 
responsibilities. However, in the final draft of the Review (see UK Parliament 2002, Section 3.3) 
any references to stakeholders accountability was subordinated to a materiality constraint. Managers 
would not be liable for managing or disclosing social and environmental information unless they 
consider them as ‘material’ and, as pointed out by Jill Solomon, “materiality is such an intangible, 
abstract notion that it would in practice be extremely difficult to prosecute a director on a point of 
social and environmental materiality.” (2007: 233) The final draft, however, recommended the 
introduction of mandatory social and environmental disclosure through the form of a Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR), a narrative, non-financial section of the company annual report (see 
Villiers 2006). After over three years of public debates, the bill was withdrawn at the very last 
moment by Chancellor Gordon Brown, on the ground of avoiding corporate red tape burden (Grant 
2006: 1), and replaced with a more modest Business Review, which met only the minimum 
European requirements
300
. Eventually a mandatory OFR was introduced for government entities 
only
 301
. 
After the onset of the financial crises, the role of business in society, in particular of the 
financial sector, was thrown once again into question (see Turner et al. 2009; Inmann 2009). New 
pressures for corporate social and environmental accountability led to a number of regulatory 
initiatives, particularly in the areas of corporate governance and climate change. In particular, the 
government has reviewed the UK Corporate Governance Code, for listed companies, (formerly the 
Combined Code) and the UK Stewardship Code, for institutional investors
302
. The two Codes are 
complementary and are both based on ‘comply-or-explain’ regulatory approach, although there 
have been discussion whether to move towards mandatory requirements. Furthermore, in August 
2010, the UK Government started a consultation
303
 on narrative reporting to identify ways to 
reinstate the OFR and further improving corporate accountability and transparency. As the result, a 
draft regulation, which is due to come into force on the 1
st
 October 2013, was issued. This would 
simplify existing reporting requirements and mandate listed companies to issue, a strategic report, 
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introducing the disclosure of information on human rights policies
304
. Furthermore, in the area of 
corporate governance reporting, it has also been proposed a new draft legislation that would revise 
the requirements for reporting on executives’ remuneration. The latter has been designed to 
strengthen shareholders’ control and corporate accountability. It shall contain two areas: a policy 
report – setting out companies’ remuneration policies – and an annual report – on how the policy 
was implemented
305
. 
The UK is also increasingly committed to support carbon (GHG) disclosure. The CRC 
Energy Efficiency Scheme issued in 2010 by the UK Environment Agency requires companies that 
use more than 6 000 MWh per annum, to measure and report on an annual basis all emissions 
related to energy use and purchase allowances
306
. This requirement is likely to concern about 5000 
medium and large undertakings, many of them lacking any experience in non-financial reporting. 
The UK is also hosting a number of voluntary regulatory initiatives that would be impossible to 
summarise in the context of this review. For instance, the Department for Environmental, Food & 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) issued in 2006 its Environmental Reporting Guidelines, designed to assist 
companies with new narrative reporting requirements relating to environmental matters.  
Overall, the debate on social and environmental disclosure in the UK has been, somehow, a 
model for many other countries, particularly in Europe. On the one hand, it shows the difficulties of 
reconciling shareholder value maximisation with broader social and environmental commitments. 
Despite the prominence of CSR policies and debates, recent corporate and financial scandals seem 
to confirm that there is a fundamental contradiction between absolute shareholder value 
maximisation and the creation of ‘shared value’. More specifically, according to the information 
emerged at the 2010 EC Workshop on ESG disclosure, the quality of non-financial disclosure under 
the current UK regulatory regime is still poor (see also Adams and Evans 2004 and Solomon 2006). 
From my interviews, it also emerged a growing isolation of the UK government from Continental 
Europe debates on CSR
307
. On the other hand, it is in the UK that extremely successful initiatives 
(CDP, A4S, Forum for the Future, AccountAbility) have emerged and the country still exerts an 
extraordinary influence on the rest of the world. Namely, the UK seems to anticipate new regulatory 
trends concerning institutional investors (Stewardship Code); remuneration and carbon disclosure 
(CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme).  
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Other European countries 
The policy adopted by the Netherlands on social and environmental disclosure legally 
ensures compliance with the European Accounts Modernisation Directive by the 2007 Financial 
Supervision Act, therefore all Dutch listed companies and institutional investors are required to 
publicly report, or explain why they do not. The Dutch approach also relies on the instrument of 
dynamic reference to national “Transparency Benchmark” scheme maintained308. The benchmark is 
run by the government but endorsed and kept up to date by consulted stakeholders, investors and 
companies, to ensure broad support and compliance. It publicly compares and rates the transparency 
performance of participating companies on a yearly basis. Furthermore, the scheme is kept updated 
to take account of new issues, and enables participating companies and stakeholders to make 
national and international comparisons between companies, showing in which areas transparency 
can be improved. Overall, the Dutch Accounting Standards Board (DASB) provides national 
guidance for reporting and the Dutch Institute for Registered Accountants (NIVRA) provides 
guidance for assurance
309
.  
In Germany, the European Modernisation Directive was transposed through the 2005 
Accounting Law Reform (BilReG), which led to amendments of the German Commercial Code’s 
§§ 289 and 315. The requirements are substantiated in the German Accounting Standard No. 15, 
published by the German Accounting Standard Board. The standard requires all German parent 
companies to publish a group management report in accordance with § 315. According to a recent 
survey, almost all German 100 largest companies publish a management report that includes non-
financial KPIs in their annual report (KPMG et al. 2010: 47). In recent years, the Committee on 
non-financial of the German Society of Investment Professionals (DVFA) has been instrumental in 
mainstreaming ESG disclosure elaborating a very influent list of KPIs for ESG disclosure
310
 that 
has been endorsed by the European Federation of Financial Analysts (see EFFAS 2010).  In 2011, 
the German Council for Sustainable Development has published the German Sustainability Code
311
 
and recommended that political and business leaders use it extensively as a voluntary instrument. 
The Code was sent to all the EC Commissioners involved in the creation of new legislative proposal 
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on non-financial disclosure and presented as “a specific German contribution to the ongoing 
shaping of opinions in the EU Commission”312. 
In Spain the public debate on social and environmental began in 2002, when the Socialist 
Party (PSOE), at the time at the opposition, proposed a draft law on CSR. The Spanish case shares 
some similarities with the UK’s. In fact once the PSOE won the elections, in 2004, there were great 
expectations for radical reforms of company law introducing CSR requirements. Only in 2011, after 
a long consultation process, the Sustainable Economic Law (LES) was approved. Article 36 
encourages listed companies to disclose non-financial reports and specifies that they should always 
state whether information have been audited or not. However, the outcome has been criticised as 
too modest compared to what had been proposed by the PSOE in 2002 (Archel et al. 2011).  
In 2007, Sweden introduced, as the first country in the world, a law that mandates state-
owned companies to publish sustainability reports. The regulation is on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis, 
meaning that companies can still deviate from reporting if a clear explanation is provided. The 
quality of sustainability reports has to be independently assured and companies have to report in 
accordance with the GRI Framework. According to a number of surveys (Borglund et al. 2010) 
following the introduction of this requirement, the percentage of sustainability reports raised 
sharply not only for state-owned companies (93% in 2009) but also private listed companies.  
 
Other non-European countries 
In part due to its apartheid history, in which a major role was played by international 
initiatives of transparency and disinvestment
313
, South Africa had, from an early stage, a lively 
debate on corporate accountability. There are a number of legal provisions that are related with 
disclosure and assurance of non-financial information. For instance, the Employment Equity Act 
(1998); National Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003); Municipal Finance Management Act 
(2003); Mineral Resources and Petroleum Bill (2009) and the Consumer Protection Bill (2009) are 
examples of this trend. However, the South African approach to sustainability disclosure has been 
shaped in particular through an ongoing process of non-legislative CG reforms. Prof. Mervyn E. 
King, Chairman of both the GRI and the IIRC, has been the architect of three codes of good CG that 
have profoundly innovated and influenced the field. The second King Code on Corporate 
Governance (2002), in particular, formalises CG requirements and states that “every company 
should report at least annually on the nature and extent of its social, transformation, ethical, safety, 
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health and environmental management policies and practices”. The third King Code of Governance 
Principles for South Africa (King III), which became effective on 1 March 2010, emphasises the 
importance of integrated reporting
314
 and highlights areas such as sustainability, risk management 
and IT governance. Another important regulatory mechanism that has been implemented in South 
Africa is the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Socially Responsible Investment Index (SRI 
Index). This SRI Index, introduced in 2004, was the first one in an emerging market and the first 
ever to be launched by a security exchange. It encourages companies to report publicly on 
sustainability-related issues.  
The United States have a long tradition of advocacy for non-financial reports that dates 
back to the 1950s and 1960s. The US has developed an ‘explicit’, shareholder-oriented approach to 
CSR based on the expansion of fiduciary duties, that differs from the ‘implicit’, stakeholder 
European tradition (Matten and Moon 2008; Marens 2011). NFR started to be regulated in the late 
1980s with the so called ‘right-to-know’ legislation. There are three important bodies that have 
shaped the field: the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), founded in 
1988 by the Social Investment Forum together with a number of environmental lobby groups; the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) authorized by US security law to require the disclosure 
of information that is “necessary or appropriated in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors” (Securities Act, Section 2b); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) responsible for 
a number of non-financial reporting requirements. Generally, it can be stated that the SEC 
disclosure requirements concern all material information (information that investors would regard 
as significant when buying shares), and can also apply to information that is financially 
insignificant (see KPMG et al. 2010: 71). The two most important disclosure requirements are the 
SEC Regulations (republished in 2008), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The former has 
created an extensive and highly integrated set of regulations, instructions, interpretative and 
explanatory releases. The latter emerged after several corporate scandals, integrating requirements 
for CG into disclosure requirements. It has been integrated into the SEC regulations and applies to 
all listed companies, including foreign ones. The EPA has developed a rule on Mandatory 
Greenhouse Gas reporting which still needs to be enacted
315
. The proposed rule would cause carbon 
intensive industries in the US to measure and report on the carbon dioxide emissions inherent in 
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their operations. However, there are many US States that are currently suing EPA to stop it from 
issuing rules controlling greenhouse gas emissions until it re-examines whether the pollution harms 
human health (Gardner 2010). Relevant developments in sustainability disclosure include the 2009 
shift of the SEC to integrate information on the financial risks associated with environmental, 
human rights and other social issues facing companies. It also includes the release, at the beginning 
of 2010, of interpretative guidance on how to disclose climate change risks (van Wensen et al. 
2011). The Dodd Frank Act, passed in 2010, is still at the rulemaking stage but it is likely to 
produce relevant decision as regards transparency
316
.  In addition, The White House Executive 
Order 13514 requires all US public agencies and department to prepare a report on their 
sustainability performance and progress. 
India has emerged as an economic giant and, over the last five years, large Indian 
companies are gradually recognising the significance of respecting voluntary international reporting 
standards. For almost all of them, the GRI guidelines are the reference point against which report. 
(KPMG et al. 2010: 80) Although starting from a very low point, transparency and disclosure is 
slowly improving and there are a number of organisations active for promoting SRI and reporting, 
such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) or the IFC Sustainable Investment (EMDP 
2009). Many important initiatives have contributed to mobilise energies for non-financial disclosure 
(KPMG et al. 2013). For instance, in 2009, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) released a 
‘Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines’. In 2011, they were revised and 
strengthened when the MCA launched the National Voluntary Guidelines (NVG) on Social, 
Environmental and Economical responsibilities of Business. In December 2012
317
, the Parliament 
has passed a new Company Bill – the first of this kind – that mandates companies to design and 
implement CSR policies and to spend 2 percent of the previous three years’ average net profit on 
CSR projects and activities. In 2013, new guidelines for public-owned companies were developed 
to internalise the practice of sustainability reporting. in 2008, Standard and Poor’s CRISIL and 
KLD Research & Analytics launched the S&P ESG India Index, which is incorporating listed 
companies that have a string commitment to meeting ESG standards Of the 500-strong list of 
companies of the National Stock Exchange, 50 met some ESG criteria and were drawn in the new 
financial scheme. More recently, the SIBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) mandated that, 
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starting from March 2012, the top 100 listed companies had to submit a Business Responsibility 
Report (BRRs) as part of their annual reports. 
In 2004, in China were published only six non-financial reports, in 2009 their number raised 
to over 600 (KPMG et al. 2010: 78). The rapid economic development of the country has come at 
significant environmental cost and has produced social tensions over wealth redistribution. 
Therefore, when in 2005 Jiao Bao announced that creating a ‘harmonious society’ should be one of 
the three guiding principle of Chinese development, the government started to explore what 
conducted CSR. Reporting was recognised as having a major role in stimulating the development of 
socially and environmentally responsible management strategies. In 2008, the SASAC (State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council) mandated all companies 
under central government control to commit themselves to sustainable development and fulfil their 
corporate social responsibilities. CSR information reporting was one of a number of aspects of this 
comprehensive directive that influenced also the non-state owned companies. Furthermore, the 
sharp increase in the number of companies reporting has been significantly driven by changes in the 
listing requirements of the Shanghai Stock Exchange
318
, at least partly stimulated by the 
Environmental Information Disclosure Act 2007
319. Overall, “China represents nowadays one of the 
most dynamic countries in the world for sustainability reporting with many companies using it as an 
entry point for starting an internal process of professionalising and systematising their sustainability 
management system.” (KPMG et al. 2010: 79) 
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Annex II: The development of CSA regulation and 
policy in the EU regulatory arena.  
 
 
[1993 – 2001] Managing change. The collapse of the European ‘corporatist coalition’ 
 
1993 
• June. EC President Delors’ appeal to business to address Europe’s structural problems of 
unemployment, restructuration and social exclusion.  
 
1994 
• Some pioneering companies respond to the Delors’ appeal (Glaverbel, Levis, BP, Accor, 
Philips, Bayer, BT, the London Enterprise Agency, the Manifeste Français des 
Entreprises contre l'Exclusion and Uniapac). Venturini and Noterdaeme (DG EMPL) 
coordinate and define principles, areas of action and examples for business involvement 
against social exclusion in Europe. 
 
1995 
• January. 20 business leaders and Jacques Delors adopt and announce the Business 
Declaration against Social Exclusion.  
 
1996 
• March. The European Business Network for Social Cohesion is established, with the 
financial support of the EC. [It will become CSR Europe in 2000]. 
1998 
• DG EMPL report on “Social Labels: Tools for Ethical Trade?” by Simon Zadek   
• October. The EBNSC together with President Santer launches the European online 
research centre on CSR.  
1999 
• December.  The Helsinki European Council.  The European Commission is invited to 
draft a long-term sustainable development strategy.  
• At the European Day - "Business & Government Joining Forces for Employment and 
Social Cohesion", the forthcoming Portuguese EU Presidency invites Etienne Davignon 
(CSR Europe) and the Copenhagen Centre for CSR to provide input into the Lisbon 
European Summit to be held in March 2000. [President of the EC Prodi (centre-left) and 
EMPL Commissioner Diamantopoulou (centre-left) provide strong backing for this 
Portuguese invitation].  
2000 
• 8 March. Etienne Davignon and some top business leaders meeting with Portuguese 
Prime Minister Guterres (centre-left). They present plans for promoting CSR signed by 
twenty CEOs addressing all EU Heads of State and Governments.  
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• 23-24 March.  The   Lisbon   European   Council puts CSR at the heart of the Lisbon 
Agenda and 15 Heads of States make an appeal to business’ sense of corporate 
responsibility.  
 
 
 
[2001 – 2008] ‘Voluntary’ CSR, corporate governance reforms and the emergence of a 
European ‘transparency coalition’ 
 
2001 
• Belgian EU Presidency Conference on CSR. In the closing debate of the Belgian EU 
Presidency Conference on CSR. Etienne Davignon responds to ETUC's request to 
negotiate a European Directive on CSR Transparency with the proposal to set up a 
EMSF on CSR.  
• May.  COM(2001)  264  final,  ‘A  sustainable  Europe  for  a  better  world:  a European 
Union strategy for sustainable development’. 
• 15 May. France. The NRE Act introduces mandatory social and environmental 
reporting. 
• June. The  Göteborg  European  Council  agreed  on  a  strategy  for  sustainable 
development and added an environmental dimension to the Lisbon process.  
• July. COM(2001) 366 final, Green Paper ‘Promoting a European framework for 
corporate social responsibility’. [For the first time the word CSR enters EU-level 
policies discourse] 
• November. RTI issues a position paper on CSR in response to the EU Green Paper 
• 31 December – deadline for CSR Green Paper Consultation papers.   
• The German Government appoints the Council for Sustainable Development. 
 
2002 
• July.   COM(2002)   347   final,   ‘Communication   from   the   Commission concerning   
corporate   social   responsibility:   a   business   contribution   to sustainable 
development’. 
• October. European Multi-Stakeholder Forum (EMSF) on CSR is launched. 
• Launch of the European Academy of Business in Society by CSR Europe and The 
Copenhagen Centre [since 2010 it becomes EABIS - The Academy of Business in 
Society].  
• October. Begins of the EMSF on CSR, hosted by the European Commission. 
• Viscount Etienne Davignon, Mads Ovlisen (Chair TCC and Novo Nordisk) and 
European Commissioner Philippe Busquin (centre-left) set the ground for new European 
support for CSR research through the European Research Framework Programme. 
 
2003 
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• June. The Modernisation Directive [Directive 2003/51/EC] introduces social and 
environmental reporting in EU Law. 
• The Sub-Commission of the UN Commission on Human Rights approves the Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms). 
• December. COM(2003)   829   final,   ‘The   World   Summit   on   Sustainable 
Development one year on: implementing our commitments’. 
 
2004 
• The UN Norms are blocked. Some states and the business community insist for a 
voluntary approach to CSR. 
• June. The EMSF on CSR, deeply divided between voluntary and mandatory approach to 
CSR, produces its final report. This is a modest document which will never signed by 
the NGOs. 
• After the end of the EMSF, there’s a stalemate. DG ENTR and DG EMPL have the draft 
of the new Communication ready. However, they decide to wait until the new 
Commission comes into office. 
• August 2004. Public   consultation   on   sustainable development policy.  
• November. The Barroso Commission takes office. 
 
2005 
• February.  COM(2005)  37  final,  ‘The  2005  review  of  the  EU  Sustainable 
Development Strategy: initial stocktaking and future orientations’.  
• The new Cabinet of the EC rejects the draft CSR Communication prepared by DG 
EMPL and DG ENTR. 
• 3-4 March. CSR Europe celebrates its 10th anniversary. At this occasion, the Chair of 
the Board of CSR Europe presents the document A European Roadmap for Businesses - 
Towards a Competitive and Sustainable Enterprise. As a response, the new EC 
President, José Manuel Barroso, offers businesses a new partnership.  
• Commissioners Günter Verheugen (ENTR) and Vladimir Spidla (EMPL) invite Etienne 
Davignon and CSR Europe's member companies to elaborate on this partnership. 
• June. COM(2005)  218  final,  European  Commission  ‘Draft  declaration  on guiding 
principles for sustainable development’.  
• The UN Norms are finally abandoned. Harvard Professor John Ruggie is appointed as 
the UN Special Representative for Business and Human Rights 
• June. European Council adopts a set of guiding principles for sustainable development. 
• November. Gordon Brown announces the UK OFR would be withdrawn.  
• December. COM(2005)   658   final,   ‘On   the   review   of   the   Sustainable 
Development Strategy.  A platform for action’.   
 
2006 
• March. COM(2006) 136 final, ‘Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs: 
making Europe a pole of excellence on corporate social responsibility’. 
• March. Launch of the European Alliance for CSR, led by CSR Europe. 
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• 31 May. Publication of the Gartner Business Value Model, which highlights the 
measurement gap between book and market value. 
• June. Directive 2006/46/EC, amending the Accounting Directives, requires that listed 
companies publish an annual corporate governance statement 
• June. Renewed   sustainable   development   strategy   adopted   by   European Council. 
• December. European Parliament (Employment and Social Affairs Committee) drafts and 
tables a non-legislative report on CSR. 
 
2007 
• 7 February. First high level meeting of the Alliance for CSR  
• 17 March. EU Parliament Resolution on CSR: a new partnership. Rapporteur MEP 
Richard Howitt. 
• June 2007 – Nov 2008: Laboratory meetings on “CSR and Market valuation of financial 
and non-financial performance” between managers and investors as part of as part of the 
European Alliance for CSR 
• October.  First Progress Report  and  Staff  Working  Paper  on  sustainable 
development.  
• October. In Vienna, the EFFAS Commission on ESG is founded. 
• 7 November. The World Intellectual Capital Initiative (WICI) is formed. The EU 
Commission is an observer since May 2008. 
• December. Council Conclusions on sustainable development. 
 
[2008 – 2013] “Footprints on the beach”. From ‘voluntary’ and ‘non-financial’ accounting to 
corporate social accountability? 
 
2008 
• February. The UK is forced to nationalize Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank.  
• 4 March. Second high level meeting of the EU Alliance for CSR (discussing 2007 
progress review) 
• 17 April. 1st meeting ECCJ and Commission.  
• 24 April. ECCJ sends three legislative proposals to Commissioners Verheugen and 
Spidla. 
• 29 May. ECCJ Conference on ‘Justice possible for victims of EU companies’. 
• October 2008. Several major business institutions fail, are acquired under duress or 
subject to government takeover. These included: Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Citigroup, and AIG. 
• December. FEE Discussion Paper “Sustainability Information in annual reports – 
Building on the Modernisation Directive” 
• 2 December. DVFA The German Society of Investment Professionals designs a set of 
KPIs for ESG.  
• 16 December. The Danish Parliament adopted a bill making mandatory for about 1.100 
of the largest businesses, listed companies and state-owned plc to report on CSR in their 
annual report on a comply-or-explain basis.  
2009 
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• January. FEE Policy Statement on ‘Sustainability’. 
• COM(2009)   0400   final,   ‘Review   of   the   EU   Sustainable   Development 
Strategy’. 
• 14 January. EC inter-services group meeting on CSR. DG MARKT starts “listening 
carefully and taking note of the rising importance of CSR”, however it excludes changes 
in NFR regulation (source: interviews). 
• 29 January. 2nd meeting between ECCJ and the Commission. 
• 10 February. At the EMSF Plenary DG ENTR Commissioner’s speech in which there is 
an important reference to transparency. ECCJ wrote that the COM study regulation on 
reporting. 
• 6 March. EC inter-services group meeting on CSR, “first point on the agenda: 
‘transparency’.” (sources: interviews) 
• 19 March. Crucial GRI’s ‘Amsterdam Declaration on Transparency and reporting’. The 
organization move away from voluntary approach and it affirms that it’s time for 
governments to mandate ESG disclosure and integrating reporting: the crisis could have 
been moderated by more ESG transparency.  
• 1 April. G20 in London. A crucial event in the eye of the global financial crisis. 
According to the press, the real big players are China and the US, while the EU arrives 
divided between Continental (FR-GER) and the UK. The two main issues at stake are 
the financial crisis and climate change. Key discussions were btw a (green) financial 
stimulus and more financial regulation. Despite huge pressure there is no money for a 
‘green stimulus’. Call from sustainable investors and broad consensus on regulate the 
financial sector.  
• 14 April. EUROSIF Public Policy Position which demands the adoption of three 
proposals to increase transparency and sustainable investments. 
• 16 April. UN Special Representative on business and HR, John Ruggie, public hearings 
at the EU Parliament on business and Human rights 
• 29 April. FEE/EUROSIF Roundtable hosted by the European Parliament [it will be used 
as a model for the EC workshops on ESG disclosure]. 
• September. Final proposal laboratory on ‘valuing non-financial performance’ of the EU 
CSR Alliance 
• 8 September. EFFAS 2nd Conference Taking ESG into consideration. Title: “ESG 
Mainstreaming: Looking for something that has already found us?”  
• Sept 2009 – Feb 2010. A series of ESG Workshops hosted by the EC (NGOs came back; 
key role of investors). 
• Publication on CSR from DG for Research  
• 10-11 November. Protect, Respect, Remedy Conference – Making the EU take the lead 
in promoting CSR. Stockholm organized by the Swedish Presidency of the EU and the 
incoming Spanish Presidency.  
• 17 November. ECCJ seminar exploring the issue of business and labour rights hosted by 
the European Parliament. 
2010 
• 27 January. SEC issues interpretative guidance on climate change risk disclosure. 
• February. ERT position paper on the crisis. This is European business’ position on key 
issues such as regulation; climate change; and financial sustainability. 
• 9 May. Monti’s Report ‘A new strategy for the single market’ [the base for the SMA]. 
• 20 May. Parliament Resolution, ‘Delivering a Single Market for Consumers and 
Citizens’. 
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• August. The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) (previously the 
International Integrated Reporting Committee) is formed. 
• 11 November. EC Communication, Towards a Single Market Act.  
• 29-30 November. EMSF Plenary. 
• Nov 2010 – Feb 2011. Public consultation on the EC Communication ‘Towards a Single 
Market Act’. 
• Final vote on ‘ISO 26000. Guidance on social responsibility’. 
• December. IFRS published a ‘Practice statement on management commentaries’ in 
which it states that narrative reports generate more meaningful information. 
2011 
• April. COM(2011) 206 final. ‘Single Market Act. Twelve levers to boost growth and 
strengthen confidence. ‘Working together to create new growth’’ announces EC 
legislative proposal on non-financial reporting. 
• 25 May. Updated OECD Guidelines for MNEs. 
• June, the United Nations Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the ‘Guiding 
Principles for Business and Human Rights’, designed by Prof. Ruggie and widely 
supported by business, states and civil society. 
• October. The German Council for Sustainable Development passes the German 
Sustainability Code. 
• October. COM(2011) 681final. ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ 
 
2012 
• April. France. Implementation decree Grenelle II Law. 
• June. German Chacellor Dr. Angela Merkel publicly supports the German Sustainability 
Code. 
• 22 June. RIO+20’s outcome document ‘The Future We Want’ explicit reference to 
sustainability reporting (Paragraph 47). A formal group of governments supporting NFR 
regulation is founded. This includes Brazil, France, Norway, Denmark, Colombia and 
South Africa.  
• October. Draft UK law on narrative reporting. 
 
2013 
• February. The EP adopts two resolutions acknowledging the importance of corporate 
non-financial transparency. 
• 10 April. EC adopts the Single Market for Green Products package. As part of this 
package, the use of the Organization Environmental Footprint (OEF) methodology. 
• 16 April. EC adopted a proposal for a directive amending Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large companies and groups 
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Annex III: All interviews (2010-2013) 
 
# NAME ORGANISATION 
 
DATE DIRECT PART. 
EU CSR POLICY 
1 EU official * EU Commission 22/04/2010 X 
2 EU official** EU Commission 30/04/2010 X 
3 Bertazzi Pietro Global Reporting Initiative 08/04/2011 X 
4 Slob Bart SOMO (NGO) 15/04/2011  
5 Verheul Marion Independent Investors Consultant 19/04/2011  
6 Iansen-Rogers Jennifer KPMG Sustainability, The 
Netherlands 
28/04/2011  
7 Walkate Harald Aegon Asset Management (VP) 02/06/2011  
8 Claudia Kruse (phone) APG /financial analysts/ICGN 06/06/2011 X 
9 Vitols Sigurt European Trade Union Institute 08/06/2011 X 
10 Cremers, Jan European Trade Union Confederation 15/06/2011  
11 Delaygues Yolaine ECCJ (NGO) 17/06/2011 X 
12 EU official EU Commission 26/06/2012 X 
13 EU official * EU Commission 23/07/2012 X 
14 EU official EU Commission 25/07/2012 X 
15 EU official EU Commission 25/07/2012  
16 EU official EU Commission 27/07/2012 X 
17 EU official EU Commission 30/07/2012 X 
18 EU official** EU Commission 08/08/2012 X 
19 Mortier Gaetan SRI expert (former MSCI) 07/09/2012  
20 Clark Penny European Trade Union Confederation 02/11/2012 X 
21 EU official EU Commission 03/11/2012  
22 Passant François EUROSIF 22/01/2013  
23 Dolan Carl (phone) Transparency International (NGO) 24/01/2013 X 
24 Norberg Claes (phone) BusinessEurope/Accountant 30/01/2013  
25 Michel Capron (email) Paris University/ECCJ/Lawyer 01/03/2013 X 
26 Mio Chiara (phone) Venice University/FEE/Accountant 05/04/2013 X 
 
 
*/** Out of the 26 in-depth, semi-structured élite interviews, two EC officers (# 1; # 2) have 
been interviewed twice (also # 13; # 18) because of the relevance of their role. The first two 
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interviews have take place in 2010 and the second in 2012.  As discussed in section 2.6, this 
allowed me to better assess changes over time in the perception of CSA regulation within the EC. It 
also allowed me to better verify their information on the light of the data I have collected and the 
knowledge of the field that I have progressively developed. 
In four cases it has been impossible to arrange a meeting for an interview in person. 
Therefore, this problem has been overcome reaching the interviewee by phone. In only one case 
(interview # 25 with Prof. Michel Capron), the questions/answers have been exchanged by email. 
The last three interviews made in 2013, have been focused on subjects that Madsen (2006: 
113-114) called agents with multiple identities. These interviews helped me to verify the 
explanatory framework proposed in the research. Using their “multiple points of entrance to the 
field”, they enormously improved my understanding of the many overlapping and even opposing 
strategies that the actors employed to shape this emerging, multi-layered, field of regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
